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Abstract 
This thesis is concerned with the space of text, with the composition of that space, its 
form and substance, and also with the perception and experience of that space. The 
argument takes in existing theoretical attempts to explain the spatiality of texts, 
particularly Joseph Frank's 1945 essay "Spatial Form in Modem Literature," and tests 
their ideas against literary texts which, it will be argued, make a vital contribution to our 
comprehension oftextual space. The keys texts studied are John Banville's Kepler, Paul 
Auster's City of Glass, Kazuo Ishiguro's The Unconsoled, and the works of Thomas 
Pynchon. 
As an understanding of the space of text develops, the work of Henri Lefebvre, 
and especially his 1974 text The Production of Space, comes increasingly to the fore. 
Criticising traditional philosophical concepts of space, which tend to view space in 
either purely physical or mental terms, Lefebvre's work enables us to place the 
discussion on textual space within a wider context. Textual space is seen to emerge as a 
social space, and thus a social product, capable of being employed in different ways 
within society, as a representation of space, aligned with mental space, or as a 
representational space, allied to lived spaces. The final sections of the thesis explore the 
reader's experience of this lived textual space, and question the role and place oftextual 
space in the social realm. 
3 
Contents 
List of Illustrations 
Acknowledgements 
Introduction 
I 
II 
III 
Writing the Space of Text: Physical and Mental Space 
Volumes and area: physical spacings 
Gaps and repetitions: internal distribution 
Telling things in John Banville's Kepler 
Placing signs and sound: visual fonns 
Connections and relations: spatial fonn 
Time and the world: the limits of spatial fonn 
Treading the line between world and space 
Wandering through Paul Auster's City of Glass 
Writing the Space of Text: Social Space 
Henri Lefebvre and the production of space 
Approaching a Lefebvrean space of text 
Harmonice corporis: spatial rhythms 
Reading the Space of Literature 
Shifting spaces: Kazuo Ishiguro's The Unconsoled 
6 
8 
10 
14 
20 
24 
39 
45 
56 
70 
80 
88 
101 
103 
115 
127 
140 
144 
4 
Uncanny parallels: an experience of the space ofliterature 
IV Citing Textual Space 
Conclusion 
Works Cited 
The edge of somewhere: the paratext 
Mapping the intertext: Thomas Pynchon 
Suppression and subversion: intertextual spaces 
168 
201 
203 
208 
215 
232 
236 
5 
List of Illustrations 
Figure 1. A map of Quinn's path through New York City 187 
Figure 2. An annotated map of Quinn's path through New York City 189 
6 
for fiona 
Acknowledgements 
I would like to thank sincerely my supervisor, Dr Josh Cohen, for his insight, advice, 
help, and encouragement. My thanks also to Dr Lucia Boldrini, Prof. Bill McCormack, 
and Dr Helen Carr for all they've done during my years in Goldsmiths' College, and to 
my family, for their love and support. 
8 
Then what hope do I have of attaining the thing I push away? My hope lies in the 
materiality of language, in the fact that words are things, too, are a kind of nature - this 
is given to me and gives me more than I can understand. Just now the reality of words 
was an obstacle. Now, it is my only chance .... Everything physical takes precedence: 
rhythm, weight, mass, shape, and then the paper on which one writes, the trail of the 
ink, the book. 
Maurice Blanchot, "Literature and the Right to Death" 
INTRODUCTION 
In Henri Lefebvre's short essay "A Vision," he describes his experience of a swim out to 
sea, perhaps going further than was wise for he "was out alone and the water was rather 
choppy" (127).1 Because Lefebvre's work informs much of what will follow, this essay 
on a vision, though brief, provides an excellent overview of the concerns of the coming 
argument. In this thesis, the discussion is always on the space of the text, dealing firstly 
with the composition of this space, its substance and structure, but later analysing how 
the space is perceived, asking how, indeed, we can ever achieve a vision of the space of 
the text. The final question concerns the location of textual space, where it lies, and 
what happens there. 
The first part of this discussion, looking at the form of the space of text, takes in 
the first two chapters, and deals with the physical, mental, and social aspects of textual 
spatiality. This tripartite division is a Lefebvrean strategy, for the undisturbed binarism 
is a rarity in Lefebvre's work, as seen in "A Vision" where the first few lines place 
Lefebvre in a space of three elements, water, wind, and earth. The last of these, seen in 
the distance as "the pebbled slope of the beach ... the yellow strip of sand," extending 
"up steeply" and back from the shoreline as land, solid ground, and yet also sloping 
down, below the water, as the sea-bed, is a suitable image for the physicality ofthe text, 
its material existence, which underlies all textual space (127, 130). The first chapter 
begins with this physical dimension, with the book as an object to be held in the hand, 
with the printed word on the page, but the space of the text soon emerges as something 
less familiarly solid, produced by disturbances in the line of the text which curl the 
pages back upon themselves, marking the printed line with points which intersect, 
coincide, and repeat. As Lefebvre says: 
This becoming is not a commonplace flux, an ever-flowing river, a 
shapeless mobility, a never-ending fluidity, a linear movement in which 
ephemeral happenings appear and disappear. It is a remorseless 
repetition of sameness which is never quite the same, of otherness which 
is never quite other than what it is, since the repetitions grow larger or 
smaller, reach a crashing, convulsive climax or fade peacefully away. 
(129) 
The space of the text becomes now a product of "this mixture of the real and the 
imaginary: repetition" where to read a text is to swim in the sea where "wave follows 
1 All quotations in the Introduction are from Lefebvre's "A Vision." 
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wave, each wave like the other, and yet the waves which have passed are completely 
different from the waves which are to come" (129, 127-28). Suddenly, the aim of the 
swim is not simply to return to the distant shore, but to take in the surface of the sea 
itself, where "in fascinating simultaneity, present, past and future are juxtaposed" (128). 
In the second chapter, this seemingly natural space, the vast sea, assumes a 
social aspect. The reader, wading through the text page by page, is seen in the context 
of a sea which, ridged with waves "like an incalculable number of backbones," is 
oriented towards the body at its heart, the rhythms of the water seen to support or 
oppose this "minute organism caught up in these undulating movements which is 
fiercely defending its precarious frontiers - teeth clenched, eyes closed, lips sealed tight" 
(127, 129). The "multiple, polyrhythmic" movement of the water, ofthe text, plays out 
"before my eyes and my lips," so that "at the centre of this chaos of repetition, within 
this gigantic being, I maintain an order, my order" (129, 128). Though the reader may 
strive to comprehend the text as an existing whole, this vision of the text in its entirety is 
incomplete without recognising the place of the reader in the text also, without 
identifying the part that the reader plays. This discovery may, for the reader, ultimately 
prove the most significant one: "through this vision of simultaneity reality becomes 
restructured, a shifting totality, roaring, buffeting, overwhelming: the sea. The vision is 
of something intangible, something elusive, a strange and liberating truth. This 
simultaneity exists for me and because of me" (128). 
The third chapter, recognising the importance of the vision ofthe space of the 
text, confronts the difficulties in gaining this vision, for, as a reader, "I am surrounded .. 
. by a fluidity which I can touch, which I can control; yet I cannot grasp it in my hands" 
(128). In particular, the discussion revolves around those points where "a wave lifted 
me up," where the reader seems granted some special insight into the space of the text, 
but always with the awareness that "not everything is visible to me. There is always 
something else, always something unexpected, always something which seems to be a 
fragment but is suddenly a whole" (127, 129). The contradictory or seemingly divergent 
effects of the textual space are analysed, where the text "enfolds me like a mother, 
gently stroking the back of my neck, but still trying to smother me;" "if! cannot 
overcome it, I shall die" (129, 128). If, "from anxiety, the vision was born," then this 
chapter takes a suitably psychoanalytical approach, its argument converging at the end 
on two extremes, life and death, and suggesting that it is in the tension between the two 
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that we find the unique experience of textual space: "never before have I experienced 
my own strength and willpower so clearly. And the hesitant emergence of 
consciousness" (127, 131). 
The fourth and final chapter attempts to analyse the place of textual space in the 
world, finding that the text is not something easily contained on the shelf, but something 
indeed fluid and extensive. "On all sides there are boundaries, limits, and deepness, that 
other deepness, the deepness of sky and water," so that the text is hardly a thing of two 
dimensions, spread thin across a page bordered by margins to the edge of the paper, but 
multi-dimensional, reaching down and out and up, connecting itself to new places, 
different contexts, for "the fearful turbulence of the waves happens only in the space 
shared by the air, the wind, the light, the sea, the marches of sky and ocean, their 
common limits. There are three. Not two. And myself' (130). The end of the chapter, 
and of the thesis, discusses what might happen in this open, intersecting, playful, and 
social space of text. 
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I 
WRITING THE SPACE OF TEXT: PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SPACE 
Place a book on its bottom edge, where the extreme edges of the spine and of the front 
and back covers frame, on three sides, a plainly solid surface (which is yet formed by 
the accumulation and compression of, of course, paper-thin slivers of material), and it 
tends to stand rather unstably, toppling easily, and falling over onto its front or back 
where it might, briefly, slide on a cushion of trapped air before settling in a new, prone 
position. To prevent this from happening, you might try opening the book up, so that its 
footprint changes from its rectangular configuration to something more fan-shaped, the 
pages sweeping out a sector of that circle whose radius they determine by their width, 
and the greater rigidity of the covers strengthening the standing structure. Alternatively, 
you might find that a book with a higher page count, and so a larger surface area on its 
lower end, is more stable than a thinner book. You could even mimic this effect, to a 
certain extent, by standing the slimmer books together so that they support each other, 
each pushing equally against the other and still standing, though usually only so long as 
the end books, too, are given some support. You might find that the best way to achieve 
this is to set the last book at an angle against the second-last, and so, with this small 
sacrifice in the vertical order, you succeed at last in keeping your books upright (the 
greater sacrifice is to use a bookend, an alien object when placed on a shelf of books 
alone). Surely the best solution is to fill a shelf of a purpose-built bookcase, made to 
store your books in perfect order. Invariably, you find that, soon, another shelf is filled, 
and, before long, you have a veritable library of books, maybe thirty-five books on each 
shelf, five shelves to each wall, their spines laying bare their titles to the eyes which run 
along the rows, scanning the lines.2 
Looking over at my own bookshelves, the lines read, first, Paul Auster's The Art 
of Hunger, followed by Ground Work, by the same author, In the Country of Last 
Things, The Invention of Solitude, The New York Trilogy. Then there's Kepler by John 
Banville, and The Newton Letter. Further along the line I read the names of Jorge Luis 
Borges, Don DeLillo, Umberto Eco, but I have to look to my left, to the other shelves at 
the end of the room, to see The Remains of the Day by Kazuo Ishiguro, The 
Unconsoled, When We Were Orphans, and, on the shelf above these actually, George 
Perec's Life A User's Manual, and six books by Thomas Pynchon. The end support is 
2The familiar custom of shelving books with their spines facing out did not always hold. When, due to 
the rarity of books, they were chained to their lecterns for security, they were also shelved with their 
spines facing in, partly because the spines did not yet bear any identifying marks, but also because "the 
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provided by the thick volume of the poems of W. B. Yeats, and a hardback copy of the 
1969 reprint of his A Vision. This work, as well as some of those by Auster, disrupt, I 
suppose, my categorising of these shelves as shelves of fiction. My non-fiction shelves, 
fewer in number, I see from here also. I can read the names of Roland Barthes, Maurice 
Blanchot, Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault (there's quite a French feel to these 
shelves), Sigmund Freud, Gerard Genette, J. Hillis Miller, Edmond Jabes, Henri 
Lefebvre. This non-fiction section, my theory, begins on the lowest shelf across from 
me, and works its way up towards fiction, which fills a shelf before continuing on those 
other shelves to the left, beginning again now on the lowest, moving on up. Except at 
the level of the individual line, it seems I must read my shelves backwards, up and to the 
left instead of down the page and to the right, but this couldn't really be avoided, the 
space of the room required it. 3 
If our purpose here is to explore the concept of a textual spatiality, surely we can 
say that this, at least, is the space of books, their natural habitat, ranged out along the 
shelves for consumption or storage, tightly pressed into lines of vertical contact. The 
aim of this chapter will be to move from this tangible, bookish space, to an 
understanding of what it is that we might mean, or not mean, by a textual spatiality. In 
truth, this chapter will be as much concerned with identifying what should not be 
described as textual space as what should, for, as we review the work of those we can 
term spatial theorists, we shall discover that no matter what common ground they share, 
the terms of their discussions never entirely overlap. Ultimately, it will be argued that 
those very characteristics which most clearly distinguish textual space have not yet been 
fully accounted for in the theories which purport to describe it. This chapter, then, 
paves the way for the introduction, in the second chapter, of the work of Lefebvre, 
whose analyses of the production of space highlight the inadequacy of other approaches, 
and better enable us to place textual space. 
This question ofplacing, the question of where we find and encounter textual 
space, the question of how it is formed or forms itself, and of how we recognise it, will 
be the focus ofthis chapter. These questions ask us what it is we see when we look at 
chain could be attached to any of the three edges of the front or back cover of the book but could not 
easily or effectively be attached to the spine" (Petroski 78). 
3If spaces can determine the order of books, the opposite is also true. For example, "A chained book 
cannot be read unless there is some kind of desk or table on which to rest it within the length afthe chain; 
that fact conditioned the structure of the bookcase. Again, since a chained book cannot be moved to the 
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books on shelves: bound paper objects, pages of printed text, or rectangular windows on 
other worlds (the streets of New York city, Central Europe four hundred years ago, a 
Parisian apartment building). Perec, for example, who writes of that Parisian building, 
sees his words project a virtual space, "a long goods train drawn by a steam locomotive 
passes over a viaduct; barges laden with gravel ply the canals," but the final image is of 
writing, "sitting deep in thought at their table, writers are forming lines of words," for 
the route to these worlds is through the text, "this is how space begins, with words only, 
signs traced on the blank page" (Species of Spaces, 14, 15, 13). This relation between 
the virtual world of the text and the printed words of the text, placed by Perec at the 
beginning and at the end of the spatial experience, will concern us throughout our 
discussion, but an indication of where our investigation might lead us is illustrated by 
Perec's own text, Life A User's Manual. Here, Perec "imagines a Parisian apartment 
building whose fayade has been removed ... so that all the rooms in the front, from the 
ground floor up to the attics, are instantly and simultaneously visible" (Species of 
Spaces 40). The revealed space of the apartment building, "adapted, what's more, to a 
board of 10 squares by 10," can act for us as an illustration of the books on our shelves, 
ten books to each of ten shelves, each book a window onto a virtual world and the 
"activities unfolding in them" (Perec, Species of Spaces 40). Now, my books are 
arranged alphabetically, so I would move from world to world in alphabetical order, 
going shelf by shelf. Perec does not move through the world of the apartment building 
row by row, but his route is strictly regulated nonetheless, determined by the "moves 
made by a chess knight," and requiring that he visit all but one of the squares just once 
(there are only ninety-nine chapters as the bottom left-hand square is not described) 
(Perec, Species of Spaces 40). If the rooms of the apartment building are like the 
sections of a jigsaw puzzle, then the line of the text is presented as the solution to the 
puzzle, recording in proper order our movement through the world of the building, and 
only then allowing us to perceive its story, for "the pieces are readable, take on a sense, 
only when assembled" (Perec, Life 189). 
The line of the text, however, takes its place on the page where, as Perec says, "I 
write: I inhabit my sheet of paper, I invest it, I travel across it. I incite blanks, spaces 
(jumps in the meaning: discontinuities, transitions, changes of key" (Species of Spaces 
window, the window must be near the book; that determined the plan of the building" (Streeter, qtd. in 
Petroski 60). 
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11). Here, movement at the level ofthe page is seen to occur independently of that 
movement through the world described by the page, the written word producing spaces 
of its own, discontinuities in the line. For example, Life A User's Manual begins with 
the Preamble, "To begin with, the art of jigsaw puzzles seems oflittle substance," so 
imagine our surprise when we encounter, again, at the beginning of chapter forty-four, 
"To begin with, the art of jigsaw puzzles seems oflittle substance"(189), the preamble, a 
preamble no longer, repeated, begun again. Now, suddenly, a connection exists 
between two parts of the text aside from their link as parts of the chain, the line of 
chapters which form the text. The possibility emerges that there is more than one route 
through the text, more than one solution to the puzzle of how to tell this story. This is 
hinted at in the description of Winckler sorting his labels from around the world. "He 
wanted," writes Perec, "to sort the labels into order, but it was very difficult: of course, 
there was chronological order, but he found it poor, even poorer than alphabetical order. 
. .. What he would have liked would be to link each label to the next, but each time in 
respect of something else ... or a relationship based not on similarity but on opposition 
or a fragile, almost arbitrary association" (Life 31-32). No matter what order is settled 
upon, the other relations remain, disturbing the assumed proper order of the line and 
diverting our attention elsewhere. 
If this is a clue to the nature of textual space, and this chapter will argue that it 
is, then, strangely, another difficulty in defining the nature of the space of text is the fact 
that we are actually so very familiar with it, for an implicit recognition of the text as a 
space produced by the interaction of repeating and linked elements affecting the path of 
the line is already evident in a number oflong-employed textual elements. The sense 
that there are "further trajectories" available to the reader, apart from the direct line of 
the text, occurs whenever we encounter a note, for example, for as Butor observes, "The 
reader is manifestly invited to read the text twice: once by continuing straight through 
the sentence, the second time via the detour of the note" ("Object" 56, 50). Genette also 
argues that the note helps to "reduce the famous and sometimes regrettable linearity of 
discourse," acting as "a local detour or a momentary fork in the text" (Paratexts 328).4 
Butor also observes that "in the most sequential works, a table of contents can help me 
recapture the volume's simultaneity" ("Object" 56), but it is the index which more truly 
4Perec remarks that "I am very fond of footnotes at the bottom of the page, even if I don't have anything 
in particular to clarify there" (Species of Spaces lIn). 
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indicates the interwoven nature of the printed line, providing, as it does, a cross-section 
of the many lines which extend the length of the text, often running unseen alongside 
the printed line, but capable, at any moment, of re-inserting themselves into the textual 
line, of entering again into the flow of print.5 Moreover, the entries in the index reveal 
to us the various paths which we may take through the text. The index enables us to 
"look up a certain word or subject without obliging us to reread the work from 
beginning to end" (Butor, "Object" 56), so freeing us from the printed line, and granting 
us access to a single, intersecting line as it winds its way through the text. We may 
move through Life A User's Manual like a chess knight but, if we so wish, and by 
referring to the index provided by Perec, we may also follow Winckler's story on page 
four, five, six, sixteen, twenty-two, twenty-three, twenty-five to thirty-three, and so on, 
or Valene's on sixteen, seventeen, twenty-three, and so on. 
When Perec writes, therefore, that "a wooden jigsaw puzzle ... is not a sum of 
elements to be distinguished from each other and analysed discretely, but a pattern, that 
is to say a form, a structure" (Preamble and 189), we should ask if it is the structure of 
the jigsaw or the form of the picture painted on it which should be the focus of our 
attention, and whether it is not sometimes better to restructure the jigsaw, even at the 
expense of the picture, in order to signify new relations. This chapter will argue that the 
space of the text is to be found in the relations between the parts of the puzzle, in the 
ordering and re-ordering of the line of the text, and not in the picture, suggesting that a 
distinction has to be made between the space of the text and the world of the text, the 
virtual picture it projects (this distinction will be further illustrated in the discussion on 
Kepler, a slim volume whose world centres on the life ofthe astronomer from 
Weilderstadt, but whose space charts for us an entire cosmos). This space is placed 
somewhere between the physical and the mental, between the wood of the jigsaw pieces 
and the objects in the picture painted on them, between the paper pages and the world 
they project. Looking now at the books on their shelves, we should see neither physical 
spaces nor mental spaces alone, but both, and also something more which, in chapter 
two, and referring always to the work of Lefebvre, we will come to term social. If this 
seems something of a leap ahead, we need, for the moment, just to imagine again each 
book on the shelf as a room in an apartment building. As Perec writes: 
5 As Genette points out, "Our modem table of contents is in reality a table of chapters, and its name is a 
little misappropriated," while an actual table of contents is "a sort of detailed index" (Paratexts 317n). 
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The inhabitants of a single building live a few inches from each other, 
they are separated by a mere partition wall, they share the same spaces 
repeated along each corridor, they perform the same movements at the 
same times, turning on a tap, flushing the water closet, switching on a 
light, laying the table, a few dozen simultaneous existences repeated from 
storey to storey, from building to building, from street to street. (Life 3) 
Before we find our way to this place, we will begin again in the most obvious way, with 
the book on the shelf, working, from here, from this physical space, towards a fuller 
understanding of the space of text. 
Volumes and area: physical spacings 
Take a book from the shelf, Banville's Kepler for example, heft it in your hand, feel its 
weight, and you might recall that a book can be called a volume. When we call a book a 
volume, we aren't necessarily thinking that the book is also simply an object occupying 
a volume of space, but this is certainly our first, tactile encounter with the space of the 
text. As W. J. T. Mitchell states, "the physical existence ofthe text itself, is 
unquestionably a spatial form" (550). In fact, the very word volume can seem better 
suited to the larger objects, the more substantial books, the weightier tomes. We 
contrast them with the 'slim volume'. By all accounts, we haven't yet encountered the 
text, haven't yet cast our eye over the printed word, and yet it seems we are already 
passing judgement on it. From the very moment we took the book from the shelf, we 
were aware of such material details as the texture of the cover, cloth, or leather, or 
board, or whether the book was a hardback or paperback, and, if a hardback, whether or 
not it had a dust-jacket, and if this was worn or still in good condition (my copy of 
Ground Work is in hardback, but the paper jacket is sadly torn).6 We will notice the 
very feel of the paper chosen for the pages of the book, and, at every stage, an opinion is 
forming of words which have yet to be read, for these tangible qualities are assumed to 
be the result of, or informed by, judgements already passed on the text (my copy of 
Kepler is just ten years old, but the paper has yellowed badly). 
6Though we are forever warned not to judge a book by its cover, Gerard Genette informs us that even 
"the color of the paper chosen for the cover can strongly indicate a type of book. At the beginning of the 
twentieth century, yellow covers were synonymous with licentious French books" (Paratexts 24). 
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It is not unreasonable to think that the size of a book might lend its subject a 
certain gravity, the weightier volume implying a weightier subject also, a more 
profound thesis. As Genette points out, "in the classical period, 'large formats' (quarto) 
were reserved for serious works ... or for prestige editions that enshrined a literary 
work," although, in contrast, it seems now that "the pocket edition wi11long be 
synonymous with canonization" (Paratexts 17,21). With publishers so intent on 
targeting partiCUlar sections of the reading public, and obviously aware of the fact that 
different formats sell to different audiences, the very size of the book becomes an 
indication of the publisher's expectations both regarding the nature of the text's 
readership, and the reaction of that readership to the text. Genette speaks, for example, 
of "supposed best-sellers, those famed 'beach books'," intended for holidaymakers, and 
made "heavy enough for the book itselfto prevent a beach towel from being gone with 
the wind" (Paratexts 19). These are sometimes also known as 'airport novels', this 
second appellation drawing attention to the significance the site of purchase has in our 
approach to the text, and our initial reaction to it. The simple act of reaching up and 
removing a book from a shelf can assume a different aspect as it is repeated in an airport 
lounge, a highstreet bookshop, a one-pound bookshop in Greenwich, a second-hand 
bookstall on London's Southbank, a comic-shop, an English-language bookshop in 
Paris, an American chain, a public library, a college library, and so on. This distribution 
in space, the very positioning of the book in the world becomes, then, a part of the 
interpretive context. Moreover, it adds another dimension to our term the "space of 
text," for now it is not just that the text as a physical object occupies a volume of space, 
but the text is also spatialised, positioned in space, as it is copied and distributed. 
The process of distribution assumes another dimension when the text involved is 
not a single unit but a multi-volume work, the text achieving, in its self-dispersal, a form 
of self-distribution also, attaining the power of multilocation. But the question of 
whether or not a work is contained within one or more volumes affects, of course, the 
internal organisation of the text also. The partitioning of the text, spreading it across the 
volumes, affects the construction and form of the text in its entirety, signalling for us, 
therefore, a first point of potential conflict between the concerns of the author and the 
concerns of the publisher. Genette presents us with an excellent example of the issues 
involved when discussing Marcel Proust's A la recherche du Temps perdu, for, as he 
says, "we know that Proust originally hoped to publish this work in a single thick 
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volume," with the initial tripartite division and the final division of the work into seven 
named volumes agreed to as a concession "to custom and to publishing requirements" 
(the conventions and habits of the publishing house were taken into consideration, as 
were printing costs no doubt, but we should not forget either that there are basic 
physical requirements also to be taken into consideration, such as what size print would 
be required, and whether a single volume would be convenient or simply cumbersome 
to handle, too awkward to hold in the hand)? (Paratexts 62). Different editions have 
treated the volumes and their titular presentations in differing ways, however, and 
Genette points out that, as a result, "since 1913 two or three generations of readers will 
have had different perceptions of Proust's work and accordingly will doubtless have read 
it differently, depending on whether they were receiving it as a set of autonomous works 
or as a unitary whole, with a single title, in three volumes" (Paratexts 63). Holding 
Kepler in my hand, I am aware that it is seen as one in a trilogy of books by Banville on 
men of science, astronomers and mathematicians, The Newton Letter and Dr 
Copernicus being the other two. Yet, nowhere is this stated on the books themselves, 
the only clue given being perhaps certain similarities in the design ofthe covers of 
Kepler and The Newton Letter, the shared images of books and manuscripts and fruit. 
Dr Copernicus is missing from my library, leading me to wonder ifmy text of Kepler is 
truly complete. 
Ifwe think of Dr Copernicus, Kepler, and The Newton Letter as three volumes 
in an ongoing work, then their dates of publication, 1976, 1981, and 1982 respectively, 
show how access to a work can be affected not only by its distribution in space, but, of 
course, its distribution in time also. A key example of how periodic publication can 
affect not only the consumption, but also the production of the text, is seen in the 
instance of serial publication, a system which "often ended up presenting the public first 
with a disfigured text pending publication in book form" (Genette, Paratexts 406). 
Some disfigurements appear only retrospectively, revealed through comparison with the 
unspoiled, if not untouched, form of the book version, although writers have also, at 
times, tried to recover what was included in the serial but excluded from the book (see 
James Joyce's concern with the Homeric chapter headings which accompanied the 
original, serialised publication of Ulysses). Most often this disfigurement took the form 
7Jorges Luis Borges, of course, has written of the possibility of an infmite book, "a volume of ordinary 
format, printed in nine or ten point type, containing an infmite number of infmitely thin leaves," but has 
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of editing or amendment with or without the author's approval, but, of course, the 
simple fact of the physical division of the text, and the delayed distribution of its parts, 
necessarily means the deformation of the text. 
Thomas Hardy, for example, whose Jude the Obscure appeared as a serial in a 
very much bowdlerised form in Harper's magazine, wrote that "the form in which it is 
appearing there is a conventionalized one, in several points," and that it "will be restored 
to its original shape in the volume" (Hardy xxxix). We can take this to mean that the 
return to an original shape will involve the restoration of the sexual material which had 
been excised for serialisation, or the toning down of some of the anti-religious elements, 
but, for a critic such as Joseph Kestner, Hardy's language suggests also that the volume 
will be physically reformed, purposefully reconstructed. Kestner, whose text The 
Spatiality of the Novel is an interesting though, it will later be argued, ultimately flawed 
addition to spatial theory, wishes to suggest that an author can communicate meaning 
through the simple division of the text into units, and through the relation between these 
units, arguing that "the written text is a graphic product with clear visual and 
architectural properties" "of rhythm and sequence, of proportion and scale," (Kestner 
126, 125).8 It is exactly this harmonious relation of parts which is distorted by the 
process of serialisation, so any reader following the text in serial form would be denied 
the possibility of apprehending the text as an "architectural" whole. It was only when it 
came to preparing the version of the manuscript meant for book form, for example, that 
Hardy divided the book into six parts, which divisions Kestner relates to the six 
subdivisions of the parts of an architectural Gothic structure. 
Furthermore, Kestner also argues that the sites named in relation to the six parts 
each represent one of Ruskin's six elements of Gothic, so that, for example, "Marygreen 
is savageness or rudeness," while "'At Christminster Again,' reflects beyond question 
redundance" (Kestner 130). In contrast, Kestner argues that the individualism of Jude 
and Sue, their strong independence, shows that Hardy associates them "with classical 
sculpture and sculptors," jarring with the overarching nature of their world, so that 
Hardy has "deliberately ill-fitted them to the Gothic form of his novel, a form symbolic 
to admit that the "handling of this silky vade mecum would not be convenient" ("Library of Babel" 86) 
8Interestingly, Genette argues, in his discussion on the use of intertitles, that Proust, having abandoned 
"the initial plan of a long textual flow without breaks or markers," later felt that he could better 
demonstrate by titular presentation the underlying structure of "the architectural unity of his work - which 
we know he valued so highly (and in fact more and more highly as it was breaking up under the influence 
of his own additions)" (Paratexts 305, my emphasis). 
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both of oppression and of failed faith" (Kestner 131, 132). Sue's final capitulation to 
society's pressures is, then, in the true sense of the word, a conformation: "[Phillotson] 
is going to marry me again," she says. "That is for form's sake, and to satisfy the world, 
which does not see things as they are" (Hardy 360). Earlier, Sue had expressed her 
sense of not fitting in by exclaiming, "I have been thinking ... that the social moulds 
civilisation fits us into have no more relation to our actual shapes than the conventional 
shapes of the constellations have to the real star-patterns" (Hardy 205). 
It is probably no coincidence that this last quotation brings us back again to 
Banville's Kepler, his tale of Johannes Kepler, the astronomer, reluctant astrologer, and 
imperial mathematician, whose purpose in life was to describe through geometry the 
true design ofthe solar system, and not to be content to "save the phenomena, to set up a 
model which need not be empirically true, but only plausible according to the 
observations" (Banville 25).9 Kepler could easily be classified as an historical 
biography, but it qualifies also as historiographic metafiction, to use Linda Hutcheon's 
term, due to its self-conscious regard for its fictional construction (McHale 152). It is, 
as RUdiger Imhof says, "a novel that acknowledges fully the necessity of an 
interdependence and inter-relationship of form and content" ("Supreme Fiction" 73), 
and, significantly, its form most obviously foregrounds exactly that process of internal 
division and inter-relation to which Kestner draws attention. For this reason, it presents 
itself as a specimen for further analysis. 
Gaps and repetitions: internal distribution 
In his lifetime, Kepler published three main works, Mysterium Cosmographicum 
(1596), Astronomia Nova (1609) and Harmonice Mundi (1619), in which he detailed his 
discoveries of what were the first three fundamental laws of planetary motion. Kepler's 
first cosmological theory, originally proposed in Mysterium Cosmographicum, was later 
"dealt a blow" by his own discoveries as described in Astronomia Nova, but he never 
abandoned the hope it held out of the "possibility of order" in "this familiar - 0 familiarl 
- disorder" of his world (Banville 181, 7, 6). This first theory was prompted by a single 
question, "Why are there just six planets?" and, since Kepler believed he was dealing 
with a perfectly structured system, designed by a perfect God ("nothing in the world was 
9Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Banville are taken from Kepler. 
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created by God without a plan the basis of which is to be found in geometrical 
quantities"), he decided that there were six planets so that their orbits would correspond 
to the "five regular perfect solids, also called the Platonic forms," which are perfect 
because their sides are identical (Banville 25, 35). He therefore proceeded to place the 
five regular solids of the cube, tetrahedron, dodecahedron, icosahedron and octahedron 
between the orbits of Saturn and Jupiter, Jupiter and Mars, Mars and earth, earth and 
Venus, and Venus and Mercury respectively. Kepler later structured his book 
Harmonice Mundi on this very model, foreseeing "a work divided into five parts, to 
correspond to the five planetary intervals, while the number of chapters in each part will 
be based upon the signifying quantities of each of the five regular or Platonic solids" 
(Banville 148). Also, "as a form of decoration, and to pay my due respects, the initials 
of the chapters shall spell out acrostically the names of certain famous men" (Banville 
148). 
This is the very model and method which Banville adopts to structure his text, 
though he does not simply copy it but expand upon it, adapting it and introducing 
nuances of design. The most obvious difference is in the names he chooses for the 
acrostic which runs through his book, spelling out the names Johannes Kepler, Tycho 
Brahe (the astronomer with whom Kepler worked from 1600 until Brahe's death in 
1601), Galileo Galileus and Isaac Newton. Banville continues then to divide the book 
into the required five parts, naming the parts after five of Kepler's books. Part I, 
"Mysterium Cosmographicum," is divided into six chapters to represent the six sides of 
a cube; Part II, "Astronomia Nova," has four chapters for the four sides of a tetrahedron; 
Part III, "Dioptrice," contains twelve chapters, even as a dodecahedron has twelve sides; 
Part IV, "Harmonice Mundi," has a chapter for each of the twenty sides of an 
icosahedron and Part V, "Somnium," has eight chapters to represent an octahedron. In 
each case the chapters are of approximately the same length, and cover the same number 
of pages, just as the sides of each of the polygons would be identical in area. 
Kepler, therefore, is given a spatial form, but, for the moment, we are talking 
only of the space of stars and planets, of orbits and vacuums, a cosmic form suggested 
by the physical division of the words on the page. We should, however, consider how 
much ofthis form would be evident on a physical level, if, say, all the pages of Kepler 
were to be displayed together on a single surface as ifit were an example of visual art. 
Certainly, the five parts would be discernible, and the equal areas of the sub-divisions 
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within them, but we could not say that the fonn of the cube, or of the tetrahedron, would 
be directly perceptible. In the same way, the six parts of Hardy's Jude the Obscure 
which Kestner finds so significant, correspond in number only to the Gothic style, and 
cannot replicate the figure, which he uses to illustrate his argument, of a rectangle 
divided by two diagonals and by a line bisecting it along its length (129). In order to 
draw attention to the potential significance of the physical construction of the texts, both 
of them must employ a fonn of internal prompting, highlighting the importance of 
spatial constructions in general to alert the reader to similar possibilities in the fonn of 
the text. So it is that Jude the Obscure, aided by Jude's occupation as a stone-mason, 
can address itself regularly to the issue of the architecture of the day: Jude reads the 
buildings at Christminster as "architectural pages" (Hardy 84. See also 12, 134-5, 136, 
306). Banville, of course, can include Kepler's plan for his Hannonice Mundi to signal 
the existence of elaborately structured texts, but he also describes Kepler's plans for a 
drinking cup "which shall be a model of the world according to my system, cast in 
silver," but, to convince the Duke that it is worth financing, must first be made with 
"scissors and paste and strips of coloured paper," this paper model described within and 
contained by the mirroring fonn of Banville's text (Banville 32, 34). 
Banville, however, is not content to simply fulfil all the requirements of Kepler's 
stated structure, but goes on to introduce more subtle features. It is possible, in fact, to 
claim that, not only does he impose the structures of the Platonic solids upon his work, 
but he also evokes the fonn of those orbits within which the solids were to be placed, 
the five parts becoming the five orbital divisions. The main device he uses to 
accomplish this is chronological reordering, returning at the end of each ofthe sections 
to the same time frame with which he started so that, as he says, "time in each of the 
sections moves backward or forward to or from a point at the centre, to fonn a kind of 
temporal orbit" (qtd. in Imhof, Banville 134). Thus, Part I begins with Kepler's arrival 
at Benatek in 1600, moves back to 1593, and eventually returns to 1600; Part II moves 
from 1600 to November 1601 and back to 1600; Part III, telling of a visit to Kepler's 
mother's house in 1609, beginning with him entering it and ending with him leaving it, 
moves in time through subjective retrospection and anticipation, largely focalised 
through Kepler, rather than through retroversions externally narrated, and takes in the 
extremes of his life, "even a notion of regressing into the womb, and last envisaged 
moments of his life before death" (Imhof, Banville 136); Part IV, a part of epistles, 
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moves from 1605 to 1612 and back again, while Part V circles between the years of his 
childhood and 1630. 
Nor is this cyclical nature confined to the five sections, for the novel as a whole 
suggests the form of a circle, as if to represent the crystal sphere which was thought to 
surround the planetary system, and onto which the stars were fixed. Imhof argues that it 
is possible to provide this sphere with a centre point, acting as the sun does within our 
own solar system, as he says that the focal point ofthe book as a whole lies in chapter 
six of "Dioptrice," that chapter where Banville places a suggestion of both the ultimate 
death and the forgotten birth of Kepler, describing him with "his hands folded on his 
breast," and telling of how "the years were falling away, like loops of rope into a well" 
until "deeper he sank. The water was warm. Then in the incarnadine darkness a great 
slow pulse began to beat" (98). It is also notable that here Kepler drifts between waking 
and sleeping, even as he does at the beginning and at the end of the text. 10 
Of course, given the context of Kepler's life, and his life's work, it is natural to 
speak of the form of the text in terms of orbits or revolutions. Thinking of the text 
without regard for its subject-matter, it seems, however, that we can still conceive of it 
as possessing a circular form, as somehow tracing out a purposefully shaped path. It is 
in recognising this that we finally move away from any discussion of space in terms of 
stars and planets, and seem instead to be describing a textual space, a space not set by 
physical dimensions, by the purely material organisation of the printed line, but formed 
by the line of textual signifiers. To illustrate, we can see that, again and again, Kepler 
presents us with spatial orbits (textual circles) evoked through temporal shifts, the 
various time-frames themselves indicated by simply stating the date, or by references to 
particular people, events, and places. At times, however, as with the circular movement 
of the text as a whole, the orbits are achieved, not by returning to a particular time, but 
only through the reiteration of themes and motifs, such as "a reference to dreaming," 
"the theme of financial destitution," and "the theme of Kepler's religious persecution" 
(Imhof, Banville 132). It is, then, the text which draws the circle, not the plot, and, 
indeed, Imhofbetrays his sense of the disjunction between the story and the language 
lOIn fact, Imhof reveals that, if we deemed it necessary, there are even greater elaborations of form to be 
found in the text. He argues, for example, that in Parts I and IV "there is reason to regard the narrative 
movement as elliptical rather than as circular" (John Banville 133), and he also sees the four chapters of 
Part II as representing an exploration of the pyramid that is the tetrahedron, each chapter as side 
appearing to anticipate the next, with the flashback of the [mal chapter representing a move downwards 
to the base of the pyramid. 
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which tells it when he describes how "the whole narrative is contained in a circular, 
global frame" (Banville 132), this frame being the textual frame which bears the 
narrative, and yet, as Imhof suggests, seems external to it, containing it. Yet, this is not 
to say that the text is removed from its narrative, untouched by it, for the orbital reflects 
the life of a man, who, in some respects, made little progress in life, who wandered far 
but got nowhere. Still, we can say that what Kepler teaches us is that, if the text has a 
space, it is a product of signifiers and signifieds, and not of their referents. As Philippe 
Sollers would say, "It is with the meaning . .. of words that we are concerned, not with 
the things in the words" (qtd. in Barthes, Sollers 58, his emphasis), so that our focus 
must be on the space of the text, not the world of the text. I I 
Kepler structures its space by employing the same devices we first encountered 
briefly in our discussion of Life A User's Manual, where the text was seen to disrupt its 
linear order through the repetition of its opening lines. Looking, for example, at Part I 
of Kepler, we can see the circularity of the text manifest itself in the repetition of 
particular images, the "borrowed hat" which reappears with mention that Baron 
Hoffmann had "lent Kepler a hat;" Mistress Barbara, who "shook him by his ill-shod 
foot," and "would shake him, looming down like a form out of his dreams;" "And 
0.00429," "and 0.00 something something 9" (Banville 3,52). The evocation ofthe 
sphere which contains the solar system requires similar repetitions, so that the first line, 
"Johannes Kepler, asleep in his ruff, has dreamed the solution to the cosmic mystery" is 
twinned with "I must have been asleep. . .. Such a dream I had ... such a dream .... 
Ah my friend, such dreams;" the second line, "He holds it cupped in his mind," is 
recalled by "Anna Billig came and filled his cup with punch;" and, we might argue, the 
third and fourth lines, "0 do not wake! But he will," speak for "Never die, never die," 
the last line (Banville 3, 191, 192). It is these repetitions in the line which signal the 
return to that point of the circle which we had first encountered, for the repetitions 
signal not just the recurrence of like parts, but the spatial coincidence of parts. We are 
not experiencing the re-appearance of an element of the line, but returning to that 
original point on the line where we first encountered it. And yet, this is perhaps not 
I I Following on from this discussion, and in line with our analysis ofPerec's Life A User's Manual, I will 
use from here on the phrases "the space of the text" and "the world of the text" to distinguish between the 
spatiality of the text and the spaces in the text (in the sense of places, locations, geography, and so on). In 
the same way, Jean Ricardou, in Problemes du Nouveau Roman, distinguishes between "'the space of the 
fiction' and 'the space of the narration'" (Kestner 148). The former is what I call the world and the latter 
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really the same point for, as Hillis Miller points out, "even an exact repetition is never 
the same, if only because it is the second and not the first." Even if the first and second 
are one and the same thing, there is a first-time experience of it, and a second. Banville 
seems to suggest just this sense of difference in his repetitions which repeat without 
repeating exactly, giving us "0.00429" and "0.00 something something 9" (3, 52), while 
his talk of 'temporal orbits' implies not just the chronological reorderings they employ, 
but also the time required to travel their path. So it is that the line of text, turning back 
upon itself, deviating from its line, produces the form which leads us to speak of a 
recognisably multi-dimensional textual space.12 
The complexity and purposefulness of Kepler's form make it an excellent test 
case against which we can measure the analyses of those we would call spatial theorists. 
In truth, however, the group of those who might be classed as spatial theorists could 
almost be made as large or as small as we wish. For example, though we have already 
included Genette in our discussion, he could only be termed a spatial theorist in the 
sense that, like so many others, Butor, Derrida, or Barthes for example, his work at one 
time or another refers to, or makes use of, space and spatial concepts. Though we have 
previously introduced Kestner as a spatial theorist, there is perhaps only one critic 
whose work is defined almost solely by its contribution to the theory of text and space, 
namely Joseph Frank, and he will be the focus of our discussion at a later stage. 
However, in a 1964 article by Paul de Man on those he called 'spacecritics', Hillis 
Miller, who was briefly mentioned in the last paragraph, was included with Frank as one 
of the practitioners of anew, spatial approach to text. 13 Ronald Foust, too, sees in the 
analyses of Hillis Miller "examples not only of the necessity of spatialization for the 
critic, but also of the influence of the spatial form hypothesis on their work" (190). The 
difficulty, however, in defining what it is that makes a spatial critic can be seen when 
we find Mitchell, whose own work builds explicitly on Frank's, describing the Hillis 
Miller of The Form of Victorian Fiction, from 1968, as a "resolutely 'temporal' critic," 
is what I call the space. Mitchell, following Northrop Frye, describes as descriptive spatiality "the world 
which is represented, imitated, or signified in a work" (551). 
I2Edward Soja, too, opens up the spatiality of his text by disrupting its line, bringing the end together 
with the beginning in a combined Preface and Postscript which gives the text a circular movement and 
shakes "up the normal flow of the linear text to allow other, more 'lateral' connections to be made," 
encouraging the reader "to see the text as a map, a geography of simultaneous relations and meanings that 
are tied together by a spatial rather than a temporal logic" (Geographies 1). 
13De Man's article reviews Hillis Miller's The Disappearance of God and Frank's The Widening Gyre, 
both of which appeared in 1963. Frank's article "Spatial Form in Modem Literature," which was 
reprinted in The Widening Gyre, originally appeared, however, in 1945. 
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only to concede that his later work marks "an apparent departure from his earlier 
hostility to spatial criticism" (545, 562). 
With regard to the development of an understanding of textual space as it is 
emerging in this discussion, however, Hillis Miller's work makes an important 
contribution. For example, in speaking of the construction of his Topographies, he 
recalls exactly our discussion of how the index in Life A User's Manual presents it as a 
space through which we may travel by many, alternative routes. He suggests that, 
though Topographies as a whole may cover particular ground, the "landscape 'as such' is 
never given, only one or another of the ways to map it," so that the chapters are "like the 
transparencies superimposed in palimpsest on a map, each transparency charting some 
different feature of the landscape beneath" (Topographies 6). The linear presentation of 
these chapters is seen as an inadequate way of presenting these overlapping, 
interrelating maps for "the order of the chapters in the printed version is a somewhat 
arbitrary sequence that signals certain relations but hides others" (Topographies 6). 
Writing in Ariadne's Thread, he describes how "each chapter's sequence could better be 
thought of as a set of examples that might be ordered in any sequence" so that the book 
as a whole is marked by "a desire for assemblage that goes against the grain of 
sequential logic or story-telling" (xiii). In both cases, and in a move which reflects our 
description of textual space as a space between spaces, he suggests that, in order for the 
text to achieve its full potential, pure physicality, the printed line, must be transcended. 
As he says: 
A final figure for the organization of this book would see it as a virtual 
hypertext, presented in a somewhat arbitrary sequence through the 
necessity of the printed book. All but the first of the chapters were 
written on the computer, and that one has been transferred there and 
revised. All were written with a certain set of topographical questions in 
mind. The chapters when called up into the RAM or 'random access 
memory' of a computer do not exist as a linear sequence. They exist 
rather as a strange spatial array in which the chapters can easily be 
arranged in different orders and through which various lines of 
exploration, in a different way in each case, are possible by following 
different paths of relation. Each chapter can be related to the others by a 
multitude of different conceptual and figurative links. (Topographies 6) 
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When it comes to understanding the space of Kepler, Hillis Miller's work on the 
nature of the line is most relevant. When we speak of the line of text, we speak, says 
Hillis Miller, ofthe way "the reader follows, or is supposed to follow, the text ... 
reading word by word and line by line from the beginning to the end" (Ariadne's Line 
5). The circularity discovered in Kepler, however, disrupts this immediate notion of a 
beginning and an end, the repetition undermining the direct line of the text. 
Recognising the significance of this disruption, Hillis Miller argues that "this linearity is 
broken ... by anything in the words on the page which in one way or another says, see 
page so and so. An example of this," as we have seen, "is the repetition from one place 
to another of the same word, phrase, or image" (Ariadne's Thread 5). Visualising this 
break in the line can be difficult, however. We could think of the physical extremes of 
the circle, the first and last pages of the book, as connected by some virtual line we draw 
between them, this line, then, rather unsatisfactorily completing the circle. Imhofs 
accounts of the elliptical form of Kepler's orbits, however, depend always on the text to 
shape them, and not on projected lines. Alternatively, we could manipulate the physical 
structure of the book so that it better imitates its text, curling the pages back so that the 
corresponding parts of the text touch, as if we were scientists trying to illustrate how 
wormholes aid travel between the stars by bending, again, cosmic space. The book is 
barely malleable enough to manage a single roll, however, and the line of Kepler's text 
is so complex, so continuously turning back upon itself, that, to mimic it, we would 
need to destroy the book as book, cutting, splicing and sticking, folding it to destruction. 
The result, in fact, when we think about it, should be Kepler's model for his 
"cosmic cup," a copy of the one he made with "scissors and paste and strips of coloured 
paper" (Banville 34), but it is not necessarily so. Kepler's orbits, for example, should 
circle around each other, yet we, as readers, encounter the orbits in order, so that it is as 
if we complete a circle, then move on to the next, to circle, continue, and so on, the five 
circles forming loops along the line. It is only by referring to Kepler's own model that 
we know we should place one circle inside the other. Reading Part I, we sweep out the 
area between the orbits of Saturn and Jupiter, circling the other parts in the process, until 
we are brought back to the same point on the circle to continue in, towards the Sull, and 
on to the line which traces the orbit between Jupiter and Mars. The line towards the 
centre is thus interrupted five times by an orbit intersecting it at a right angle, and 
around which we must travel. The final orbit, between Venus and Mercury, is evoked 
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through repetitions such as "A fine rain drifted slantwise" and "The rain beat upon the 
world without" (Banville 155, 192), but this last page, part of the innermost orbit, is, of 
course, also supposed to be part of the cosmic sphere which contains all the orbits; it 
occupies, or contains, the two extremes of the cosmic space. It is at points like this that 
the knot of the textual line seems to pull so tightly that it must break free from its place 
on the page, transcending, like Hillis Miller's virtual hypertext, any form we could grant 
it through our manipulation of the physical form of the book, and emerging into a truly 
textual space. 
The full form of Kepler's cosmic space gives us a true insight into the form of 
textual space. We can see how it employs the flexibility of the sign to create forms 
which seem to abstract themselves from a concrete reality and yet this is not the space's 
sole aspect. We could argue, perhaps, that Banville could produce, ifhe so wished, a 
textual space unmistakeably structured according to Kepler's cosmic model, with each 
orbit clearly positioned in relation to all others, but achieving this might mean the 
destruction, in tum, of any narrative line, the world of the text so distorted, through the 
extreme use of anachronies for example, that it can no longer be interpreted as an 
effective biography of Kepler (we touched on such possibilities briefly in our discussion 
of how a restructuring of the form ofPerec's jigsaw puzzle might be at the expense of 
the picture painted on it). Also, we have seen the textual line twist and slip from the 
printed page, and yet it remains grounded on that page, for the physical organisation of 
the text, the division into five parts, and the number of chapters in each part, remains a 
structural element in the formation of the cosmic space, the construction of the five 
regular polygons essentially taking place in physical space. The situation of the forms 
of repetition at the beginnings and ends of these divisions also aids in the identification 
of the circular patterns, while, moreover, we can see a form of interaction between the 
space of signs and the physical spaces in Part II, where the movement of the textual line 
relates the four chapters together in such a way as to evoke the form ofthe pyramid. 
The importance of the interaction of the various aspects of this emerging textual 
space is seen in Hillis Miller's distinction between the manipulation ofthe printed and 
textual lines. His argument is rooted in a brief discussion of Victorian novels, bringing 
us back to a consideration of serial publication and the effect of this delayed distribution 
on the form of the text, and our appreciation of that form, while also providing us with 
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an interesting comparison with Kestner's analysis of chapters as bearers of meaning. To 
quote Hillis Miller: 
The physical, social, and economic conditions of the printing and 
distribution of Victorian books, that is, the breaking of the text into 
numbered or titled parts, books, or chapters, and publication in parts 
either separately or with other material in a periodical, interrupts this 
linearity but does not transform it into something else. (Ariadne'S Thread 
5) 
Whatever the extent of its distribution in space and time, the line of the text is not in this 
way complicated by the form of repetition which would lead us to speak of it producing 
a textual space. To that extent, we would describe the text as relatively formless and, 
indeed, as Kestner admits, "Many writers have criticized the architecture of," for 
example, "Dickens's novels: Flaubert complained ofthe 'faulty construction' of 
Pickwick Papers; Poe, as Eichenbaum observes, felt that the serial publication of 
Barnaby Rudge prevented the author from having a detailed plan" (116). Without being 
required to fit itself to any plan, the trajectory of the line remains unperturbed: 
The text of a Victorian novel, to remain with that as prime example for 
the moment, with its divisions into chapters and parts, is like bits of 
string laid end to end in series. Its publication in parts over a period of 
time that, in the case of Dickens's big novels, was almost two years in 
length, only emphasizes this linearity. Publication in parts gives that 
linearity an explicitly temporal dimension. (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Line 
5) 
Kestner, however, sees Dickens working around the timetable which so stretched out his 
text, arguing that "although published from 1 December 1860 to 3 August 1861 in 
weekly installments in All the Year Round, Great Expectations nevertheless reveals 
startling properties of architectural rhythm, scale, proportion, and sequence" (117). 
Leaving aside the question of whether Kestner's architecturality automatically implies a 
spatiality also, here we at least find Kestner appealing to John Hagan's description of 
"three methods of repetition which unify the work: first, of words and phrases; second, 
of characters ... ; and third, of incidents and locations" (117). For Kestner, "a 
recurrence of scenes and characters, however, has meaning only if it is structured in a 
certain way vis-a.-vis all the other architecture ofthe novel" (117), and he therefore 
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develops a structure based on the chapter divisions within the text, wherein the three 
parts of the text are themselves composed of three parts formed of two halves of three 
chapters each. The tripartite division in Part I, for example, is signalled by the 
repetition of elements (statements involving inscription) at the beginning of the first, 
seventh, and thirteenth chapters, and again by repetition (intruders into the forge) in the 
sixth, twelfth, and eighteenth chapters. Furthermore, Kestner sees this structure fortified 
by a series of relations between the parts, so that" as the openings of sextets are parallel, 
the openings ofthe triads are contrasting" (120). The result is "a controlling unity 
operating not only at the end of each part but also collectively for the novel" (Kestner 
121). This unity, however, might not necessarily be evident to all: 
Victorian readers had to read one part of Bleak House and then, after an 
interval, the next part, and so on. The spurious instantaneous unity or 
simultaneity of the single volume held in one's hand was further broken 
by the fact that Victorian novels, even when their scattered parts were 
gathered in volume form, were often printed in two, three, or even four 
volumes. The linearity of a novel is always temporal. (Hillis Miller, 
Ariadne's Thread 5) 
The divergence in these opinions illustrates a tension between temporality and spatiality 
which has long been a contentious part of any discussion on textual spatiality. Hillis 
Miller presents the Victorian reader encountering a text defined by its linearity, by the 
sequential order of its parts. Kestner, on the other, describes a text designed as a tightly 
structured whole, its part related through repetition and juxtaposition. Yet, it is not 
insignificant that the architectural form Kestner finds in Hardy's Jude the Obscure 
materialised only when the manuscript was being readied for publication as a single 
volume. 14 It would be interesting to know what effect it would have had on Hardy's 
structuring of the text, as well as Kestner's reading of it, if the book had been published, 
as many of Hardy's earlier works had, in three volumes, (the single volume was adopted 
in consideration of the cost only). In fact, Kestner does speak of how "the three 
volumes of Jane Austen's Pride and Prejudice or Emma were required by the demands 
of circulating libraries, but frequently one may see the form of the syllogism in such 
tripartite arrangements. The novels present a major premise, minor premise, and 
14Genette's comment on the architectural unity of Proust's work refers also to a text initially conceived as 
a single volume. 
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conclusion" (121). Such an appeal to the forms oflogical reasoning hardly seems to 
offer support to a spatial reading, but instead invokes what is, for many, one of the most 
attractive aspects of the unbroken line. As Barthes says of narrative, "Logic 
immediately pervades the notion of time: that which follows next is at the same time the 
result" ("Action Sequences" 10), the sequentiality of the line tempting us into believing 
that it is driven by a logic of causality which drives it irreversibly forward. To argue 
that a text is a structure whose third part must, by logical necessity, follow from the first 
two, is to present a text whose momentum carries it unerringly forward, unmoved by 
repetition. That this line can span three volumes without difficulty, supports Hillis 
Miller's initial assertion that physical distribution alone does not necessarily construct a 
textual space: 
One must distinguish sharply, however, between effects of discontinuity, 
spaces or hiatuses between segments of a narrative line, and true 
disturbances of the line that make it curve back on itself, recross itself, tie 
itself in knots. Those spaces may have a powerful effect, in one way or 
another, on the meaning, but they are not in themselves forms of 
repetition breaking linearity. (Ariadne's Thread 6)15 
Kestner's analysis ofthe structure of Dickens's Great Expectations, however, does 
appeal to forms of repetition as a structural element, and doesn't present an overall form 
based on logical construction. Instead, though, Kestner draws a relation between the 
three parts of the text and, in tum, between the three sections within each of those three 
parts, where the first section is "preparatory," the second "revelatory," and the third 
"climactic," Dickens thus attempting to control how the reader may "enter, pass through, 
and exit" the text, and always focussed on propelling the reader through one part of the 
text and on to the next (Kestner 119, 116). Kestner's assertion that Dickens's intention 
was "that the observer be guided through the edifice, and particularly that he be advised 
when one section has been left" (120), suggests that Dickens was not so much 
concerned with the reader developing an awareness of the text as a spatial construct, a 
simultaneously existing whole whose parts lay in meaningful relation to each other, but 
rather that the reader was to immerse him/herself in the line, and not to look back, but 
15Nor, it can be argued, does the 'serialisation' of Hillis Miller's argument here, as quotations interspersed 
throughout the main body of the text, lessen the logical progression of his own line of thought. As he 
admits, he cannot resist at times "the desire ... to write an orderly, logical, rational, logo centric book, a 
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leave behind the line already covered and looking ahead instead to the anticipated 
climactic ending. The repetitions, in this sense, are simply the reproductions, on a 
smaller scale, of structures designed to guide us along the line of the text, but these 
structures, though reflecting each other in form, are not meant to be read in relation to 
each other. They are, indeed, temporally self-contained, "like bits of string laid end to 
end in series" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 5), and we can no more talk of their 
architectural unity than we would speak of the complex spatiality of certain popular 
television programmes which employ the same linear forms ("Holy episodic climaxes, 
Batman! ").16 
What Kestner's approach does reveal, however, is one way of perceiving the 
possible existence oflarger textual structures. For Kestner's analysis of Great 
Expectations, "The basic clue is the opening unit of six chapters. . .. Within each 
division of six, there are subdivisions ofthree that reflect in miniature the relationship of 
parts I, II, and III to each other" (117), so smaller structures, more easily apprehended in 
their entirety, provide us with a glimpse of potentially grander spaces. Something 
similar occurs in Kepler where the third chapter of the first part performs a perfect 
circle, moving from "the 19th of July, 1595, at 27 minutes precisely past 11 in the 
morning: that was the moment" (Banville 19), back to 1593, before returning to that 
very moment, this minor orbit reflecting the presence of the wider textual orbits. This 
idea that divisions in physical space grant us access to discrete parts of the textual space 
is akin to that of Philip Stevick in "The Theory of Fictional Chapters," where he argues 
that chapter divisions playa vital role in our understanding of the work as a whole. As 
with Hillis Miller, he does not suggest that it is the simple fact that the novel "this very 
temporal continuity should be so frequently interrupted" (172) which produces 
disturbances in the line, but he does see these interruptions delimiting an area within 
which we are more likely perceive non-linear patterns. He bases his view on the idea of 
gestalt perception, that tendency of humans to perceive patterns between parts, so that if 
book, with a beginning, middle, end, and finn underlying logos or ground. This desire was instilled by 
all my education and culture" (Ariadne's Thread xi). 
16Kestner's argument for a spatial form based on a syllogistic structure, or a structure completed by a 
climactic moment, is made to seem all the more unusual when we consider its similarities with Frank 
Kermode's discussion in The Sense of an Ending, where he positions himself in direct opposition with, in 
particular, Frank's concept of spatial form. Here, Kermode develops, through an analysis of Apocalypses 
and crises, an understanding of fictive narratives as "coherent patterns which, by the provision of an end, 
make possible a satisfying consonance with the origins and with the middle" (17). In other words, once 
the end is fixed, that which precedes it will always appear in proper order. Yet, we have already seen, in 
the circular orbits of Kepler, how the spatiality of a text can problematise endings. 
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three dots are seen, so is the possibility of those three dots forming a triangle. He feels 
that this gestalt impulse is equally applicable to narratives, that "the impulse to shape 
narratives into patterns is simply the ineluctable result of the human perceptions that lie 
at its basis" (Stevick 173). The gestalt perception falters, however, when faced with an 
entire narrative and "the sheer bulk of its detail" (Stevick 173). Encountering the length 
of a novel, we find that parts evade our memory, and so the pattern of the whole is lost 
to us. It is through the use of chapters, "partly discrete, partly enclosed units," each of 
which has a form in itself, that the pattern of the whole is conveyed; "one responds to 
the form of a novel by responding to its chapters" (Stevick 172, 174). 
Stevick's theory is at times confounded by the often rather arbitrary nature of the 
divisions of prose into volume, chapter, or section. The history of the chapter shows 
that though Cervantes's Don Quixote has them, Cervantes using divisions as he was 
parodying the poetic form of the romance, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe and Moll 
Flanders do not, despite appearing over a century later. Stevick admits that "in Moll 
Flanders, Defoe makes no apparent chapters; the novel is typographically continuous. 
Nevertheless, it does contain narrative units" (177). This illustrates, however, that when 
Stevick speaks of narrative patterns, he seems not to mean formal patterns but rather 
fabular patterns alone, so that the pattern of a work might encompass "the moral 
education of the hero, say, or the vicissitudes of a love affair" (Stevick 174). In this 
sense, his interpretation of chapters is close to Joseph Conrad's, who suggests that the 
quality ofthe chapter is in "carrying the action a step further or embodying a whole 
episode," much as paragraphs in tum structure a chapter or essay, carrying the argument 
on, or expressing a single point (qtd. in Vidan 136). 
Ironically, though, Conrad makes this comment when considering the form of 
Lord Jim, whose chapters he feels deviate from this norm and serve simply to allow "the 
reader's attention to rest," in the manner of Henry Fielding (Vidan 136). Fielding, 
writing in the eighteenth century, always used chapters as he thought of the novel as "a 
comic Epic-Poem in Prose," and epic poetry was divided into sections (Fielding, Preface 
4). In Joseph Andrews, Fielding describes how these divisions are for "the Advantage 
of our Reader," suggesting that the "little Spaces between our Chapters may be looked 
upon as an Inn or Resting-Place," while the breaks between the books can be seen as 
"those Stages, where, in long Journeys, the Traveller stays some time to repose himself, 
and consider of what he hath seen in the Parts he hath already past through" (70-71). 
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His sister, Sarah Fielding, in History of Charlotte Summers, lauds his use of divisions, 
"the main design of which must be to give time for shifting the scenes and conveying 
the audience without hurry or apparent absurdity to and from the several places and 
apartments where the poet had laid his action" (qtd. in Watson 67), suggesting that the 
chapter break can also act as a welcome elision of text to link episodes. Stevick 
compares this idea of the chapter break providing an opportunity for consideration of 
what has gone before, to his assertion of "the need for limiting the size of the fictional 
unit to the capacity ofthe reader's gestalt-making facility," but the fact that Fielding's 
chapters "are often more or less arbitrarily ended units" means he has to admit they 
make "only the most fragile of gestalts" (Stevick 180, 181).17 
Though the focus of Stevick's theory leads him away from a consideration of 
textual space as we are beginning to understand it, nevertheless his approach highlights 
two significant factors. Firstly, there is the possibility that the scope of the textual space 
might surpass our comprehension, that "the whole exceeds the limits of the esthetic 
understanding" (Stevick 176). Secondly, there is difficulty in correctly identifying and 
interpreting formal patterns. Stevick cites four possible options for the writer: s/he "can 
present the data of his book, or chapter, or episode along with their enclosure," so that 
not only are we given the three dots, but the lines are drawn between them to form a 
triangle; the writer can give us the three dots but "enclose these materials in a way 
different from our expectations," perhaps drawing a circle through them instead of a 
triangle; the writer "can provide us with materials suggesting the means for their 
enclosure yet withholding from us the enclosure itself," so that though the dots are 
observable, the responsibility for making the connections between them is left with the 
reader; or, finally, the writer may give us "an irregular sprinkling of dots; we may 
experiment, if we wish, with lines and curves and figures, but any enclosure which we 
make is uncertain, subjective, and arbitrary, like interpretations of Rorschach ink-blots" 
(174, 175). 
One of Stevick's first illustrations of the impulse to perceive patterns is a 
description ofthe way in which "an observer of the sky separates figure from ground 
and perceives that one group of stars resembles a 'W' and another resembles a crab" 
17Fie1ding's refusal to match his formal divisions to fabular units contrasts usefully with Stevick's 
discussion of Richardson, where the pronounced formality of the epistles emphasises the deliberate lack 
of narrative resolution, so that "the letter is a masterful representation of uncertainty," allowing the novel 
to achieve "sustained and continuously tragic suspense" (Stevick 179). 
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(172). In his description of the reader who connects the dots with "lines and curves and 
figures" he seems to recall those astronomers who would attempt to "save the 
phenomena" (Banville 25), and tend to fit their theories to the observable evidence 
rather than pursue the theoretical source which produced those observations. Thinking 
in these terms, we see a strange symmetry in Kepler, for the space which we, as readers, 
encounter in the text, is a model of that very space which Kepler himself seeks to 
provide evidence for. Even as we trace the movement of the textual line, place the parts 
in relation to each other, and try to observe the whole, so Kepler maps the movements of 
the stars and planets, traces their orbits, and tries to understand the forces which 
organise this cosmic unity. In tum, Kepler encounters similar difficulties to the reader 
of Kepler, challenged to correctly identify and interpret the passage of the orbits, and to 
gain an insight in to the nature of the space in its entirety. As such, Banville's account 
of Kepler's quest might give some indication of how he might expect us to produce our 
own spatial reading. In this, Kepler performs for us the sort of role that Stevick assigns 
to chapters, allowing us to see on a smaller scale the knot of questions posed by the 
space of text, and the possible answers to those questions which this very discussion 
might arrive at. 
Telling things in John Banville's Kepler 
Kepler's life's work is marked firstly by a trusting faith in the Author of his cosmic 
space, his God. If he held "the world to be a manifestation ofthe possibility of order," it 
was because the world was created by a perfect God, a God who could have created 
only a perfect world; "his God was above all a god of order" (Banville 7, 25). If the 
suggestion would seem to be that we, too, should have faith in our author, and trust 
Banville's purpose, it is problematised by the fact that, in contrast with Kepler's desired 
order, his own life seemed one of absolute disorder. Driven by nature and circumstance 
from his home town ofWeilderstadt to Tubingen, Graz, Prague, Linz and, finally, to 
Sagan, and through occupations varying from teacher to courtier to astrologer and 
mathematician, he was a victim of the religious and political upheavals of his time, of 
the religious persecutions of Archduke Ferdinand against those of the Protestant faith, 
and of the national financial constrictions which condemned him eventually to a state of 
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near-poverty. He must ruefully agree with Tycho Brahe's observation that "one has 
always to contend with disturbance" (Banville 7). 
This contrast between divine order and earthly chaos is encapsulated by Banville 
in the image of Kepler's wife, Babara Muller, who, on their arrival at the castle of 
Benatek, "had been unpacking, and now with the glowing fruit," an orange, "cupped in 
her hands she sat down suddenly amidst the strewn wreckage of their belongings and 
began to weep," the image of this unnatural fruit recalling the "solution to the cosmic 
mystery" which Kepler had held in his dreams "cupped in his mind" (11, 3). Later, 
when Kepler attempts to interest the Duke in his "cosmic cup," the perfect geometry of 
the design he describes contrasts again with the chaotic scene he finds himself in, 
"jostled ... and pushed" by those around him, and yet this disorder seems too neat, too 
conveniently discordant (34, 35). "The room was crowded," writes Banville, "the 
milling courtiers at once aimless and intent, as if performing an intricate dance the 
pattern of which could be perceived only from above," perhaps by the "angels" or 
"angry bearded god" painted on the ceiling (34-35). Order, and of course this means for 
us a spatial order, becomes a matter of perspective, of knowing from where the object 
must be viewed, indicating that we must know how best to approach a text, but 
suggesting also that the truest reading will result from an adoption of the author's 
position, attempting to occupy the seat of god. 
There are moments when Kepler does seem accorded some special vision, some 
privileged insight on the world around him. Fittingly for an astronomer, accustomed to 
use of a telescope, and author of two works on lenses and optics, Astronomia pars 
Optica (1604) and Dioptrice, these moments tend to involve the refraction or passage of 
light, but not through some instrument aimed at the sky, but through more mundane and 
earth-bound elements such as windows and tears. It begins at Benatek which, for 
Kepler, represents at first a possibility to work without distraction, to find a peace away 
from disorder; when he first speaks with Tycho Brahe, "the wall by which they sat was 
almost all a vast arched window of many leaded panes (Banville 7). When, in his 
classroom, he first perceives the relation of the orbits to the Platonic forms, the 
discovery which ensures he "shall live forever," he is brought to tears, "the diagram, the 
easel, the very walls of the room dissolved to a shimmering liquid" (Banville 27). 
Elsewhere, "he walked slowly to the window, as if stalking some rare prize .... The 
mystery of simple things assailed him. . . . was it the music of the spheres?" (Banville 
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60-61. See also 29,58, 101, 121). Yet these visions, moments framed and filtered by 
the refracting surface, do not grant him access to a total knowledge. They tend, instead, 
towards an intensification of feeling, a greater empathy with the world around him, the 
"simple things," "the mysteriousness of the commonplace," "a snail crawling up the 
window outside ... [whose] economy, the heedless beauty of it, baffled him" (Banville 
61,86,99). They thus recall the epigraph to Banville's text, "Preise dem Engel die 
Welt," Rilke's words from the Ninth Elegy of his Duino Elegies, which are translated in 
the text itself as "Give this world's praise to the angelf" (86), and would continue with 
"not the untellable: you can't impress him with the splendour you've felt; in the cosmos 
where he more feelingly feels you're only a novice. So show him some simple thing ... 
Tell him things" (Rilke 245). 
Yet Kepler's focus is still directed towards the stars, and not towards things on 
earth, and still he would seek the view from the angel's place on high, with the heavens 
themselves in his sights and not just worldly things. Unsurprisingly, then, Kepler 
suggests that only in death will we be granted that totalising vision; "death is the 
perfecting medium" (134). In textual terms, death is the end, and "the End is a figure 
for [ our] own deaths" (Kermode, Sense of an Ending 7), where, if we were to 
understand the text in traditionally linear terms, we too might expect to arrive at a full 
understanding of what has gone before, for the end is the point oflogical conclusion, or 
the result of a causal series. Two things, however, undermine the possibility of this 
final revelation, for Kepler and for the reader. Firstly, Kepler's discoveries are greeted 
by him as those lasting truths which grant immortality (he "shall live forever," "Never 
die, never die" (Banville 27, 192)), and, indeed, death does not arrive for him in the 
course of the text (the fact of his death in "Regensburg on November the 15th, 1630" is 
instead given in a Note following the main body of the text). Also, as Kermode 
remarks, "The physician Alkemon observed ... that men die because they cannot join 
the beginning and the end" (Sense of an Ending 4), so of course Kepler eludes a true 
end, for, as we have seen, the text itself circles back upon itself, repeating. 
Secondly, as we return to that part of the text which we first encountered, those 
first few lines on that first page, we realise that all that the author had, has, and will have 
to say is already evident. The very first lines reveal a whole which is always and 
everywhere already formed, self-aware, and nothing can be added to it at its end that has 
not already been inscribed in its parts. As Imhof relates, "Kepler's idiosyncratic notion 
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regarding the epistemological and astronomical discoveries; his ideas about the shape of 
the cosmos; the many wrong turns he took on his way towards arriving at his 
momentous laws; his marital difficulties and the family disharmony - these are some of 
the themes sounded at the start" (Banville 104). Even elements ofthe form of the novel 
are implied in the first paragraph, for the use of different tenses, "asleep ... has dreamed 
... he holds ... he would ... do not ... he will ... shook ... leaving" (Banville 3), 
anticipates the anachronies which will inform the orbital structure of the parts. As if 
were the Big Bang of textual space, all the matter of the text, all that matters in the text, 
is evident at the beginning, but quickly outstrips us. It is as Kepler's friend 
Wincklemann suggests, that "at the beginning God told his chosen people everything, 
everything, so now we know it all- and understand nothing," or, "Everything is told us 
but nothing explained" (Banville 47, 191). No point in the text, therefore, is privileged 
above any other, and no place, partiCUlarly the end, suggests itself as a site of revelation. 
The text is not oriented, as if along some horizontal line, towards an end point which 
gives meaning to its beginning, but occupies instead a transversal plane on which all 
points are equally significant. 
The lack of an Apocalyptic ending implies that, though we encounter that whole 
in its entirety, traverse it as we read, we are not guaranteed an apprehension of its unity. 
Again, Kepler's search for an explanation here mirrors the reader's own, and, faced with 
the complexity of structure which Banville creates for Kepler, we can legitimately put to 
him the question the Duke asks Kepler when shown the plans for his cosmic cup, "'That 
is clear, yes,' he said, 'what you have done, and how; but, forgive me, may we ask 
why?'" (Banville 36). Imhofpraises Banville for his "admirable portrait of the man 
Kepler" (Banville 124), but it is hardly intended as an historical biography, a true and 
accurate representation of a man and his times. If Kepler is usually described as an 
historiographic metafiction, attention tends to focus on the second part of this 
categorisation rather than the first. In this interpretation, Kepler emerges as an author in 
his own right, not a reader. Where Tycho Brahe was "the assiduous gatherer of 
information," Kepler was the creative thinker, never more so than when he produced his 
models of the cosmos, "both supreme fictions, creations of the mind that have no 
counterpart in reality" (Imhof, Banville 114, 129). His model of his universe, his paper 
toy, is as false and fictitious a representation of his own world as Banville's is, and so he 
comes to be seen as a supreme artist, as well as an accomplished scientist. By adopting 
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his harmonious structure Banville can be seen as both paying homage to Kepler for 
constructing such an artistically perfect form, while perhaps also gently mocking a 
search for a harmony that cannot exist, which can remain only a fiction, a work of art. 
Yet by presenting Kepler's world-view as an artistically perfect form, Banville 
may not be treating Kepler's theories ironically, but may offer them some fond support. 
If Kepler believed that death would reveal that his life had gone to plan all along, that 
"At the final moment, we shall at last perceive the secret & essential form of all we have 
been, of all our actions & thoughts" (Banville 134), then Banville grants this final wish 
by fitting the parts of his life to that essential form Kepler had always sought, so 
allowing perfect order to emerge from the apparent chaos of Kepler's life. We have seen 
already how Banville manipulates the passage of Kepler's life to create this form, but 
Kepler would perhaps hope that even the disorder of his world might result in some 
harmony, for, as he observed, "Even random phenomena may make a pattern which, out 
of the tension of its mere existing, will generate effects and influences" (175). In fact, 
Kepler himself perceives in the confusion of his life some emerging patterns, some 
uncanny coincidences: "Three times the name Susanna had occurred in his life" (158). 
He feels this most clearly at the time of his mother's trial. Declared innocent of 
witchcraft, her acquittal nevertheless coincides with the disappearance of Kepler's friend 
Wincklemann: "Kepler could not rid himself of the conviction that somewhere, in some 
invisible workshop ofthe world, the Jew's fate and the trial verdict had been 
spatchcocked together" (Banville 174). These chance occurrences, then, the apparent 
connection of unrelated events, speak to Kepler of some controlling force, so that it is as 
if" someone had been trying to tell him something," "as if it had all been slyly arranged" 
(Banville 158, 101. See also 50, 164). These points of coincidence become new 
windows on the controlling order of his life, evidential fragments which might yield a 
more profound insight given further study. The incident ofWincklemann's 
disappearance becomes "a pin-hole in the surface of a familiar world, through which, if 
only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might glimpse enormities" 
(Banville 174). In the same way, it is the points of repetition, of spatial coincidence, 
which become meaningful for us, and alert us to reorderings in the textual line and the 
production of the textual space, prompting us to search, in the apparent connection of 
unrelated points on the textual line, for a clue to the significance of the textual space as a 
whole. 
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A tension remains, however, between the sense that all is ordered, that the events 
of the world are engineered for significance, and the sense that everything occurs by 
chance, without intended meaning. It is in deciding between what is meaningful and 
what not that Kepler moves from being a reader, interpreting raw data, to assuming the 
position of writer which is granted to him by the metafictional interpretation of the text. 
Something similar occurs in the course or our own reading of the text, for the possibility 
remains that we "might be overdoing it," that the repetitions in the line which we read so 
much into, these linear deviations, are merely coincidences, in the sense of chance 
events (Imhof, Banville 133). By interpreting such moments as significant, by creating 
new connections and relations between parts of the text, we too seem to move from 
being just readers of the text to something more, co-creators of the textual space we 
move through; "he who discovers them creates them; the perceiver creates form and 
structure just as an artist creates texture and form," (Banville 129) writes Imhof, 
referring to Kepler's adherence to a Platonic epistemology which leads him to argue that 
the proportions which "everywhere abound ... are all relation merely, and inexistent 
without the perceiving soul" (Banville 180). The possibility that any shapes found in a 
text are actually the result of interpretation alone, that the reader does not find those 
shapes but create them, leads some critics, such as Ivo Vidan, to suggest that "spatial 
form is a subjective category the application of which depends on individual 
appreciation" (140), and will obviously form an important part of the remaining 
discussion. 
As with Kepler, and to add to our confusion, we are denied the chance to 
confirm the accuracy or completeness, the legitimacy, of our reading, for, as described, 
our view remains a partial one, each knot in the line just one part of the overall pattern, 
each loop just a "pin-hole" to look in on the whole. Like Kepler, we may aspire to the 
position of the angel, but the book Kepler itself suggests our perspective will be limited. 
The cover illustration is of another book, a manuscript perhaps, whose front cover is 
pictured on the front cover of Kepler, its back on the back, with the two spines 
overlapping. The title Kepler, unlike Banville's name, is printed in such a way that, 
while we naturally assume it is the title of the book we hold, it may also be the title, the 
pictured title, of the manuscript. But the manuscript is larger than the book, so the 
covers cannot coincide completely. Instead, we can see only the top left-hand comer of 
the front, with its detailed headband, the top half of the spine, and the top right-hand 
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comer of the back. The book Kepler is just a window onto a larger text, framed by its 
physical limits. 
This curtailed image of the manuscript may also indicate Banville's intention to 
avoid writing a full biography of Kepler, but to shape his life to a certain extent. We 
might now also suggest an explanation for Banville's design, for when we consider the 
apparent emergence of form from the chaos of Kepler's life through repetition and 
coincidence, we begin to understand that Banville's imposing of geometric forms on 
Kepler's biography is not a violent act. Paradoxically, Banville introduces order through 
literally disordering Kepler's life, through the anachronies which disrupt chronological 
order to produce spatial harmony. The devices described, the orbits and repetitions, 
mirror Kepler's circular wanderings ("there was something, an eerie sense of being 
given a second chance at life, as if it were Graz and the Stiftsschule all over again"), and 
the repetitions which tum his life's path back on itself ("three times the name Susanna 
had occurred," "all this had happened before somewhere") (Banville 165, 158,97). The 
textual spatiality Kepler moves in, therefore, may not represent accurately the 
chronological path of his life, but it may produce a truer representation of the space 
through which Kepler believed he moved, an harmonious and perfect cosmic space not 
simply containing or contrasting with the chaos, coincidences and repetitions of Kepler's 
life, but resulting from them. The textual space does not record the reality of the solar 
system or the true movements of the planets, but instead gives form to the ordered world 
which Kepler felt he existed within but simply could not fully apprehend. In contrast 
with the ill-fitting Gothic space of Hardy's Jude the Obscure, which confines his 
independent characters, Banville's text accords with the experience of his subject, a man 
who came to some of his greatest discoveries "quite by accident" (Imhof, Banville 131). 
The textual space becomes, then, a lived space, a social space, with Kepler as its source 
and centre; "our lives contain us," "the soul and the circle are one" (Banville 134, 180). 
Placing signs and sound: visual forms 
Place a book on some surface, on the table before you perhaps, open it up and leaf 
through it, curling the pages over and flicking them towards the back board or front, it 
hardly seems to matter which, and, blurring past you, you can expect to see a procession 
of fairly uniform, rectangular, dark shapes. Slow the speed of these turning pages and 
45 
the shaded areas suddenly resolve themselves into lines of figures, areas of ink, or paint, 
or pencil, spread upon, or injected into, or absorbed by a surface contrasting in its colour 
or texture, and, focus, and the figures are letters and marks of punctuation, grouped into 
words and sentences, paragraphs and chapters, an entire book of them. If the focus in 
the previous sections was on the larger divisions, the volumes and chapters, our concern 
here will be with the significance of the placement and arrangement of the text on the 
page. 
This section, therefore, is again concerned with the distribution of the text, and 
yet there might be some unease expressed at the suggestion that we can move from the 
book as object, and the commercial production and consumption of that object, to 
mention of the form and layout of the text on the page, as if this represented a graded 
spectrum of similar elements. Yet, as Mitchell argues, "What is not usually observed is 
that this sort of inquiry into the physical spatiality oftexts may be related to a host of 
other spatial dimensions in literature" (551), while other critics have also, in their 
suggested terminology, embraced wide extremes of scale. Genette, for example, defines 
the paratext (which will be discussed in more detail at a later stage) simply as that which 
"enables a text to become a book" (Paratexts 1), whether this be the distribution of ink 
on a page to create the form of an individual letter, the format of the book, or even 
something beyond the book, such as the circulation of the author's image to advertise the 
text. Similarly, John Lennard's understanding of 'punctuation', as detailed in his entry in 
Literary Terms and Literary Theory, bears close resemblance to the pattern of 
distribution described, developing, as it does, a range of spatialities, or "spatial levels" 
(Lennard 712). For Lennard, punctuation consists of: 
(1) letter-forms, punctuating the blank page; scripta continua . .. ; (2) 
interword spaces, including paragraph-, verse line- and stanza-breaks; (3) 
the marks of punctuation with their associated spaces; (4) words or other 
units distinguished by fount, face, case, colour, siglum, or position; the 
detail of the mise-en-page; (5) the organization of the page and opening; 
the principles of the mise-en-page; (6) pagination or foliation, 
punctuating reading; (7) the structure of grouped pages; sections, 
chapters, prolegomena and appendices, and apparatus; and (8) the book 
itself, as a complete object punctuating space or constituent volume. 
(712) 
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So far, our focus has been on levels (7) and (8), but at every level both Genette's 
paratext and Lennard's punctuation draw attention to the presentation of the text, and to 
the significatory content of that which is apparently non-text but only the appearance of 
the text. In each case, they argue for an increased awareness of the active role that these 
substantialising elements play in the act of interpretation. Lennard, for example, argues 
that "punctuation is a tool of authority, limiting as well as generating and inflecting 
meaning, and has long been of interest to church and state," so that "the art of 
punctuating is influenced by religion, utility, philosophy and aesthetics at least as much 
by logic or theoretical coherence" (712). The purity and plainness of the black text on a 
white background is immediately coloured in its production by its emergence into a 
social context. We have already seen how cultural and commercial factors can 
influence the form of the book, but, in attending to the word as printed on the page, we 
might have naIvely expected that we were in the domain ofthe writer, experiencing the 
text as they experienced it also. Yet, even for a writer such as Banville, so concerned to 
determine volume, part, and chapter breaks, the overall appearance of the text might be 
quite outside his control, depending as it does on page width, margins, typeface, and so 
on. Genette says that "typesetting - the choice of typeface and its arrangement on the 
page - is obviously the act that shapes a text into a book" (Paratexts 34), yet it is often 
the publisher who decides the sizes and shapes of the letters, the spacing between lines, 
as well as between sections, and the width of the margins, so that, ultimately, the 
publisher's influence extends across every page. 
The text may be further affected by historical and cultural methods for 
presenting certain textual elements, such as dialogue, which can also alter the form of 
the text. George Watson argues that, "In libraries and bookshops, aspiring readers may 
be seen turning the pages, confident they can tell at a glance whether dialogue 
predominates. . .. It now represents the most important fact one can easily discover 
about a novel without actually reading it" (41), yet the form that dialogue takes on the 
page was not always as it is now. I8 That this comment is made with regard to novels, 
I8As Watson says, "Its very punctuation and arrangement on the page were for long uncertain, with 
numerous variations between individual printers, including italics for the spoken words, and even a 
dramatic arrangement with the speaker's name at the start of each speech .... It was only as late as the 
1780's that French and English settled into something approaching their present conventions ... [while] 
the convention of starting each speech with a new line was not regularly established before 1800" (46). 
Genette points out that Proust initially wanted his volumes "printed without paragraph indentations, even 
for the dialogue" (Genette, Paratexts 62) so that it would "enter more into the continuity of the text" 
(Proust, Correspondance, qtd. in Genette, Paratexts 62). 
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however, rather than books of poems, or the texts of plays, shows the extent to which 
the pages of novels especially tend to adhere to our expectations of them, with 
deliberate deviations from the basic structures relatively rare in prose fictions. 
Inevitably, though, there are exceptions, affecting the appearance ofthe text on the page 
by indenting passages, sentences, and individual words, skipping lines, placing words in 
particular positions, printing words in bold, or italic, or underlined. 
Poetry, by comparison, seems a far more malleable form, and, aside from the 
more mundane changes in layout required by the normally shorter, often varying, line 
lengths (as compared to prose), as well as by the spaces between stanzas and poems, 
poets also seem more inclined towards typographical experimentation. Still, we should 
not accept either that a poem as it appears on the page is exactly as envisaged by its 
author. Even a well-known, and celebrated, poem such as Ezra Pound's "In a Station of 
the Metro," which appeared in 1916 in what has become its recognised form, 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd; 
Petals on a wet, black bough. 
first appeared in 1913, in Poetry, taking a different form: 
The apparition ofthese faces in the crowd: 
Petals on a wet, black bough. 
At this level, where we would perhaps expect the author's voice to speak the loudest, 
where we would surely feel we are as close to the text as is possible, at the very face of 
the text, still external factors intervene, affecting our interpretation of what we read 
through its manipulation of the textual environment we read within. 
Certain writers, however, distinguish themselves by their concern for 
maintaining control over the form of the text on the page. Genette, for example, argues 
that "there are cases in which the graphic realization is inseparable from the literary 
intention: it is hard to imagine certain texts by Mallarme, Apollinaire, or Butor deprived 
of this dimension," and elsewhere says of But or, notably the one writer ofthe three most 
associated with prose forms, that in his "Mobile, for example, the white spaces on the 
page - their relations to the printed words - playa major role in the effect created and in 
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the expression oftheme" (Paratexts 34, 19n). Butor's own views on the use and purpose 
of textual forms are very much worth attending to. In "The Book as Object," Butor 
describes the book simply as "one of the ways in which language can be preserved," but 
he introduces a more specific requirement later on when he describes it as "preserving 
speech" (39). Within this context, he then laments the largely arbitrary nature by which 
the prose text is usually formed, depending, as we have seen, on page width, typeface 
and so on, so that line breaks occur independently of any syntactical divisions, such as 
sentences and clauses, and also without regard for what we might term performative 
indicators, such as commas and periods, which are used to organise and structure the 
text. "Ideally, of course," Butor says, "the line breaks would correspond to something in 
the text, the text would be already articulated into measures. Each line of writing, hence 
each continuous movement of the eye, would correspond to a unit of meaning, of 
hearing; the time the eye takes to skip from one line to the next would represent a pause 
in the speaking voice" ("Object" 41). In fact, it is exactly this form of motivated 
lineation, when the division of "the thread of speech into lines ... is justified by 
something more than editorial accident" ("Object" 41), which Butor posits as one of, if 
not the defining characteristic of verse as opposed to prose. It is only when Butor 
moves from discussing the length of the line to the length of the column, formed by the 
lines as they run down the page, that he can speak of a comparable justified division for 
prose, the division of the column into strophes or paragraphs. "Strophe, perfect page, as 
'verse, or perfect line'" ("Object" 41), he says, deliberately incorporating the words of 
Stephane Mallarme. 
Mallarme, of course, is notable for his use of what Butor terms his "expressive 
typography," where the selection of font, as well as its layout and presentation, were 
intended to inform the delivery of the poetry ("Object" 51). Thus it is that the 
"differences of intensity in the utterance of words are translated by differences in body 
type," "the blanks denote the silence," and "roman and italic ... correspond to the 
transcription of a timbre or tone of voice," while it "is certain that Mallarme was also 
trying to find equivalents for the pitch of sounds" ("Object" 52). The stated intention of 
all of these forms oft yp 0 graphical intervention, as well Butor's stated desire that, even 
in prose, line length fulfil some role in structuring the delivery of the material, refer 
back to Butor's conception ofthe written word as primarily the preserver of speech, the 
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spoken word. As such, the written word comes to be seen as secondary to orality, and, 
in poetry in particular, to the oral performance.19 
Some of the implications of conceiving the written word simply as a record of 
the spoken word are apparent in the work of Gotthold Lessing, who, in Laocoon: An 
Essay upon the Limits of Painting and Poetry, famously placed the qualities of the 
spoken and written words together in opposition with those of the plastic arts. Lessing, 
in discussing the nature of the aesthetic and what subjects could best be represented by 
poetry and painting, suggests that the nature of the medium determines to a large extent 
the success with which either art may represent an object or action. The two arts 
employ different means of expression, "the one using forms and colours in space, the 
other articulate sounds in time" (Lessing 91), implying an immediate distinction 
between one, painting, as a spatial art, and the other, poetry, both spoken and written, as 
a temporal art. He continues to say, "if signs must unquestionably stand in convenient 
relation with the thing signified, then signs arranged side by side can represent only 
objects existing side by side, or whose parts so exist, while consecutive signs can 
express only objects which succeed each other, or whose parts succeed each other, in 
time" (91).20 Thejuxtapositional and visual nature of painting is suited to portraying 
objects while the sequential and, essentially, aural/oral nature of poetry equates with 
presenting actions. Since then, many proponents of a spatial form in literature have 
worked within these boundaries for, as Joseph Frank says, "Time and space were the 
two extremes defining the limits of literature and the plastic arts in their relation to 
sensuous perception" ("Spatial Form" 8). 
Of course, recalling Butor's description of poetry as a text incorporating justified 
line breaks, it is apparent that the traditional concept of poetry implies exactly a 
secondary relation of the written text to the spoken word. Richard Bradford makes this 
clear in his analysis of poetry's double pattern. The first part of this is "the pattern of 
comprehensibility" (Bradford 5), the grammatical and syntactical order of language 
which enables us to develop meaningful statements from a vast number of available 
19Watson suggests that even the adoption of chapters may have its roots in an oral culture, for "in an age 
that read aloud as well as silently, there may have been practical considerations in favour of interrupting 
narrative in an intelligible way" (67). It is interesting to remember that Fielding's chapter lengths were 
determined, too, by quotidian rhythms rather than narrative imperatives, except that the focus was on the 
rhythms of the reader rather than the performer, as he "does seem often to divide his narrative according 
to the duration of attention which he can legitimately ask of his readers" (Stevick 180). 
20Joseph Frank points out that Lessing "did not originate this formulation ... but he was the fIrst to use it 
systematically as an instrument of critical analysis" ("Spatial Form" 6). 
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words. Each of those words then has its own sound, its own phonetic quality 
independent of any referential function it might be serving, with the result that language 
tends to have a rhythmical quality, "surface patterns of rhythm and sound" (Bradford 5). 
The double pattern is evident when these surface patterns are purposely structured into 
regular and constant beats, so it is the double pattern which defines the traditional poetic 
line; "for the poetic line to become a verifiable phenomenon it must be possible to 
discern a pattern which is anterior to what can be regarded as the accidents of speech or 
prose rhythm" (Bradford 6). The poetic line, therefore, is determined by accepted 
metrical units, each line representing "the acoustic presence of a single unit of the 
double pattern" (Bradford 6). 
As Bradford illustrates, it was in the debate over free verse that the significance 
of the relation between the poetic line and the double pattern came to the fore, for if a 
line did not structure itself according to recognised metrical patterns, but instead gave in 
to "the natural rhythmic imperatives of composition and expression" (Bradford 6), then 
it left itself open to the accusation of being no more than shaped prose. Amy Lowell, 
the self-appointed "spiritual chief' of the Imagists (as Ezra Pound laments ("Letter" 
142)) felt the need to tackle this charge in her preface to the 1916 collection Some 
Imagist Poets, arguing that it arose from "the almost complete ignorance ofthe public in 
regard to the laws of cadenced verse," which was, for her, "the sense of perfect balance 
of flow and rhythm" (140, 138). F.S. Flint, an early advocate ofvers libre, and one of 
the founding members of the society which would produce the Imagists, also spoke, in a 
letter to J.C. Squire, of the need to throw off "the strait jacket of regular metre and 
rhyme" (145), and to compose, as he writes in "Imagisme," "in sequence of the musical 
phrase, not in sequence of a metronome" (129). Other practitioners of free verse have 
reacted to criticism either by ignoring it or by arguing instead that the shape of the poem 
mapped "the essentially poetic movement of vocalisation" (Bradford 6), thereby 
returning shape to sound, or even more specifically, to the act of speaking. 
Amy Lowell suggests something of this attitude when she writes "Poetry is a 
spoken and not a written art" (139), but this common approach to the poetic line is 
probably epitomised by the Projectivist or Black Mountain poets, including Robert 
Creeley, Ed Dorn, Hilda Morley, John Wieners, Robert Duncan, and, of course, Charles 
Olson. As Paul Hoover points out, "Attention to the line as a unit of breath is a major 
principle of Black Mountain composition" (Introduction xxxii), and so, in the essay 
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"Projective Verse" (1950), we find Olson rejecting the inherited, traditional, poetic line, 
and urging that "the line comes (I swear it) from the breath" (616). Allen Ginsberg too, 
a member of the Beat movement in the fifties and sixties, of course, rather than the 
Black Mountain poets, felt the breath was the source of the line. "My breath is long," he 
said, "that's the Measure, one physical-mental inspiration of thought contained in the 
elastic of a breath" (Ginsberg 635-36). Both Ginsberg and Olson "reconnected poetry 
with the body" (Hoover, Postmodem 3), but, moreover, and as with Mallarme, through 
the use of the typewriter Olson strove to write the poem as a score for its own 
performance: "For the first time the poet has the stave and the bar a musician has had. 
For the first time he can, without the convention of rime and meter, record the listening 
he has done to his own speech and by that one act indicate how he would want any 
reader, silently or otherwise, to voice his work" (618). Notably, this dedication of the 
text to the vocal performance of the work is achieved only by wresting control of the 
text, its punctuation and its distribution, from the intervention of industrial of 
commercial producers; "What we have suffered from, is manuscript, press, the removal 
of verse from its producer and its reproducer, the voice" (618). 
For the Beat movement, writing was "public, direct, performative, ecstatic, 
agonized, oral and incantatory" (Hoover, Introduction xxx), a view which reached its 
logical extreme in the seventies with the performance poetry of David Antin, Jerome 
Rothenberg and John Giomo. Improvising in the moment, drawing from and expanding 
on prepared texts, incorporating theatre, ritual and accompaniment, this poetry 
challenges "the preciousness of the page" (Hoover, Introduction xxxviii), affirming 
Olson's view that "the materiality of language is a regrettable condition of the medium, 
something that must be used and transcended as rapidly as possible" (Bradford 150). 
When the works of the performance poets are recorded as texts, they employ the same 
techniques of typographical arrangement to give an indication of the original 
performance, but the suggestion is that the written word is very much just the remains of 
the initial moment, and thereby the lesser art. The written word here, then, is seen as 
secondary to what is oral. Philippe Sollers, in fact, warns that, in "our obsession with 
time," we are "becoming more and more blind to the spatiality of signs," for "we 
habitually," though mistakenly, "consider [writing] a simple fictitious image of the 
spoken word or of its imitative transcription" (Sollers, "The Novel" 69). Genette also 
observes that "One has long considered writing ... as a simple means for the notation of 
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speech" (Figures III qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 242). If this is the case, then it hardly 
seems worthwhile to speak ofthe spatiality of the page, of textual layout or marginal 
influences, because these spatial elements are meant only to inform an oral performance, 
so that the written word and the form it takes, is seen as partaking only of the nature of 
the spoken word, that is, not spatial, but temporal, sequential, and linear. 
The obvious question here, however, is why artists so concerned with the 
preservation of vocal nuances, of timbre, pitch and volume, should even persevere with 
this simple means of preserving speech when technology has made it so easy for us to 
capture precisely the spoken word.21 This is exactly the question which Butor poses at 
the beginning of his essay "The Book as Object," and his answer, perhaps surprisingly, 
ignores issues of effectiveness, ease, affordability, longevity, or reproducibility, but 
returns us immediately to the book as a volume, an object in space. "The sole, but 
significant, superiority," he says, "not only of books but of all writing over the means of 
direct recording, which is incomparably more accurate, is in the simultaneous exposure 
to our eyes of what our ears can grasp only sequentially" ("Object" 39-40), so that, 
again, the distinction is made between the spatial area of the page as viewed by the eye, 
and the temporal experience of following the line of conversation. 
It is at this point, however, that Butor's reasoning comes into conflict with 
Lessing's argument. Lessing makes a number of assumptions in the above declarations, 
the first being that a text develops its meaning solely through a sequential presentation 
of its component parts, yet, as we have seen, Butor's highest recommendation oftext is 
its simultaneous quality. In this, Butor seems to suggest, though doesn't properly 
distinguish between, two differing, though related, functions of the simultaneity of the 
text. The first emphasises the fact that the text acts as a container of the thread of 
speech which doesn't require that the thread be rolled up for convenient storage, as on a 
tape or film, and so unrolled for each replaying, with only the present instant audible. 
Instead, in a text all elements are co-existent, equally accessible, and the text as volume 
is apprehensible in its entirety, in all three dimensions, allowing us to better orient 
ourselves and navigate within the body of the text. Butor speaks of how, to achieve a 
similar ease of access on a recording, a record can "be divided into concentric zones, or 
21Ginsberg's "Notes for Howl and Other Poems" first appeared, in fact, as the liner note to a recording of 
Howl and Other Poems in 1959. 
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bands" and only then can we "possess a certain freedom, a mobility with regard to the 
text" ("Object" 40). 
What the text also allows, however, which is denied to us by the aural recording 
but results from the co-presence of all parts of the thread of speech in the pages of the 
text, is the possibility of simultaneously apprehending different areas of that thread. In 
fact, Butor argues that the evolution in methods for storing this permanent thread shows 
that the concern lies with how "to make the largest possible section of [the text] legible 
at one time" ("Object" 40). A single straight line would mean the beginning would 
soon be too far removed from the viewer's eye to be discernible, but each alternative has 
its own problems. We might employ boustrophedonic script ("alternating lines in 
opposite directions ... but this method has the disadvantage of making the series of 
characters reversed from one line to the next almost unrecognizable"), or cylinders ("one 
section of the line necessarily conceals the rest") ("Object" 40, 41), but now we simply 
"cut the line of text into lengths which are then arranged one under the next, forming a 
column" ("Object" 41). This arrangement of lines filling columns filling pages filling 
volumes has "the advantage of allowing the reader a great freedom of movement in 
relation to the 'unrolling' of the text, a great mobility which most nearly approximates a 
simultaneous presentation of all parts of a work" ("Object" 42). The ease of navigation 
permitted by the physical structure ofthe volume therefore permits the near 
simultaneous apprehension of all parts of the work. This aspect of the text is equally 
significant on a smaller scale, however, for the written word, as opposed to the spoken, 
has the advantage of "leaving accessible to our eyes what our ears would already have 
missed, permitting us to grasp a whole sequence at a single glance" ("Object" 40). 
Butor's observations suggest that, despite being employed to record a series of 
signs in sequence, the text's manner of permanent, spatialised presentation adds another 
dimension to the line of speech, problematising Lessing's easyequation.22 Richard 
Bradford, too, criticises Lessing for his essentially phonocentric attitude, insisting that it 
22It is for aesthetic reasons that Lessing does not permit the written description of objects in space (it is 
only for the writer of prose who "is satisfied with being intelligible, and making his representations plain 
and clear" (101», for descriptive language would lack the aesthetic harmony of coincidence with its 
object. As Genette remarks, "description has to model in successiveness the representation of objects co-
existing and juxtaposed in space; narrative language would thus be distinguished by a sort of temporal 
coincidence with its object, while descriptive language, on the contrary, would be irreparably deprived of 
such coincidence" (Figures II qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 238). Genette, however, suggests that in 
written, as opposed to oral, literature, there is little to hinder the harmony of the description as "nothing 
prevents the reader from retracing his steps and considering the text, in its simultaneous spatiality, as an 
analogon of the spectacle it describes" (qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 238). 
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is wrong to say simply that "language moves and visual representations are static" 
(Bradford 34). Bradford argues, of Lessing, but also of the Projectivist poets such as 
Olson, that what they "conveniently forget is that speech and typing must stop, that the 
kinetic of the poem will eventually become stasis, and the text will present itself as a 
network of silent graphemes" (151).23 It is the graphic nature of the poem on the page 
with which Bradford is concerned because he feels that the written word presents 
possibilities of meaning which are indiscernible in listening to the poem. 
In order to develop his analysis of what he terms visual form, Bradford employs 
a "sliding scale," a means for gauging the extent to which poets exploit the possibilities 
of poetic form on the page. At one end ofthe scale, Bradford places the blank verse of 
Milton and Wordsworth. In the seventeenth century, the use of blank verse in poetry 
was quite unusual for if, as Bradford says, "Rhyme provided an aural signal for the 
existence ofthe double pattern" (11), then the absence of rhyme meant that the end of 
the poetic line might no longer be audible, the iambic beat might be lost among the 
natural surface patterns of the language, and poetry would be 'reduced' to prose. The 
end-of-line beat, however, which can disappear for the ear with the loss of rhyme, is a 
visible and concrete element of the poem when it is being read, an element which, 
moreover, Bradford argues, can often act as a counterpoint to the interpretation 
suggested by an oral reading. As an example, Bradford refers to that section in Milton's 
Paradise Lost (1667) where Eve relates to Adam how God told her to: 
follow me 
And I will bring thee where no shadow stays 
Thy coming (4.470-1) 
In the brief instant before the eye moves from "stays" to "Thy," an initial meaning of 
'restrains' suggests itself before the reader adapts to the syntax of the next line and 
realises that here "stays" means 'awaits'. The problem for someone listening to the 
poem, and for Adam, to whom this is being related, is that without seeing the poem, and 
the positioning of the line break, this double signification, suggesting "a hesitant, 
unreliable dimension of Eve's character," remains unapparent (Bradford 58). Butor's 
23 As Perec writes, "Letter by letter, a text forms, affirms itself, is confIrmed, is frozen, is fIxed" (Species 
of Spaces 9). 
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praise for the written text's perpetual presentation of the words it records suggests that 
this better enables us to grasp what is being said, that seeing a sentence in its syntactical 
and grammatical wholeness aids us in comprehending the meaning of what is being 
said, but Bradford's analysis of visual form suggests that the layout of the written text 
can communicate to the eye what would never be accessible to the ear. 
Significantly, this interpretation of visual form also seems to describe a 
hesitation in the movement of the line, a disruption in the line akin to that introduced by 
repetition, as discussed in the previous section. Indeed, we can see that, while the visual 
line communicates one meaning, the syntactical line communicates another, requiring 
us to double back upon the words we have just read, re-reading them in order to inscribe 
the new meaning upon them. Complicating, therefore, Hillis Miller's assertion that such 
"spaces ... are not in themselves forms of repetition breaking linearity" (Ariadne's 
Thread 6), the more authentically simultaneous presentation (as compared to the 
Victorian novel) of the poetic lines does create a double reading of a single point. 
Rather than being like "bits of string laid end to end" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Thread 5), 
the poetic line both ends and does not end, and so loops back upon itself, to be re-
written and re-read, before continuing. 
Connections and relations: spatial form 
It is Bradford's visual form which finally leads us to the work of Joseph Frank. His 
seminal essay "Spatial Form in Modem Literature," appearing in 1945, arose in 
response to two works. The second of these, giving us our first link to Bradford, was 
Lessing's Laocoon, which provided Frank with the theoretical system around which, and 
against which, he would base his argument. However, it was the unique style of 
composition of the first, Djuna Barnes's Nightwood, which posed Frank the initial 
problems, for it seemed as if a certain as yet undefined and unexpressed quality 
distinguished it from much of the literature of its time. Nightwood would, then, remain 
the focus ofthe resulting essay, whose purpose would not be to develop any kind of 
theory of modem literature, but rather to cast some light on the workings of a difficult 
text, though Frank later wrote that it was perhaps "out of a sense of gratitude to the book 
that had started me on my way" (Preface xiii) that Nightwood remained so central to his 
essay. What Frank then calls this "lopsided character of the essay as a whole" (Preface 
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xii) may be one of the reasons that his essay retains a rather singular characteristic, as 
individual in its own way as Barnes's Nightwood. Highly quotable, and always thought-
provoking, Frank's essay has attracted considerable attention and criticism, and been 
praised for its insights into the works of Joyce and Proust especially, as well as for 
drawing attention to, and for intelligently illuminating, Barnes's Nightwood, considered 
by many to be something of a neglected masterpiece. 
The essay, described by Wellek and Warren as an "admirable study" does, 
however, have its weaknesses (303). Paul de Man, for one, reviewing Frank's collection 
of essays, The Widening Gyre, welcomes the "insight" shown in "Spatial Form in 
Modem Literature" but later condemns its "very sketchy intellectual history" and "rather 
useless excursion into eighteenth-century aesthetics" (111, 110, 114). Moreover, he 
goes on to point out that "the purely literary essays that conclude the work [The 
Widening Gyre] make little use of the methodological possibilities inherent in the 
concept of spatial form" (111), a remark which, strangely, also seems applicable to the 
essay itself in an analysis ofNightwood which tends to depend more on the assertion of 
its spatial form rather than on the rigorous application of the valuable concepts 
developed up to that point. Frank's essay emerges, then, as a stimulating piece of work, 
but lacking any detailed elaboration of its key concepts, and, in fact, it was to be another 
thirty years before Frank returned to the subj ect which, as he himself admits, he "had 
more or less lost contact" (Preface ix), having long since turned his attention to a study 
of the history of Russian literature and culture, and, especially, Dostoevsky. 
Frank's original essay stands, then, as something of an oddity, and Frank himself 
is hard to classify. Some mark him down as a New Critic, with Patricia Tobin 
describing "Spatial Form in Modem Literature" as "that influential document of the 
formalist New Criticism" (3) and Richard Poirier suggesting the New Critics methods 
were "epitomized in such influential codifications as Joseph Frank's essay of 1945" (qtd. 
in Frank, Preface xi). Others state flatly that he is not (Tate vii, de Man 110). His 
association with the New Critics probably stems partly from the fact that his essays 
were published in their early forms in journals seen, as Tate puts it, as "strongholds of 
New Criticism" (vii). Tate, however, describes Frank as "his own man" (viii), and there 
is very much a sense of a personal vision at work in the essay, the writer motivated by a 
clear and compelling challenge, and neither swayed by, nor attached to, the fashionable 
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movements of the time.24 This might explain some of its attraction, but as Frank 
Kermode explains, it also happened that the essay "crystallised what had been for the 
most part vague notions, ideas that were in the air, and gave them a memorable name" 
("A Reply" 579), a comment which at least partly explains the popularity of what 
remains a frustrating but fecund piece of work. 
To begin with the work which provided the impetus for Frank's exploration, it is 
interesting to see some ofT. S. Eliot's comments from the introduction to Barnes's 
Nightwood echo again the theme of a simultaneously present totality which has been 
developing throughout our discussion, for he speaks a number of times of the 
importance of coming to "an appreciation of its meaning as a whole" (1), and of the 
"whole pattern" (3, 5). Eliot himself is one of the writers, along with Barnes, and others 
such as Pound, Proust, and Joyce, who, Frank argues in this essay, require us to 
apprehend their works as a whole, in their entirety, and so "ideally intend the reader to 
apprehend their work spatially, in a moment oftime, rather than as a sequence" (9).25 
This sequence is, as we have been seeing, the spoken order of language where, as Butor 
puts it, "Every word follows one other, precedes one other" ("Object" 40), in single file. 
In order to make the reader read spatially, Frank argues, this familiar verbal line must be 
disrupted, and "it would be necessary to undermine the inherent consecutiveness of 
language, frustrating the reader's normal expectation of a sequence and forcing him to 
perceive the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space rather than unrolling in time," 
spooling out as if off a tape or film. Now, the "syntactical sequence is given up for a 
structure depending on the perception of relationships between disconnected word-
groups," with the end result that "the meaning-relationship is completed only by the 
24Perhaps this is partly the result of the fact that Frank wasn't writing from within the academic circle, but 
was working as a journalist in Washington D.C. for at least part of the time he was writing the essay. 
25To illustrate Kermode's observation that Frank's essay gave form to existing vague ideas, we should 
note the remarkable similarities between Frank's argument and G. Wilson Knight's comments on 
Shakespeare's tragedies: "One must be prepared to see the whole play in space as well as in time. It is 
natural in analysis to pursue the steps of the tale in sequence, noticing the logic that connects them .... 
And yet by giving supreme attention to this temporal nature of drama we omit what, in Shakespeare, is at 
least of equivalent importance. A Shakespearian tragedy is set spatially as well as temporally in the 
mind. By this I mean there are throughout the playa set of correspondences which relate to each other 
independently of the time sequence which is the story .... Now if we are prepared to see the whole play 
laid out, so to speak, as an area, being simultaneously aware of these thickly-scattered correspondences 
in a single view of the whole, we possess the unique quality of the play in a new sense" (3). Future 
echoes of Frank's spatial form appear also in the work of Northrop Frye: "the word meaning or dianoia 
conveys, or at least preserves, the sense of simultaneity caught by the eye. We listen to the poem as it 
moves from beginning to end, but as soon as the whole of it is in our minds at once we 'see' what it 
means. More exactly, this response is not simply to the whole of it, but to a whole in it: we have a vision 
of meaning or dianoia whenever any simultaneous apprehension is possible" (77-78). 
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simultaneous perception in space of word-groups that have no comprehensible relation 
to each other when read consecutively in time" ("Spatial Form" 10, 12, 13). 
These are the key tenets of Frank's theory of spatial form, and they have proved 
relatively uncontroversial. Though de Man, for example, may find fault with the 
historical aspects of Frank's essay, he argues of Frank's method that "such a procedure is 
altogether sound from a hermeneutic point of view. There is nothing different here from 
what happens when, in an interpretation of a short poem, we feel entitled to progress not 
simply line by line but by establishing relationships backward and forward" (111). 
Similarly, Frank himself remarks on "how little specific objection has been taken to my 
actual arguments or analyses. Most ofthe discussion has turned on the larger cultural 
implications" ("Years After" 205-06). This is not to say, however, that there are no 
problems with Frank's development of his methods. To begin to assess Frank's spatial 
form, therefore, it might be helpful to first see how it compares to Bradford's visual 
form. Bradford, for example, includes an analysis of the work of e. e. cummings, whose 
work he places at the other end of his sliding scale to Milton, due to the extent to which 
he exploits the potentiality of the visual form in poems such as the following from his 
95 Poems (1958): 
l(a 
Ie 
af 
fa 
11 
s) 
one 
I 
mess 
The reader is aware that a connection is being made between the experience of 
loneliness and the leaf falling, but, as Bradford says, "It is impossible to describe the 
order in which the reader is able to distinguish the formal materiality from the 
metaphoric resonance of the poem" (35). If we wished, we might project a world 
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around the poem (as Bradford says, "the end of summer evoking a sense of sadness and 
isolation" (35)), but the material form of the poem, and the way in which it works 
visually, seems to make this unnecessary. The path of the falling leaf is reflected in the 
path of the poem itself, while the fragmentation of the words, and the interrupted 
linearity, mean that the realisation ofthe word "loneliness" is deferred so that it exists 
both before and after, and therefore during, the leafs fall, so that the two can be 
apprehended simultaneously. The sense of loneliness is entwined with the experience of 
the falling leaf, even as the words are entangled with each other. If, as Bradford says, 
"We feel the word 'loneliness' as we watch the leaf fall," we are also reading the 
experience ofloneliness as we fall along the poem in "a blending of the material and the 
referential dimensions oflanguage" (Bradford 35). Also, we see that the "one" of 
loneliness is isolated, like the individual, as are the two 'l's, each evoking the number 
"one," and the same sense of solitude. Bradford argues, then, that "Somewhere within 
the text there is the conventional temporal syntagm 'A leaf falls', but in the process of 
simply decoding what Lessing calls these 'consecutive symbols' we are also aware that 
the linguistic signs have come to operate like the 'parts ... in juxtaposition' of a 
painting" (35-36). 
Frank would certainly arrive at a similar interpretation, for this poem, in its 
fragmentation and interspersal of words and syntactic units, negates the readers' normal 
expectations of sequentiality and requires them to grapple with the relations between the 
spatially superimposed elements of "loneliness" and "a leaf falls." Where Frank might 
differ from Bradford is in Bradford's statement that "Our awareness of how temporal 
language can describe or signify a relation between an event and a feeling is fused 
simultaneously with a visual representation of that process" (35), for though we can 
obviously draw comprehensible relations between the separated parts of "loneliness" 
and between the fragmented sections of "a leaf falls," to form a word and a syntactic 
whole respectively, the poem relies for its effect on the simultaneous awareness of a 
connection between the two word-groups which is not grammatical but metaphorical. 
In other words, there does not appear to be an equivalent in "temporal language" 
(,Loneliness is like a leaf falling' or 'Loneliness is caused by a leaf falling') which 
adequately matches what cummings's poem achieves by its spatial arrangement. 
Where Frank's approach differs from Bradford's is that it does not actually 
require the writer to affect the visual form of the poem. Despite this, the form of "1 (a" 
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does serve as an excellent representation both of the subversion of sequentiality, and of 
the simultaneity of perception meant by Frank when he speaks of spatial form. It is 
almost as if the poem were intended as a concrete illustration of the experience of 
spatial form. Frank suggests only that, in order to prompt the reader to attempt a spatial 
reading, the writer must "undermine the inherent consecutiveness oflanguage" ("Spatial 
Form" 10), but there are different ways to achieve this. Pound's "In a Station of the 
Metro," for example, would represent for Frank a poem which requires a spatial reading, 
for Pound himself defined an "Image" as "that which presents an intellectual and 
emotional complex in an instant oftime" ("A Few Don'ts" 130). Just as cummings's 
"l(a" presents an emotional complex based on the simultaneous apprehension of its 
inter-woven parts, so Pound emphasises the need to respond to the two parts of his 
poem in an instant, as a complex, resonant whole. "Such a complex," says Frank, "does 
not proceed discursively, in unison with the laws of language, but strikes the reader's 
sensibility with an instantaneous impact" ("Spatial Form" 9). For some readers, 
however, the incompleteness of the syntactic units and the form of their punctuation, 
that is, the division ofthe parts by a semi-colon as well as the line-breaks, is not enough 
to undermine the sequentiality of the line. Harvey Gross, for example, accepts that "the 
two images have spatial and emotional relationships," but suggests that "grammar, 
however, is not missing; it is automatically supplied by the reader," and so he feels free 
to re-write the lines in the following form: 
The apparition of these faces in the crowd 
(Are like) Petals on a wet black bough (sic, Gross 162) 
Bradford describes this re-integration of such lines into the apparently natural 
"successive pattern oflanguage" as "phonic naturalisation" (87), but the inadequacy of 
this approach, and this reading, becomes apparent when we look back on the original 
form of the poem, as it appeared in 1913. Then, the four irregular interword spaces 
further emphasised the spatialised aspects of the poem, and encouraged not just the 
juxtapositional apprehension of the two, larger elements, but played with the 
possibilities of relations between smaller sections also, "The apparition" and "Petals," or 
"bough" and "in the crowd." On this smaller scale, then, the physical distribution in 
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space of the text again plays a key part in producing the spatiality of the text and our 
awareness of it. 
Despite Gross's reluctance to read "In a Station ofthe Metro" in tenns of its 
spatial relations, the rather one-dimensional nature of his imposed reading illustrates a 
feature of visual or spatial fonn which both Frank and Bradford remark on, namely the 
problems it presents for critical analysis or attempts at naturalisation. In Frank's view, 
"The one difficulty of these poems, which no amount of textual exegesis can wholly 
overcome, is the internal conflict between the time-logic oflanguage and the space-
logic implicit in the modem conception ofthe nature of poetry" ("Spatial Fonn" 13). 
Bradford says of visual structures that they "pre-empt and negate the analytic 
conventions of criticism by investing the printed text with an inbuilt tension between 
succession and simultaneity," so that visual fonn is "probably the final point of 
resistance to the process by which critical writing has catalogued and colonised the 
'language of poetry'" (43, 181).26 A further point of contact between Bradford and 
Frank views is in the effect they see spatial and visual fonns having on the nature of the 
work of art itself. There is a self-referential nature to the work as relations are built up 
between the constituent elements of the text, meaning that priority is no longer given to 
the concept of language as signifying an external referent or operating in reference only 
to a thing external to the linguistic system. As Frank says, "Since the primary reference 
of any word-group is to something inside the poem itself, language in modem poetry is 
really reflexive" ("Spatial Fonn" 13). In Bradford's understanding, this translates itself 
into a concern for the materiality of the poem rather than a focus on the ideational image 
which the poem conveys. He draws his examples of visual fonns, therefore, from poets 
who see the function of the poem as being more than the conveyance of an image. 
Bradford says of Wordsworth that, "he wanted the poetic artefact to become part of the 
experience represented, rather than an ephemeral spoken event, which is all too easily 
replaced by the ability of the hearer to move beyond the words to the imagined 
experience that brought them into existence," while Williams "draws the reader into a 
26W. J. T Mitchell, also, says "This familiar pattern in literary criticism - the claim that we do, at least for 
a moment, 'see the meaning' of a work, coupled with our inability to state it in a verbal paraphrase -
seems to me a phenomenon that rises out of a spatial apprehension of the work as a system for generating 
meanings" (553). 
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double (twofold) encounter with the language itself and with the world both created and 
reflected by the language" (66, 76).27 
At this point, however, what seems to be required is a more detailed analysis of 
the internal relations Frank: speaks of, the basis of their relation, and the methods for 
signalling the existence of these relations. In fact, the necessary undermining of "the 
inherent consecutiveness oflanguage" in order, as Frank: describes, to assert the 
significance of "word-groups that have no comprehensible relation to each other when 
read consecutively in time" ("Spatial Form" 10, 13), is already evident both in Banville's 
Kepler, where we witnessed significant relations drawn between words through the 
successful undermining of the straight line by the repetition of words or word-groups, 
and in Bradford's visual form, where the disparity between what is seen and what is 
heard produces a disruption in the movement of the line. Comparable disruptions, 
however, can be produced on the level of what is heard alone, for repetitions are, of 
course, a common poetic feature, with Gerard Manley Hopkins actually defining verse 
as "speech wholly or partially repeating the same figure of sound" (qtd. in Jakobson, 
"Linguistics" 358-59), whether through rhythm, metre, alliteration, assonance, or rhyme. 
Looking at rhyme, for example, which is "based on a regular recurrence of equivalent 
phonemes or phonemic groups" (Jakob son, "Linguistics" 367), we can easily see how 
the repetitions of sound patterns create between words connections which are 
independent of any grammatical connection, connections which cut across the sequence 
of the text. Roman Jakobson, however, repeatedly argues for an understanding of 
rhyme based not on sound alone; "it would be an unsound oversimplification," he says, 
"to treat rhyme merely from the standpoint of sound. Rhyme necessarily involves the 
semantic relationship between rhyming units;" "equivalence in sound ... inevitably 
involves semantic equivalence;" "the metrical parallelism oflines, or the phonic 
equivalence of rhyming words prompts the question of semantic similarity and contrast" 
("Linguistics" 368, Language 95-96). The phonetic equivalences foregrounded by an 
oral/aural conception of poetry, where similarity is created through the rhythm and 
metre of the lines, where "word stress is assumed to equal word stress, as unstress 
equals unstress," is also an indication of a semantic equivalence which includes 
27Both these qualities, the resistance to naturalisation and the self-awareness of the text, are cited in 
Jonathan Culler's description of the "essence of literature," which, he says, "is not representation, not a 
communicative transparency, but an opacity, a resistance to recuperation which exercises sensibility and 
intelligence" ("Towards" 258). 
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associations of "similarity and dissimilarity, synonymity and antonymity" (Jakob son, 
"Linguistics" 358). 
Semantic equivalence, which, therefore, may be signalled through phonetic 
equivalence but is not confined to similar-sounding words, is the ground on which we 
build what Jakobson calls the axis of selection. Also known as the paradigmatic axis, 
and incorporating relations of similarity, substitution, encoding, and metaphor, this axis 
is twinned with the syntagmatic axis, involving combination, contextual integration, 
contiguity, decoding and metonymy (Gelley 476). Together, these two axes, now 
familiar concepts in linguistic theory, govern the construction of the line, the 
paradigmatic providing a list of similar words, one of which will be selected to be 
integrated into the linear sequence organised by the syntagmatic. As such, the 
paradigmatic axis stands as a virtual line vertical to the line of the text, while the 
syntagmatic axis is usually visualised as operating horizontal to the line of the text. 
Analysis of Frank's examples shows that one of the devices structuring the 
significant "word-groups" is exactly this horizontal axis formed by "positional (namely, 
syntactic) contiguity" (Jakobson, Language 91), so that each word-group forms a single 
syntagm. This is clearly the case in Pound's "In a Station ofthe Metro," for example, 
where the two disconnected word-groups which must be perceived simultaneously are 
the two syntactic fragments embodied in the two printed lines. Perceived 
simultaneously, the one is effectively inscribed on the other, and they are to be read at 
the same time (some, however, as we have seen with Gross, would argue that the more 
natural tendency is to position them within a larger contiguous unit, that is, have them 
follow each other in time rather than juxtapose them in space). 
The syntagmatic axis, however, is not one with the textual line, that is, it is not 
tied to it at every point. Barthes, writing only a few years after Jakobson's development 
of these concepts, wrote of the resulting means of analysing narrative, then "both in 
their infancy:" 
The first is functional, or paradigmatic. It tries to bring out, over and 
above the mere sequence of words, the elements which are knotted 
together within the work. The second is sequential or syntagmatic. It 
tries to discover the path - or paths - followed by the words from the first 
to the last line of the text. ("Sollers" 42) 
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This reference to "paths" through the narrative suggests the way in which contiguous 
elements can remove themselves from the line of the text, give way to another syntagm 
and then return to the line, reappear along its course. In fact, a sense of fragmentation as 
the syntagmatic lines replace each other on the textual line, interwoven and overlapping, 
is one of the hallmarks of literature remarkable for its spatial form. Frank suggests that 
R. P. Blackmur, in his analysis of what he called Pound's anecdotal method in the 
Cantos, was one of the first to adequately describe it: 
[The form] is that of the anecdote begun in one place, taken up in one or 
more other places, and finished, if at all, in still another. This deliberate 
disconnectedness, this art of a thing continually alluding to itself, 
continually breaking off short, is the method by which the Cantos tie 
themselves together. So soon as the reader's mind is concerted with the 
material of the poem, Mr. Pound deliberately disconcerts it, either by 
introducing fresh and disjunct material or by reverting to old and, 
apparently, equally disjunct material. (qtd. in Frank, "Spatial Form" 12) 
This is seen in condensed form in cummings who, more clearly and materially than 
Pound, illustrates the spatial coincidence of the two syntagmatic parts of the poem, 
"loneliness" and "a leaf falls," the inscription of the one on the other, by compressing 
them into the thin, vertical line of the poem, resulting in the fragmentation of their parts, 
and the disruption oftheir contiguity which, nevertheless, cannot obliterate their 
connection. This process of switching from one "path" to the other and back again, 
from "loneliness" to "a leaf falls" and back, suggests a further complication in the 
apprehension of spatial form. The act of perceiving a connection between disconnected 
word-groups (such as "loneliness" and "a leaf falls") is made all the more difficult by the 
need to first adequately perceive each individual word-group, especially when we 
consider that a word-group may comprise a syntactic whole spread across a number of 
pages, perhaps throughout an entire book. Spatial form can require, then, a double 
apprehension. We must recognise the spatially distributed word-groups themselves, as 
well as the relation between them. 
Frank's spatial form, however, does not employ the syntagmatic axis alone, as 
further analysis of the nature of the interaction between the two axes will show. Take, 
for example, "Sonnet in Search of an Author" (1962) by William Carlos Williams: 
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Nude bodies like peeled logs 
sometimes give off a sweetest 
odor, man and woman 
under the trees in full excess 
matching the cushion of 
aromatic pine-drift fallen 
threaded with trailing woodbine 
a sonnet might be made of it 
Might be made of it! odor of excess 
odor of pine needles, odor of 
peeled logs, odor of no odor 
other than trailing woodbine that 
has no odor, odor of a nude woman 
sometimes, odor of a man. 
Traditionally, semantic rhyme, bringing things into symbolic consonance or dissonance, 
most obviously occurs at line ends (for "'verse' draws its name from the point at which it 
is deployed" (Agamben, "Corn" 30)), but the absence of rhyme does not necessarily 
deprive the line end of a significatory aspect. As Bradford describes, "Just as rhyme 
operates not only as a marker of the line ending but as a device that thickens and 
intensifies meaning, so the visual structure that replaced it would come to represent an 
axis in the interplay between abstract form and signification" (17). In this case, 
Bradford takes the line-endings as the cue for the selection of syntactically disconnected 
words which nevertheless form a structure of inter-connections with a bearing on his 
interpretation of the poem. In other words, it is the line-endings which here alert us to 
the pattern of internal references which Frank sees producing spatial form. The result is 
the following: 
sweetest 
woman 
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excess 
of 
fallen 
woodbine 
excess 
of 
odor 
woman 
man (52) 
Bradford feels that there is "clearly some sort of interplay between the conventional 
foregrounding of words at each line ending and the sequential, though very uncertain, 
movement of the syntax" (53). Indeed, though the line endings foreground words with 
no apparent semantic equivalence, their positional equivalence alone (meaning the plain 
similarities in their spatial siting), suggests that they are providing something akin to a 
visual listing of the paradigmatic dimension open to Williams in the composition of the 
poem, as ifhe perceives a further equivalence between them, but is unsure of its basis. 
These, to use Barthes's words, are "the elements which are knotted together" "over and 
above the mere sequence of words" (Sollers 42), but the tie between them is not plainly 
grammatical or logical. Williams's inability, or reluctance, to define the relations 
between these parts is mirrored in the hesitancy of the fonn of their combination, which, 
at times, maps exactly the axis of selection, "odor, man and woman" (line 3) mirroring 
the last three parts of Bradford's selection, "odor, woman, man." As Bradford argues, it 
may be possible to say that "the poem is 'about' the poet's attempts to confine and 
rationalise a sequence of phenomena drawn from the images of the natural world and 
their correspondence with humanity, male and female" (53), but, as with cummings's 
poem, the description cannot adequately explain the action of the poem. The interaction 
of the vertical and horizontal, and the process of mapping, is visible only through the 
perception of isolated words in their relation to each other as part of a static spatial array 
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or, as Bradford describes it, through the "formal dimension of the text [which] can only 
be perceived visually, in silence" (53).28 
Another interesting illustration of the interaction of such horizontal and vertical 
lines is provided by Butor, though without any reference to Jakobson's work. In 
discussing the way that the text is presented on the page, Butor describes the Western 
tradition of writing from left to write as tending to privilege the horizontal line of the 
writing, that is the horizontal axis, over the axis which travels the length of the page or 
the depth of the book. He writes: 
All the links usually studied by grammar are established along this 
dynamic horizontal, but when we encounter a certain number of words 
which have the same function in the sentence, a series of direct objects, 
for example, each one is attached in the same fashion; they have basically 
the same position in the sequence of links, and I perceive a kind of 
interruption in the line's movement; this enumeration is arranged, then, 
• 
perpendicularly to the rest of the text. ("Object" 44-45) 
Butor's example is Gargantua (1535) wherein Rabelais lists for the reader the 218 games 
played by the giant. Butor provides a selection of these in the form of a vertical list. All 
the items in the list are marked by their similarity in that they are all proper names and 
all occupy the same grammatical point in the sentence; if only one game were to be 
listed, any of the 218 from the vertical axis could be used without affecting the meaning 
of the sentence. "Each of these games listed occurs at the same point in the horizontal 
development of the sentence," says Butor ("Object" 45), and yet, of course, each of 
these games is initially individually located on the horizontal line of the text, that is, the 
list is presented to us as a sequence of words, the axis of selection effectively occupying 
the axis of combination, as in Williams's sonnet. 
Jakobson, also, famously allows coincidence between the two axes when he 
says, in "Linguistics and Poetics," "The poetic function projects the principle of 
equivalence from the axis of selection into the axis of combination. Equivalence is 
promoted to the constitutive device of the sequence" (358, his emphasis). Both Butor 
and J akobson, then, describe a horizontal line containing elements which, due to their 
28Banville also uses a form of positional equivalence to create relations between certain elements, but 
with a different aim. Where Williams uses the line ends and the visual image of the poem's vertical 
printed form to reflect the paradigmatic dimension, Banville uses the first letters of the chapters for the 
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semantic equivalence, effectively occupy the "same position," for, as Jakobson says, 
"The capacity of two words to replace one another is an instance of positional similarity, 
and, in addition, all these responses are linked ... by semantic similarity (or contrast)" 
(Language 91). This positional similarity would apply even to words separated along 
the line of the text: for example, if the 218 games listed in Gargantua appeared on 218 
different pages. From repetition we move to rhyme to semantic equivalence to, now, 
positional similarity, a further repetition, for the equivalent words remain linked by that 
virtual vertical line of selection. The appearance and re-appearance of those words can 
be interpreted either as the repeated intersection ofthe 'vertical' line with the horizontal, 
the one cutting across the other as a wave-form, for example, or else can be seen as the 
repeated return of the line of the text to that point of intersection between the horizontal 
and vertical (a true knot), perhaps with a different word selected from the list with each 
encounter. It is not surprising that, at this point, Butor perceives "a kind of interruption 
in the line's movement" ("Object" 45), for such points are directed not only along the 
path ofthe narrative line, but are also connected by another, oblique line with another 
point (yet the same point) on the line. With the text emerging as a network of inter-
connecting verticals and horizontals, and with the relations between words no longer 
determined by sequentiality alone, we can agree with Frank's interpretation of 
Jakobson's poetic function, that, "In a poetic message ... the customary order of 
combination is overlaid by an order based on equivalence - that is, by a space-logic 
running counter to the linear temporality of syntactical structure" ("Years After" 231-
32). The image of a continuously unfolding textual line, determined by a logical 
progression, and driven unerringly towards its end, comes to be replaced by the image 
of a text whose body is the fragmented and interrupted manifestation of numerous lines, 
syntagmatic and paradigmatic, narrating and listing, arguing and citing, whose 
overlapping, intersecting and touching produces the single line of the text.29 
acrostic which produces the names of Johannes Kepler, Tycho Brahe, Galileo Galileus, and Isaac 
Newton, thus employing positional similarity to draw out an axis of combination. 
29"A course in mathematics," says Carlos Williams, "would not be wasted on a poet or reader of poetry if 
he remember no more from it than the geometric principle of the intersection ofloci: from all angles lines 
converging and crossing establish points" (qtd. in Jones, Introduction 42). And, says John Berger, "It is 
scarcely any longer possible to tell a straight story sequentially unfolding in time. And this is because we 
are too aware of what is continually traversing the storyline laterally. That is to say, instead of being 
aware of a point as an infinitely small part of a straight line, we are aware of it as an infmitely small part 
of an infmite number oflines, as the centre ofa star oflines" (40). 
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Time and the world: the limits of spatial form 
To return for a moment to the idea of semantic equivalence as a structuring device, an 
excellent example can be found in the opening pages of Sollers's The Park, where the 
narrative line seeks out and connects itself to, but is also directed towards and connected 
to, red objects. Redness is the base ofthe paradigmatic axis woven along the textual 
line, so that, as Jean Ricardou describes, "here the color red is a privileged thread. It 
appears four times in the opening lines," "images line up around it" ("Writing" 267-68). 
We have a "red dress," "lips," a "red, diamond-shaped sign," and "red light," and, later, a 
"red lamp," a "light reddened," "red Bangal flares," a "sky reddened," and, notably, "a 
vertical red line," for redness is itself here the vertical line connecting with the 
horizontal, marking these points as positionally similar. The book speaks ofthe 
possibility of other colours tracing a line through the text, "places just indicated by a 
colored detail, but by that very color related to each other, places connected by an 
invisible thread" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 267). The paradigm may present itself as 
a line of red, or a line of blue, perhaps, but a line might also be drawn on the basis of 
colour alone, to include black and white, or objects transparent and opaque. 
This example from Sollers is interesting also in the extent to which the world of 
the text is involved in the construction of the space of the text. The language is patently 
aware of itself, reflexive in the way Frank describes, the line directed as much towards 
the other elements on the paradigmatic chain as towards the progression of the printed 
line, but, in Sollers, the sense of textual construction is so profound, that it is as if the 
world too is oriented towards the line of the text, attending to it, rather than, as we 
would normally expect, being simply conveyed by that text. As Ricardou explains: 
The red light at the intersection is ... selected not only by the street 
evoked by the descriptive trajectory ... , but by analogy with the serial 
phenomenon itself. The cars, like the images, "regrouped in three lanes 
at the red light." Phonetically a relative of line, the word lane 
underscores this deliberately. . .. It is a case of the fiction providing an 
allegory of the function that is producing it. ("Writing" 268-69) 
The site of this interaction between the space and the world of the text will be the focus 
of the next sections for, unfortunately, the sensitivity ofRicardou's approach to text is, 
understandably but unfortunately, lacking in the somewhat broad strokes through which 
70 
Frank defines spatial fonn. Though we might argue that our analysis of Frank's spatial 
fonn up to this point adds significantly to a furthering of our understanding of the 
textual space glimpsed also in the works of Hillis Miller, Butor, and Bradford, when we 
focus on the specifics of his theory, as evidenced in the examples he provides, the value 
of his contribution does tend to be compromised. Most problematically, Frank rarely 
distinguishes between textual levels, between the world of the text and a space of the 
text, and this is especially evident in the first non-poetic example of spatial fonn 
discussed by Frank, Gustave Flaubert's Madame Bovary (1857). 
This is Frank's first analysis of a spatial fonn constructed oflarge-scale 
elements, so that "the unit of meaning is not, as in modem poetry, a word-group or a 
fragment of an anecdote; it is the totality of each level of action taken as an integer" 
("Spatial Fonn" 15-16). In other words, and as previously suggested, the syntagms of 
larger works are not limited to a word or syntactic unit, but may comprise an account, an 
argument, a narrative, a speech, a monologue, a description, or a discourse. Moreover, 
though the same operations as we have seen in the poetic examples still apply, the 
alternating returns to different syntagmatic threads for example, such interruptions in the 
line tend to occur less often or with less rapidity, so that we find ourselves staying with 
the one line for longer periods. As Frank says, "the novel, with its larger unit of 
meaning, can preserve coherent sequence within the unit of meaning and break up only 
the time-flow of narrative," so that whereas the use of spatial fonn in poetry can result 
in the rapid breakdown of a coherent sequence, the larger units of the novel can 
maintain their internal coherence while instead the temporality of the narrative is 
interrupted ("Spatial Fonn" 16). The existence of coherent sequences in a spatial fonn 
is exactly what causes Frank problems, however. 
In the county fair scene of Madame Bovary, Frank's interest lies in the way that 
"there is action going on simultaneously at three levels," with events occurring at street-
level, on a raised platfonn, and at a window overlooking the scene ("Spatial Fonn" 14). 
Flaubert himself writes ofthis scene that "Everything should sound simultaneously" 
("Correspondence" qtd. in Frank, "Spatial Fonn" 15), this simultaneity, as Frank 
describes, being achieved through the fragmentation of the temporal line, "by breaking 
up temporal sequence," as Flaubert splices the different levels together in his cutting 
back and forth between them ("Spatial Fonn" 15). Following on from Frank's initial 
descriptions of spatial fonn, and our subsequent discussions, it would not seem 
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contradictory to imagine that we can visualise the three levels of action in the country 
fair as running alongside each other, with the full significance of anyone level 
becoming evident only when read in relation to the other two (Frank does speak at one 
stage of "the reflexive relations of the two actions" ("Spatial Form" 15). It would be as 
if we were watching three films at once (or as if we could view different parts ofthe 
same filmic world at the same time, as in Mike Figgis's Timecode, where the screen is 
divided into four frames), or, as Albert Thibaudet points out, like "the medieval mystery 
play, in which various related actions occur simultaneously on different levels" (Frank, 
"Spatial Form" 14-15). Frank, however, describes things differently, suggesting that 
"this scene illustrates, on a small scale, what we mean by the spatialization of form in a 
novel. For the duration of the scene, at least, the time-flow of the narrative is halted; 
attention is fixed on the interplay of relationships within the immobilized time-area" 
("Spatial Form" 15). The significance of this comment lies in the way in which Frank's 
concern with simultaneity over sequentiality is expressed less in terms of a spatialisation 
of the text through the interruption of the line, but is instead described as the abolition of 
time within the world of the text. Frank is clearly suggesting that, in interrupting the 
line of the text, Flaubert is arresting the passage of time within the text, and that it is in 
this timelessness alone that spatial form can be apprehended. Unlike the manageable 
word-groups offered up by his poetic examples, Frank is seen to have difficulty in 
incorporating such larger, narrative syntagms into his vision of spatial form. He does 
not explain, for example, how we should visualise these frozen actions, how a 
character's passage through the world of the text might appear in a timeless moment. 
Perhaps it would be akin to viewing a film, not as a projection, but in its celluloid state, 
the characters present in every frame, but altered slightly by a time no longer allowed to 
pass at its regulation twenty-four frames per second. Frank's own hesitation in how to 
treat the text in this situation is evident from his language, for he variously describes the 
events ofFlaubert's text as "action" producing a "slowly rising crescendo," and "scene," 
using the latter both in the sense of a sequence of events finally reaching a "climax," and 
also employing its implications of static, pictorial presentation, as in "Flaubert sets the 
scene" ("Spatial Form" 15, 14). 
This close relation of spatial form to the near abolition of time is seen in Frank's 
repeated definitions; "a complex presented spatially in an instant of time," "these word-
groups must be juxtaposed with one another and perceived simultaneously," "the 
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simultaneous perception in space," "units of meaning are apprehended reflexively in an 
instant of time," "spatially, in a moment of time" ("Spatial Form" 9, 12, 13, 16,24). 
The difficulties arise from the fact that, as Alexander Gelley observes, "Joseph Frank's 
discussion of spatial form applies the same terms to both the phenomenal space or 
locales depicted in a fiction and to the way the linearity of a text is projected onto a 
mental space" (471). Frank's confusion of textual levels means that what we have been 
interpreting as apprehension in a moment of time, that is, an attempt to grasp the 
entirety of a work in an instant, becomes the apprehension of a moment of time, reading 
as if everything in the text occurred at the same time. The difference between the two is 
exactly the difference between an apprehension ofPerec's text on 11 Rue Simon-
Crubellier, and an apprehension of Val ene's planned painting of the apartment building. 
So insistent is Frank on this point that in Spatial Form in Narrative, an anthology which 
further defines and expands on Frank's concept, spatial form is equated exactly with this 
negation of time, "'spatial form' in its simplest sense designates the techniques by which 
novelists subvert the chronological sequence inherent in narrative" (Smitten and 
Daghistany, Preface 13).30 Yet it is hard not to think that such a reductive view of 
spatial form is based on a misunderstanding. Perhaps Kant indicates the crux of the 
problem when he says: 
We represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, in 
which the manifold constitutes a series of one dimension only; and we 
reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with 
this one exception, that while the parts of the line are simultaneous the 
parts of time are always successive.3 ! (Critique of Pure Reason qtd. in 
Gelley 474) 
The implication is that "a figure accessible to perception in a simultaneous act can never 
be adequate to the experience of succession" (Gelley 474), for, despite the importance of 
the stated exception, those advantages granted by a simultaneously perceptible figure 
too often erroneously become the limits placed upon the successive elements of that 
30The contributors to the collection are Joseph Frank himself, Jeffrey R. Smitten, Jerome Klinkowitz, 
Ann Daghistany and J. J. Johnson, David Mickelsen, Eric S. Rabkin, Joseph Kestner, Ivo Vidan, James 
M. Curtis, and Ronald Foust. 
3! Ricardo Gull6n remarks that "until Kant we do not find any idea of space that can justifiably be related 
to literary space" (11) while Mitchell believes, "If we combine Leibniz's model of physical space with a 
psychological model, such as Kant's idea of space as a mode of intuition, then we have at least identified 
the philosophical tradition in which a poetics of space ought to be situated" (543). 
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figure. 32 In other words, Frank, writing in the forties, tends to suppose that a natural 
bond exists between the sign and the signified, whereas, as Bradford writes, "There is no 
natural connection between the phonemic and graphic structures of language and the 
substance of the experience and objects they seek to represent" (27). 
Frank's mistake has its roots in his own source material, particularly in his 
concern for the limits on the arts set by Lessing. It has already been shown that 
Bradford, in his development of visual form, reacts against Lessing's assumption that a 
text develops its meaning solely through a sequential presentation of its component 
parts. It is also Frank's central point that avant-garde writing strains against the idea that 
"literary form, to harmonize with the essential quality of its medium, must be based 
primarily on some form of narrative sequence" ("Spatial Form" 6). Yet, Frank's view of 
what spatial form accomplishes, that is the negation of time, can now be seen almost as 
an acceptance of a second assumption made by Lessing, that there is a necessary relation 
between the signifier and the signified, that there is a link between what is written and 
what is being written about so that indeed "signs arranged side by side can represent 
only objects existing side by side" (Lessing 91).33 The limitations which this formula 
imposes on the plastic arts become now applicable to spatial form, requiring that it be 
used only to portray a static instant in the world of the text, a timeless moment.34 
Mitchell describes as "one ofthe major obstacles" the "notion that spatial form is 
properly defined as an antithesis or alternative to temporal form and that literary works 
achieve 'spatiality' only by denying temporality" (541-42), yet any attempt to see spatial 
form as a necessary effect of, or as necessarily resulting in, the negation of time will 
32Conversely, Mitchell suggests that, since time can be mapped, since "it is a time that one may always 
represent as a line" (Derrida, Grammatology 290), then "far from being a unique phenomenon of some 
modem literature ... spatial form is a crucial aspect of the experience and interpretation of literature in 
all ages and cultures" since "continuity and sequentiality are spatial images based in the schema of the 
unbroken line or surface; the experience of simultaneity or discontinuity is simply based in different 
kinds of spatial images from those involved in continuous, sequential experiences of time" (Mitchell 541, 
542). 
33Lessing's views, though, are not without qualification, and he admits that "it may be urged, the signs 
employed in poetry not only follow each other, but are also arbitrary; and, as arbitrary signs, they are 
certainly capable of expressing things as they exist in space" (101). It follows that either Lessing 
recognises that language can be spatially organised, the linguistic signs necessarily sharing the objects' 
spatial nature, or else he recognises that there is not an inalterable link between a word and its object. 
34This is not to say that the exploitation of the spatiality of the text isn't particularly suited to the 
presentation of a single image or a static moment in time. See, for example, Bradford's discussion of 
William Carlos Williams' Pictures from Brueghel, where "he is showing us how poetry can overreach, 
without abandoning, its status as a temporal medium and actually become like a painting" (116). See also 
C. Philo's analysis of Michel Foucault's writings on Raymond Roussel's La Vue in Death and the 
Labyrinth (144-48). 
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encounter difficulties, as can be seen in Ivo Vidan's "Time Sequence in Spatial Fiction." 
Vidan wonders "can the plot itself, or simply the story, be considered a factor of 
spatiality, of simultaneous perceptibility?" exploring whether chronological reordering, 
"the very handling of the sequential character of a story," automatically produces spatial 
form (132, 133), particularly in those cases where the intention of the author is to 
present a timeless array rather than developing action, a "complex situation" rather than 
an "enfolding process" (140).35 Studying the complex chronological structure of Lord 
Jim, Vidan concludes that "the actual order in time has been suppressed through the 
actual juxtaposition of episodes, minor incidents, and analytical recallings: the effect is 
one of simultaneous relevance. Sequence is transposed into coexistence," "time has 
turned into space" (137, 138). Vidan's initial conclusion, therefore, considering plot 
structures alone, is that for a text to be considered as having spatial form "what is 
needed is a way in which the temporal sequentiality of the story is neutralized by an 
appropriate abandonment of chronological presentation" (140), but the erasure of time is 
not the actual aim ofthis chronological reordering. Vidan's final conclusion is that "the 
actual quantity of chronological looping is not decisive for the production of spatial 
form. . .. What is decisive is whether the order and relationship of time sequences 
functionally contribute to the impact of the novel's totality" (149). This is spatial form 
motivated by a "significance that informs the whole story," but the significance derives 
not only from the story itself, but from its arrangement also, so that, though it might be 
possible that the story could be told in chronological order, we would then have to ask 
"What would the story itselflose?" (140, 138). We have seen exactly this in our 
discussion of Kepler, whose specificity of form would be lost without its chronological 
reordering. 
Such analysis further foregrounds the extent to which objects and actions in the 
world of the text tend to have a dual role, acting both as part of the narrative and as 
elements in the formal structure of the text, participating both in a temporal progression 
and in a spatial array. Anachronies become another device in what is, for some, the 
secondary mode of production of spatial form (though it has tended to be central to our 
discussion), namely spatial form created using "a word-group or a fragment of an 
35Compare this to Edwin Muir's distinction between "the character novel, which represents action 
predominantly in space, and the dramatic novel, which represents action predominantly in time" (Fasel 
230). In the character novel, "Time is assumed, and the action is a static pattern, continuously 
redistributed and reshuffled, in Space" (Gu1l6n 20). 
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anecdote" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 16). Frank's insistence on the connection between 
spatial form and the negation of time, however, suggests a weakness in his formulation 
ofthe term which is apparent also in his discussion of Proust, whose method Frank 
describes in this way: 
Hundreds of pages sometimes go by between the time [characters] are 
last seen and the time they reappear; and when they do tum up again, the 
passage oftime has invariably changed them in some decisive way. 
Rather than being submerged in a stream of time and intuiting a character 
progressively, in a continuous line of development, the reader is 
confronted with various snapshots ofthe characters 'motionless in a 
moment of vision' taken at various stages in their lives; and in 
juxtaposing these images he experiences the effects of the passage of 
time exactly as the narrator had done. ("Spatial Form" 24) 
We can easily imagine a character's lifeline acting as one of the lines woven through the 
text, but this is not a sufficient reason to describe this as spatial form. For example, we 
previously described the recognition of spatial form as comprising two stages, first 
perceiving the connection within the line itself, and then relating that line to another, but 
Frank is here treating two points on the same line as if they existed on separate strands. 
Moreover, a relation is usually drawn between points which have no comprehensible 
relation when encountered in time, yet these two points are obviously related as part of 
the same temporal sequence. There is no true interruption in the line, it is simply the 
case that part of the line is not narrated. Also, though the reappearance of a character 
may mean also the reintroduction of a textual element, through the reemergence of a 
particular discourse or style, Frank's concern here is with worldly aspects only, namely 
the changes which have taken place in the character, so the formal aspect of spatial form 
is absent. He is not comparing spatially isolated parts of the text, but the past and 
present of a character in the world of that text, a purely temporal aspect. Frank's 
argument is that "To experience the passage oftime, Proust had learned, it was 
necessary to rise above it and to grasp both past and present simultaneously in a moment 
of what he called 'pure time.' But 'pure time,' obviously, is not time at all- it is 
perception in a moment oftime, that is to say, space" ("Spatial Form 24). Again we 
find Frank asserting an unconvincing relation of inverse proportionality between time 
and space, the less time, the more space, leaving himself open to equally assertive 
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counter-arguments. "'Pure time'," says Ida Fasel, "obviously is not space" (229), while 
Frank Kermode says that "Frank's expression of juxtaposing images 'spatially, in a 
moment of time' seems to me to sum up the problem quite neatly. These adverbs are in 
apposition - they are held to mean roughly the same thing. But they do not" ("A Reply" 
587). 
Kermode more convincingly relates Proust's 'pure time' to Aquinas's concept of 
aevum, arguing "there is an historical link between the aevum and Proust; furthermore 
this duree reelle is, I think, the real sense of modern 'spatial form,' which is a figure for 
the aevum" (Sense of an Ending 72). Aevum, in turn, Kermode traces back to 
Augustine, for "when Augustine recited his psalm he found in it a figure for the 
integration of past, present, and future which defies successive time. He discovered 
what is now erroneously referred to as 'spatial form'" (for a discussion of Augustine on 
time see Paul Ricoeur, Time and Narrative, 5-30 especially) (Sense of an Ending 71). 
Even as Kermode was explaining spatial form in terms oftime, however, Frank: was 
trying to define Kermode's sense of the intemporal in terms of space. Kermode's 
argument is that, in the organisation of the plot, "that which was conceived of as simply 
successive becomes charged with past and future: what was chronos becomes kairos;" 
"mere successiveness ... is purged by the establishment of a significant relation 
between the moment and a remote origin and end, a concord of past, present, and future" 
(Sense of an Ending 46, 50). Frank: interprets this as meaning that "plots therefore seem 
to work against the flow of time ... to create relations of meaning detached from pure 
succession" ("Years After" 220), when a truer interpretation would seem to be that the 
plot, by fixing a beginning and an end, makes meaningful or significant a moment's 
position in the timeline, without actually altering the order of the successive points on 
the line, or creating any relations which diverge from it. It is a move from succession to 
meaningful, linear order, whereas spatial form, as de Man rightly points out, means "we 
are no longer left with a chaotic succession, but with a figure, a trajectory, a network" 
(111). Frank is again confusing textual levels, and Kermode seems generous when he 
says, "If! was afraid of 'spatial form' it was doubtless because it would have short-
circuited the thinking I was trying to do in The Sense of an Ending ("A Reply" 588).36 
36Kermode's comments in The Sense of an Ending initiated a debate with Frank which ran through 
Frank's "An Answer to Critics," Kermode's "A Reply to Joseph Frank," and Frank's "Spatial Form: Thirty 
Years After," where the [mal argument centred on whether there could ever be asserted a "relationship 
between modernist spatialising and political and cultural fascism" (Kermode, "A Reply" 586). 
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Even if we dispense with any idea that spatial form is meant to imply the 
immobilisation of time within the world ofthe text, some critics still see a difficulty in 
spatial form's claim to the events of the narrative. Fasel, for example, though she 
accepts Frank's spatial form as a "satisfactory" description of narrative structure, 
accepting that it "does indeed give us the method of modem art-writing," nevertheless 
finds it metaphysically "inadequate" (FaseI225, 226). She prefers the Bergsonian 
temporal concepts of 'duree', "the constant creative flow of Becoming," and spatialised 
Time to explain such works as discussed by Frank, suggesting that "modem novelists 
apply spatial time to form, duree to content," preserving the sense of a dual aspect to the 
elements of the text (227, 228). She condemns spatial form if conceived purely as the 
negation of time, describing Joyce's Ulysses as "time emptied into itself without 
passion, the river become stagnant, become space" (227). In what is by now a familiar 
argument for us, she says that to reduce language to stasis is to strip it of its most natural 
qualities: 
Language by its very nature moves. It creates an illusion of reality by its 
physical property, its progress across the line, across the page through the 
book, as much by what it says. Fiction also moves. It is temporal. Even 
when it reshuffles chronology into new patterns, chops time into non-
sequences, new relationships, nervous juxtapositions, to give the sense of 
pictorial or perceptive simultaneity in space, the action moves. (229) 
Yet, showing a greater awareness of Frank of the distinction between form and content, 
she appreciates the "metaphysical implications" of a spatial form which does not deny 
the energy of its parts, which explores "the impasse of inaction locked with action, of 
mobility made simultaneously immobile" (229,228). 
Other critics see any kind of claim by spatial form on narrative as a dangerous 
thing, however, because at the level of text, if not world, spatial form does require a co-
existence of parts (we have seen both Butor and Bradford argue that the text, the printed 
word on the page, is ever static, immobilised, no matter what action it describes). 
William Spanos, for one, urges that the literary work "must ... be projected temporally 
and apprehended or, to use Martin Buber's term, 'met' sequentially in time" ("Literary 
Criticism" 90). He agrees with Lessing in saying that language is suited to the 
presentation, not of objects, but "of human life or, to put [Lessing's] insight in another 
way, of Being characterized not by stasis but by mobility, by consciousness of a future 
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and, thus by Becoming; in short, of existential Being. . . . As such it must be 
encountered consecutively, within the matrix of the conditional, oftemporallimits" 
("Literary Criticism" 91). He rejects Frank's exhortation to "suspend the process" of 
reading ("Spatial Form" 13) when this risks "radically mimimizing the sequential 
dimension and reducing the existential experience" (Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 89). 
Eerily recalling our discussion of Kepler and his attempts to transcend the conditions of 
his own life, Spanos argues the reader has a moral obligation not to assume "the 
perspective of a god or an angel ... but rather the perspective of a man discovering the 
world" ("Literary Criticism" 91). 
Throughout these arguments, and seen again in Spanos's talk of stasis and 
mobility, time is opposed to space, and space portrayed as the poorer relation for, as 
Michel Foucault says, "Space was treated as the dead, the fixed, the undialectical, the 
immobile. Time, on the contrary, was richness, fecundity, life, dialectic" ("Geography" 
70). These positions do themselves no favour in replicating the stubborn dualism of 
Frank's argument, for, as Gelley says, "a position like Frank's that differentiates so 
sharply between the temporal and the spatial and tends to playoff one mode against the 
other is beset with difficulties" (485n.). In the introductions to these arguments, 
however, before the real debate is embarked upon, we tend to see a greater degree of 
equivocation: Spanos says that "Lessing's distinction, needless to say, is problematic in 
its over-simplification .... He is clearly wrong in his insistence that a painting or a 
sculpture is perceived in an absolute instant of time" ("Literary Criticism" 90), and 
Kermode that "Forms in space, we should remember, have more temporality than 
Lessing supposed, since we have to read them in sequence before we know they are 
there, and the relations between them" (Sense of an Ending 178). For Mitchell, the 
connection of space and time, and the abolition of the assumption that they are 
necessary opposites, is exactly the basis for the development of a truer sense of spatial 
form. His starting point is similar to Butor's in that the space of the text is marked 
firstly by its physical co-presence. Using Leibniz's definition of space as "an order of 
coexistent data," "I know," he says, "before I open a book that all the words are already 
there and that the text is therefore a spatial form in Leibniz's sense" (543, 544). 
Mitchell's key point, however, is that "nothing in the definition requires that this 
simultaneity be directly experienced," and he goes on to argue that it is in fact 
impossible to consider spatiality as non-temporal as "we never apprehend space apart 
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from time and movement," "we cannot experience a spatial form except in time" and he 
suggests instead that "we ought to treat their relationship as one of complex interaction, 
interdependence, and interpenetration" (544). As Samuel Alexander says, "there neither 
is Space without Time, nor Time without Space" (qtd. in Gu1l6n 11). 
Treading the line between world and space 
If Frank's discussions ofFlaubert and Proust raise questions around the issue of spatial 
form and time, his other example, Joyce's Ulysses, suggests a further complication. 
"Joyce," says Frank, "composed his novels of a vast number of references and cross 
references that relate to each other independently of the time sequence of the narrative. 
These references," which we can see as the fragmented parts of the intersecting lines as 
experienced by the reader, "must be connected by the reader and viewed as a whole 
before the book fits together into any meaningful pattern. Ultimately, if we are to 
believe Stuart Gilbert, these systems of reference form a complete picture of practically 
everything under the Sull, from the stages of man's life and the organs ofthe human 
body to the colors of the spectrum," but Frank argues that these patterns are secondary 
to "Joyce's most obvious intention ... to give the reader a picture of Dublin seen as a 
whole" ("Spatial Form" 16-17). The unfortunate use ofthe word "picture," which seems 
to replicate Frank's errors in relation to Flaubert, is tempered by later references to "a 
whole teeming city," "Dublin life" and "Dublin as a totality," but what is most 
interesting is the way in which the space of the text is seen here to correspond exactly 
with the world of the text, Frank equating linguistic structures with locales ("Spatial 
Form" 17, 18). In other words, this is a text which we can follow as a printed line, but it 
is also woven from a great number of lines, so numerous that every word in the text is 
accounted for by at least one of them. As we walk the streets of Joyce's city, at every 
step we encounter, and so momentarily inhabit, an intersecting line which will appear 
again later, and reappear again later still. Both the printed line and this network of 
intersecting lines cover the entire city, but the question is whether the line and the 
network produce the same city. 
While it is hardly a mistake for Frank to deal with the world of the text in spatial 
terms (as Jacques Derrida says, "Is it not frequently said that every metaphoric 
enunciation spatializes as soon as it gives us something to imagine, to see, or to touch?" 
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("White Mythology" 227)), the concept of spatial form itself cannot explain the move 
from space to text. Frank's argument is that "all the factual background summarized for 
the reader in an ordinary novel must here be reconstructed from fragments, sometimes 
hundreds of pages apart, scattered throughout the book" ("Spatial Form" 18), and this 
"distributed exposition" is enough for him to describe this as spatial form (Smitten, 
Introduction 19). Yet, Frank's description of this form differs from the others. Firstly, 
Frank here includes the possibility of a temporal dimension, for "the reader is intended 
to acquire this sense [of Dublin as a totality] as he progresses through the novel, 
connecting allusions and references spatially and gradually becoming aware of the 
pattern of relationships" ("Spatial Form" 18-19). Though Frank later says that it is only 
once the reader has arrived at the end that "all the references are fitted into their proper 
places and grasped as a unity," he then does not explain what extra dimension of 
understanding, what "meaningful pattern," will be granted to the reader through this 
simultaneous apprehension. To say that this will "place all references in their proper 
context" is to suggest it is the world of Dublin alone which is to be apprehended, as a 
picture, map, or spatial complex, rather than the elements of the text as an intellectual 
complex (Frank, "Spatial Form" 19). In fact, as Kumar says, "The perceptual form of 
the novel can be disregarded, Frank seems to argue, if you have sufficient empirical 
information concerning Dublin" (61). As Frank nowhere argues that spatial form 
reproduces physically the spatial layout of the world it embodies, with fragments 
situated within the area ofthe text meant to correspond with sites in the city, there is 
nothing to be gained from the spatial apprehension of the world through "fragments" as 
compared to an apprehension of the world as normally "summarized." The line and the 
network cover the same ground. 
Though Frank is wrong in describing the construction of this world in terms of 
spatial form, for the process of connecting and collecting fabular information seems 
different to the process of constructing meanings through the juxtaposition of word-
groups, nevertheless the easy slippage from the space to the world of the text suggests 
that these processes are different facets of the same phenomenon. In his confusion of 
the world of the text with the structures of spatial form Frank, in fact, prompts a further 
possible aspect of textual spatiality. As Vidan says, "In order to understand later 
sections of any narrative, we must connect their content with that of the earlier sections, 
thereby establishing reflexive reference on the level of events, character features, etc. 
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But the reflexive reference here is in the mind that constructs the story out of verbal 
signals, not necessarily in the reiteration of verbal signals" (133). Vidan is concerned to 
distinguish this process of world building or reflexive understanding from a more 
specifically identifiable spatial form, the expanding concept of spatial form requiring 
further categorisation so that we may distinguish between a text such as Kepler which 
exploits the spatial possibilities of the text to create a very structured space, and a text 
which displays only what may now come to be seen as an inherent spatiality, the 
internal order of reflexive references through which we form an image of the world of 
the text. Mitchell here suggests the term "tectonic" "to suggest the global, symmetrical, 
gestalt-like image that is generally associated with so-called spatial effects" (560), while 
Sharon Spencer describes as "architectonic" the novel whose "goal is the evocation of 
the illusion of a spatial entity, either representational or abstract, constructed from prose 
fragments of diverse types and lengths and arranged by means ofthe principle of 
juxtaposition so as to include a comprehensive view ofthe book's subject" (xx-xxi). 
The wider the application of the term spatial form, however, the greater the need 
to interrogate the form, as in type, ofthe spatialities being described. The word 
'spatiality' itself suggests that the text is being talked about not as a space in itself but in 
terms of a relatedness to space, as if the text is space-like but not a space. Beyond the 
level of the physicality of the printed volume, critics will accept that, figuratively 
speaking, the text is a space, but that, as Mitchell says, "Neither linear nor spatial 
phenomena in literary forms are literally spatial; both are ways of organizing time in a 
coherent image" (560). Here, recalling Vidan's discussion, Mitchell is speaking of the 
organisation of time within the world of the text, and how "the reading experience may 
produce in us the sense that no real time is passing, that we are in an eternally timeless 
realm where everything occurs simultaneously. Or it may produce the illusion of 
temporal sequence, with distinct stages like beginning, middle, and end" (544). The 
flexibility of the spatial metaphor means Mitchell can suggest that "any time we sense a 
'map' or outline of our temporal movement through the text, we are encountering ... 
spatiality" (552), while the flexibility of the material means that Spanos seems to be 
able to claim with equal validity that we should speak of "the 'time-shape' of a literary 
work of art - linear (progressive or regressive), circular, spiral, discontinuous, etc." 
("Literary Criticism" 100). The crux of the difficulty, or the heart of the temptation, is 
the ease with which spatial metaphors lend themselves to textual matters, and the extent 
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to which they have infiltrated our writing on text. Hillis Miller illustrates this when he 
points out that "the tenn narrative line, for example, is a catachresis. It is a violent, 
forced, or abusive importation of a tenn from another realm to name something which 
has no proper name" (Ariadne's Thread 21). Through a simple exploration oflinear 
tenninology, Hillis Miller develops nine areas which would, no doubt, be tenned 
spatial: 
First come the physical aspects of writing or of printing books. . .. A 
second region of linear tenninology involves all the words for narrative 
line or diegesis: denouement, curve of the action, turn of events .... 
Note that these lines are all figurative. They do not describe the actual 
physical linearity of lines of type or writing. . .. A third topic is the use 
oflinear tenns to describe character, as in the phrases 'life line,' or 'what's 
my line?' . . . A fourth place is all the tenninology of interpersonal 
relations. . .. Another region is that of economic tenninology .... 
Another area of narrative tenninology involves topography: roads, 
crossroads, paths, frontiers, gates, windows, doors, turnings, journeys, 
narrative motifs like Oedipus murdering Laius at the place where three 
roads cross. . . . Another topic for investigation is illustrations for novels. 
. .. Another region for investigation is figurative language in the text of 
a novel. . . . A final topos in the criticism of fiction is the question of 
realistic representation. (20-21) 
Without even a mention of 'plot' or 'passage,' the spatial metaphor emerges as a rich vein 
to mine, a wonderful insight on the nature of the text and our thinking about it, but a 
fertile vocabulary which must be treated knowingly or it will project only vacant spaces. 
Such figurative wanderings through the text can result in a space within which it 
is difficult to orient oneself. Kestner, for example, in The Spatiality ofthe Novel, 
develops a concept of space as the secondary illusion of the novel, arguing that, though 
literature is essentially temporal, nevertheless it can convey the effects of simultaneity. 
"The secondary illusion of the novel is thus a spatial agent inherent in the temporal art 
of the novel by which the complete realization of the fonn is effected" (Kestner 19). He 
defines three kinds of spatiality, the geometric, the virtual, and the genidentic. The 
"geometric spatiality of the novel," he says, "involves Euclidean elements, such as the 
point, the line, and the plane," but here he tends not to mean that the novel occupies or 
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constructs a Euclidean space, but is instead suggesting that certain novels can be 
viewed, or understood, in tenns of the point, line, plane, and so on. The "word virtual 
may be used to designate the fonn of spatial secondary illusion in the novel, which 
involves the literary text and its relation to the spatial arts of painting, sculpture, and 
architecture" (Kestner 33, 69) and, though his discussion on the text in tenns of an 
architectural space has certainly been helpful, this virtual space seems largely concerned 
with how scenes within a novel can be thought of in pictorial tenns, while 
characterisation can be related to sculpture. Genidentic spatiality is more complicated, 
dealing with the issue of textual interpretation, which involves "two factors, one 'in' and 
one 'out,' with a mediator between" (Kestner 135). Concentrating on the nature ofthis 
mediation, Kestner draws on Bergson's concept of the dynamic mode of assimilating the 
conscious states of others to suggest that, "One ofthe properties of a novel, therefore, is 
that it is a dynamic field through which the reader may atemporally be the characters, be 
the author of his own text, and be an interpreter. The dynamic field ofthe novel, 
common to the work, to its author, and to its interpreter, is language, by its nature 
dynamic" (Kestner 138-39). Interpretation thus becomes interpenetration. The dynamic 
field oflanguage, Kestner argues, results in a genidentity between text and interpreter, 
between related texts, and between signifier and signified. 
Truthfully, however, though Kestner's work is detailed and ambitious, many of 
his concepts, including the dynamic field oflanguage, remain confusing and ill-defined, 
and it is difficult to precisely detennine what he means even by "the spatiality of the 
nove1." More specifically, the spatiality ofthe novel, which is presented as a definable 
characteristic, is immediately divided into the geometric, virtual, and genidentic without 
consideration of how these three relate to each other, or of how they cooperate in the 
fonnation or structuring of the spatiality of the text, or of whether they account for all 
fonns of spatiality in the novel or if they are just three possible examples from many, 
and this is without questioning whether Kestner sees these as figurative or literal spaces. 
Mitchell, on the other hand, is very aware of the metaphorical aspects of spatial 
tenninology in discussing texts, but appeals to Nelson Goodman to explain his 
approach: "Metaphorical possession is indeed not literal possession; but possession is 
actual whether metaphorical or literal" (qtd. in Mitchell, 540n). He develops four levels 
of spatiality, "the literal level, the physical existence of the text itself," "the world which 
is represented, imitated, or signified in a work," spatial fonn in the structural or fonnal 
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sense, and "that point where the interpretation ofliterature (presumably a rational, 
sequential activity) converges with the experience of it" (550, 551, 553), but again there 
is little sense of how these spatial levels interact. In particular, there is no attempt made 
to bridge the gap between the physical and figurative aspects of a text's spatiality, or to 
explain a space such as Banville's Kepler which so fully incorporates both. 
Considering the constant risk of metaphorical fudging, Frank's own 
understanding ofthe spatiality of his spatial form is put under pressure, for his textual 
space seems only a product of frozen time, or is invoked through spatially loaded 
terminology: connections, relations, juxtapositions, oppositions, groups. This makes it 
all the more important to see how Frank, in a new account of spatial form which 
appeared in his article "Spatial Form: Thirty Years After," expands and defends the 
concept, especially when this is where Frank, who had always viewed spatial form 
"exclusively as a particular phenomenon of avant-garde writing" now admitted that "this 
no longer represents my own point of view" ("Years After" 203). To begin with, he is 
interested in the spatial awareness in the work of Roman Jakobson, just as we ourselves 
appealed to Jakobson's linguistic concepts to explore the formations and relations ofthe 
connected word-groups. He is encouraged by the Formalist distinction between story 
and plot, by Boris Tomashevsky's distinction between "bound motifs" ("essential to the 
causal-chronological sequence") and "free motifs" ("independent of such a sequence" 
("Years After" 234)), and in Todorov's "logical-temporal order" and "spatial order."37 
Frank is most appreciative of Genette's work, but, even amid this expanding conception 
of spatial form, Frank still relates spatial form to an idea of time negation, as is evident 
when he speaks of Genette's distinction between "narration," which "attaches itself to 
actions and events," and "description," which "lingers on objects and things considered 
in their simultaneity, and ... seems to suspend the course oftime and contributes to 
spread the redt in space" (Genette, Figures II qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 237). 
It is through the work of Genette that Frank also introduces what he sees as "the 
broader horizon against which the idea of narrative spatial form must now be seen," 
namely Structuralism (Foust, too, argues that "The fruition of spatial form can occur 
37Formalist thought, however, seems to conceive of textual space purely in linear terms. Shklovsky's 
differentiation of plot and story meant that "the dominance of structure, of plot over material, was 
emphasized" (Eichenbaum 121), but the structural changes seem only to apply to the order of the 
presentation of the events, changed "by simply transposing parts" (Shklovsky 57), and understood as the 
swapping of one section of a linear narrative with another, or as operations taking place in a space of just 
two dimensions. 
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only in a henneneutic Structuralism" (185)) ("Years After" 241). As Genette writes, 
"the manifest spatiality of writing may be taken as a symbol for the profound spatiality 
of language" for "it is undeniable that Saussure and his continuators have brought to the 
foreground a mode of being oflanguage that one must call spatial" (Genette, Figures III 
qtd. in Frank, "Years After" 242, 241). It is Saussure who, in his analysis oflanguage as 
a synchronic system, first places the signifier at the centre of a network of syntagmatic 
and paradigmatic axes, but it is a network which tends not to find its place on the page. 
The signifier, says Saussure, "being auditory, is unfolded solely in time," and writing, 
when "the spatial line of graphic marks is substituted for succession in time," returns to 
being just a record of the spoken word, denied the possibilities of "visual signifiers ... 
which can offer simultaneous groupings in several dimensions" (70). "The elements are 
arranged in sequence on the chain of speaking" (Saussure 123), and it is these 
contiguous linear elements which are the syntagms. The paradigmatic lines, which we 
had described as cutting across the line of the text, intersecting and interweaving, are 
fonned by associative relations which, for Saussure, are fonned "in the memory," "in 
the brain" (123). 
Saussure is, of course, describing a system of language, not of a text, but Frank's 
willingness to see spatial fonn absorbed into Saussure's linguistic spaces means a 
willingness to see the fonns abstracted from the page, and placed in a relational space 
removed from the text. With the associative relations made in a mental space rather 
than between the physical elements of the printed text, the line of the text is left 
undisturbed, making it seem strange that Frank would want to describe this in tenns of 
spatial fonn. And yet, this is the logical conclusion for Frank to arrive at, given his later 
views on how spatial fonn should be perceived, for the "spatiality oflanguage" 
described by Saussure is the twin to the process of reflexive reference described by 
Vi dan, the one occurring at the level of the space of the text, the other occurring at the 
level of the world of the text. Once the concept of spatial fonn is defined as including 
these spatialities also, it is no surprise to see Kennode lamenting that spatial fonn 
"seems to be only a weak figure for the process, compounded of memory and 
prediction, by which we understand utterances of whatever length," so that Frank's "new 
account of it seems to apply to any act of reading whatsoever" ("A Reply" 582, 581). 
For it does apply to any act of reading, Frank suggesting now that the emergence of 
spatial fonn should no longer be seen as "a radical break with tradition," but that "every 
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narrative work of art necessarily includes elements that may be called spatial" ("Years 
After" 235, 236). This would represent the view of critics such as Mitchell also, who, as 
we have seen previously, sees spatial form as "an essential feature of the interpretation 
and experience ofliterature" (546). 
Frank is here distancing himself further froUl those critics with whom we had 
originally linked him, such as Butor and Bradford, though his continuing insistence on 
spatial form as the negation of time had already disrupted any connection to their 
analyses of the significance of the simultaneity of the words on the page, of the reader's 
exposure to the printed text, and of the tension between the temporal experience of that 
text and its static arrangement. With Frank spreading spatial form across all textual 
levels, his final development of spatial form may seem emptied of persuasive force. On 
the contrary, however, his broad and inclusive definition ofthe spatiality ofthe text 
actually produces very valuable observations. For example, if we say, as Saussure says, 
as Genette says, that all language is spatial, then even the most linear of texts is spatial. 
Indeed, Mitchell argues that "continuity and sequentiality are spatial images based in the 
schema of the unbroken line or surface; the experience of simultaneity or discontinuity 
is simply based in different kinds of spatial images from those involved in continuous, 
sequential experiences of time" (542). He says of the line and the figure that "neither of 
these forms is more spatial (or temporal) than the other but that each provides a distinct 
set of experiential and analytic images" (560-61). A distinction emerges again between 
texts which present themselves as purely linear, progressive and straight, and those, like 
Kepler, which emerge as purposefully constructed and defined spaces, formed through 
the manipulation of the physical, phonetic and semantic relations of the words of that 
text, and physically manifesting the potential spatiality of language. 
The question now arises as to what might motivate the production of one form of 
spatiality over the other. Significantly, Hillis Miller observes that "a straight line 
conveys no information beyond the fact that the line is there" (Ariadne'S Line 8), while 
Steven Connor says that "it is repetition more than any other trope which draws the 
attention of the reader to the medium oflanguage" (15). The straight line of "'natural', 
non-literary language is characterized by its flowing irreversibility, moving too fast for 
us to be conscious of the process of signification" (Connor 15), while the spatialised line 
clearly positions itself between the reader and world, the knot of repetition meaning 
there is always the chance of an unnatural intervention on the part of the author. The 
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linear text, though recognising its place between spaces, and its potential for spatial 
form, acts as if attempting to minimise the distance between the reader and the world, 
emptying itself of significant volume or bulk in order not to obstruct a view of a world. 
It sides with the view that the written word "is supposed to be a passive expression on 
the surface of the world" (Blanchot 370). The spatialised text, in its material application 
of the inherent spatiality of language, becomes a significant place in itself. 
Frank's error, therefore, is in trying to describe the space of text as ifit were 
uniform or homogeneous. Yet, the sophistication which Frank's theory seems to be 
lacking can often be found instead in the works of those authors whose texts we might 
term spatial, for they are hardly unaware of the possible tensions in their texts between 
form and content, space and time, or of the process of the reader's exposure to that text. 
Writers for whom writing itself is a subject, who, like Sollers, wish to stress the 
"scriptive activity" (Ricardou, "Writing" 263), will often reveal their worlds as written 
spaces by including within them characters who are readers, who are exposed to text in 
the world of the book. Then, as if this were an exposure to text as contagion, a 
scriptural virus may infect every line, and the texts lay bare the textuality of their own 
worlds also. One such text, building for us, like Ulysses, a textualised city, is Paul 
Auster's City of Glass, the first story in his The New York Trilogy, and the focus of the 
next section. 
Wandering through Paul Auster's City of Glass 
Our reader in City of Glass is Daniel Quinn, a writer of detective stories who, by 
chance, has become involved in a real-life investigative case. He has assumed the 
identity of the detective Paul Auster, and is trailing a man, Peter Stillman, recently 
released from captivity, who had kept his young son imprisoned for nine years, and 
now, again, could pose a threat to his safety. Trailing Stillman involves monitoring his 
movements from the moment he first arrives by train at Grand Central Station and steps 
out into New York, described on the very first page as "an inexhaustible space, a 
labyrinth of endless steps" (Auster, City 3). Quinn's following of Stillman, however, 
seems pointless at first as Stillman does not attempt to approach his son, but instead 
walks through the city by seemingly random and arbitrary routes. Each day he simply 
emerges from his hotel, picks broken and useless items off the streets, and places them 
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in his bag, lunches in the Riverside Park, dines at the Apollo Coffee Shop on 97th Street 
and Broadway, and then returns to his hotel. 
After five days of following Stillman's wandering figure, Quinn, to stave off the 
boredom, begins to take a careful note in his red notebook of everything that Stillman 
does and everywhere that he goes.38 He is fully immersed in following Stillman's path, 
is with him every step of the way as Stillman discovers New York, and yet the result is 
only incomprehension. "Quinn felt no closer to Stillman than when he first started 
following him. He had lived Stillman's life, walked at his pace, seen what he had seen, 
and the only thing he felt now was the man's impenetrability" (Auster, City 67). 
Though this account raises questions about Auster's own existentialist position, 
nevertheless we can see that, in this case, Spanos' desired result, the direct experience of 
human life, means nothing. On the thirteenth day, however, Quinn looks over his notes 
and, "for no particular reason," maps out Stillman's journey for each day (Auster, City 
67). The first resulting diagram resembles a rectangle, though "it might also have been 
a zero or the letter '0'" (Auster, City 68). The second is "a bird of prey perhaps, with its 
wings spread," or it is the letter 'W' (Auster, City 68). It is followed by the letter 'E', 
then "a shape that resembled the letter 'R' ... a lopsided '0' ... a tidy 'F' ... a 'B' that 
looked like two boxes haphazardly placed on top of one another ... a tottering 'A' ... a 
second 'B': precariously tilted on a perverse single point" (Auster, City 70). From these 
nine letters, spelling out o-w-e-r-o-f-b-a-b, Quinn realises that the entire series will read 
THE TOWER OF BABEL, inferring from his knowledge that Stillman had previously written 
a book entitled The Garden and the Tower: Early Visions of the New World, dealing 
with the biblical Garden of Eden and Tower of Babel. 
Stillman, then, has been writing his way across the surface of the city, his steps 
tracing a literal passage as he makes his way through the streets, but the close relation 
between the world and space of the text is seen in the way the world which embodies 
the message inevitably affects ip9 Stillman's "lopsided" letters scrawled on the grid of 
New York's network of streets suggest Sollers's description of learning to write, how the 
"hand shakes, as does the shadow of the pen on the white surface divided into squares 
38Relate this to Barthes' claim that, "The reduction ofreading to a consumption is clearly responsible for 
the 'boredom' experienced by many in the face of the modem (,unreadable') text, the avant-garde film or 
painting: to be bored means that one cannot produce the text, open it out, set it going" ("Text" 163). 
39Words are related to steps on a number of occasions in the text. Quinn, for example, when telling the 
story to a character called Auster, "began at the beginning and went through the entire story, step by step" 
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by fine blue lines" (The Park, qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 264),40 but their lopsidedness 
is also an indication of the constraints that simply existing in a physical space places 
upon Stillman. He is not simply drawing his letters on a map, but is walking his 
message through the city, and the steps he takes are necessarily in some way determined 
by the landscape he traverses, by the 'actual' world of New York. He cannot, for 
instance, leap tall buildings in a single bound, though on a map he might conveniently 
skip them, with the result that that Quinn admits of the first letter that it "resembled a 
rectangle" but "given the quadrant structure of New York streets, it might also have 
been a zero or the letter '0'" (Auster, City 68). In the same way, writers must attend to 
some extent to the world of their text for, as we saw with Kepler, a perfect textual space 
may require a text so fragmented and disconnected that it can no longer serve the 
writer's narrative purpose. Writers who wish to avoid surrealism or magic realism tend 
not to leap the tall buildings of their own narratives, do not have their characters lie in 
lamps and read by the light of a bed, for "it will not do to call the lamp a bed ... or the 
bed a lamp" (Auster, Ghosts 148). If these are the constraints their written world puts 
upon them, then the paths by which they write this world can be equally restricting 
when they try to mould their textual spaces. Syntactic convention may place the step, 
the word "step," in slightly the wrong position in the line of printed text, and so the 
paradigmatic line, as visibly traced on the surface of the page, is deviated slightly from 
its perfect path, resulting in shaky and uneven forms, or, in Stillman's case, letters. 
Adherence to syntactic normality is, again, often motivated by a concern for the 
readability for the world of the text, since the naturalistic impulse is seen as better 
served by coherent sequences.41 
(Q!y 94), while in the second tale in the trilogy, Ghosts, the narrator speaks of "the way of the world: one 
step at a time, one word and then the next" (136). 
40Perhaps it is not a coincidence that Auster writes, or has written, his books on gridded engineering 
paper (see Gurganus 11, 12). Nor, perhaps, is it a coincidence that the characters in his story Ghosts are 
named after colours, "Blue," "White," "Black," "Brown," "Redman," "Gray," "Green," "Gold," "Violet," 
"Rose," as are the mountains, "White," and the streets, "Orange" (where there's a "red-brick church" 
(137)). 
41Udaya Kumar, for example, points out that spatial form in Joyce's Ulysses is particularly evident in the 
syntactically adventurous and often fragmentary monologues, where "connections are verbal and 
associational" (51). These monologues are marked also by their detachment from the timeline of the 
world of the text, so that "we cannot institute a unilinear time based on the narration and then locate the 
monologues within it. ... This causes a temporal indeterminateness" (Kumar 67). Timothy Clarke, 
meanwhile, discussing Blanchot's interpretations of Mallarme's work, says that, because "the word no 
longer refers to an object in the concrete world," it is inscribed instead in a now-familiar space, "an open 
context where it plays or, in a loose sense, rhymes in many directions at once. Thus the Mallarmean poet 
will avoid linearity and accord novel importance to layout, spacing, punctuation" (82). "Once 
representation is eschewed, the order of the text need no longer submit to the sequentiality of mundane 
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Stillman writes, of course, on a page from the intricate spaces of New York 
itself, choosing a suitably rectangular area "bounded on the north by 110th Street, on the 
south by 72nd Street, on the west by Riverside Park, and on the east by Amsterdam 
Avenue" (Auster, City 58).42 This New York space, however, could hardly be described 
as a blank page, pure and white, and ready for the pen. Rather this page has already 
been written across, the streets themselves being the printed lines of text on the space of 
the page (and it is only through a spatial apprehension of this text that Stillman's 
meaning becomes evident, for if we were to read the page of the city line by line, from 
left to right (street by street, from West to East), going down its length (from North to 
South), we would encounter his message as a series of disordered and disconnected 
points with, as Frank says, "no comprehensible relation to each other" ("Spatial Form" 
13)). Stillman himself reveals for us the textuality of the city space in the message he 
writes across its surface. The Tower of Babel, for Stillman, relates back to the story of 
the Garden of Eden, where Adam, given the task of naming all the things of the world, 
had spoken words which had grasped the essential heart oftheir objects; "A thing and its 
name were interchangeable. After the fall, this was no longer true. Names became 
detached from things; words devolved into a collection of arbitrary signs; language had 
been severed from God" (Auster, City 43). The story of the garden of Eden, then, is not 
only the story of "the fall of man, but the fall of language" (Auster, City 43), but 
Stillman's project is to restore the language of man to a prelapsarian state, to undo the 
effects of the fall which saw the word divided from the thing it named. Collecting 
broken things, he creates a new language by renaming what has lost its original 
function, so that the word is again a part of the true thing, so that he can "make language 
answer our needs" (Auster, City 81).43 His writing across the city seems part of this 
same grand project, for it renames New York as the new Tower of Babel, the 
construction of which will herald the return of the language from before the fall, 
time" (82). Significantly, however, "language does not quite abandon the 'real word' (sic); representation 
is transposed into another space" (82). For Frank, though, Mallarme's space is too extreme, risking "the 
self-negation oflanguage" ("Spatial Form" 13). 
42 Auster maps the city onto the page in The Invention of Solitude also, writing, "He has spent the greater 
part of his adult life walking through cities, many of them foreign. He has spent the greater part of his 
adult life hunched over a small rectangle of wood, concentrating on an even smaller rectangle of white 
paper" (98). 
43Stilhnan is attempting to return to a world of myth, which, as described by Blanchot "supposes no 
separation of sign and referent; meaning cannot be disembodied from the agents of the mythical 
narrative. It is as if the myth would ideally return the reader to a primitive state in which thought had not 
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meaning "it would again be possible for the whole earth to be of one language and one 
speech" (Auster, City 48). In this naming, the word seems again a part ofthe thing, for 
Stillman's writing is a language ofthe earth, or ofthe city; his steps have taken place in 
the streets of New York. Stillman's text, then, stands in relation to Auster's own, for 
both of them write on and about the New York streets, working within the same space, 
but interpreting the results of their actions in opposing ways. Though Auster's New 
York, true to Stillman's re-naming, is interchangeable with the words which produce it, 
revealed as a truly textual space, it is not, as Stillman believes, because the words are 
one with the city, 'The Tower of Babel' its essential name in this world, the mark of its 
true presence, but rather that, for Auster, there is no city outside the text, the world is 
produced by, not simply represented within, the textual spatiality. Stillman presents his 
text as ifit were absolutely natural, the line adhering to its object, with no space 
between, but Auster's text is a space which fills our entire vision, obscuring everything 
else. We cannot access Auster's New York except through Auster's text, but there is 
nothing to that New York but its text.44 
Frank's spatial form can, perhaps, take us this far in our analysis ofthe textual 
space that is City of Glass, but no further. Frank may, however, have pointed the way 
forward for us when, at the end, he read spatial form through the work of Saussure, for a 
further insight into the nature of this space does seem to emerge if we look to the way in 
which Saussure structures the relations between the elements of his linguistic space. 
His proclamation is that "in language there are only differences," "phonic and 
conceptual differences" (120, 127). Any element in the syntagmatic line differs from 
those elements on either side, "its environing sounds," while differing also from all 
associated elements "that may come to mind," a potentially limitless number since 
"terms in an associative family occur neither in fixed numbers nor in a definite order" 
(Saussure 131, 126). Difference lies at the root of all relations, whether syntagmatic or 
paradigmatic, the nature of this difference being illuminated further if we take into 
consideration the work of Jacques Ehrmann. He argues that "the poetic nature of 
language may be defined by two necessary and sufficient characteristics: displacement 
learnt the trick of abstracting from physical things" (Clark 77). "Primitive man knows that the possession 
of words gives him mastery over things ... the name has not emerged from the thing" (Blanchot 379). 
44The City of Glass itself ends when the text [mds its conclusion, when the "city was entirely white now," 
like an empty page (Auster, City 132). Meanwhile, Ghosts really begins only as "snow is falling on the 
quiet street, and everything has turned white" so that "Black's shoes have made a perfect set of tracks on 
the white pavement," like words on a new page (Auster, Ghosts 140). 
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and repetition," and, in a move which seems targeted at systems such as Jakobson's, 
which equates the syntagmatic and paradigmatic with the metonymical and 
metaphorical, goes on to suggest that "since this displacement is time in motion within 
language, it is no more satisfactory to explain it by the structures of metaphor and 
metonymy - which are obviously the elementary forms of displacement - because it is 
displacement itself which is at the basis of every structure" (245,246). Ehrmann then 
goes on to say that "repetition and displacement are inversions of one another: repetition 
is a displacement of the same, and displacement is repetition of the other. But repetition 
is never exactly the same, nor displacement absolutely other" (246). To say that 
repetition is never exactly the same is to say, simultaneously, that the act of repeating is 
not the same and that the object repeated is not the same; repetition itself is 
unrepeatable. And this is just as we discovered previously, that even a repetition of that 
which is exactly the same is a repetition which is different, for there is a first experience 
of the thing and then its repetition (Derrida, too, speaks of "the logic which links 
repetition to alterity" ("Signature" 315». Ehrmann's categories of repetition and 
displacement suggest a differential process of varying degrees of similarity and 
dissimilarity applied to both object and action, substance and practice. Difference is 
produced spatially, temporally, and substantially, by similar objects and actions in 
different places, by similar objects and actions at different times, by differing objects 
and actions at the same time and in the same place. And these differences are produced, 
made evident, "are themselves effects" of what it is that relates sign to sign, the 
differance, Derrida's "neographism," which is "literally neither a word nor a concept," 
but, famously now, means both difference and deferral, differing and deferring, 
"differance as temporization, differance as spacing," so that "what is written as 
differance, then, will be the playing movement that 'produces' - by means of something 
that is not simply an activity - these differences, these effects of difference" (Derrida, 
"Differance" 11,3,9, 11). 
Returning now to the space of City of Glass, our focus again is on Stillman's 
message. We hadn't yet mentioned the true scale of Stillman's efforts, but they are most 
impressive, for it takes many steps to form even a single letter, and days to form a word. 
If, however, we are suggesting that the streets of New York are the printed lines of text 
then, at this level at least, we can say that each step is a word on the printed line. Each 
of the steps of Stillman's message, then, maybe thought of as a textual fragment (say 
93 
"step" instead of Sollers's "red") occupying a point of intersection between the 
contiguous line ofthe text, the streets ofthe city, and the paradigmatic path which cuts 
across it. The steps represent textual fragments of, to use Jakobson's phrase, positional 
similarity, related to each other by a semantic equivalence which means that, within the 
terms of Auster's analogy, we can say that any ofthe steps would be equally as effective 
if they were to replace any of the other steps within the line of the passage. In 
Ehrmann's terms, Stillman's letters are formed by the repetition of the same action again 
and again, but each step is also absolutely different from all others, marked by a 
positional dissimilarity, occurring at a different set of spatial coordinates.45 Ultimately, 
the individual step itself hardly matters, it communicates nothing, but depends on that 
which precedes it and that which will follow a step later, assuming significance only 
within that space which differentiates it from its others, only on that detour along the 
line of steps that thread their way through the city as they spell out their message: "It is 
because of difJerance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-
called 'present' element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to 
something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element, 
and already letting itself be vitiated by the mark of its relation to the future element" 
(Derrida, "Differance" 13). 
But Quinn is unsure if we can even say that the steps spell out their message. 
None ofthe letters is, as Derrida says, "A written sign, in the usual sense ofthe word, .. 
. a mark which remains, which is not exhausted in the present of its inscription" 
("Differance" 317). Instead, "Stillman had not left his message anywhere. True, he had 
created the letters by the movement ofhs steps, but they had not been written down. It 
was like drawing a picture in the air with your finger" (Auster, City 71). Moreover, "a 
written sign carries with it a force of breaking with its context" (Derrida, "Differance" 
317), while Stillman's message seems wholly of its context, one with the streets. 
Except, as Auster shows, "the pictures did exist - not in the streets where they had been 
drawn, but in Quinn's red notebook" ~ 71), and it is this recontextualisation, 
removing the line from their present, "inscribing or grafting it into other chains" 
(Derrida, "Differance" 317, which draws out a meaning. An 0 that might be a rectangle 
or zero, a W that is first a bird of prey or "only two abstract shapes" (Auster, City 68), a 
45It is etymologically tempting, but misleading, to link iterability with itinerary at this point. Also, that 
the same points can be both positionally similar and dissimilar recalls our original discussion of how best 
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doughnut, two boxes, a ladder, and an upside-down pyramid (the "mute mark" of 
dijferance, "the form ofthe letter ['a'] when it is printed as a capital" (Derrida, 
"Differance" 4) which become an 0, a B, an A, and a B when seen in relation to other 
elements in possibly the same system, these are what come to form Stillman's message. 
But still Quinn is not sure, for there are four days missing, and "the mystery of those 
four days was irretrievable" (Auster, City 69-70), and, he predicts, there are two days 
yet to come, the meaning of the full communication delayed yet further, deferred, and 
that fullness impossible with days lost. It is iterability alone, which "structures the mark 
of writing itself' (Derrida, "Signature" 315), which communicates anything, allowing 
him to see similar forms in this differing context. And it is a final recontextualisation, 
placing the letters in relation to Stillman's other writings, which finally prompts Quinn 
to read the lines as THE TOWER OF BABEL. 
That delayed 'EL', however, acts like a deferred rhyme, denying Quinn's reading 
the sense of completeness which rhyme, in its symmetrical displacement ofthe same, in 
its harmonious repetition of the other, would provide. As a point of positional similarity 
strangely removed, the missing rhyme, the corn, as Giorgio Agamben tells us, is "a 
point of rupture ofthe poetic body," and so opens the text to uncertainty ("Corn" 34).46 
Left struggling with Stillman's message, facing an incompleteness which looks to him 
for completion, and the possibility that "the letters were not letters at all" (Auster, City 
71), Quinn goes to bed, thinking of the coming E and L, finally telling "himself that El 
was the ancient Hebrew for God. In his dream, which he later forgot, he found himself 
in the town dump of his childhood, sifting through a mountain of rubbish" (Auster, City 
72). This mountain of rubbish continues the theme of broken objects, broken homes, 
broken men, broken words, but Stillman's re-naming of New York is, of course, an 
attempt to fix words, to return language to its God, so that it fulfils its function, to reveal 
the thing it names, and is not debased by those broken things which no longer fulfil the 
function their name calls for, which no longer work. Work, as described by Blanchot, 
operates on teleological principles: "For example, my project might be to get warm. As 
long as this project is only a desire, I can turn it over every possible way and still it will 
to visualise the text, as knotted thread or line. 
46Interestingly, Agamben argues that, since the umelated rhyme represents a rupture in the 
"correspondence between strophic division, which is marked by regular rhymes, and melodic division," 
the use of the corn as a structuring principle signalled "a radical crisis in the relation between the text and 
its oral performance" which meant the "emancipation of the poetic text not only from song but from all 
oral performance" and a movement towards "poetry as something essentially graphic" ("Corn" 33). 
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not make me warm. But now I build a stove. . .. I had in front of me stones and cast 
iron; now I no longer have either stones or cast iron, but instead the product of the 
transformation of these elements - that is, their denial and destruction - by work" 
("Literature" 370-71). The writer, such as Stillman, may seem to do a similar kind of 
work because the artistic work negates language in its present form and transforms it 
into something new. Auster characterises this attitude in the figure of, suitably, Max 
Work, Quinn'S pseudonym, who "allows Quinn'S texts to accomplish an end, to create 
order" so that "Work (as a character) allows Quinn'S writing to perform work (as a 
concept)" (Nealon 94,93). For Blanchot, however, writing is different, it "plays at 
working in the world" ("Literature" 395), for "words - writing's raw material - refuse to 
be negated within a higher unity; they are always there to attest to what should have 
been destroyed in the limiting negation that brings about the work of meaning" (Nealon 
98). Words resist having limits placed upon them, won't allow the literary work to 
become a closed context, constructed for one purpose, for one function. Writing 
"manages to loosen the limits, to open the same field to a much greater range" (Derrida, 
"Signature" 311), and, in this way, words are uneconomic, wasteful, because they will 
not work for the writer alone. Stillman's writing, meant for one thing only, is 
nonetheless marked by its iterability, is opened to recontextualisation, removed from its 
author, and placed in a field that "is in effect that of play, that is to say, a field of infinite 
substitutions only because it is finite, that is to say, because instead of being an 
inexhaustible field, as in the classical hypothesis, instead of being too large, there is 
something missing from it: a center which arrests and grounds the play of substitutions" 
(Derrida, "Structure" 289). There is no God in Babel (differance puts into question 
"precisely the quest for a rightful beginning, an absolute point of departure, a principal 
responsibility" (Derrida, "Differance" 6), and, in the "chaos of Stillman's movements," 
Quinn's fear is that he is left with what is only meaningless, rubbish (Auster, City 69). 
The radical playfulness of the space of differance is daunting for, where 
previously our network of lines seemed to draw significance to particular points, focus 
our attention, now it seems they radiate outwards, leading us ever onwards and away. 
This city is, as Auster says, "a labyrinth of endless steps" (City 3), and any point of 
entry gives access to any number of paths, for infinite combinations of vertical and 
horizontal are possible, every point defers to and differs from the others. If we can still 
say that each word stands as a point of intersection, we can move from it in any 
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direction, follow it along whichever associative path we wish, move where our 
imagination takes us, "anyone thing is always, in some way, already another thing, a 
multitude of other things" (Ricardou, "Writing" 274). Each forking path produces 
further crossroads, further diversions. Ricardou's warning is that the starting points for 
such flights of fancy, the "vectors of organization, gradually lose their directive power. 
They themselves evolve, collide, and are finally lost in patterns so complex, so rapidly 
overlapping, that the mind is soon no longer able to follow them" ("Writing" 266). 
Losing sight of our point of entry, we rapidly become lost ourselves in the maze of 
textuality, for each step leads to so many places. "'The sky is blue', for example," writes 
Sollers, "would be metamorphosed into images, memories, journeys or sensations of 
multiplied transversal presences" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 267). No wonder, then, 
that Stillman's progress through the city is so slow, advancing on his journey 
"sometimes by the merest of increments, pausing, moving on again, pausing once more, 
as though each step had to be weighted and measured before it could take its place 
among the sum total of steps" (Auster, City 58). Each step must indeed be carefully 
considered, for there are an infinite number of steps to select, or reject. 
Significantly now, the need to adhere to the world, as described above, is now 
not a constraint, a deformation of the purity of the textual space, but a source of 
guidance, a means of preventing the text from falling into chaos (the same attention to 
the world is seen in Sollers when, describing a woman, "it is the female body (the face) 
that selects from the series of possibilities of red" (Ricardou, "Writing" 268». Sollers 
employs another limiting device also, a temporal limit, the daily rhythm, night and day, 
for "the Night selects all the images evoked in the first part, the Day in the second" 
(Ricardou, "Writing" 271). Stillman, meanwhile, gives a day to each letter, thus 
limiting the possible range of his meanderings. A further means of containing his 
message is Stillman's decision to stay within the boundaries of 11 Oth Street, 72nd Street, 
Riverside Park, and Amsterdam Avenue, for "this strictly material measure metes out 
the physical space allotted the writing for its development, and regulates the writing 
itself," says Ricardou ("Writing" 270), though writing, of course, of how Sollers' 
narrator "chose a notebook" and "divided it into two parts" (qtd. in Ricardou, "Writing" 
270).47 To limit the space is to limit the growth of the potential textual network, but the 
47 Anna Blume, in Auster's In the Country of Last Things, experiences these temporal and physical limits 
also, as her "handwriting has become smaller and smaller" so that she can "fit everything in" to her blue 
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potential can also be limited by the actual for, finally, Stillman's path is assured simply 
because he is writing it. The act of writing, as Ricardou shows, is very different to the 
act of imagination which can so quickly lose itself in its wanderings. "Exercising the 
imagination while at the same time apprehending its movement - such is the privilege 
that writing seems to enjoy," he writes, and again, as with Butor and Bradford, it is the 
written word's durability which is significant: "The written fragment is not flight, 
mobility, disappearance, but rather inscription, a stable reference" ("Writing" 266). 
Moreso even than the orbits of Kepler, Stillman's spatial form depends on its physicality 
to convey its message, for the forms of the letters must be legible, each of their parts 
occupying a suitable site, intersecting with the printed lines at the correct point. It is not 
enough that a "privileged thread" like Sollers's red be written through the text, but this 
thread, if drawn across the text, actually inscribed on the page, must signify something. 
Stillman's path is meaningful because he remains oriented within the space of the page, 
and the parts of his passage remain in proper relation with each other because his 
actions physically situate them, they cannot shift. When we remember that Stillman, as 
writer, can account for only four words scrawled across the surface of the city, and 
cannot claim to be the author of this space in its textual entirety, the stability of this 
writing achieves a further importance, for Stillman's steps assume, now, their positional 
similarity by their very inclusion in Stillman's work, marked out in their relation to each 
other by the work that Stillman does in his walking through the city. Outside of any 
other relation that may exist between the parts of this path, this act of writing itself gives 
them a common ground. 
The space of text emerges, then, as a differential space, stepping back from 
chaos, yet subverting its own order, and delimited in time and space by physical 
placement and virtual projections. It is found in the printed word, projecting a mental 
world, but is reducible to neither, combining both, a space amid places. In describing it, 
we recall Derrida's observation that "between two opposites, the third can participate, it 
can touch the two edges" (Truth 34). The joining of the two edges was the problem 
facing Immanuel Kant, for, as Derrida says, his "first two critiques of pure (speculative 
and practical) reason had opened an apparently infinite gulf' (Truth 35). Kant was 
aware ofthe need to fill this gulf, this abyss. He writes: 
notebook (183). Finally, she realises, "You might have to stop, but that is only because you have run out 
of time. You stop, but that does not mean you have come to the end" (Auster, In the Country 183). 
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If thus an abyss stretching out of sight is established between the domain 
ofthe concept of nature, that is, the sensible, and the domain of the 
concept of freedom, that is, the suprasensible, such that no passage is 
possible from the one to the other (by means therefore, ofthe theoretical 
use of reason), as between worlds so different that the first can have no 
influence on the second, the second must yet have an influence on the 
former. . .. Consequently it must be that there is a foundation of unity. 
(qtd. in Derrida, Truth 35-36) 
The domains Kant speaks of are physical and mental space. The expressed need to find 
a passage from one to the other is partially answered in his third Critigue, "identifying in 
art (in general) one of the middle terms for resolving the 'opposition' between mind and 
nature, internal and external phenomena, the inside and the outside" (Derrida, Truth 35), 
but Derrida takes this further. Drawing on Kant's repeated use ofthe metaphor or 
analogy "of the immense 'abyss' which separates the two worlds and ofthe apparent 
impossibility of throwing a bridge from one shore to the other," Derrida argues that the 
"recourse to analogy, the concept and effect of analogy are or make the bridge itself' 
(Truth 36). He goes on to say, "The analogy ofthe abyss and of the bridge over the 
abyss is an analogy which says that there must surely be an analogy between two 
absolutely heterogeneous worlds, a third term to cross the abyss, to heal over the gaping 
wound and think the gap. In a word, a symbol. The bridge is a symbol, it passes from 
one bank to the other, and the symbol is a bridge" (Truth 36). 
Following Ehrmann, we can see the symbol as only another form of 
displacement, a further manifestation of text's differing and deferring space. It seems 
we can rewrite Derrida, saying the bridge is the space of text, it passes from one bank to 
the other, and the space of text is a bridge. It touches the edges of physical and mental 
space, bridging the two, connecting them, and it does not side with one or the other, but 
remains attached to both while also remaining of itself. It is a bridge between places, 
which can be traversed, crossed over, allowing traffic to pass from one side to another. 
As such, it is a space which can be occupied, upon which (perhaps even under which) 
we can dwell if we so wish, but this then raises the question of what it might mean to 
linger in textual space, and where this would then place us. This is the question which 
the next chapter attempts to answer by asking whether, when we describe textual space 
as a third space, between the physical and the mental, we are describing a textual space 
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only, or whether this describes also another space which we haven't as yet named or 
fully understood. 
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II 
WRITING THE SPACE OF TEXT: SOCIAL SPACE 
In the previous chapter, our aim was to arrive at an understanding of what might be 
meant by textual space, how we might recognise it, and what it encompassed. 
Beginning with the reassuring physicality ofthe book as an object, and the distribution 
of this object in a commercial domain, we continued on to the study ofthe distribution 
of print on the page, and how this affected our reading of the text. Arguing against the 
idea that the written word is only a record of the spoken word, we moved from a 
discussion of the significance of material divisions in the textual line to an 
understanding of the importance of repetition as a disruptive element in the seemingly 
smooth progression ofthe text. Gradually, textual space emerged as a network of 
connections and relations between elements of greater similarity or dissimilarity, held in 
tension between the pages which give it substance and the world which it constructs. 
What also became clear, however, as we began to distinguish between spaces, worlds, 
spatialities, and spatial forms, is that, as Rob Shields points out, "we are in desperate 
need of a vocabulary to conceptualise the varied production and consumption of varied 
spaces, places and landscapes" (154), especially as it became apparent also, even in the 
contrast between the linear and the non-linear, that textual space was a non-uniform 
space, but rather one which could be shaped and utilised according to one's purpose and 
intent. The question to be addressed in this chapter is whether textual space is itself 
unique, or whether it participates in a larger spatiality, one which, like textual space, is 
not easily classified as either physical or mental. If such a space can be identified, then 
an analysis of the nature of this space should give us a greater insight into the specific 
nature of textual space also. 
Just such a space was the subject of a lecture given in July 1995 at a conference 
in the City University, London, where Edward Soja spoke of the re-emergence of the 
concept of space as an important element in social and cultural theory. In a discussion 
which reflected what spatial theorists were saying about literary theory, Soja had 
already argued, in Postmodern Geographies, that social theory was guilty of prioritising 
the temporal over the spatial, and his intent there was to readdress the imbalance, not 
placing geography, or the wider concept of space, in a temporally-minded critical 
consciousness, but placing it on a par with time in its importance for social theory. In 
his lecture, Soja argued that it was now possible to discern a move away from a dialectic 
towards a new trialectic where every object was seen as simultaneously historical, 
social, and spatial. Soja has traced this renewed interest in spatiality back to Michel 
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Foucault, John Berger, Ernest Mandel, and Fredric Jameson, but it is the work of 
another of his named theorists, Henri Lefebvre, which will be the focus of this chapter 
and what follows, even as it has implicitly informed all that has gone before. Although 
Lefebvre does not tend to portray space and time as fighting for dominance within social 
theory, his work is an example of the type of theory which Soja champions, concerning 
itself with the "ontological trialectic" (Soja, Thirdspace 70) ofhistoricality, spatiality, 
and sociality. More than this, Lefebvre displays an extraordinary sensitivity towards the 
nature of space itself, and argues against what he would see as an inadequate 
understanding of the ways in which we inhabit the spaces of society. Whereas, 
traditionally, philosophy tends to view space either in material terms, as containing 
concretised forms which can be empirically described, or in ideal terms, as a construct 
of thoughts and representations, Lefebvre added to these physical and mental spaces a 
new space, a lived space, "actually lived and socially created spatiality, concrete and 
abstract at the same time, the habitus of social practices" (Soja, Geographies 18). Social 
space is not added as something separate, however, but instead "all 'space' is social 
space" (Shields 155) in the sense that all that Lefebvre includes in the word 'l'espace' is 
social space. This chapter will argue that it is within this lived, social space that we 
should understand textual space, the space of text, and, moreover, that, in discussing 
space in terms of spatial practice, representations of space, and spaces of representation, 
Lefebvre provides us with the key to identifying and analysing the varying forms of 
textual space. 
Henri Lefebvre and the production of space 
The key work in elaborating Lefebvre's theories of space, and the focus of our 
discussion, is The Production of Space, a continuation and summation of his thoughts 
on the nature of space, politics, urbanism, the city, and everyday life. It begins with a 
brief history and critique of the ways in which space has been conceived, moving from 
Aristotle's understanding of space ( and time) as categories enabling humans to classify 
perceptions, to Descartes's understanding of space as that which contains all objects and 
perceptions of them, and returning to a categorical concept of space in the work of Kant. 
Though this is an issue which still occupies philosophy, Lefebvre claims that, in recent 
times, mathematicians have laid equal claim to space and, in their attempts to describe 
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it, have in fact "invented spaces - an 'indefinity', so to speak of space: non-Euclidean 
spaces, curved spaces, x-dimensional spaces (even spaces with an infinity of 
dimensions), spaces of configuration, abstract spaces, spaces defined by deformation or 
transformation, by a topology, and so on" (Lefebvre 2).48 These then are conceptual 
spaces, being either spaces within which the world can be mathematically represented, 
or spaces which have no worldly, in the sense of physical, reality, but can only be 
conceived of in mathematical terms by the mind. They exist then as what Lefebvre 
would call mental space. Moreover, they would also seem to exist within mental space, 
for Lefebvre appears to understand the term in two ways; it is not necessary that a 
particular space, Euclidean or other, be postulated, it is sufficient simply that something 
should happen which, though obviously abstracted from the physical world, is equally 
obviously situated in some theoretical space. Thus, when Roland Barthes says of 
Jacques Lacan, "His topology does not concern within and without, even less above and 
below; it concerns, rather, a reverse and an obverse in constant motion - a front and back 
forever changing places as they revolve around something" (Critique qtd. in Lefebvre 
5n), he is placing Lacan's discourse within some space of clear orientations, an up and 
down, a frontward and backward, a left and right, an inside and outside, despite the fact 
that Barthes does not explicitly situate or describe this space. As Lefebvre says, "No 
limits at all have been set on the generalization of the concept of mental space: no clear 
account of it is ever given" (3). Indeed, this space is rarely recognised by those who use 
it, despite the fact that any space self-created by an author must, in some way, conform 
to the author's views and preconceptions, and so cannot be "extra-ideological" (Lefebvre 
6). 
In contrast with the idealism of mental space, and providing us with the second 
spatial category, there is seen to exist physical space, real space, the space of physical 
actuality. Within this space, Lefebvre says, objects are sensible by the human body, 
knowable by the five senses of sight, hearing, touch, taste, and smell, empirically 
describable. This space coincides with, or at least contains, the space of nature, where 
nature includes not simply natural objects such as trees and flowers, but all things which 
exist, and have existed, independently of human intervention, including the Earth, the 
solar system, and even the Universe or, as Lefebvre describes it, the Cosmos. Lefebvre 
says that physical space is "defined by practico-sensory activity and the perception of 
48Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Lefebvre are taken from The Production of Space. 
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'nature'," but he qualifies his use of "nature" for the same reason that it cannot truly be 
said that physical and natural space coincide, namely because "(physical) natural space 
is disappearing" (Lefebvre 27,30). If 'natural' can be interpreted as 'untouched', little 
remains that is natural, for social practices have progressively colonised the natural 
world. 
For some, mental space is the only space of the text. For example, Edward 
Marcotte's question, and proffered answer, is: 
But what space does a novel fill - the space occupied by the physical 
book, pages bound in cloth or paper? Or is it the dimensions of the 
printed page itself, so many lines of so many inches across, with so many 
letters per inch? But can we then say that the fiction is somehow 
constituted within these printed characters? 
This has to be nonsense, of course. Fictional space exists in the 
mind alone. (267) 
The space of the text is here denied a physical aspect, but removed to a mental space, 
which is a space given only the appearance of an existence as a result of mental 
processes for, as he says, "the space ofthe mind is no space" (268), for the mind has no 
dimensions. Marcotte's first question, "What space does a novel fill?" assumes a 
different aspect now, for, placed in a space without co-ordinates, it is left to the mind 
itself to delimit the space of the novel, to embody a thing of no substance. As Blanchot 
also remarks, though critically, "people create an opposition between action, which is a 
concrete initiative in the world, and the written word, which is supposed to be a passive 
expression on the surface of the world" ("Literature" 370). 
The strict division of space into mental and physical spaces is, for Lefebvre, a 
problematic one. He contends that, while it is rare that a philosopher should even 
acknowledge the mental space within which s/he theorises, it is rarer still for a 
philosopher to detail the way in which that mental space relates to physical space, that 
space in which human beings, as physical creatures, exist. The result of this indistinct 
relation between the mental and physical spaces is the effective sidelining of the realm 
of social interaction, which takes place within physical space. Philosophical thinking, in 
Lefebvre's opinion, has failed to come to terms with the link between theory and 
practice, especially social practice, and has replaced the human collective in the mental 
space with "the abstract subject, the cogito of the philosophers" (Lefebvre 4). Man, 
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therefore, human beings, society, has fallen into the gap between mental and physical 
space. It is partly this imbalance which Lefebvre wishes to readdress in The Production 
of Space, repositioning humankind in a third space, a social space and, in so doing, 
developing a reconfiguration in our understanding of space which "aims both to 
reconnect elements that have been separated and to replace confusion by clear 
distinctions; to rejoin the severed and reanalyse the commingled" (Lefebvre 413). The 
duality of mental and physical, which Lefebvre sees as being as unnatural as any 
supposed division between mind and matter, or culture and nature, or even time and 
space, becomes then a triad of mental, physical, and social, where there is always a 
possibility of overlapping, shared, and similar qualities rather than two isolated spaces 
separated by a vacuum. 
Lefebvre's introduction of a third space is simply one example of what Soja 
describes as "his insistent disordering or ... deconstruction of binary logic" (Thirdspace 
7). For Lefebvre, two terms were never enough, a position reflected even in the 
situation of his own life. Though he lived mostly in Paris, he always remained tied to 
his roots in the Pyrenees, so that he embraced both the urban and the rural, the centre 
and the periphery; "I enjoy my life between the centers and peripheries; I am at the same 
time peripheral and central, but I take sides with the periphery" (Lefebvre, Temps qtd. in 
Soja, Thirdspace 29). For Lefebvre, there "is always the Other, a third term that 
disrupts, disorders, and begins to reconstitute the conventional binary opposition into 
an-Other that comprehends but is more than just the sum of two parts" (Soja, Thirdspace 
31). Lefebvre applies this strategy, which Soja describes as "thirding-as-Othering" 
(Thirdspace 5), not only to the duality of centre-periphery, but also to the dualities of 
subject-object, mental-material, natural-social, bourgeoisie-proletariat, local-global, and 
agency-structure, each time "transforming the categorical and closed logic of either/or to 
the dialectically open logic ofbothland also" (Soja, Thirdspace 60). Lefebvre's use of 
dialectical logic was based on the belief that the dialectical materialism which Marx had 
applied to limited areas could be developed as an universal method. Lefebvre's focus, 
however, is always on the dialectical, though, "at the same time, knowledge and 
understanding and the opportunities for transformation are limited by material, historical 
conditions" (Shields 111 ).49 
49 As Shields points out, Lefebvre's 1939 work Materialisme Dialectigue, translated in 1968 as Dialectical 
Materialism, is his best-known and most widely translated work. The adoption by the Parti Comrnuniste 
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The co-dependent nature of the triad of spaces means that social space is hard to 
define for, though it is contiguous with the mental and physical spaces, it is not limited 
by their status. Lefebvre himself asks, and answers, "Is this space an abstract one? Yes, 
but it is also 'real' in the sense in which concrete abstractions such as commodities and 
money are real. Is it then concrete? Yes, though not in the sense that an object or 
product is concrete" (27). Such 'yes and no' answers can be frustrating, but what 
Lefebvre does say for definite is, "(Social) space is a (social) product" (26). As a 
product, then, it is not a result of nature, for nature, in Lefebvre's view, does not produce 
but creates, for it brings forth all that it does spontaneously, without consciousness, and 
without labour. Neither can social spaces be generally considered as works of art if, as 
Lefebvre thinks, works can be defined as "unique, original, primordial" (Lefebvre 73), 
because, even if beautiful, such places are rarely planned as works of art but are the 
results of geographical, historical, economic, political, military, and other forces, and 
can be changed constantly by these forces. Moreover, these spaces are reproducible for 
"repetitious spaces are the outcome of repetitious gestures" (Lefebvre 75). The defining 
factor of social space, then, is that it is a social product. 
Lefebvre contends that every society, and so every mode of production, 
produces its own space. In order for this society to survive, this space must contain the 
social relations of reproduction, "the bio-physiological relations between the sexes and 
between age groups, along with the specific organization of the family," and the 
relations of production, "the division of labour and its organization in the form of 
hierarchical social functions" (Lefebvre 32). In a capitalist system, a society must also 
contain the relations for reproduction of those elements which constitute capitalism. 
These actions and interactions of production and reproduction are included within what 
Lefebvre terms "spatial practice." Spatial practice is that which Barney Warfrefers to 
as "the ontological reality of spatial existence" (111), and which Lefebvre says "consists 
in a projection onto a (spatial) field of all aspects, elements and moments of social 
practice" (8). Though spatial practice includes the social actions of the members of a 
society, and results in a social space, "secretes that society's space" (Lefebvre 38), social 
spaces can also restrict the members of that society, classifying actions as either 
permitted or prohibited. Spatial practices of today include those of everyday life, the 
Frans;ais (peF) of Soviet theoretical orthodoxy one month after the book's initial publication, however, 
meant a large part of the first printing was seized and destroyed, while the book also suffered later when 
Althusserian interpretations of Marx came to the fore (Shields 109-10). 
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daily routine of the individual, and the construction and use of transport and information 
networks which link places designated for "working, living, recreation, circulation" 
(Jencks, Keynote address). These practices have their source, ultimately, in the human 
body which performs the actions and, by doing so, defines the basic directions within 
space of up and down, higher and lower, left and right, before and behind, while at the 
same time, due to the bipedal nature ofthe body, introducing notions of symmetry and 
asymmetry. 
The spatial practices which contribute to the production of the space of the text, 
include all that affects the physical reality of the text as book. These are the practices 
which we earlier subsumed under the heading distribution, involving the act of writing, 
including the longhand writing of words onto paper, the typing ofthe words on a 
manual typewriter or on a computer, or any other method of production of the text; the 
editing process, as well as any other actions which affect the layout and appearance of 
the text; the reproduction of the original text, whether this is the initial printing from 
computer, the copying of the text from one computer disc to another, or the 
photocopying or printing of an original manuscript; preparations for the final 
presentation of the text, including, for example, the binding of the book; the commercial 
distribution and purchasing ofthe book which guarantees the geographical availability 
of the text (this distribution is comparable to the transport and information networks 
which are included within the wider set of social spatial practice, because it involves the 
placement of objects throughout the world which are linked because they are identical 
and so demand certain actions, reactions, and interactions from their users, even as 
certain actions are performed within spaces designated for leisure, living, and work); the 
practice of reading and interpreting the text. 
These spatial practices are also social practices, social space being a social 
product. Every stage in the production of a text, therefore, is affected by social 
conditions which alter the text and our experience of it, for, as Derrida writes, "the place 
of writing is linked ... to the nature of social space, to the perceptive and dynamic 
organization of the technical, religious, economic and other such spaces" (Qf 
Grammatology 290). Opening a book, for example, there are conventions at work of 
which may be unaware, and yet still they affect our approach to the text, our tangible 
and, as Lefebvre suggests, bodily experience of it. In the placement of the title and half-
title, we should notice how the right-hand page, or recto, is privileged over the left-hand 
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page, or verso, so that, as Butor explains, "The movement from left to right which 
carries our eye along constantly tends to make us leave the left page for the one on the 
right, which for this reason is called the 'good' side" ("Object" 55). The eye, then, 
moves automatically to the right, beginning its sweep through the pages of the book, an 
action which will be reflected on each and every page as the eye moves along the lines, 
echoing the movement ofthe hand, or the cursor, which first produced the text. This 
seems a natural action, but Butor, in his discussion, has already alerted us to former 
methods of record. Derrida, for example, discusses "writing by the turning of the ox -
boustrophedon - writing by furrows [which] was a movement in linear and 
phonographic script," an economical form which proved "less suitable for writing than 
reading"(Of Grammatology 288, 289). As a social product, textual space is affected by 
changing spatial practices, which can mean the reconfiguration of the reading and 
writing processes. As Barthes writes, "Where should one start? Well, by the working 
instrument, the typewriter. ... Everything begins not with the subject, but by the 
instrument of production" (Sollers 78). Thus, we should not think that even now textual 
space is static, for we have already seen how Hillis Miller sees in new technologies the 
means to liberate both writer and reader, visualising his text as "a virtual hypertext ... 
[where] each chapter can be related to the others by a multitude of different conceptual 
and figurative links" (Topographies 6).50 
As well as these relations of production and reproduction, social space also 
contains symbolic representations of such social relations, and it is through these 
representations that a society is informed, or informs itself, of its own nature, so 
encouraging continuity and containment of that society. Since it is the body that is the 
root of social space, it is also the body which is often used to represent fundamental 
social concerns of sexuality, power, and death, either in an explicit (frontal) or implicit 
(coded) way (Lefebvre 33). Lefebvre divides this representation into two forms, 
representations of space, and representational spaces (or" spaces of representation" 
[Stewart 610]). The former, "which might equally be thought of as discourses on space" 
(Shields 161), is "tied to the relations of production" (Lefebvre 33) and is the dominant 
space in any society, being the conceptualised space of scientists, planners, engineers, 
and urbanists. The latter space, "which might best be thought of as the discourse of 
50Mireille Rosello argues that "the metaphorical system goveming our conceptualization of reading is 
transparently dependent on the print medium" and that hypertextuality acts "to defamiliarize the reading 
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space" (Shields 161), is a space invested with symbolism and meaning. Lefebvre says 
of it, "This is the dominated - and hence passively experienced - space which the 
imagination seeks to change and appropriate" (39). As a social space, it will be argued, 
textual space may contain both forms of representation. Moreover, in this identification 
of representations of space and representational spaces, it seems Lefebvre enables us to 
properly discern between those textual spaces which are marked by their spatial 
linearity, and those displaying spatial form. We had suggested that the linear text, in its 
attempt to minimise its volume, seemed to assert that it was in no way interfering with 
the information it conveyed, for "a straight line conveys no information beyond the fact 
that the line is there" (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's Line 8). Therefore, where the spatialised 
text, it will be argued, becomes a representational space, the linear text would act like a 
window on reality, providing us with a true representation of space guaranteed by its 
natural relation with the objects it presents. 
As representations of space, however, such texts do remain a part of a socially 
produced space, and must conceal this in order to convince us that they are really 
natural. Lefebvre, in discussing how it might be possible to conceal the fact that space 
is a product, suggests that this is achieved through "a double illusion," the illusion of 
transparency and the realistic illusion (27). Significantly, the effect of these interacting 
ideological illusions mirrors the desired effect of Stillman's project in City of Glass, for 
the end result is an apparently unproblematic relationship between language and a 
comprehensible world. The illusion oftransparency means space is viewed "as 
innocent, as free of traps or secret places," for "anything hidden or dissimulated - and 
hence dangerous - is antagonistic to transparency," with the result that "comprehension 
is thus supposed, without meeting any insurmountable obstacles, to conduct what is 
perceived ... from the shadows into the light" (Lefebvre 28). It is through speech and 
writing, Lefebvre argues, through "a total clarity of communication" and a "grasping of 
the 'object'," that we assume decipherment is possible, meaning "communication brings 
the non-communicated into the realm of the communicated - the incommunicable 
having no existence beyond that of an ever-pursued residue" (Lefebvre 28-29). Reality 
offers no resistance to its explication in speech and writing, and "a rough coincidence is 
assumed to exist between social space ... and mental space," the world being as we 
imagine it (Lefebvre 28). Where the illusion of transparency is related to "philosophical 
process and the book as object" (123, 122). 
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idealism," the realistic illusion, on the other hand, "is closer to (naturalistic and 
mechanistic) materialism" (Lefebvre 30). In this view, which recalls Stillman's vision 
of a functional language, "language resembles a 'bag of words' from which the proper 
and adequate word for each thing or 'object' may be picked. In the course of any 
reading, the imaginary and the symbolic dimensions, the landscape and the horizon 
which line the reader's path, are all taken as 'real'" (Lefebvre 29). In contrast, in 
representational spaces the symbolic dimension remains a more insubstantial thing. 
The production of space involves, therefore, a second triad of spatial practice, 
representations of space, and representational spaces. In order to clarify and expand on 
these terms, Lefebvre introduces a third triad to correspond with the second, basing it on 
the human body. In relation to spatial practice, he speaks of perception, as practice and 
action presuppose the use of limbs and the sensory organs. Representations of space, 
involving scientific and technical knowledge, are related to the mind and what is 
conceived therein. The final element of the three, representational spaces, because they 
are experienced through associated images and symbols, are spoken of as being lived. It 
will be noted that this last triad mirrors the very first, with physical space being linked 
to what is perceived, mental space with what is conceived, and social space with what is 
lived. 
Again, none of the three elements in the production of space is easily explained 
or defined for, as with mental, physical and social space, they are both overlapping and 
separate, and can exist independently or dependently within the same space. Perhaps 
the best way to illustrate the nature of these elements, and especially to distinguish 
between the categories of spatial representation, is to note, as Lefebvre has, the ways in 
which the balance has shifted amongst them through history for, as already has been 
said, every society has its own social space. The history of any social space is not, 
however, necessarily the history of that society as we would usually know it, as a series 
of dated events or as "a sequence, whether teleological or not, of customs and laws, 
ideals and ideology, and socio-economic structures or institutions (superstructures)" 
(Lefebvre 46). The history of a social space is rooted in nature, in the situated, climatic 
conditions of an area which determine the productive capabilities of the society which 
grows there. An obvious example, pointed out by Lefebvre (73-77), is the city of 
Venice and the ways in which it has adapted to, and been formed by, the sea. 
Considering the nature of this history, it can be seen that though Lefebvre might seek to 
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produce a unitary theory of physical, mental, and social space, he is not attempting to 
develop a meta-theory with explicitly predictive or prescriptive conclusions. Instead, 
Lefebvre's unitary theory is essentially a descriptive one, allowing for a detailed and 
insightful analysis of societies without claiming to be able to fully explain why they are 
as they are. 51 
Lefebvre's history essentially charts the transition from one form of space to 
another, namely from absolute space to abstract space. Absolute space is to be found in 
the earlier historical, as opposed to pre-historical, societies, though it could also be said 
that it "refers primarily to spaces of pre-capitalist times" (Sayer 458). Absolute space 
involved the 'appropriation' of natural sites, such as a cave, a mountain-top, a spring, or 
a valley, which were chosen for their "intrinsic qualities" (Lefebvre 48) but were then 
brought into the political and religious realms, usually through architectural structures 
with symbolic significance. This symbolism was emphasised through rites and 
ceremonies. Lefebvre uses as an example the Parthenon in Greek society, a sacred 
place, as are all absolute spaces, with a clear perimeter and "aspects but no facade" 
(Lefebvre 237), so that it cannot simply be 'read' but must be perceived in its entirety. 
Its construction is at one with its appearance "so that the external appearance and the 
composition ( or structure) of Greek buildings are indistinguishable from each other: 
each contains and reveals the other" (Lefebvre 238). Absolute spaces were often empty, 
"a sanctified inwardness set itselfup in opposition to the outwardness of nature" 
(Lefebvre 48), but it was as if, due to the qualities of its location, the space could be a 
part of, and so contain, all the space of nature around it. Though empty inside, this left 
room for the forces of nature, for fertility and death, for the divinities, whose presence 
might be symbolically indicated either through nature, "the peaks, the heavens; and 
abysses or gaping holes," or through the architectural structure, through its columns, 
planes, levels, and so on; "horizontal space symbolizes submission, vertical space 
power, and subterranean space death" (Lefebvre 236). Again, the power represented in 
the architecture is emphasised by religious, magical rites which protect the priestly 
510ne effect also of Lefebvre's unitary theory, "is to reunite over-specialised areas of knowledge by 
substituting or giving an overriding emphasis to the spatiality of action, objects, laws, semiotic codes, 
economic processes and cultural practices rather than analysing them in terms of the priorities prescribed 
by the specialised domains of knowledge" (Shields 151). Thus, Lefebvre, while directly influencing his 
one-time assistant Jean Baudrillard, and engaging in philosophical debate with Jean-Paul Sartre, has also 
found his work employed by geographers such as Soja, David Harvey and Dereck Gregory, though he 
"never published in a geography journal in his life" (Shields l56n), and has been cited by feminist writers 
such as Donna Haraway and Bell Hooks. 
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rulers of the space by permitting some acts and prohibiting others in their rituals, while 
also setting aside some areas of the space as public and others as private or sacrosanct. 
In this sense also, what surrounded the absolute was condensed within it. These 
magical spaces were true representations of space and representational spaces, for 
through the spatial practices performed within them, they echoed the social structures of 
the outside world, while in their structure and intent, they signified that society'S 
comprehension of the cosmos. 
In contrast with the absolute space of the pre-capitalist societies, the space 
produced by capitalist society is, Lefebvre argues, abstract space. Abstract space 
superseded historical space, which had originally overcome absolute space. The 
development of historical space included a shift in emphasis from country to town, with 
a corresponding shift in the nature of agricultural production. The increasingly 
important towns and cities excluded nature from their territories, resulting in the gradual 
disappearance of absolute spaces, which were founded in natural locations. By the 
twelfth century, a further element of historical space had developed, described by Erwin 
Panofsky as "visual logic" (Lefebvre 259), evident in works such as the great cathedrals. 
These differed from temples such as the Parthenon where construction and appearance 
were one and the same, because these new cathedrals employed load-bearing columns 
and pillars which meant walls could be lighter and more decorative. The use of statues 
and facades became widespread as medieval architects attempted "to have the exterior 
present the interior and render it visible" (Lefebvre 261). This was the beginning of the 
"trend towards visualisation" which was to entail, with the emergence of abstract space, 
space's "subordination to the written word" (Lefebvre 261). 
The process of abstraction began with "the divorce of labour from direct 
association with the satisfaction of needs" (Sayer 458) when "productive activity 
(labour) became no longer one with the process of reproduction which perpetuated 
social life" (Lefebvre 49), so being abstracted from its original role, leading to abstract 
social labour and, inevitably, due to the connection between modes of production and 
space, to abstract space. As an attempted description of the sort of space created by this 
era's predominantly capitalist societies, abstract space is obviously a complex concept. 
Lefebvre says that as "a product of violence and war, it is political; instituted by the 
state, it is institutional," and that it "is buttressed by non-critical (positive) knowledge, 
backed up by a frightening capacity for violence, and maintained by a bureaucracy 
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which has laid hold of the gains of capitalism" (285, 52). If the three categories in the 
production of space are applied, "in spatial practice, the reproduction of social relations 
is predominant. The representation of space, in thrall to both knowledge and power, 
leaves only the narrowest leeway to representational spaces, which are limited to 
works, images and memories, whose content, whether sensory, sensual or sexual, is so 
far displaced that it barely achieves symbolic force" (Lefebvre 50). In so describing 
abstract space, Lefebvre is, of course, incorporating Marx's concept of alienation, which 
Lefebvre develops as a key element in his own thinking, and does not confine to the 
workplace alone, but extends throughout everyday life. Lefebvre's 'alienation' is a 
spatial concept "referring to displacement and distance" (Shields 40), resulting in "the 
estrangement of man from man and from his own individuality" (Lefebvre and 
Guterman qtd. in Shields 45), making us strangers to ourselves. Moreover, our own 
alienated state is hidden from us "or covered over with myths: people were actually 
convinced that they were living the 'good life'" (Shields 40). The members of society 
are effectively cut off from the space of nature or, indeed, any alternative space to that 
within which the relations of capitalism are reproduced. As this space is controlled by 
bureaucratic forces with a vested interest in the continuation of capitalism, there is a 
trend within abstract space towards homogeneity, towards the production of a uniform, 
manageable abstract space, though this homogenisation is counteracted to some extent 
by inherent contradictions in abstract space. In order to produce and reproduce this 
space, capitalist systems, which already determine most spatial practices, employ 
representations of space to ensure the continuation of these practices. Access to spaces 
of representation, then, are limited, with lived space being replaced with conceived 
space, and people encouraged simply to watch rather than to act. In fact, living 
becomes, for Lefebvre, "the practice of overcoming alienation to reach a deeper level of 
understanding, of engagement and of reconciliation" (Shields 43). But societies are 
alienated from life by the continuous representations of how they should live in a world 
where the "metaphorical qualities of objects are also ignored in a general reduction of 
the meaningfulness of the world to a set of predefined and commodified advertising 
images" (Shields 41). As Lefebvre says; "Perhaps it would be true to say that the place 
of social space as a whole has been usurped by a part of that space endowed with an 
illusory special status - namely, the part which is concerned with writing and imagery, 
underpinned by the written text Gournalism, literature), and broadcast by the media; a 
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part, in short, that amounts to abstraction wielding awesome reductionistic force vis-a-
vis 'lived' experience" (52). 
The reductionist force of abstract space can be analysed according to Lefebvre, 
through three elements, or formants. The first of these is the phallic formant, for it is 
the phallus, Lefebvre claims, which is most often represented because "metaphorically, 
it symbolises force, male fertility, masculine violence" which "does not remain abstract, 
for it is the brutality of political power" (Lefebvre 287). The second element is the 
geometric formant, or the desire to reduce space to a utilisable space such as that of 
Euclidean geometry, "the reduction of three-dimensional realities to two dimensions (for 
example, a 'plan', a blank sheet of paper, something drawn on that paper, a map, or any 
kind of graphic representation or projection)" (Lefebvre 285). The third is the optical 
(or visual) formant, the blanket application of Pan of sky's logic of visualisation, which 
involves "dependence on the written word ... and the process of spectacularization" 
(Lefebvre 286). These last two are effected through metaphor and metonymy which 
privilege the visual over all other senses so that "finally, by assimilation, or perhaps by 
simulation, all of social life becomes the mere decipherment of messages by the eyes, 
the mere reading of texts" (Lefebvre 286). 
Approaching a Lefebvrean space of text 
It is very apparent that Lefebvre considers a textualisation of space (not to be confused 
with the spatialisation of text) to have played a large part in the abstraction of space. 
Textual space would thus be aligned with representations of space, "how space is 
portrayed" (Warf 111). The conceptual approaches to representation which inform the 
writing of the text, are often implied in the labels attached to them, Realist, Modernist, 
Postmodernist, Futurist, and so on, and the portrayal of spaces within these texts, the 
representation of the world, is affected by the conceptual apparatus ofthe writer(s) and 
of the genre. Thus Lefebvre speaks of how "Celine uses everyday language to great 
effect to evoke the space of Paris .... Plato ... offers marvellous descriptions of 
cosmic space, and of the space of the city as a reflection of the Cosmos. The inspired 
De Quincey ... or Baudelaire in his Tableaux parisiens, offer us accounts of urban 
space rivalling those of Victor Hugo and Lautreamont" (14-15). 
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When it comes to the textualisation of space, however, the focus of Lefebvre's 
attack is semiology, leading Barney Warfto declare, "Few today would feel at home 
with his casual dismissal of symbols and epistemology, his hostility to language and 
abstraction" (112). For Lefebvre, the epistemology oflinguistics projects a mental 
space within which linguists theorise, so that, in the triad of parts in the production of 
space, it aligns itself with representations of space. As an example, Lefebvre refers to 
the work of J. M. Rey, and Noam Chomsky in particular, who "has posited the existence 
of a linguistic level ... endowed with specific properties - with orientations and 
symmetries," speaking of "ajinite set of levels ordered from high to low" (Lefebvre 4-5, 
5). This tendency towards abstraction we saw too in the theoretical precursors to these 
linguists, in the Structuralist space postulated by Saussure, and in the attempts at 
"constructing a poetics which stands to literature as linguistics stands to language" 
(Culler, Structuralist Poetics 257), seeking an underlying system of literary elements 
and combinations which would explain the readability of all texts. Such systems are 
inevitably open to questions concerning the ontological nature ofthe structures 
described. To use Lefebvre's terms, one can ask if these structures are present in the 
physical space of the text, or whether they exist purely as abstract constructs within 
mental space. Genette says of them that, "they are systems of latent relations, conceived 
rather than perceived, which analysis constructs as it uncovers them, and which it runs 
the risk of inventing while believing that it is discovering them" ("Structuralism" 68), 
suggesting that these structures exist more naturally in mental rather than physical 
space. Lefebvre understands a structure as abstracted from its context as that which "is 
conceived, and implies a representation of space" (Lefebvre 369). More importantly, 
Genette indicates the dangers of a pure structuralism when he describes it as "an 
ideology, the prejUdice of which is precisely to value structures at the expense of 
substances, and which may therefore overestimate their explanatory value" 
("Structuralism" 68), while Shields argues that Structuralism was an indication "ofthe 
extension of alienation ever deeper into the previously unregulated areas of everyday 
life" (122). 
Operating within a mental space, linguists are open to the same criticisms that 
Lefebvre makes of all who do so. The first is that they ignore the created gap between 
their new mental spaces and the existing spaces of social reality, tending to "spring 
without the slightest hesitation from mental to social" (Lefebvre 6). The second charge 
116 
made against such an abstract approach is that social practice is excluded from the 
linguistic process as it becomes something of an entity in itself, self-creating and self-
generating; "Epistemological thought, in concert with the linguists' theoretical efforts, 
has reached a curious conclusion. It has eliminated the 'collective subject', the people as 
creator of a particular language, as carrier of specific etymological sequences" (Lefebvre 
4). Lefebvre is wary of a conception oflanguage where comprehensibility is developed 
from within, for then "language, the vehicle of understanding, gives rise to an 
understanding of itself which is an absolute knowledge" (133). When "the 
methodological study of chains of signifiers is thus placed at the forefront of the search 
for knowledge," the result is "an extreme formalism, a fetishization of consistency in 
knowledge and of coherence in practice: a cult, in short, of words" (Lefebvre 133, 131). 
Relating the theory of the sign to set theory and so to logic, Lefebvre says, "Every 
mental and social relationship may thus be reduced to a formal relation of the type: A is 
to Bas B is to C. Pure formalism becomes an (albeit empty) hub for the totalization of 
knowledge, of discourse, of philosophy and science, of perceptibility and intelligibility, 
oftime and space, of 'theoretical practice' and social practice" (133), obviously related 
to the Modernist epistemological pursuit of "the standardisation of knowledge and 
production" (PRECIS 6 qtd. in Harvey 9). 
The "coherence in practice" and the "totalization of knowledge" of which 
Lefebvre speaks, can be seen as part of the desire for homogenisation within capitalism, 
everything gradually being reduced to language; "everything - music, painting, 
architecture - is language. Space itself, reduced to signs and sets of signs, becomes part 
of knowledge so defined. As, little by little, do all objects in that space" (Lefebvre 133). 
Lefebvre's conviction is that not everything is reducible to language, "that signifying 
processes (a signifying practice) occur in a space which cannot be reduced either to an 
everyday discourse or to a literary language of texts," and so he is dismayed, for 
example, by any architectural attempt to make a building 'readable', where "the architect 
is supposed to construct a signifying space wherein form is to function as signifier is to 
signified" (Lefebvre 136, 144). Lefebvre would encourage the efforts of architects such 
as Robert Venturi who "sees space not as an empty and neutral milieu occupied by dead 
objects but rather as a force full oftensions and distortions" (Lefebvre 145). 
Lefebvre's fears of an extreme formalism which would strive to reduce the three-
dimensions of space to a two-dimensional readable surface, and which would encourage 
117 
architects to aim for this as a new conception of space, make an interesting comparison 
with those of Spanos, reacting against the spatialisation of time rather than the 
textualisation of space. 52 The instinct which leads Lefebvre to condemn the readable 
space is the same as that which has Spanos decry a "formalist theoretical discussion" 
which considers an encounter with a text as "preeminently a matter of 'seeing'" 
("Literary Criticism" 89). Indeed, the ultimate aim ofliterary Formalism was to arrive 
at "a general theory" ofliterature (Eichenbaum 104), purportedly through scientific 
principles, and it shares the reductive tendencies of any model which attempts to 
standardise knowledge. The development of such a theory inevitably results in the 
abstraction to some degree of the material being analysed, so that though a formal 
device is initially studied in the context of the work as a whole and what it achieves 
within that work, it is then related to some abstracted concept of that device so that its 
function can be delineated. Eichenbaum speaks of how "the Formalists quite naturally 
used literary works only as material for supporting and testing their theoretical 
hypotheses," demonstrating "that the same device may reappear in diverse materials," 
and attempting "to differentiate, to understand, the function of a device in each given 
case" (115, 117, 132). The salient devices are removed to a conceptual space, no longer 
situated within a physical context. 
Now, many ofthe interpretations of spatial texts presented in the course of our 
discussion did involve formal elements such as "parallelism, comparison, repetition, 
symmetry" (Eichenbaum 113), all notably devices cited in (Russian) Formalist literary 
52Lefebvre's textualisation and Spanos's spatialisation are both defined in terms of a lifeless space 
abstracted from the social world. Spanos links the formalist approach with the negation of time, and, 
with it, of change, progression, Becoming and, ultimately, of life. Therefore, for Spanos spatial literature 
expresses a "desire to escape from time and change or, in Worringer's term 'the flux of happening,' into a 
static sharp-edged eternity of geometric plastic form" ("Literary Criticism" 94). Spanos here is referring 
to Wilhelm Worringer who, in his work Abstraction and Empathy, suggests two catalysts for art, one the 
"aesthetic urge to abstraction (the rejection of material forms)," the other the "aesthetic urge to empathy 
(the affIrmation of material forms)" (Spanos, "Literary Criticism" 94). The latter, which is expressed 
through naturalistic art-forms, is evident where there exists "a happy pantheistic relationship of 
confidence between man and the phenomena of the external world" (Worringer 15 qtd. in Spanos, 
"Literary Criticism" 92), while the former, which results in non-naturalistic, "dehumanised" (Spanos, 
"Literary Criticism" 92), "nonorganic, linear-geometric styles" exists when "the relationship between man 
and the cosmos is one of disharmony and disequilibrium" (Frank, "Spatial Form" 53). Frank originally 
sees the spatial emphasis in modem literature as an effect of the aesthetic urge to abstraction, a reaction to 
the "insecurity, instability, the feeling of loss of control over the meaning and purpose of life amidst the 
continuing triumphs of science and technics" ("Spatial Form" 55). Note, however, that Worringer's 
"urges" again illustrate a particular bipolarity, the urge to empathy tending towards the physical, or at 
least the natural, and the urge to abstraction tending towards the mental. It is interesting, therefore, to see 
Spanos introduce a third urge, the urge to engagement or the urge to "dialogic encounter with the 
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theory which did draw attention "to interrelationships among the linguistic signs" 
(Abrams 273). To any accusations that a spatial understanding of a text is simply a 
formal understanding, we can say that, obviously, if a Formalist approach aids in the 
identification of the specific structuring elements in a text, then there is no reason not to 
borrow such techniques, but this does not mean that a spatial analysis of a text should 
have the same aims as a Formalist analysis, to develop "a science ofliterature that 
would be both independent and factual," to differentiate between poetic and practical 
language, to identify the literariness that makes a work a work of literature, to examine 
the defamiliarising effects of formal devices, and to understand literary evolution "as the 
dialectical change of forms" (Eichenbaum 102, 136). Moreover, in our analysis of 
textual spatiality we have always insisted that the space is dependent on embodiment in 
the text, so that the emphasis is not on developing a system or account of the devices 
used but rather the significance of their employment within the text to produce a specific 
space of signification to guide the reading. As Vi dan points out, "in a merely technical 
analysis, however exhaustive, no enumeration of recurrences and thematic collocation, 
of recognizable symmetries and contrasts, can ever reach the spatial effect of the whole" 
(150). No description ofthe structures of the space can equal the force of experiencing 
that space, or, as Shields says, "it is not possible to do what the Structuralists wanted; to 
separate out two 'levels of analysis' ... without tending to forget and mystify the fact 
that language is an equally human invention" (123). 
To illustrate the significance of attendance to the physicality ofthe text, and, 
especially, the physicality of the text as experienced in time, we need only recall 
Bradford's characterisation of his visual form, when "words and phrases will begin to 
resonate through the text not merely because of their position within the syntactic 
sequence but also ... because ofthe spatial relationship," and a "tension or counterpoint 
... is created by a disjunction between the temporal movement of language and the 
movement of the eye across its static configurations on the page" (Bradford 28, 31). But 
Bradford's visual form is also instructive in other ways at this point. We might 
remember, for example, how Bradford placed cummings on the extreme end of his 
sliding scale, for in cummings "our awareness of how temporal language can describe or 
signify a relation between an event and a feeling is fused simultaneously with a visual 
dreadful world of crisis generated by temporal flux" ("Literary Criticism" 95), which can perhaps be 
described as the social urge, the urge to connect with social space. 
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representation of that process. . .. Without actually transforming language into visual 
iconic images, cummings succeeds in fusing the conventions of interpretation that, for 
Lessing, separate poetry from the visual arts" (Bradford 35). Bradford does, however, 
include on his sliding scale certain forms of poems which employ iconic signification, 
namely picture, or pattern, poems, also known as the calligrammes.53 For Bradford, the 
work of Herbert and Herrick in particular, "in which the symbolic function of the 
language and the iconic function of visual art are both present," are important in the way 
that the visual and aural are combined to convey different facets of the same effect, 
though Bradford does feel that such poems are not as effective as the blank verse of 
Milton in exploring the tensions which can develop between what is seen and what is 
heard: "In the pattern poem the line is the stable building-block which, defined by metre 
and rhyme, represents a discrete component of sequential auditory structure, and it also 
operates as a graphic unit of the visual image. There is no conflict between the visual 
and auditory materiality of the line" (Bradford 106,109). 
Superficially related to calligrammes, but beyond even cummings's end of the 
scale, are concrete poems. Although Edwin Morgan, writing for the catalogue ofthe 
1965 exhibition "Between Poetry and Painting" at the ICA, describes concrete poetry as 
"only emphasising and developing an already existing component of visual effect" (qtd. 
in Bradford 130), Bradford rejects concrete poetry because it privileges the graphic 
impact of a language form at the expense of the syntactical and grammatical structures 
which make a linguistic discourse possible. They threaten to "move so far into the 
purely graphic or the mathematical that they are no longer making their appeal through 
language as such" (Morgan, qtd. in Bradford 130). Bradford takes as an example the 
following by Eugen Gomringer: 
silencio silencio silencio 
silencio silencio silencio 
silencio silencio 
silencio silencio silencio 
silencio silencio silencio 
53The picture poem dates back to classical Greek poetry, where examples include the "Syrinx" (shaped so 
that it might be inscribed on a pan-pipe), generally attributed to Theocritus, though perhaps mistakenly so 
(see Gow 2: 554). Possibly the fIrst English example is Stephen Hawes's The Convercyon of Swerers, 
while other writers to have used the form include George Herbert, Robert Herrick, Lewis Carroll, Dylan 
Thomas, Francois Rabelais, and Guillaume Apollinaire. More recent examples of pattern poems include 
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A poem such as this can be said to have achieved the "contrived depthlessness" that 
Jameson sees as the defining characteristic of post modern architecture (qtd. in Harvey 
58); it is simply depthless, and so, supposedly, "readable" (Jencks, Architecture qtd. in 
Lefebvre 144), its form "supposed to enunciate or proclaim the function" (Lefebvre 
144). A "concrete poem communicates its own structure; structure-content" (A. de 
Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari qtd. in Bradford 133), so that the correspondence 
of form and function" or in other words," as Lefebvre puts it, "the application of the 
criterion of readability, makes for an instantaneousness of reading, act and gesture" 
(144). Compare this to Ricardo Gullan's remarks that "concrete poems seem to be 
written, or rather inscribed, without regard to temporality; rapidly visualized, they are 
related to the notion of simultaneity and not succession. The eye takes the composition 
in at a glance and captures, by its configuration, its meaning" (14). Of course, to do this 
successfully, the concrete poem must isolate itself as far as possible from the sequential 
and temporal characteristics oflanguage, must reject "the combinative system through 
which the integers of linguistic communication are strung together to create meaning" 
(Bradford 131). The aim is to "create a specific linguistic area," allowing the meaning 
of the poem to be developed from within (A. de Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari 
qtd. in Bradford 134). The poem becomes a self-contained system, its own saturated 
context, depending on nothing external to it to complete it. 
Bradford's interpretation ofthe poem is that "we might claim that the poem-
picture is a meditation upon the paradox that in order to describe silence in language we 
need to use a linguistic symbol which transfers easily into sound, whereas true silence 
can only be communicated by the absence of the signifier" (Bradford 132). The 
"silencio" absent from the middle of the poem is the truest representation of silence, an 
unspoken silence. As an object which proclaims its function, as a dedicated work, this 
appears as the mirror image of Stillman's letters, intended as pure communication in 
contrast to the reticence of the poem. Silence and the Tower of Babel, the gaping mouth 
and the speaking tongue, zero and one, both imagine themselves to be whole. The one, 
knowingly, strips language of all that is worldly, identifying that which signals the 
absence of event, action, or object, and the other, in its innocence, thinks itself complete 
in the presence of that which it names, a mythical object. But Bradford's criticism of a 
John Hollander's "Skeleton Key" and "Swan and Shadow," Derek Mahon's "The Window," and Gloria 
Anzaldua's "I Press My Hand to the Steel Curtain," which maps North and South America. 
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work such as Gomringer's is that "they invite the reader to relocate them within the kind 
of communicative circuit that they seek to transcend" (132), and that there is an inherent 
tension in the concrete poem being seen as "an object in and by itself, not an interpreter 
of exterior objects" and yet depending upon a (linguistic) system which is external to the 
poem and whose purpose is specifically to refer to objects and experiences exterior to 
that system (A. de Campos, H. de Campos, and Pignatari qtd. in Bradford 133).54 As 
with Stillman's letters, the impossibility of an absolute context opens the work to a 
wider field, draws them into the play of differance. 
This is of particular significance when we consider that Shields says ofDerrida's 
description of the play of language that "Lefebvre would agree," though "he would 
deplore the alienated state of language, scoffing at those who concluded that signs ended 
up referring to nothing" (124), as misguided readings of Derrida tend to suggest. In 
fact, Lefebvre, discussing the gap between social and mental spaces, allows that, "by 
contrast, when Derrida gives precedence to the 'graphic' over the 'phonic', to writing 
over speech ... clearly some search is being made for a transition or articulation 
between, on the one hand, the mental space previously posited (i.e. presupposed) by 
these authors, and, on the other hand, physical/social space" (Lefebvre 5n). This might 
surprise those who contrast Derrida with Lefebvre, because Lefebvre himself is often 
read as privileging the immediacy of the speech act over the written communication, his 
argument "blurred and oversimplified into a black-white contrast between authentic 
speech and language (structure)" (Shields 124). In truth, however, Lefebvre's focus is 
not on the speaking subject, but on the role of the body as it brings language into the 
world, manipulating its environment and cultural codes through actions which are not a 
guarantor of meaning but are "fundamentally unpredictable" (Shields 123). Lefebvre's 
desire, then, is for a study oflanguage "in use not as an abstract system" (Shields 124). 
He makes mention of Georges Bataille's category of "social space (communication, 
speech)," and of "that social space wherein language becomes practice," and says that 
"perhaps what have to be uncovered are as-yet concealed relations between space and 
language" (19, 5, 17). Perhaps some of these relations are indicated in Derrida's 
reminder that communication may mean "the vehicle, transport, or site of passage of a 
meaning, and of a meaning that is one," Stillman's ideal, but that we may also, actively 
54Bradford's point is well taken when one realises that this translation of the poem, from Solt (91), is far 
more readable for someone who does not speak German than the original, which involves the repetition 
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and physically, "communicate a movement, or that a tremor, a shock, a displacement of 
force can be communicated - that is, propagated, transmitted. It is also said that 
different or distant places can communicate between each other by means of a given 
passageway or opening" ("Signature" 309). Dijferance, of course, "is the name we 
might give to the 'active,' moving discord of different forces, and of differences of 
forces" (Derrida, "Differance" 18). 
At this point, therefore, we can observe that Lefebvre might not be aggrieved so 
much by a textualisation of space but by "a literary language oftexts" (Lefebvre 136), 
the way in which texts are spoken about, or, more pertinently, conceived. The 
conceptual spaces within which we theorise about signs, the spaces of Formalism and 
Structuralism which Lefebvre sees as reductive forces acting upon social space, are 
means of representing texts and textual space. In this sense, the aim of these 
representations is to make texts readable, constructing mental models of the text which 
are as abstracted a representation of the text's spatiality as they are of social space, 
reducing the space of the text to the terms of theoretical space. The formalist approach, 
in the broadest sense, cannot recognise the full extent of the spatiality of the text but can 
only apprehend its surface. Applying Lefebvre's concerns about the space of 
architecture to literature's space, it seems that the same concept of readability has 
deprived literary texts of a third dimension also, a third space, the lived space, social 
space. As Lefebvre describes it, social space is a space which "qualifies as a'thing/not-
thing', for it is neither a substantial reality nor a mental reality, it cannot be resolved into 
abstractions, and it consists neither in a collection of things in space nor in an aggregate 
of occupied places. Being neither space-as-sign nor an ensemble of signs related to 
space, it has an actuality other than that of the abstract signs and real things which it 
includes" (402). With the text reducible neither to its physical existence nor to ideal 
abstraction, both concrete and also abstract, not natural but reproducible, a social 
product, conceived of through representations of space, and sharing all this with social 
space, then the text must be considered spatially, as a social space, perceived and 
produced through spatial practice, and not simply viewed but experienced, lived, 
through reading. 
That Lefebvre should lead us to such a reading of texts is not ultimately 
surprising, for his distaste for the alienation ofthe everyday which lies at the root of his 
of the word "schweigen" (see Gomringer 58). 
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hostility towards an abstract textuality, also results in a optimism regarding the 
possibilities of literature, and especially "the creation of 'works' (likened to artworks) 
instead of products or commodities. These 'works' or oeuvres are an antidote to 
alienation" (Shields 100).55 As a member of a group of young philosophers calling 
themselves les Philosophes (including Pierre Morhange, Georges Politzer, Norbert 
Guterman, Georges Friedmann, Paul Nizan, and, on the fringe, Sartre), who published 
their own journal from 1924 to 1925, Lefebvre imagined "a new postwar world in which 
poetry and a new form of lived philosophy would come to the fore. . .. The central 
theme of this self-published journal was the idea that it is possible to create lucidly one's 
life as a work of art" (Shields 13). The idea embraced what might be termed youthful, 
certainly masculine, notions of adventure and desire, including a "hooligan style" and 
"absurdist gestures," but the sometimes crude actions of the group gained theoretical 
weight after their discovery ofthe work of the Dadaists and the Surrealists (Shields 30). 
Les Philosophes were to become increasingly involved with the Surrealists, to 
the extent that they produced ajoint manifesto, published in Clarte. Lefebvre himself 
had close relations with Tristan Tzara, one ofthe founders of Dadaism, and, later, would 
form one of the links between Surrealism and the Situationists, after Guy Debord 
attended his seminar group in Strasbourg. Lefebvre was drawn to Dadaism because it 
revealed "the potential of surprise, shock and humour for thinking of not only artistic 
images but of everyday life in new ways" (Shields 54). By blurring the divisions 
between high and low art, presenting everyday objects as works of art, and bleeding 
drama into life, it questioned the assumption that the function of art was as a 
representational tool serving society. Lefebvre also admired the Surrealists, though 
their aim was to transcend rather than remove alienation, in a process so individualistic 
as to leave little room for the social. Both movements, however, declared in some form 
the Philosophes'beliefthat "self-definition could only be found through action and self-
expression" (Shields 32). 
For Lefebvre, this process of self-definition was most fully realised in what he 
termed moments of presence, which we would "categorise as 'authentic' moments that 
break through the dulling monotony of the 'taken for granted'" (Shields 58). On a larger, 
societal level, such moments might express themselves in festive events, as 
55Lefebvre wrote only a few books on literature alone, Rabelais, Musset, Pignon, and Contribution a 
l'esthetique. 
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outbreakings of an adventurous and revolutionary spirit contributing to "the eternal 
Festival and the creation of situations" (Lefebvre qtd. in Shields 92).56 Though 
Lefebvre was never able to fully present his theory of moments, Shields suggests that he 
viewed them as "creating a link between the body and consciousness," and as "having a 
concrete existence ... a certain tangible quality" (59). Moreover, these moments take 
form, for they are "themselves essential forms in which everyday contents are arranged 
in recognisable patterns" (Shields 60), but these patterns are always part of a larger 
design, and the moments just glimpses of a larger whole. "Partial totalities," says 
Lefebvre, "I see them as 'points of view' reflecting totality" (qtd. in Shields 60). 
As such, Lefebvre's moments recall those points in Kepler where the astronomer 
is given a glimpse of greater truths through those coincidences which act as windows on 
the realities of his world, like "a pin-hole in the surface of a familiar world, through 
which, if only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might glimpse 
enormities" (Banville 174). Moreover, these moments of presence act within our 
experience of the everyday just like points of repetition on the textual line, for they 
disturb and "puncture the 'everydayness' or banality of repetitive tasks like a ray of 
sunshine through clouds" (Shields 60-61). We would argue, of course, that the 
repetitiveness of the routine which numbs our experience oflife should be mapped on to 
the uninterrupted line of the text, for the repetitions in the line which divert us from our 
preordained course are anything but routine, instead disrupting our placid progress 
through the text. As moments in the text, they draw our attention to our own presence 
and participation in the text in a way which, Lefebvre would insist, is not uniquely 
individual, but "may link us to others' experiences at other times and in other places" 
(Shields 62).57 
That we can make such a connection between textual repetitions and Lefebvre's 
spontaneous moments of renewal is supported by the similarities between the 
spatialising practices we have been describing, and those of the Dadaist poets who 
"fragmented the structures that perpetuated the trivialisation of the lives of the people" 
by, as Kermode would say, their disruption of a sense of an ending (Shields 57). 
56The Situationists themselves, however, criticised Lefebvre's theory of moments, arguing that Festivals 
could too easily become State-sponsored spectacles, producing false moments. They also felt that his 
theory remained too abstract, mixing "existential experience with essentialist concepts of, for example, 
'love'" (Shields 104). 
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Kermode is critical of a randomly determined fragmentation of the sort practised by 
William Burroughs, whose aim was "to produce the accident of spontaneity" (Burroughs 
qtd. in Kermode, Sense of an Ending 118) in order to not only undermine the narrative 
line but, argues Kermode, "to defeat our codes of continuity, cultural and temporal" 
(Sense of an Ending 117). For Kermode, pure disjunction or "the absolutely New is 
simply unintelligible" and the noise ofthe randomly assembled text is only ever 
welcome when we hear in it an echo of "our inherited notions oflinguistic and narrative 
structure" (Sense of an Ending 116, 118). This he finds in the work of the Dadaists, for, 
though their call was for "abolition, spontaneity in a tottering world ... Art, something 
old, animated it" (Sense of an Ending 120).58 This accords with Lefebvre's 
understanding of moments, for they do not represent a break from the everyday, but 
rather emerge as part of it, for, "while everday life is colonised ... Lefebvre maintains 
that everyday life is also the site of the authentic experience of self, ofthe body and of 
engagement with others" (Shields 77). The everyday includes "the different rhythms of 
the life-cycle, expressed in family life" which can free it from "the regulatory 
framework of linear time," just as the textual line contains those very repetitions which 
will disrupt and divert it (Shields 95). Moreover, there are also similarities to be found 
between those oeuvres wherein there is always the potential for moments for presence, 
and those spatial forms produced by the disorderings in the textual line (Shields 95). As 
Shields argues, the oeuvre is "characterised by formal simultaneity where all the parts 
refer to the whole and vice versa. The importance of the oeuvre is its character of being 
a totality, an indivisible whole, from which something is always lost ifit is separated 
into component parts" (101). Each of these concepts, therefore, of the everyday, of the 
oeuvre, and ofthe moment, which are central to Lefebvre's lived philosophy, and to 
lived space, can be related to our own experience of textual space. The next section 
looks more closely at these relations, focusing especially on how the text is a space 
which is lived. 
57 Agamben, too, compares those festivals which "interrupt the homogeneity of profane time" to the work 
of art in which "the continuum of linear time is broken, and man recovers, between past and future, his 
present space" ("Original Structure" 101, 102). 
58Barthes shows how Sollers, too, calls for a "genuine spontaneity" (Sollers qtd. in Barthes, Sollers 55) 
which is "not linked to a disorder of the words" and "does not consist in paying no attention to language" 
(these practices are "the height of convention") (Barthes, Sollers 55n, 56n). Instead, Barthes says, 
Sollers's search for spontaneity is "an almost utopian ... quest for an a-language, a fully corporeal one, 
fully alive" (Sollers 55-56n). 
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Harmonice corporis: spatial rhythms 
"But what is a writer doing when he writes?" asks Blanchot. "Everything a man does 
when he works, but to an outstanding degree. The writer, too, produces something - a 
work in the highest sense of the word. He produces this work by transforming natural 
and human realities. When he writes, his starting point is a certain state of language, a 
certain form of culture, certain books, and also certain objective elements - ink, paper, 
printing presses" ("Literature" 371). Blanchot's vocabulary here, as he describes the 
production of his literary space, defined by Clark, echoing Soja, as a "third space" 
between mimetologism and "'literarity' in the sense first isolated by the formalists" (76), 
reflects remarkably Lefebvre's as he speaks of that other element in the production of 
social space, "the 'mixed' space - still natural yet already produced - of ... poetry and 
art. The space, in a word, of representations: representational space" (Lefebvre 203). 
Representational space is a dominated space, for our capitalist society privileges 
representations of space, conceived space, over this lived space. Yet, these 
representational spaces, also known as spaces of representation, are central to any 
development of a textual spatiality along Lefebvrean lines, for at the basis of 
representational space lies absolute space, that pre-capitalistic space which Lefebvre 
relates to the space of language, asking, "Is this perhaps the space of speech? Both 
imaginary and real" (251). Lefebvre says of representational space that it is the space of 
"'inhabitants' and 'users'," and it includes the space of "some artists and perhaps ofthose, 
such as a few writers and philosophers, who describe and aspire to do no more than 
describe" (39). Later, Lefebvre speaks of societies, such as the Chavin of the Peruvian 
Andes, whose "representational space appears in their art works, writing-systems, 
fabrics and so on" (43). All this suggests that Lefebvre did not reject the possibility of 
textual representational space, "space as directly lived through its associated images and 
symbols" (Lefebvre 39).59 
For an impression of how this space might work, we can look to Lefebvre's 
discussion of the theatrical space, which, like the "imaginary and real" space of 
language (Lefebvre 251), involves an "interplay between fictitious and real 
59Notably, it is one of Lefebvre's strongest convictions "that signifying processes (a signifying practice) 
occur in a space which cannot be reduced either to an everyday discourse or to a literary language of 
texts" (Lefebvre 136), recalling the resistance to naturalisation which Bradford and Frank see in their 
visual and spatial forms respectively. 
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counterparts" (Lefebvre 188). Lefebvre says that, as a result of this interplay, "bodies 
are able to pass from a 'real', immediately experienced space (the pit, the stage) to a 
perceived space - a third space which is no longer either scenic or public. At once 
fictitious and real, this third space is classical theatrical space" (188). This theatrical 
space which is both fictitious and also real, lying beyond the stage and yet not crossing 
into fantasy, parallels the textual space which is more than the physical book, though 
always grounded in it, the space of the text a staging area for all that might be possible, 
though, we should say, within limits. Of theatrical space, Lefebvre also says: 
To the question of whether such a space is a representation of space or a 
representational space, the answer must be neither - and both. Theatrical 
space certainly implies a representation of space - scenic space -
corresponding to a particular conception of space (that of the classical 
drama, say ... ). The representational space, mediated yet directly 
experienced, which infuses the work and the moment, is established as 
such through the dramatic action itself. (188) 
For Lefebvre, theatrical space is a particularly social space, and he speaks of how a 
"Greek theatre presupposes tragedy and comedy, and by extension the presence ofthe 
city's people and their allegiance to their heroes and gods" (222). 
We might ask if there is action, or an action, in the text which establishes it as a 
representational space. We must already know that we cannot mean the action 
recounted in the narrative alone, for this would return us to the world of the text, to the 
scenic space. We could reconsider the actions involved in reading; taking the book 
from the shelf, opening it, turning the pages, scanning the lines, the eyes skipping from 
one line to the next. Or we could imagine the actions ofthe writer, if we knew what it 
was to write, though sometimes, as Butor described, the writer at least guides us in our 
reading, in the judged line-ends of the poem, aiding comprehension and articulation. In 
prose, he spoke of the strophe, the perfect page, but this is a poetic division also. As 
Lowell writes, "The unit in vers fibre is not the foot, the number of syllables, the 
quantity, or the line. The unit is the strophe, which may be the whole poem, or may be 
only a part. Each strophe is a complete circle," and, then, she reminds us, "In fact, the 
meaning of the Greek word 'strophe' is simply that part ofthe poem which was recited 
while the chorus were making a turn around the altar set up in the centre of the theatre. 
The simile of the circle is more than a circle, therefore; it is a fact" (Lowell 139). 
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Immediately we have the idea of the construction of the text rooted in the action 
of a body performing onstage. This seems to reverse the normal order. Dramatic 
works, obviously, inform the actor's movements onstage, their words and intonation, 
and there are examples, such as the aforementioned Beat movement and especially 
performance poets, where this sense of the text as a limiter of movements has a far more 
literal sense. For poets such as David Antin, who extends "the prepared text, through 
theater and ritual" (Hoover, Introduction xxxvii), poetry becomes something which 
requires a performance space, and though in Antin's case the text is secondary to the 
performance, it is the catalyst for what will ultimately be the poem. Others, however, 
use the text to form the performance space, and to guide the performer. Jackson Mac 
Low's series of poems The Pronouns involves a set of cards "'on which there are groups 
of words and action phrases around which dancers build spontaneous improvisations.' 
Due to a 'correspondence of format to syntax, each verse line, including its indented 
continuation, if any, is to be read as one breath unit.' Thus the series of poems not only 
stands as script for the dance, but also provides its own instructions for oral 
performance" (Hoover, Introduction xxxiv). 
As Lowell implies, however, just as the body can be shaped by a text, so text can 
be formed by the body. A close relationship between the body and the text is evident in 
the work of Charles Olson, for example, in the way he saw the length of the poet's 
breath determine the length of line, the natural rhythms of the body being reflected in 
the rhythms of the poetry. Olson did not see the text just as a score for its own 
performance but also as a record of its own production, "a graph of the process through 
which it was produced" (Baym et al. 2422), or, as Bradford puts it, "the line is a record, 
an indication of the perceptual, mental and spoken process that brought it into 
existence" (148). For Olson also, the text is a space, a field "where all the syllables and 
all the lines must be managed in their relations to each other," a field wherein these 
elements "(the syllable, the line, as well as the image, the sound, the sense) must be 
taken up as participants in the kinetic of the poem just as solidly as we are accustomed 
to take what we call the objects of reality; and that these elements are to be seen as 
creating the tensions of a poem just as totally as do those other obj ects create what we 
know as the world" (Olson 616-17). Rather than seeing the poem as a text requiring a 
performance space, it becomes possible to see the text as a performance space in itself, 
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where the writer has recorded the process of writing and where the reader now re-
experiences this process by contact with the rhythms, tensions and relations of the text.60 
Olson can be said to have "reconnected poetry with the body" so that "the line 
becomes an extension of the body itself' (Hoover, Postmodern 3, Introduction xxxii), 
but Ginsberg sees the same occurring in prose also: "There is a tradition of prose in 
America, including Thomas Wolfe and going through Kerouac, which is personal, in 
which the prose sentence is completely personal, comes from the writer's own person -
his person defined as his body, his breathing rhythm, and his actual talk" (qtd. in 
Hoover, Postmodern 130). If textual space ever seemed like a purely static 
configuration, such an understanding of the basis of its production results in a far more 
vital space, related to lines of movement, voices in dialogue, the rhythm of bodies. Nor 
should we think that the body is present only in those texts which, like Olson'S, make an 
effort to visually affect the text in accordance with the motions of the writer. An 
absence of line-ends, or of italics, or missing lines does not mean the breath is absent 
from the text for, as Derrida and Hillis Miller show, the very words we use to name 
writing can be traced back to the body which writes, for "writing is named by the 
involuntary sound in the throat caused by the bodily effort required to do it," the guh 
sound (Ariadne's Thread 10). Sollers, for example, recorded his unpunctuated text 
Paradis on tape, "restoring, by the way he read the stream-of-consciousness sentences, 
the punctuation so disconcertingly absent from the printed line" (Thody 13), and 
Barthes, quizzing himself on why Sollers should write without punctuation, says also 
that "you restore the punctuation, by the way you read it to yourself or by saying it out 
loud," with the lack of punctuation producing, perhaps, "a new rhythm, a new tempo" in 
the reader (Sollers 35). 
That the word 'rhythm' should itself punctuate the descriptions of the production 
of these texts is significant, because rhythm implies again a sense of repetitive elements, 
now more explicitly placed on a temporal line, but resulting in the same interruptions 
and breaks.61 As Agamben writes, "rhythm ... appears to introduce into this eternal 
flow [oftime] a split and a stop. . .. We perceive a stop in time, as though we were 
60For Bradford, however, Olson's space is ultimately a disappointing one, "not designed to set up for the 
reader a complex interplay between metaphor and metonymy. Indeed it is not designed at all; it is, in the 
most literal sense, a sequential recording of the unresolved possibilities and indecisions that occur at the 
interface between impressions and language" (149). Perhaps Olson shared the opinion of the Beat poets, 
that writing "could no more be revised than the act / of walking across a room" (Hoover xxix-xxx). 
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suddenly thrown into a more original time" ("Original Structure" 99). Rhythm includes 
a more obviously spatial dimension too, however, which is perhaps less familiar. 
Mitchell points out that we "generally suppose that this term applies literally to temporal 
phenomena such as speech and music and is a mere metaphor when used in discussions 
of sculpture, painting, or architecture" (548). Recent studies into the etymology of the 
Greek rhythmos, however, show that it "was based ... in the physical act of drawing, 
inscribing, and engraving and was used to mean something like 'form,' 'shape,' or 
'pattern'" (Mitchell 548). 1. J. Pollitt suggests of "rhythmoses" that: 
[they] were originally the 'positions' that the human body was made to 
assume in the course of a dance, in other words the patterns or schemata 
that the body made. In the course of a dance certain patterns or positions, 
like the raising or lowering of a foot, were naturally repeated, thus 
marking intervals in the dance. Since music and singing were 
synchronized with dancing, the recurrent positions taken by the dancer in 
the course of his movements also marked distinct intervals in the music .. 
.. This explains why the basic component of music and poetry was 
called a 'foot.' (qtd. in Mitchell 548-49) 
Dance, therefore, exhibits a rhythm which is both linear and cyclical with its continuous 
movement in space and time, and the repetition of patterns and positions. For Lefebvre, 
rhythm implies exactly this unity of the linear and cyclical, and "the way in which 
rhythms may be said to embrace both cyclical and linear is illustrated by music, where 
the measure and the beat are linear in character, while motifs, melody and particularly 
harmony are cyclical" (206).62 In the same way, a text combines the linearity of the 
narrative with the cyclical return to themes, motifs, images, symbols, characters, places, 
and words, reflecting as it does the rhythms of the body. Lefebvre always draws 
attention to the close connection between the body and rhythm, "for the body indeed 
61Kermode, for example, speaks of the "plot which depends on those subtle repetitions which E. M. 
Forster calls 'rhythms'" (Sense of an Ending 55). 
62Lefebvre's The Production of Space has been referred to variably as "dense," "vital" (Dear 489,494), 
"challenging," "rambling," "illuminating," "frustrating" (Sayer 459), "impenetrable," "intimidating" 
(Warf 112), "rich," and "suggestive" (Stewart 617), while, in his review, Molotch complains that, 
"Lefebvre wrote densely, with ... disorganised development of content" (893), and though the book 
begins with the coherence and structure of the "Plan of the Present Work," the plan dissolves in the 
sections that follow. Soja's explanation is that "Lefebvre wrote The Production of Space in the form of a 
fugue, a polyphonic composition based on distinct themes which are harmonized through counterpoint 
and introduced over and over again in different ways through the use of various contrapuntal devices" 
(Thirdspace 58). 
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unites cyclical and linear, combining the cycles of time, need and desire with the 
linearities of gesture, perambulation, prehension and the manipulation ofthings" (203). 
Ultimately, it is "through the mediation of rhythms [that] ... an animated space comes 
into being which is an extension of the space of bodies" (Lefebvre 207). Though they 
are aligned more directly to the world of the text, it is no coincidence that natural 
rhythms play such a significant part in the texts we have discussed: the steps in City of 
Glass, night and day in both City of Glass and The Park, sleeping and waking in Kepler, 
and the beating heart at the centre of that book.63 For Agamben, rhythm becomes "the 
principle of presence that opens and maintains the work of art in its original space" 
("Original Structure" 98). 
Now, space itself becomes the record of rhythms, for "space is nothing but the 
inscription of time in the world, spaces are the realisations, inscriptions in the 
simultaneity ofthe external world of a series oftimes, the rhythms of the city, the 
rhythms of the urban population" (Lefebvre qtd. in Shields 156). We witnessed this in 
our analysis of Stillman's textual space, formed by a sequence of steps which inscribe 
his message in an urban world. This sense of the text as a space produced by the body, 
and as a record ofthe rhythms ofthe body, is always present in the work of Auster. 
Before any word, he writes, "finds its way to the page it must first have been part of the 
body, a physical presence that one has lived with in the same way one lives with one's 
heart, one's stomach, and one's brain" (Invention of Solitude 138).64 Of Beckett, he 
writes, "the prose of Mercier and Camier moves along at a walking pace ... buried deep 
within the words, a silent metronome is beating out the rhythms of Mercier and 
Camier's perambulations" ("From Cakes to Stones" 85). And in an earlier essay, "The 
Art of Hunger," writing of "an art that is indistinguishable from the life ofthe artist who 
makes it ... an art that is the direct expression ofthe effort to express it," he brings 
space, the textual network, and the body together in one brief phrase, "the city is a 
labyrinth of hunger" (9, 18). Here, it is a cycle of need which governs the text, for the 
man who would be a writer "must eat in order to write. But ifhe does not write, he will 
63Imhof also argues that Part IV of Kepler, named for Kepler's Harmonice Mundi (where he describes 
that "harmony is form" (Banville 182)) is "suggestive of a compositional strategy known in music as 
retrograde canon ... / in which the imitating voice gives out the theme not as the fIrst voice gave it but 
with the notes in reverse order" (Imhof 136-7). 
64Edmond Jabes, whose work has influenced Derrida, and whom Auster has translated, speaks in an 
interview with Auster of how "a writer works with his body. You live with your body, and the book is 
above all the book of your body" (Auster, "Book of the Dead" 198). "The book," he says, "has become 
my true place ... practically my only place" (Auster, "Book of the Dead" 194). 
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not eat. And ifhe cannot eat, he cannot write. He cannot write" (Auster, "Art of 
Hunger" 9). The labyrinth, too, the textual network with its diversions and hesitations, 
has as its source the body. Auster writes: 
But just as one step will inevitably lead to the next step, so it is that one 
thought inevitably follows from the previous thought, and in the event 
that a thought should engender more than a single thought ... it will be 
necessary not only to follow the first thought to its conclusion, but also to 
backtrack to the original position of that thought in order to follow the 
second thought to its conclusion ... and in this way, if we were to try to 
make an image of this process in our minds, a network of paths begins to 
be drawn, as in the image of the human bloodstream ... or as in the 
image of a map ... so that what we are really doing when we walk 
through a city is thinking. (Invention of Solitude 122) 
The theme is taken up again in a short review, notably entitled "New York 
Babel," of Le Schizo et les Langues by Louis Wolfson, a schizophrenic who could not 
bear to hear or speak the English language, his hatred of his mother translating itself 
into an hatred of his mother tongue. In order to escape contact with English and 
"drawing on the several languages he has studied, he becomes able to transform English 
words into phonetic combinations of foreign letters, syllables, and words that form new 
linguistic entities, which not only resemble the English in meaning, but in sound as 
well" (Auster, "Babel" 121). In this way, the sentence "Don't trip over the wire!" 
becomes "Tu'nicht treb uber eth he zwim," a combination of German, French, and 
Hebrew. This metamorphosis of the English language has an equally transformative 
effect on the world around him; "By looking out on his world through a different lens, 
by punning his world - which is immured in English - into a different language, he is 
able to see it with new eyes, in a way that is less oppressive to him, as if, to some slight 
degree, he were able to have an effect upon it" (Auster, "Babel" 122). 
Auster later connects this phobia with Wolfson's fear of food, tracing this link 
between speaking and eating back to Adam, who named the creatures in the Garden of 
Eden but was then expelled for eating ofthe Tree of Knowledge. We have already seen 
how Stillman interprets this expulsion as meaning also "a fall of language" (Q!y 47), 
that point of which language was severed from reality. It is to redeem this fall that he 
walks around New York, collecting items that are broken and shattered, renaming them 
133 
and, at the same time, writing the word THE TOWER OF BABEL across the city. This act of 
writing by walking and Wolfson's act of speaking by translation both strive to avoid 
speaking a broken English language. Moreover, it seems possible to expand this motif 
to include Quinn himself, whose fondness for his own Max Work character suggests 
that he would sympathise with the aims of Stillman's quest. If, as Norma Rowen 
suggests, "we remember that one school of thought adhered to the theory that the 
prelapsarian language was preverbal, a language of signs" (229. See also 
Malmgren192), then Quinn himself, perhaps unknowingly, partakes in Stillman's search 
by writing for the most part in his red notebook with a ballpoint pen bought from a deaf 
mute, a flag attached to the pen showing the hand positions for each of the twenty-six 
letters and urging the user to "LEARN TO SPEAK TO YOUR FRIENDS" (Auster, City 52). 
When Quinn finally fails in his investigation, he recreates the circumstances of 
Stillman's first experiment to use his son to access the prelapsarian language, for Quinn 
"ensconces himself in a room in the now-deserted Stillman apartment and reproduces 
almost exactly the conditions of Peter's childhood incarceration" (Rowen 231). The 
room, as a contained space, contrasts, for Auster, with the city as a place of writing. We 
saw, in the previous chapter, in the hesitant and measured progress of Stillman's writing, 
the dangers posed by the labyrinthine paths of the city. There is always, as Ricardou 
warns, the chance of getting lost. Describing in The Invention of Solitude the 
difficulties he encounters in writing about his father, Auster admits that "I have a sense 
oftrying to go somewhere, as if! knew what I wanted to say, but the farther I go the 
more certain I am that the path towards my object does not exist. I have to invent the 
road with each step, and this means that I can never be sure of where I am. A feeling of 
moving around in circles, of perpetual back-tracking, of going off in many directions at 
once" (32). Later, he says "his steps, by taking him nowhere, were taking him nowhere 
but into himself. He was wandering inside himself, and he was lost" (87). Rowen sees 
the same thing happening to Quinn, for "his wide divagations through the labyrinth of 
New York only bring him back to the inner world that he has been so assiduously 
avoiding" (227). Quinn's final destination, the room in the apartment in the city of New 
York, is the place "in which his inner reality might be expressed" (Rowen 226), the site 
of his truest writing. For Auster, too, the room, the physical location, becomes the place 
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of, and for, writing.65 He is "impossibly restless," then "he returns to his room .... He 
writes ... then he goes out to eat his dinner" (35, 75). "It begins, therefore, with this 
room," because only in this room is the body directed towards writing, not tempted to 
wander (Auster, Invention of Solitude 80). Quinn also considers "getting up and going 
to another room, but then he realized that he was quite happy where he was" (Auster, 
City 127). There is no need for him to leave because, when he wakes up, there is 
always food for him in the room, and he has the red notebook to write in. 
Once contained, the body becomes the site of writing, and, as a writing body, makes its 
site, the room that holds it, a place for writing. In the end, after writing in solitude for 
some time, Quinn "felt that his words had been severed from him, that now they were a 
part of the world at large, as real and specific as a stone, or a lake, or a flower. . . . He 
remembered the infinite kindness of the world and all the people he had ever loved" 
(130-31). "Here," says Rowen, "are words that tum into things, images of such force 
and clarity that they seem able to take their place in the world of objects, to become 
matter," and so, she asks, "Has Quinn found the prelapsarian tongue?" (232, 231). 
In his room, however, writing, Auster is like the character S. in his room, where 
the "walls were like the skin of some second body around him, as ifhis own body had 
been transformed into a mind, a breathing instrument of pure thought" (Invention of 
Solitude 89). With the room centred on the body, and the body centred on its writing, 
the writing becomes all that there is in the room, it fills it, and expands beyond it, like "a 
skull that encloses the room in which a body sits," because this space is now a space of 
writing (Auster, Invention of Solitude 88). So it is that Auster remembers standing in 
Emily Dickinson's room and "thinking of the seventeen hundred poems that were 
written there, trying to see them as part of these four walls, and yet failing to do so. For 
if words are a way of being in the world, he thought, then even ifthere were no world to 
enter, the world was already there, in that room, which meant it was the room that was 
present in the poems and not the reverse" (Invention of Solitude 123). 
Even before he has entered that room in Stillman's apartment, Quinn has become 
another link in a chain of characters for whom speech has become not simply "a 
65Charles Tomlinson "reminds us that the word 'stanza' once meant literally 'a room', a space within 
which we can move, but with limitations" (Bradford 167). Agamben observes also that in courtly lyric 
poetry "the anatomy of the body oflove has a strict correlate in the poem's metrical structure," as seen in 
the "anatomical metaphors that proliferate in metrical terminology (the stanza's 'feet,' 'face,' and 'tail')" 
("Corn" 28). The room, here, as an extension of the body, comes to form a second skin, so that Agamben 
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strangeness, an anomaly, a biologically secondary function ofthe mouth" (Auster, "New 
York Babel" 124) but is instead something situated in the world, something achievable 
through walking or signing, through a manipulation of the physical body in reality 
which renames that reality, recasts it through its revealed textuality. As "a way of being 
in the world," words become now an extension of reality, reconnected to it or embedded 
in it, a second skin for the body. Each ofthe stories in The New York Trilogy presents 
a variation on this theme, where a written biography stands for a man, or to be written 
about is to be changed. In Ghosts a writer called Black hires a detective called Blue to 
observe, trail, and report on him "to prove he's alive" (Ghosts 181). In The Locked 
Room the narrator becomes the literary executor of his old friend Fanshawe, carrying 
the load of unpublished manuscripts away from the apartment Fanshawe shared with his 
wife in two large suitcases which "together ... were as heavy as a man" (The Locked 
Room 208). Later, when the narrator attempts to write a biography of Fanshawe, he can 
inevitably see the book only as "a work of fiction" and yet Fanshawe's wife Sophie, now 
the narrator's wife, urges him to stop, saying "Your [sic] bringing him back to life" (The 
Locked Room 246, 285).66 
For Quinn, therefore, his situation in the room may hold more meaning than he 
perhaps at first realises. When we look to his place in the text, we will find that it seems 
possible to isolate him from all that might be considered real, possible to separate him 
from everything around him. His wife and child are dead; through the pseudonym 
William Wilson, he presents himself to the world as a writer (he is tempted, but fails, to 
introduce himself as Wilson to a young woman at the train station when he sees her 
reading one of his novels, while, in the same way, the woman who has moved into his 
apartment knows only that a writer, William Wilson, lived there); he has a literary agent 
whom he never meets; increasingly withdrawn, he lives vicariously in the world through 
the character of the private eye Max Work; when he finally plays the part of the 
detective himself, the identity he must adopt is Paul Auster's; Virginia and Peter 
Stillman Jr. disappear, while Peter Stillman Sr. commits suicide, and the few others that 
Quinn encounters include a deaf mute and a counterman "whose name he did not know" 
(Auster, City 37). Even in The Locked Room, the man originally hired to find 
can describe the "capacious storehouse or receptacle" of the stanza (Dante qtd. in Agamben, "Corn" 35) 
as the "formal womb of the stanza" ("Corn" 36). 
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Fanshawe, a man named Quinn, is said to have disappeared. The only characters who 
encounter Quinn and remain are Paul Auster, his wife, and their son Daniel. It seems 
that the reader would do well to heed the initial recommendation that, "As for Quinn, 
there is little that need detain us. Who he was, where he came from, and what he did are 
of no great importance" (Auster, City 3). All that remains of him in the end, all his 
remains are, is the red notebook in which he keeps his notes on Stillman, and which, in 
conjunction with the character Paul Auster's witness, allows the unnamed narrator to tell 
Quinn's story. 
The possibility arises, therefore, that the perceived author of the red notebook, 
the core of the story, is himselfumeal. In fact, City of Glass contains at least three other 
embedded narratives with fictitious authors. The first of these is the collected Max 
Work novels, written by William Wilson. The second is Henry Dark's The New Babel 
which is summarised in Stillman's The Garden and the Tower: Early Visions ofthe New 
World, itself paraphrased in Quinn's notebook, though of course "there never was any 
such person as Henry Dark" (Auster, City 80). The third is, peculiarly, Cervantes' Don 
Quixote which Cervantes claims was written in Arabic by Cid Hamete Benengeli and 
which Paul Auster claims was translated back into Spanish by Don Quixote himself. 
Quinn's fictitiousness would explain a number of things; the detail of the narrative; the 
disparity between the content of the narrative and what is quoted directly from the red 
notebook, supposedly the narrative's source; the impossibility though actuality ofthe 
narrative reporting Quinn's dreams "which he later forgot" (Auster, City 9, 106). But 
this is not to say that Quinn does not exist. When he writes the initials DQ (for Daniel 
Quinn, but also for Don Quixote) on the first page of the red notebook, which "was the 
first time in more than five years that he had put his own name in one of his notebooks" 
(Auster, City 39), he inscribes within the text his own adherence to the text, and places 
himself in the textual network of Auster's New York. 
Ifhis words are "a way of being in the world," therefore, it is not because, as 
Stillman would have hoped, he had "come up with the correct text of reality" (Rowen 
232), but because "materializing the signs, the notebook creates them" (Malmgren 197). 
The named notebook is a record of a reading of a text which remarks on the textuality of 
the world it produces, so that, reading and re-writing Stillman's message, Quinn reads 
66Barone points out also that Marco Stanley Fogg, from Auster's Moon Palace, "delights that his initials 
stand for manuscript," so that "Marco Stanley Fogg - MS - may be a life as work-in-progress" 
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the true nature of his textual existence, and writes himself into the world. "Language is 
not truth," writes Auster, "It is the way we exist in the world" (Invention of Solitude 
161), so what Quinn achieves is not a true representation of space, but rather a space of 
representation, a directly lived textual space produced by the body of text. "In his 
heart," writes Auster, "he realized that Max Work was dead" (City 127), while 
Malmgren comments, "Quinn tried to pretend to be a Work, but he was condemned to 
be a Text" (197). Bound as he is to the text, Quinn's end coincides "with the dwindling 
of pages in the red notebook," but it is not as ifhe has accomplished nothing (Auster, 
City 130).67 "Quinn's contact with the pure prelapsarian word has been partial, 
momentary, and personal. He was granted only a series of glimpses," writes Rowan, but 
"in giving utterance to these glimpses, however, Quinn again laid hold on his vocation 
as a poet" (232). In the representational space of his text, therefore, Quinn achieves a 
Lefebvrean moment, an authentic experience of his place in the world. 
If, at the end of the last chapter, we had wondered whether textual space could 
be related to any other form of spatiality, in this chapter that space has emerged as a 
lived space, an extension of our social reality. As a social product, formed by 
economical, technological, social, and spatial practices, we have seen how it can be 
employed as a representation of space or can emerge itself as a representational space, 
within which we might even gain an authentic experience of ourselves in a society 
where we are often alienated from all that we are. But this is not to say that textual 
space, as a representational space, is simply where we are free to be ourselves, or 
released from social constraints. Quinn, for example, though the author of the red 
notebook, is a reader also, of Stillman's words, and is also authored, inscribed in, and 
limited by, his text, asking, "What will happen when there are no more pages in the red 
notebook?" (Auster, City 131). The room enveloped by the text which is produced by 
the body, nevertheless remains the room which contains the body, holding it. Lefebvre 
reminds us that "Activity in space is restricted by that space; space 'decides' what 
activity may occur, but even this 'decision' has limits placed upon it. . .. Space 
commands bodies, prescribing or proscribing gestures, routes and distances to be 
covered. It is produced with this purpose in mind" (143). If this chapter, therefore, was 
(Introduction 5. See also Kirkegaard 177). 
67Quinn is not alone in experiencing this textual expiration. Stillman's own death was "all over the 
papers," and Quinn knew that Virginia Stillman was gone too when "the line went dead" (Auster, City 
122, 123). 
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concerned with the production of the textual space, then the next chapter is about its 
consumption. Its focus throughout will be on the experience of the one who enters the 
space ofthe text to face its commands and demands, the experience ofthe reader. 
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III 
READING THE SPACE OF LITERATURE 
As we arrive in this third chapter, textual space has emerged as a social space brought to 
life by the rhythms of the body at its heart. Throughout, however, we have seen the 
playfulness of text and body held in tension with the limits imposed upon them by their 
very inclusion in society, and by the physical, temporal, and even biological realities of 
their being. Now, we will consider how the resulting space affects those who are 
invited to experience it, the readers who enter a text in the presumed hope that they will 
get something out of it. We will especially try to understand how the reader might 
respond to the particular difficulties posed by the space oftextuality, the sort of 
difficulties implied by the arguments of those who resist any attempt to describe the text 
in terms of space at all. 
Some pages ago, for example, in a discussion of Philip Stevick's theory of 
chapters, it was briefly noted that one of the implications of his analysis seemed to be 
that the scale of a textual space might far surpass our ability to comprehend that space, 
to take it in. Similar concerns seem to be at work in Bradford's visual form, which 
focuses on that part of the text immediately perceptible to the eye of the reader, and also 
emerge in the course of But or's discussion ofthe book as object where he argues that the 
aim of the evolving forms of textual records was "to make the largest possible section of 
[the text] legible at one time" ("Object" 40). The suggestion is that what is out of sight 
is out of mind, and that a partial grasp of the text, in a sense that is almost purely 
physical, will result in a partial understanding also. As Percy Lubbock describes it, 
"Nothing, no power, will keep a book steady and motionless before us, so that we may 
have time to examine its shape and design. As quickly as we read, it melts and shifts in 
the memory; even at the moment when the last page is turned, a great part of the book, 
its finer detail, is already vague and doubtful" (qtd. in Stevick 174). These comments 
seem to recall the words of Quinn, the reader to Stillman's writer in Auster's City of 
Glass, who, in a passage immediately following his discovery of the letters, alerts us to 
one of the problems facing his reading: "Stillman had not left his message anywhere. 
True, he had created the letters by the movement of his steps, but they had not been 
written down. It was like drawing a picture in the air with your finger. The image 
vanishes as you are making it. There is no result, no trace to mark what you have done" 
(Auster, City 71). 
These observations echo some of the strongest criticisms faced by Frank when 
he first proposed his concept of spatial form. Frank had always argued that spatial form 
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required the reader "to suspend the process of individual reference temporarily until the 
entire pattern of internal references can be apprehended as a unity" ("Spatial Form" 13), 
an apprehension which sees all parts of the text existing in their relation to one another 
simultaneously. Walter Sutton asks simply, "How can the idea of the image as an 
instantaneously-apprehended phenomenon be reconciled with the fact that the whole 
work, as an image, is read consecutively through the period of time?" (115) arguing that 
"since reading is a time-act, the spatialization of literature can never be entirely 
achieved" (Frank, "Years After" 207). It is for Frank to explain what happens to allow 
the reader "to perceive the elements of the poem as juxtaposed in space" (Frank, 
"Spatial Form" 10) but to Sutton's criticism that "since reading is a time-act, the 
achievement of spatial form is really a physical impossibility," Frank says, "I could not 
agree more. But this has not stopped modem writers from working out techniques to 
achieve the impossible - as much as possible" ("Spatial Form" 60).68 Frank, therefore, 
essentially recognises that the immediate apprehension of spatial form is impossible 
during the act of reading, if at all, but would say that this does not negate the form's 
existence. Though reading remains a linear act, tied to time, "the temporality of this act 
is no longer coordinated with the dominant structural elements of the text. Temporality 
becomes, as it were, a purely physical limit of apprehension" (Frank, "Years After" 
207).69 It is as if, in reading spatial form, we must "measure what has ceased to exist" 
(Ricoeur 17). 
It is hardly an insignificant admission to say that the space of the text, this social 
space, might be, in part, inaccessible, out of our reach. Yet, this chapter will argue that 
a spatial awareness is absolutely necessary in reading a text, but, perhaps more 
significantly, that an understanding ofthe spatiality of the text informs our 
understanding of reading itself. In this, we side with Foust's argument that "What 
criticism has not stressed is that spatial form is primarily a theory of perception that 
focuses on the reading process. Its prime rule - similar to both phenomenology's 
68Cary Nelson says, "Pure spatiality is a condition toward which literature aspires, but which it never 
achieves" (3). 
69Mitchell says of Leibniz's defmition of space as an order of coexistent data, that "nothing in the 
defmition requires that this simultaneity be directly experienced" (Mitchell 544). Also Lessing's 
description of the wayan object is viewed through language actually has many similarities with Frank's 
description of the way temporality limits the apprehension of spatial form: "The coexistence of the body 
comes into collision with the sequence of the words, and although while the former is getting resolved 
into the latter, the dismemberment of the whole into its parts is a help to us, yet the reunion of these parts 
into a whole is made extremely difficult, and not infrequently impossible" (106). 
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'empathy' and Structuralism's 'dissection/articulation' - is that the reader must engage the 
text on its own terms in a strenuously participatory reading that attempts to re-create the 
experience embodied in it" (199). 
If this chapter has to do with the act of reading and how it relates to the nature of 
textual space, the first difficulty is that reading, that common and habitual act, is, as 
Tzvetan Todorov, notes, "hard to observe" (46). When he says this, we know that he 
does not mean that we cannot observe that part of the reading process which is 
physically manifested through the actions of the reader, through the reading aloud of the 
text itself, through the movement of the eyes over the text, or across and gradually down 
the page, through the turning of the pages, or the scrolling down of the screen, and 
perhaps even through the studious and attentive demeanour of the reader, seated or 
standing or lying down. Instead, we understand that the act of reading involves also an 
unseen, internal process involving the comprehension of the meaning of the signs being 
read, and the emergence of an understanding ofthe text in its entirety. 
To observe even ourselves reading in this way is difficult, requiring some private 
inner eye to tail us through the text, always one step behind, paying more attention to 
the reading than to what is being read, as if the act of reading was an autonomous 
process applied equally to various passive objects. This is at least how we might 
imagine it happening but, as Todorov says, "introspection is uncertain" (46), leaving us 
to seek our subject elsewhere. One alternative is to look to the accounts of others of 
their reading, or else, more obliquely, we might look not to the act of reading itself, but 
to the evidence of that reading, to the essay, article, or other writings which come as a 
result of, or as a response to, that reading, as if we were detectives who might 
reconstruct the scene of the crime from the remaining traces of the passage of events. A 
better alternative, placing us contemporaneous to the act of reading itself, is to study a 
representation of the act of reading, the act of reading as it appears in text. 
This is not a rare appearance, Todorov arguing that "reading ... (inevitably) 
becomes one of the themes of the book," at least in those texts where reading can be 
understood as "the construction of an imaginary universe," that is, in those texts which 
might be described as representational (46, 39). The characters of such texts must 
comprehend their own universe, must come to an understanding of their place in the 
scheme of things, and perceive their relation to the elements of the world around them. 
This world is, as we saw in the first chapter, necessarily the effect of text, for "What 
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exists, first of all, is the text, and nothing else," so that the character's response to the 
world as they see it might be said to mirror the reader's response to the text of this world 
(Todorov 39). In this way, they must read their own environment even as we read to 
understand them; they are "rigorously parallel to the reader who constructs the 
imaginary universe on the basis of his own information" (Todorov 46). 
It was exactly this close mirroring of construction in the world and space of the 
text which led Frank to identify, in his discussion of Ulysses, that latent spatiality which 
we have seen more fully realised in the more structured forms of, for example, Kepler. 
But Kepler, too, provides us, in the figure of Kepler, with a model reader, but one who 
is concerned not only with his relations to the world around him, but with the mysteries 
surrounding the world itself. And it is in those who confront mysteries that we find 
some of our greatest readers, as in detective fiction, for example, which, as Peter Huhn 
writes, "seems to be unique among narrative gemes in that it thematizes narrativity itself 
as a problem, a procedure, and an achievement" (451). As a result, and as we have seen 
with Quinn, "in the method he applies to the puzzling text that confronts him, the 
detective is indeed a kind of exemplary reader, correctly interpreting ambiguous or 
misleading signs" (Sorapure 71. See also Holquist and Spanos, "The Detective"). 
Following Quinn's tale in City of Glass, following him as he follows Stillman, allows us 
to become readers of his reading, perhaps not quite reading with him but keeping 
abreast with him in his pursuit of Stillman, close enough to observe in detail the 
methods of his reading, and to learn of the difficulties the role of reader holds. In the 
next section, therefore, he will be our shadow and our guide as, in an attempt to read a 
reading of a space, we enter another textual city with a reader at its heart, Kazuo 
Ishiguro's The Unconsoled. 
Shifting spaces - Kazuo Ishiguro's The Unconsoled 
Inevitably, there are times when we encounter a text we don't fully comprehend. The 
book itself may be lengthy, ifnot particularly difficult to read, with a detached and 
patient style which might suit its bleached world and fragile characters. The plot is not 
necessarily the source of any misunderstanding, and may, in fact, seem relatively 
straightforward. A renowned pianist perhaps, called Ryder, arrives at a city in crisis 
somewhere in Central Europe, where, in a few days time, he will give a recital upon 
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which the cultural and moral future of the whole city depends. What the members of 
the audience hear on that Thursday night will either restore their faith in their aesthetic 
judgement, and give new impetus to their self-belief in their society as a whole, or else 
will reveal to them their lost and backward nature, and the extent to which their city no 
longer deserves to be considered a place of importance. Ryder, having mislaid his 
schedule for the vital days preceding the concert, will bluff and brazen his way through 
engagements he arrives at unprepared for, or misses altogether, always afraid to lose 
face before those who idolise him, forever being diverted from his course by private 
matters and encounters with people from his past. 
This is a story we can follow (even this briefre-telling suggests this), but, if we 
are to compare our reading to Quinn's progress, we would say that we have got only as 
far as the second stage in his reading. We have, admittedly, gone further than Quinn 
had on those first five days when, simply following Stillman along the path of his 
letters, he reflected in his movements the actions of Stillman as writer. At this stage, we 
can no more say that Quinn is a reader than we can the person whose reading consists 
only of the directly observable layer of reading, for Quinn may shadow Stillman with a 
gaze which is no more than the inattentive eyes' movement across a page, automatic and 
unseeing. It is only when Quinn begins to take note of Stillman's path that he becomes a 
true reader, and our own ability to paraphrase Ishiguro's text suggests we are at a similar 
stage. Yet, this reading does not necessarily mean understanding, and Quinn says of his 
own notes, "'Picks up pencil in middle of block. Examines, hesitates, puts in bag'," that 
"these sentences seemed utterly worthless to him" (Auster, City 65). Frank, of course, 
would argue that these words mean nothing to Quinn because his experience of 
Stillman's text up to this point is at odds with the form of the text itself. Quinn may 
follow Stillman every step of the way, watch him and note what he is doing, but, as a 
reader, at anyone moment he can be at only one point in the text as he travels it from 
beginning to end. For both Quinn and the reader, and Quinn as reader, each instant of 
experience during reading dominates the whole, and the passage is more likely to be 
remembered as one continuous event happening over a definite period of time, rather 
than as a journey covering set areas of space, so that it is the narrative, the sequential, 
linear and temporal nature of any story, which narrows the reader's vision, 
overshadowing Frank's asserted spatial aspect. In order to make sense of Stillman's text, 
Quinn must work to fulfil Frank's exhortation to perceive the elements ofthe text as 
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juxtaposed in space, and so move beyond the limitations of a temporally bound 
perspective. 
Quinn's object all along "was to understand Stillman" and, in order to achieve 
this, he had "started with a limited set of facts: Stillman's background and profession, .. 
. a book of bizarre scholarship" (Auster, City 65). In the same way, we have access to 
the facts ofIshiguro's life (born in Nagasaki, Japan, 1954, and so on), and can appeal to 
outside sources to give their opinion on his text, agreeing that it "offers a meditation on 
the nature of celebrity and relations between artists and their audiences" (Svoboda par. 
l), that "It's about people who built their lives on top ofthings that have broken, wounds 
that won't heal, something that went wrong very early on. They are looking for 
consolation in relationships, art, or career. Consolation was not to be found" (Ishiguro 
qtd. in Ohno par. 17). It is only right that we agree with these last words, for these are 
the views of the author himself, and are all the more encouraging in that they allow us to 
believe that, as Quinn would say, "the steps were actually to some purpose" (Auster, 
City 61), that this is a text which its author intends should mean something. Yet, though 
Ishiguro speaks with absolute authority about his novel The Unconsoled, and guides us 
in our reading through his insight, still the feeling is that there are things which have 
been left unsaid, that there must be something more. 
Quinn, too, feels the inadequacy of "facts ofthe past [which] seemed to have no 
bearing on the facts of the present" (Auster, City 67) and it is at this point that he 
"turned to a clean page of the red notebook and sketched a little map of the area 
Stillman had wandered in. Then, looking carefully through his notes, he began to trace 
with his pen the movements Stillman had made on a single day" (Auster, City 67). Up 
to this point, Quinn had been unable to recognise the letters as they emerged, for, as he 
said, these forms left "no trace," they were not "written down." When we imagine again 
how Stillman's texts would appear when printed on the average page, we can see that the 
same problem faces all readers, for, although the letters, the spatial forms, are contained 
within the writing of the text, just as each step takes its place on the street pavement, 
they leave no trace, and we cannot see the line of relation which would divert us from 
the printed line, the streets in parallel where we lose ourselves. 
Quinn does have certain advantages though. The first is that Stillman's steps 
form a spatial unity with not a single one removed from the relations which link them, 
as ifhis steps formed a text wherein each word stood in a structured relation with all the 
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other words in the text. Most texts, however, structure themselves on the spatial form of 
the line, defined by contiguous relations, making only select use of deliberate 
spatialisations based on the oblique lines of selection and substitution. Though most 
readers are, in some sense, led by the writer along the path of these lines, even as Quinn 
has Stillman to guide him through the long text of the streets, the dominant linearity of 
the printed text, as we have seen, can easily obscure the spatiality of the text. It is only 
when he becomes aware of the existence of the letters that Quinn removes himself from 
an act oflinear reading, no longer following in Stillman's footsteps, forced to travel at 
his pace, always right behind him. Instead, Quinn, in his mapping out of Stillman's 
movements for the preceding days, gains the perspective which Frank sees as vital for 
an apprehension of spatial form.70 
As readers entering The Unconsoled, however, a text which, like Auster's New 
York, seems "a labyrinth of endless steps" (Auster, City 3), the difficulty lies exactly in 
identifying those steps which would form the 'Stillman's letters' oflshiguro's text, in 
recognising the point at which we should diverge from the line of the text. Without 
knowing what we should take note of, we might not find even the entrance to the maze 
of steps, never mind its centre. Here, we can appeal only to what seems most 
remarkable in the text, which, in this case, is the bizarrely surreal nature of the world of 
The Unconsoled, which, above all other elements in the text, disorients the reader, and 
challenges us to make sense of what is happening. The world confronts us with three 
especially notable characteristics, all of which are evident even in the first chapter. The 
first is Ryder's selective amnesia, which has him entering a hotel on the book's first page 
knowing nothing of Thursday night, or ofMr Brodsky the conductor, or of his 
relationship to those around him. "When I tried to recall some basic details about the 
70Whether or not we would still wish to call this part of the process 'reading', or whether it is better 
served by a term such as 'interpretation' is another question. Certainly, this sort of distinction between 
reading and interpreting has already been made by Richard Shusterman, who would say that, "reading 
(and, more generally, understanding) is not always interpreting" (114). If it is said that Quinn seems to 
comprehend Stillman's actions as he follows him and notes what he is doing, but only fully realises the 
significance of what he is seeing when he interprets the form of the letters, this seems to fit with 
Shusterman's view that "while understanding - even highly intelligent understanding - is often 
unreflective, unthinking, indeed unconscious (even if always purposive), interpretation proper involves 
conscious, deliberate thought: the clarification of something obscure or ambiguous, the deciphering of a 
symbol, the unraveling [sic] of a paradox, the articulation of previously unstated formal or semantic 
relations between elements" (133). Todorov, too, argues that "After constructing the events that make up 
a story, we then give ourselves over to the task of reinterpretation" (Genres in Discourse 44). Therefore, 
even though we might agree with Sutton that, limiting the act of reading to a temporal process, the 
immediate apprehension of spatial form is an impossibility, once a reading is supplemented by an act of 
interpretation, the apprehension of the text's spatiality again becomes possible. 
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present visit," he says, "I had little success" (Ishiguro 15), but his forgetfulness is not 
complete for, eventually, he has a faint recollection of once possessing a schedule for 
the days ahead, now misplaced and forgotten. 71 
The second remarkable feature of Ryder's world is the apparent distortion of 
time and space, and their relation to each other. People appear where previously there 
were none, and buildings many miles apart suddenly adjoin each other, are, in fact, the 
same building. Ryder may ride the elevator with Gustav, his hotel's porter, and talk 
with him at great length, for over six pages in fact while the lift still rises, and yet 
remain unaware, until well in to the ascent, that they were "not alone in the elevator. A 
small young woman in a neat business suit was standing pressed into the comer behind 
me" (Ishiguro 9). 
Finally, there is the fact that, despite the first-person narration, Ryder often 
provides us with information he could not have access to, at times even seeing through 
disembodied eyes. Watching Gustav, he recognises that "a certain matter that had been 
preoccupying him throughout the day had again pushed its way to the front of his mind. 
He was, in other words, worrying once more about his daughter and her little boy" 
(Ishiguro 13). Later, while seated in a car, Ryder, impossibly, watches the hotel 
manager's son, Stephan, enter the front door of an apartment and be led by a Miss 
Collins through the front parlour and a second doorway, and then down a shadowy 
corridor to the drawing-room which, Ryder tells us, "looked expensively elegant in an 
old-fashioned way. On closer inspection, however, I could see much of the furniture 
was extremely worn" (Ishiguro 57, see also 319-27). 
It is in these marks of the unknown that we seem to find our path into the text, 
our starting point. Yet, in identifying these three elements, we are like Quinn once he 
has traced out the shapes of Stillman's letters but not yet decided what they are. These 
three points may be unrelated, may be the equivalent of a rectangle, a bird, and a letter, 
or they may all be part of the same system, may all be letters, an '0', a 'W' and an 'E'. 
We have to wonder whether we are discovering something meaningful here, or are 
simply "scribbling nonsense" (Auster, City 68). We are, like Quinn, "ransacking the 
chaos of Stillman's movements for some glimmer of cogency" (Auster, City 69). If the 
next step is to confirm that these elements are indeed all part of a larger system, like the 
alphabet, then we must try to gain some sense of what this system might be. Starting 
71 Unless otherwise indicated, all quotations from Ishiguro are taken from The Unconsoled. 
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out, we might assume that if we could lay our hands on some small clue, it could point 
the way to others, so, looking for other, more minor oddities, we begin to see that the 
strangeness of his world has some effect on Ryder, too: he is often being roused from 
his sleep, or poised at the edge of slumber, being "lulled by her words," so that he 
"found it difficult not to doze" (Ishiguro 44, 191). At times it seems as ifthe entirety of 
The Unconsoled takes place at that point between waking and sleeping, in a bout of 
fitful dozingJ2 Here, a comment made by Sigmund Freud, that "dreams seem to be an 
intermediate state between sleeping and waking" (Introductory 116), suggests the 
possibility of drawing a parallel between Ryder's world and the worlds of dream, and, 
indeed, there does seem to be further evidence to encourage us in investigating this link. 
The most obvious point is that the breaks between the sections ofthe text, the blank 
pages of the book, coincide with the few periods of extended sleep that Ryder has. Each 
section, apart from the first, begins with Ryder waking up, but waking, of course, into 
this drowsy world which lies between waking and sleeping, so that the text seems a 
product of some dreaming process. In addition to this, the text contains factual 
deviations from our reality, such as a film version of2001: A Space Odyssey starring 
Clint Eastwood and Yul Brynner, which finds Eastwood "preparing for the dismantling 
of HAL, carefully checking over his giant screwdriver" (Ishiguro 108), which might be 
taken as a form of dream wish fulfilment, the dreamer's dream cast. We can also see 
Ryder follow a woman through the narrow and steeply dropping streets of the city, and 
watch as she steadily draws away from him, along paths it takes him an umeasonable 
amount oftime to cover. Finally, he loses her, and is left standing at the edge of a vast 
and darkened field. Then, towards the end of the first part of the book, late on the 
Tuesday night, Ryder is brought to a reception at which he will speak, but, when 
standing to address the audience, he finds "that my dressing gown was hanging open, 
displaying the entire naked front of my body" (Ishiguro 143). It seems a classic dream 
situation. 
Our first supposition, therefore, might be that the The Unconsoled is obeying the 
laws of a dream world, operating by the perverse syntax of the dream. If we accept this 
notion, we can then explain the distortion of time and space, and the transmigration of 
Ryder's spirit, but we are still no closer to understanding why they do happen. In fact, 
72For a discussion of the "Sollersian wakening ... a complex time, at one and the same time very long 
and very short" see Barthes, Sollers 56-57. 
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viewing the world of the text as a dream may not offer any help on this point at all, for 
Freud himself states that one of the peculiarities of the dream is that it "is on the one 
hand hard to grasp and on the other offers us no starting-point for further inquiry" 
(Introductory 125). Within a dream which has been purposefully constructed, however, 
as this one has, we might assume that there is an underlying sense to the selection and 
arrangement of its parts, and, if we could discover the idiom of this particular dream 
world, then it would enable us not only to see the true meaning in each event, but also to 
discern the correct relation between the various elements of the text. Admittedly, the 
interpretation of dreams might not be something with which we're particularly familiar, 
but by turning again to Freud, the most influential of dream analysts, and now seen to 
have been mentioned above with not complete innocence, we can immediately see the 
text transformed. The world of the text becomes everywhere sexualised, strewn with 
sexual symbols: from Ishiguro's description of the atrium "at the centre of which, 
dominating everything, was a fountain - a tangle of nymph-like figures in marble 
gushing water with some force" (23), we can go to Freud's assertion that "the male 
organ can be replaced by objects from which water flows" (Introductory 188), while 
"the flip-flopping of my slippers" (Ishiguro 148) brings the observation "slippers are 
female genitals" (Freud, Introductory 191). Elsewhere, the passage "I found myself 
looking at a tall cylinder of white brickwork, windowless apart from a single vertical slit 
near the top" (Ishiguro 182) suggests "the male organ, finds symbolic substitutes in the 
first instance in things that resemble it in shape" (Freud, Introductory 188); "the hill 
continued its descent down through a mass of tree-tops. . .. once I had built up my 
rhythm, he sighed" (Ishiguro 184), "The pubic hair of both sexes is depicted in dreams 
as woods and bushes" (Freud, Introductory 190); "we continued our descent in silence, 
Christoffs breathing becoming increasingly laboured behind me" (Ishiguro 185), 
"staircases, or, more precisely, walking on them, are clear symbols of sexual 
intercourse. . .. the common element here is the rhythm of walking up them" (Freud, 
Introductory 191); "my tie was fluttering stiffly out behind an ear" (Ishiguro 267), 
"Neckties ... are a definitely male symbol" (Freud, Introductory 191). 
Employing Freud's dream symbols to re-interpret the text so radically transforms 
the world of the text that it has to encourage further analysis. For Freud, of course, 
dreams are an expression ofthe unconscious, and dream elements are "substitutes for 
something the knowledge of which is present in the dreamer but which is inaccessible to 
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him" (Freud, Introductory 143). Moreover, the symbolism which is used by the 
manifest dream, the dream as it appears to us, is only one of the ways in which the 
elements of the latent dream, the genuine material behind the substitute dream, are 
distorted. Freud lists the other distorting relations as "the relation of a part to a whole, 
approximation or allusion ... and the plastic representation of words" (Introductory 
204). The dream-distortion itself is a function ofthe dream-work which, on the level of 
the dream as a whole, achieves condensation ("the fact that the manifest dream has a 
smaller content than the latent one" (Introductory 205», displacement (meaning 
allusion, and also where "the psychical accent is shifted from an important element on to 
another which is unimportant" (Introductory 208», and the transformation of thoughts 
into visual images. Recognising the symbolism of the dream landscape, therefore, is 
only one step in the process of interpretation, one stage in the undoing of the dream-
work, for we must still structure the relations between the parts of the dream. As Freud 
says, "In the course of the dream-work all the relations between the dream-thoughts 
drop out; these are resolved into their raw material and it is the task of the interpretation 
to re-insert the omitted relations" (Introductory 186). 
When it comes to this part of the interpretive process, we are faced with a 
number of difficulties. First, there is the fact that our dream, The Unconsoled, is so 
long, and so demands many explanations, but a more intractable problem is Freud's 
belief that the analysis of any lengthy dream means including "much material in the way 
of associations and memories" (Introductory 220). In fact, Freud tells us "it is the 
dreamer himself who should tell us what his dream means" (Introductory 130), and we 
have no dreamer who is not also a part of the dream, or, rather, we have no access to a 
dreamer outside the dream. Though Ishiguro's text encourages our dream analysis by 
presenting us with a consciously created unconscious, so that we don't have to read the 
unconscious into an unwary text, or convince ourselves that a character is "vexed by 
unconscious impulses unfathomable even to the text itself' (Ellmann, Introduction 3), 
nevertheless, without access to the conscious life of the character, it is hard for us to 
come to any definite conclusion. Indeed, we can only assume that Ryder is in fact the 
dreamer of this dream. 
Our hesitation at this point reflects Quinn's uncertainties also. Despite his 
discovery of the existence of the forms, despite recognising them as letter shapes, and 
despite reading in them a coherent message, still Quinn is beset by doubts, that "he had 
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imagined the whole thing. The letters were not letters at all. . .. Stillman had nothing 
to do with it. It was all an accident" (Auster, City 71). Quinn experiences these fears 
despite the great advantage he has over other readers, the ease with which he may plot 
the relations between the steps on a map of the city, reading their design on its surface. 
Each step finds its location within this wider textuality of the city and is oriented by it, 
so that the city provides the proper context within which the message must be 
understood, though, as we saw in chapter one, the message becomes evident only 
through a process of recontextualisation, transposed into Quinn's red notebook, a fact 
which of itself introduces doubt. Nevertheless, the map of the city provides Quinn with 
the key to understanding Stillman's passage because it reveals the organisation behind 
the apparently random wanderings, and also because it allows Quinn to transcend the 
limits imposed by a reading of the text at 'ground level', immersed in the temporal line 
of Stillman's steps through the city. As a representation of the space of Stillman's text, 
as a plan of the city, the map means Quinn may assume the position of Kepler's desired 
angel, able to comprehend now those letters "the pattern of which could be perceived 
only from above" (Banville 35). 
Our own interpretations, our own mappings, similarly require us to situate 
Ishiguro's text within a wider textuality, orienting its elements according to recognised 
relations, and so demand a critical perspective, an intellectual stance from which we can 
hope to perceive between the parts of the text the correct semiotic relations, and so 
comprehend the meaning ofthe whole. So far, we have placed the text within a 
psychoanalytic context, but we have far greater reason than Quinn to be anxious about 
the validity of our reading, for our map is not a given. And if we were to find that first 
step into the maze, and follow its path to its conclusion, we would yet be faced with 
another difficulty, for we would still need a map upon which to plot our voyage, a way 
of seeing how all the points of our reading relate to each other. In effect, we are in the 
position of having to solve the labyrinth from within, of having to project a point from 
which we can view a space which surrounds us. Only then will we see how the simple 
line we experience is twisted and turned upon itself.73 
73Kermode, approaching the text as an organised timeline, describes a similar situation, saying "We 
project ourselves - a small, humble elect perhaps - past the End, so as to see the structure whole, a thing 
we cannot do from our spot of time in the middle" (Sense of an Ending 8). Of course, in order to see the 
whole of a line (rather than simply a cross-section of it), you must view it from an angle, but Kermode 
would probably prefer not to suggest that we actually leave the line. Such a position is usually explained 
by recourse to an analogy of a climb up a mountain, the elevated point of view allowing the entire course 
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Assuming now that, in our reading, we have identified sensible fonus, an '0', a 
'W', and an 'E' for example, and assuming also that we are convinced that we were 
meant to find these fonus, still, like Quinn, we have to draw a relationship between 
these elements. At this point, when we are closest to revealing the author's intentions, 
we are more likely to discover instead what Harold Bloom might describe as "anxieties 
when confronted with anterior powers" ("Freud" 183) as we prepare to face up to the 
vast accumulation of literature which may find some expression in the lines of The 
Unconsoled. We have already supposed that the work of Freud plays some part in the 
construction of the text, but we cannot know what else lies around it, what textual world 
Ishiguro sees it inhabiting, or what other texts it relates to. Nor can we tell if we know 
anything of this wider textual world to begin with, whether anything we have ever 
encountered overlaps with what Ishiguro has brought to The Unconsoled. It might 
emerge that our Stillman is "far more dangerous than previously imagined" (Auster, 
City 71). The result is an unstable mixture of self-doubt and arrogance as we try to 
match our own experience to Ishiguro's ingenuity, wondering if we will ever recognise 
in the text what we don't already know, yet trying to believe that we know enough to 
reveal all that the text has to show us. 
Again, it is Quinn who suggests a way forward. In the end, he was able to 
interpret Stillman's writing only through a further recontextualisation, placing the 
discovered letters in the context of Stillman's previous works, and so arriving at the 
words THE TOWER OF BABEL by reference to the text The Garden and the Tower. Ifwe 
are assuming that Ryder is the dreamer of our text, then it seems logical to proceed by 
focussing on his part in the story. Placing it in the context ofIshiguro's other works, the 
most striking comparisons emerge in connection with the book which followed The 
Unconsoled, When We Were Orphans. The title itself indicates that both Ryder and the 
protagonist of the later book, Christopher Banks, share, as Banks says, a "lack of 
parents" (Ishiguro, Orphans 6), while "My parents," says Ryder. "That's who we're 
talking about. There's no confusion here, I trust" (Ishiguro 255). Both of them also, as 
leading practitioners in their respective fields, display an acute awareness of the potency 
of their presence and actions. Banks speaks of how, "although this was still a good year 
of the climb to be seen. Interestingly, Kerrnode, in defending Frank against one of his critics, suggests 
that "Shattuck stresses the climb, Frank the view" ("A Reply" 580), but where Frank's view would be of 
the ground covered, the route in its entirety, Kerrnode's view would focus on placing moments of the 
journey in relation to its beginning and its end. 
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before my name acquired anything of the standing it has today, I was already beginning 
to appreciate for the first time the scale of responsibility that befalls a detective with any 
sort of renown," and even early in his career, when investigating the case of Charles 
Emery's death, he is told that, ifhe can solve the mystery, it will revitalise not just the 
family household but the whole town: "They'd be so grateful. Yes, they'll be talking 
about you here for generations" (lshiguro, Orphans 30, 33). We have already seen how 
Ryder's performance is expected to save a city which "is at crisis point" (Ishiguro 200). 
With these connections underlined, we can finally begin to see a structure linking the 
elements we've noted on our psychoanalytic chart, for these parts of the story map 
exactly onto the defining features of the work which produced Freud's most famous 
complex, namely Oedipus the King. As with both Ryder and Banks, Oedipus arrives at 
a city in turmoil to be hailed as the city's saviour, and, eventually and unexpectedly, 
finds it is his relationship with his parents which is his greatest concern. 
Our final answer, then, our THE TOWER OF BABEL and solution to the labyrinth of 
The Unconsoled, is that the dream of the text is an expression of Ryder's unconscious 
Oedipal desire, though Oedipus's twin crimes of patricide and incest necessarily take 
less extreme forms in the censorious world ofthe dream. Though Ryder is an 
internationally renowned pianist, his parents have never seen him play, but he believes 
they will be there on the Thursday night to see him in concert for the first time. Then, 
receiving the praise of his father, he can be seen to have bettered his father, dethroning 
him, vanquishing him. Receiving the admiration of his mother, he will have gained her 
esteem, and won her affections. In this way, he kills his father, and takes his place as 
his mother's love. 
Support for such an interpretation comes from the way this situation is re-
enacted between different sets of son and parents throughout the book. Ryder's own 
step-child, Boris, clearly yearns for the respect of his surrogate father, somersaulting on 
a playground climbing-frame, fantasising of protecting his parents from gangs of street 
thugs, and displaying an earnest eagerness for DIY. Their relationship, however, is one 
of unacknowledged efforts and unspoken disappointments, while all the time Boris 
grows as his mother's source of support and strength. It is Stephan Hoffman, though, 
the young son of the hotel's manager, who relates most closely to Ryder. He, too, is a 
pianist, struck by how elegant his mother is, shunned by his own parents. Ryder's 
advice to Stephan is "to try and enjoy your playing as much as you can, drawing 
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satisfaction and meaning from it regardless ofthem," but Stephan's father undermines 
his confidence, saying, "Your mother and I, we love you too much to be able to watch 
it" (Ishiguro 71, 480). Within the framework of Freudian dream analysis, however, this 
comment assumes a greater significance, for Freud sees piano-playing as a symbol of 
masturbation, for "Satisfaction obtained from a person's own genitals is indicated by all 
kinds of playing, including piano-playing" (Freud, Introductory 190). Stephan's 
parents, like most, "do not approve ofthis behaviour" (Freud, "Dissolution" 174), so 
naturally can't condone it by attending his performance. The masturbatory implications 
of piano-playing also put us in a position to better explain the awkward nature of some 
earlier scenes involving Ryder too, as when, needing to practice his playing, he is shown 
to the lavatory by Hoffman, who directs him inside with" a quick furtive gesture over 
his shoulder" (Ishiguro 338). When his practice is unsuccessful, Ryder has to admit 
that, "It's been the same since I was a child. I've never been able to practice unless I had 
complete, utter privacy" (Ishiguro 341). 
Freud describes masturbation as an "incomplete sexual satisfaction," and says 
that "neurotic symptoms are substitutes for sexual satisfaction," which might explain 
why Ryder shares so many of the characteristics of neurotic people, with "their 
incomprehensible reactions to human intercourse and external influences, their 
irritability, their incalculable and inexpedient behaviour" (Introductory 434, 349,426). 
Freud argues further that a child who masturbates is inevitably threatened with 
castration, and it is this threat which results in what he calls the dissolution of the 
Oedipus complex, when the complex is submerged, and "the libidinal trends belonging 
to the Oedipus complex are in part desexualised and sublimated ... and in part inhibited 
in their aim and changed into impulses of affection" (Freud, "Dissolution" 177). The 
effect of this dissolution, when the consciousness represses, and sometimes even 
destroys, the Oedipus complex, can be seen in the form of Ryder's dream, for, even as 
the dream gives expression to the unconscious Oedipus complex, the repressed desire 
for parrincest is sublimated for Ryder into the creative musical act which will 
symbolically achieve for him what his conscious mind cannot admit to. Still, the 
masturbatory aspect of the piano-playing preserves the essentially Oedipal nature ofthe 
performance, for the act of masturbation is tied to his Oedipal desires, "his masturbation 
is only a genital discharge of the sexual excitation belonging to the complex" (Freud, 
"Dissolution" 176). 
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Yet, the nearer Ryder comes to achieving his desire, the harder it becomes for 
him to realise his aim, for, as Freud says, the dream-distortion "becomes greater the 
worse the wish that has to be censored" (Introductory 176). What Ryder is experiencing 
is essentially an anxiety-dream, more likely to produce unpleasurable feelings than any 
sense of gratifying wish-fulfilment, for "An anxiety-dream," says Freud "is often the 
undisguised fulfilment of a wish - not, of course, of an acceptable wish, but of a 
repudiated one" (Introductory 254). In Ryder's partly distorted anxiety-dream, the 
censoring agent recognises the emerging repressed wish, and so the introjected 
knowledge of the taboo against incest raises obstacle after obstacle to endanger his 
performance, including the lost schedule, the missed meetings, the lack of practice, and 
the strange wall which blocks his path to the concert hall, "built by some eccentric 
person at the end ofthe last century" (Ishiguro 388). Freud points out that we may often 
wake ourselves from such a dream before the repressed wish is finally fulfilled, but 
Ryder seems to wake himself into this dream, experiencing all of the anxiety which 
accompanies it as he is "woken ... seized by a sudden concern," "seized by the panicky 
feeling," "with the panicky sense" (Ishiguro 155,293,413). As the end to the dream 
approaches, the dream-work seems to stubbornly resist producing anything which would 
yield to Ryder what he secretly desires, so that it becomes increasingly difficult to read 
in the dream the fulfilment of Oedipal desire, yet Freud urges us that the "wish-
fulfilment cannot be obvious but must be looked for" (Introductory 251). What we must 
take into consideration as well, however, is that in an anxiety-dream wish-fulfilment 
may result in, not pleasure, but punishment, the fulfilment of the wish of the censor 
which cannot give the unconscious what it desires. Ifwe cannot find the fulfilment of 
Ryder's Oedipal desire, then we should look instead for the punishment which is its 
opposite: his castration. 
If our aim is to find the Oedipal in Ryder's dream, then we should look for those 
areas where their stories most closely parallel each other, especially as the dream nears 
its end. Encouragingly, on the night of the concert itself a number of incidents take 
place which seem to strengthen the links between Ryder and Oedipus. For example, the 
conductor, Brodsky, is making his way through the woods towards the domed concert 
hall, when he's involved in an accident, knocked from his bicycle by a passing car or 
truck. Ryder, arriving at the scene, has a sudden moment of doubt as the "thought 
vaguely crossed my mind if I had caused this wreck, that I had perhaps been involved in 
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some accident without knowing it" (Ishiguro 439-40). In the same way, Oedipus must 
think again of a long-forgotten incident, when he had met and killed a man at "the silent 
crossroad in the forest clearing" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 1398) while he was on the 
road to Thebes. Only the possibility that it may have been robbers, and not Oedipus, 
who killed Laius, and that a witness still survives who might testify to this, prevents 
Oedipus from immediately condemning himself. Soon after his encounter with Brodsky 
in the woods, Ryder rings Sophie and tells her she "hadn't aged at all. Not so anyone 
would notice" (Ishiguro 446) which, in this world of obscure and misremembered 
relations, seems to position her in Jocasta's role. Yet, if Sophie is indeed the one who 
has been cast as the mother, then we have to wonder why Ryder becomes increasingly 
alienated from her, not more attached, while it is Boris who stays always at her side, the 
stepson taking the place of the usurper who would "never love you like a real father" 
(Ishiguro 532).74 Even less apparent is the way in which Ryder might be said to have 
slain his father. Only one death occurs, Gustav's, but his takes place off-stage, when 
Ryder is not even present, and so recalls the death of Poly bus, Oedipus's foster-father, 
rather than the murder of Laius. 
These intransigencies present a real challenge to our ability to come to terms 
with this text. They question not only the possibility that any application of the Oedipus 
complex can hold here, but also the extent of our familiarity with the text, and of our 
knowledge ofthe complex itself, of the methods of dream interpretation, and of Freud's 
work as a whole. Whatever claim we might have made with regard to having some 
authority over the issues involved in this text has been undermined by the feeling that 
our answer doesn't hold, that something is yet missing, and that in some other, as yet 
unknown text lies the next key, the next terminological phrase needed to continue with 
the reading. The only alternative to capitulation, however, to the admission ofthe 
inadequacy of our reading, is to persevere. Like Oedipus, we, too, have further evidence 
to include, further paths to explore, for in the triangle of relations we have uncovered 
between The Unconsoled, Oedipus, and Freud, one side remains to be developed, 
namely the relation between Oedipus and Freud. 
74It is interesting, however, that Freud suggests that the male genitalia can appear in a dream as a small 
son, especially when we think of Boris on the climbing frame, or his appreciation of Ryder's gift to him 
of a DIY manual, or how he fights off the street thugs in the apartment block where Ryder relives his 
fights with Sophie, for Freud shows how sexual intercourse can be symbolised within the dream world by 
"rhythmical activities such as ... riding and climbing . .. ; so, too, certain manual crafts, and, of course, 
threatening with weapons" (Introductory 190). 
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The importance of the story of Oedipus, and of Sophocles's text of that story, 
derives from the fact that, as Cynthia Chase argues, "Freud reads Oedipus: the Oedipus 
complex draws its specificity from the Sophoclean tragedy, rather than just from the 
ostensible semantic content of the Oedipus legend" (57). The significance ofthe story 
lies not alone in the matter of Oedipus's parrincest, but also in the action of the drama 
where the reality of Oedipus's past acts comes to light. Freud famously described the 
action of the playas "a process of revealing, with cunning delays, and ever mounting 
excitement - a process that can be likened to psychoanalysis" (Dreams 269). The play, 
with its beginning in illness, with its recovered memories and misinformation, with its 
resistance to the emergence of the truth, and the final recovery of the past, dramatises 
the psychoanalytic process. More than this, however, Chase argues that Freud is drawn 
to Sophocles's text by an alternative Oedipus complex, by the "drive to interpretation 
and 'self-analysis'" (58), which, in both their cases, is motivated by a concern for the 
father, and ends in the discovery ofthe Oedipus complex. It is Oedipus's drive to 
interpretation which means his story is defined by, but not confined to, the acts of 
patricide and incest, for, around and alongside these acts, Oedipus engages in a search 
for answers to questions posed, on the cause of the plague on the city, on the identity of 
Laius's killer, and on the truth of his own identity (in the course of his investigations, of 
course, he also plays the part of the detective). It was with an answer that he first won 
fame in Thebes, when he solved the riddle of the Sphinx, and Freud sought to emulate 
him by seeking the solution to the riddle of dreams. In our case, it seems we should 
now follow Freud's lead and read Oedipus, allowing Oedipus the reader to guide even as 
Quinn did. 
Oedipus made his mark, then, as an interpretor, as a reader of apparently 
remarkable ability. Faced with a riddle which had confounded every other, 'Which 
animal walks on four feet in the morning, two feet at noon, and three feet in the 
evening?' Oedipus saw in this truncated lifeline the story of man, and so produced the 
answer to defeat the Sphinx. This version ofthe riddle of the Sphinx, however, is only 
one of a number of alternatives. It also appears in only a very slightly altered form as 
"Which animal walks on four legs in the morning, two legs at noon, and three legs in the 
evening?" (Burgess 14-15). Answering the riddle means understanding that the image 
ofthe day should be taken as the figurative representation of a lifetime, so that the line 
of the riddle projects itself onto the chronology of the lifeline, but it also involves 
158 
finding the reason behind the changing numbers. As such, the riddle demands a spatial 
comprehension, and an ability to perceive that term which stands in paradigmatic 
equivalence with each section of the riddle. Another version, "What goes on four feet, 
on two feet, and three, / But the more feet it goes on the weaker it be?" ("Sphinx") 
doesn't foreground the chronology, though the first line retains nevertheless the natural, 
temporal order, but the second line provides more of a clue to the relationship between 
the numbers of feet than either of the first two versions. As such, this line doesn't 
continue the story but writes across it, structuring the narratological relation between the 
parts as they tell of how man grows from weakness to strength, only to return to frailty 
again at the end of his life. A fourth version is more elaborate, asking Oedipus to 
identify "a thing with two feet and four feet, with a single voice, that has three feet as 
well. It changes shape, alone among the things that move on land or in air or down 
through the sea. Yet during the periods when it walks supported by the largest number 
offeet, then is the speed in its limbs the feeblest of all" (Gould 19 qtd. in Chase 67). In 
contrast with the chronological line of the first version, here even the order of numbers 
is confused, and an extra added through the single, one, voice, though the key to their 
relation remains. Yet it is perhaps this version which makes Oedipus's answer the most 
truthful when he answers 'man' and so names himself, for Oedipus fits even the 
confused and overlapping thing of the first line. As Chase points out, "Sophocles 
dramatizes the riddle by representing Oedipus as king, as exposed child, and as blind 
old man all in the single scene of the tragedy" (68), and so, simultaneously, as a man 
with two, four, and three feet. Oedipus is the three terms of the riddle's paradigmatic 
axis collapsed into an individual figure, and is described as such by both himself and 
Teiresias. Teiresias describes him as "brother, as it shall be shown, / And father at once, 
to the children he cherishes; son, / And husband, to the woman who bore him; father-
killer, / And father-supplanter" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 454-57). Oedipus sees himself 
as "sinful in my begetting, / Sinful in marriage, sinful in shedding of blood!" 
(Sophocles, Oedipus line 1190-91). 
By indirectly revealing Oedipus's fate as a blind, old man, the answer to the 
riddle of the Sphinx can be seen to prefigure the answer to the riddle of the Phocal crime 
also. All riddles converge then at the Oedipus complex. The line of the Sphinx's riddle 
leads there, as does the riddle of who killed Laius, as does the riddle of Oedipus's 
identity, as does Freud's solution to the riddle of the affect of Oedipus the King as 
159 
drama. Nonetheless, we had begun to doubt that the enigma of The Unconsoled also 
centred around the Oedipus complex, but these uncertainties might be dispelled by the 
parallels between the riddle of The Unconsoled and the riddle of the Sphinx which 
become apparent if, for our answer, we look for a tripartite being with a single voice. 
Then, we see that the text of The Unconsoled seems to present us with the same 
impossible thing as the riddle, a thing that has two feet, four feet, and three feet, a thing 
that, again, is Oedipus. If we need to find the child Oedipus, then we can look to 
Stephan, who is figuratively crippled by his parents' lack of confidence in him, but who 
nevertheless returns to the stage of the concert hall, to the stage of the drama, or Thebes, 
where the action takes place. There, he gives a performance which the audience sees as 
"a kind of omen" which suggests that the evening might "prove a turning point for the 
community after all" (Ishiguro 482). If this might be the young Oedipus come to 
maturity through his victory over the Sphinx, then Stephan's final "wistful, faintly ironic 
reading" (Ishiguro 482) reflects the bitter truth of Oedipus's answer. Ryder provides us 
with Oedipus as the king who has performed triumphantly in the past, but is now asked 
to save the city again. The peculiarly textual form ofthe dialogic drama by which the 
double-edged salvation is revealed is seen in the proposed format of the question and 
answer session in the concert hall where, Ryder is told "the words will be spelt out 
simultaneously on the electronic scoreboard fixed directly above your head" (Ishiguro 
381). For Oedipus as he appears at the end of the play, it seems best to look to Brodsky 
who, after his fall from the bike, is found to have a wooden leg, and who must walk to 
the stage with the aid of an ironing-board propped under his arm. 
The form of the riddle laid the three parts of the one thing along its single line, 
its one voice, and here The Unconsoled presents us with the three aspects of its Oedipal 
character spread intermingled throughout its length. Reading spatially allows us to link 
the dispersed, but of course already related, sections to each other, and in the 
juxtaposition of these three characters we perceive the figure of Oedipus, even as the 
three terms of the riddle reveal 'man' to be their answer. With this three-personed 
Oedipus, it becomes easier to read the answer to The Unconsoled as the Oedipus 
complex. It no longer seems necessary for Ryder's parents to appear, for anything may 
enter at those points where Ryder's story intersects with Stephan's and Brodsky's, and, 
indeed, they do seem to provide access to the required elements. In comparison with 
Stephan's success, his father Hoffman meets with utter failure. The evening was his 
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responsibility, but, like many others before, proved to be nothing but a disaster. Having 
long wondered why his cultured wife stayed with him, and having lived so long with the 
pressure to prove his worth to her while always failing, Hoffman now finally asks why 
she had ever married him. "What a mistake you made," he says, "A tragedy" (Ishiguro 
507). He describes himself, in a way which recalls Oedipus's riveted feet, and marks 
him as Oedipus's precursor, as "the very ball and chain on your ankle" (Ishiguro 507), 
and can only beg her to leave him. With the son elevated to a position of respect within 
the community, and the father ruined, this seems an adequate version of the murder of 
Laius. Ifwe need to speak of incest, then perhaps we can look to Brodsky, the elder 
Oedipus and the former lover of Mrs. Collins, the social queen ofthe city who "did my 
best to help the unhappy people here" (Ishiguro 499). Laying Stephan's story over 
Ryder's, and Ryder's in turn over Brodsky's, we arrive at last at an image of Oedipus. 
Oedipus's incestuous crime, of course, does not bring an end to his story, which 
continues with the working out of its gruesome repercussions. Brodsky's desire is to 
reunite with Miss Collins, to make love to her once more, but he's bothered by "a 
wound. I got it many years ago" (308), which makes it painful for him. If, in Oedipal 
terms, Brodsky's relationship with Miss Collins represents the love of the mother, then it 
seems natural to think of this wound as a form of castration, which is the "resulting 
punishment" (Freud, "Dissolution" 176) of such intercourse. After Brodsky's 
performance in the concert, Miss Collins rejects him and his obsession with his wound, 
telling him that he is "going somewhere horrible now. Somewhere dark and lonely, and 
I won't come with you" (Ishiguro 499). So it is that Oedipus is sent into exile, with his 
blindness as his wound, his punishing castration. As Freud points out, "The self-
blinding of the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the 
punishment of castration" ("Uncanny" 231). This wounding and exile should, then, be 
what finally provides us with the wish-fulfilment ofthe text, with the dream's censoring 
agent successfully punishing the dreamer for attempting to fulfil a forbidden desire. Our 
conclusion seems to be that The Unconsoled is an anxiety-dream which expresses an 
Oedipal desire, but is eventually overpowered by the censor. 
Further evidence for this is to be found by turning from the riddle of the text to 
the one remaining riddle, namely the cause of the maladies afflicting the city of The 
Unconsoled. Perhaps the telling factor here is the audience reaction to Brodsky's 
performance. As conductor, Brodsky brings the orchestra with him in his interpretation 
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of his chosen musical piece, but Ryder becomes increasingly concerned by a reading 
which "was almost perversely ignoring the outer structure ofthe music - the composer's 
nods towards tonality and melody that decorated the surface of the work - to focus 
instead on the peculiar life-forms hiding just under the shell" (Ishiguro 492). Brodsky 
ignores the deceptive appearance of the manifest dream, to address the riddle posed now 
by the music, but when "the music veered dangerously towards the realms of perversity" 
(Ishiguro 494) it seems that the Oedipus complex is once again the answer. It seems the 
audience recognises this too, but is unwilling to accept it. They reject the interpretation 
given to them by Brodsky and, through an act of shared repression, convince themselves 
oftheir wellbeing by remembering "the splendid heritage ofthis city, all the things 
we've got to be proud of' (Ishiguro 516). 
This final repression, this painless return by the people of the city to a placid 
state, is a telling point. Ryder is relatively unconcerned about the way in which the city 
solves its own problems, saying "After all, if a community could reach some sort of 
equilibrium without having to be guided by an outsider, then so much the better" 
(Ishiguro 524). Freud was drawn to Oedipus not only because of the insights to be 
gained from his parrincestual character, but also because of his status as a reader and 
interpreter, his ability to solve problems, but in the final analysis of The Unconsoled this 
side of the Oedipus complex is, at least on this level, absent. The process of 
psychoanalysis so vividly illustrated in Oedipus the King, the process of revealing what 
lies hidden, could never be reproduced in a text which must end with a successful 
repression instead of disclosure. The salvation that Oedipus offers Thebes is given at 
the expense of his own revelation, for, as Claude Levi-Strauss explains, "myths of the 
Oedipal type ... always assimilate the discovery of the incest to the solution of a living 
puzzle personified by the hero" (2: 24). Ryder cannot be permitted to save this city with 
a performance which will also reveal his Oedipus complex; the dream-censor cannot 
permit it, and so the city heals itself with the conviction that it knows itself, and has a 
past to be proud of. 
There is one further question to be addressed to complete this reading. The 
interpretation of the text as a dream of punishment-fulfilment raises the issue of the 
death of the father, which seems not to have been repressed but successfully achieved. 
Against this, it might be argued that, though Stephan's father may fall from grace, 
Stephan experiences no sense of triumph, instead admitting to Ryder that "My parents 
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are right" (Ishiguro 520), an attitude which seems less the expression of a wish fulfilled 
than the acceptance into the super-ego ofthe law of the parent which accompanies the 
dissolution of the Oedipus complex. Furthermore, Brodsky may have loved Miss 
Collins, but this lies in the past of the text, while all we witness is the aftermath of his 
castration. In relation to this, it is interesting to note that Stephan embodies the Oedipus 
ofthe before of the text of Oedipus the King, that is, Stephan's story relates Oedipus's 
rejection by his parents, his maiming, the murder of his father, and his eventual return to 
Thebes, to the stage, where he wins the respect ofthe city by the skill of his 
interpretation. Brodsky, on the other hand, represents what occurs to Oedipus after 
Oedipus the King ends, when, already both wounded and rejected, he is asked to return 
by a city which believes that it is in him "that they must grow to greatness" (Sophocles, 
At Colonus 419). The crime of Oedipus, and the text which reveals it, is thus absent 
from The Unconsoled, but this absence is not "a hole" with either determinable or "with 
indeterminable borders" lying at the centre of the text, but is known only as a deferred 
and differing presence in these other texts which supplement the Oedipal with what 
precedes and follows it (Derrida, "Differance" 6). Stephan fails to recognise the father 
he kills, but instead asserts the authority of the father-figure, and the law of the father, in 
an act of self-banishment, even as Oedipus, in his self-imposed exile from Corinth, puts 
Polybus in the place of the father he cannot kill. As Pucci says, Oedipus "by running 
away from his home in Corinth ... authenticates Polybus and Merope as his own 
legitimate parents and he obtains this authentification by inflicting on himself and on 
them a loss, his own absence" (Pucci 108-9, see also 123-44). Brodsky, meanwhile, 
reveals the mark of the crime through the punishment which results from it, and the 
censor has done its work on both fronts, declaring the nature ofthe law, which is the law 
of nature, the law against incest, and exacting its punishment, without ever revealing the 
specifics of the crime. 
Ryder remains the only Oedipal persona inhabiting the actual text of Oedipus the 
King, but the necessity of our appealing to the supplementary tales of Stephan and 
Brodsky to find the elements required to fulfil the Oedipal formula, reveals the extent to 
which the text of Oedipus the King has been censored and written over throughout the 
course of The Unconsoled. Essentially, it is the deferral of the parents' return which 
negates the possibility of Ryder realising, and perhaps even expressing, those 
unconscious desires, and, indeed, the close ofthe book finds Ryder repeatedly 
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acknowledging his parents' absence. Beginning with his initial admission that he had 
"so far been unable to find a single sign of my parents' presence anywhere in the 
building," finally he "remembered all at once just how tenuous had been the possibility 
of my parents' coming to the town. I could not understand at all how I had ever been so 
confident about the matter" (Ishiguro 508, 512). While Freud's reading of Oedipus the 
King reveals to him his own complex, both in terms of his own relationship with his 
father, and his drive to self-analysis, our own reading of The Unconsoled reveals the 
very impossibility of the fulfilment of the complex due to the unattainability of the 
parents. The irony is, however, that Ryder's parents had once visited the city, in fact 
"it's all been pretty well documented" (Ishiguro 513), but all that remains is the trace of 
their passing, a vague memory oftheir being in the city. 
We have to wonder how often Ryder has been let down by his parents, travelling 
from city to city with the expectation that they will follow to hear him play, that this trip 
will be "the very special one, the very important trip, the one that's very very important" 
(Ishigur0217), only to experience again such disappointment when they fail to show, 
and perhaps to learn again that they have been there before him. This drive to see his 
parents is the distorted echo of a similar series of actions in his childhood. Then, while 
out playing in a lane outside his house, Ryder "had suddenly felt a sense of panic and a 
need for the company of my parents" but, recognising this as an immature emotion, had 
"forced myself to delay my departure" (Ishiguro 172). The child delays his return to the 
house in an effort to train himself to master life without his parents, while the adult tries 
to make his parents come to him in an effort to assert his independence, but in actuality 
makes a delayed return to a place his parents have already been, repeating his childhood 
actions. The striking matter is the way in which this behaviour mirrors the game of 
"disappearance and return," or 'fort' ['gone'] and'da' ['there'], which Freud observed 
being played also by a young boy (Beyond 15). Freud's interpretation of this behaviour 
was that in "their play children repeat everything that has made a great impression on 
them in real life, and that in doing so they abreact the strength of the impression and, as 
one might put it, make themselves master of the situation" (Beyond 17), even as the 
child Ryder asserts his own sense of maturity by controlling his reactions to the enacted 
loss of his parents. 
The adult Ryder's same tendency to replay the loss and hoped-for regainment of 
his parents, reveals that, like a neurotic patient, Ryder is experiencing what Freud calls 
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the "compulsion to repeat" (Beyond 19). Here, we see perhaps the one failure of the 
censoring agent of the dream to counter the desire of the unconscious repressed, for the 
compulsion to repeat comes from the repressed, as the patient "is obliged to repeat the 
repressed material as a contemporary experience instead of ... remembering it as 
something belonging to the past" (Beyond 18). Freud is interested, however, in the way 
that the re-experience of these repressed events seems to contravene what he calls the 
pleasure principle, whereby the mental life of the individual works to avoid unpleasure 
and produce pleasure. Freud points out that "It is clear that the greater part of what is 
re-experienced under the compulsion to repeat must cause the ego unpleasure, since it 
brings to light activities of repressed instinctual impulses" (Beyond 20), just as an 
anxiety dream creates its unpleasant effect through the fulfilment of a repressed wish. 
More striking, though, is the way in which the compulsion to repeat will recreate 
circumstances which in no way could produce pleasure for the individual, so that "the 
compulsion to repeat also recalls from the past experiences which include no possibility 
of pleasure, and which can never, even long ago, have brought satisfaction even to 
instinctual impulses which have long since been repressed" (Beyond 20). The series of 
actions which tend to be repeated in these cases are "the activities of instincts intended 
to lead to satisfaction; but no lesson has been learnt from the old experience of these 
activities having led instead only to unpleasure" (Beyond 21). In Ryder's case, we 
might initially want to argue that Ryder is trying to relive the fulfilment of his Oedipal 
desire, that at some point his parents witnessed and appreciated his piano-playing, and 
that it is this sequence of events he wishes to re-enact, only for the censoring agent to 
react against this. Considering his childhood game, however, it seems that what he truly 
feels compelled to repeat is his traumatic abandonment by his parents, and his dream, 
like the young boy's game, is an attempt to control the traumatic situation. "These 
dreams," says Freud, "are endeavouring to master the stimulus retrospectively, by 
developing the anxiety whose omission was the cause ofthe traumatic neurosis" 
(Beyond 32). 'Anxiety' here is being used in a clinical sense to describe "a particular 
state of expecting the danger or preparing for it, even though it may be an unknown 
one" (Beyond 12). Just as Ryder prepared himself in his childhood for the loss of his 
parents by experiencing the "growing fear and panic ofthese occasions" when he kept 
himself from them (Ishiguro 172), developing an anxiety in an advanced reaction to 
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their absence, so the adult Ryder repeats his loss in dream, in the hope that the next time 
he might be prepared for it. 
What we have to consider is why a loss for which the child Ryder had so 
thoroughly prepared, still resulted in such a traumatic shock to his system. Perhaps the 
answer lies not in the manner of his parents' desertion, but in their reasons for leaving. 
Speaking to his childhood friend, Fiona, of his parents' fights, she asks "Don't you know 
why they argue all the time?" and goes on to tell him that "They only argue like that 
when ... when special things happen" (Ishiguro 172). But she is forbidden from telling 
him the truth, from telling him what "Everybody else knows" (Ishiguro 173). Surely the 
truth is that it is Ryder's Oedipal desire which lies at the heart of their fighting, and that 
what is so traumatic is that it was when he felt closest to them, when he felt on the verge 
of fulfilling his Oedipal wishes, that they abandoned him. Now, his compulsion drives 
him to repeat those actions which will see his Oedipal desire result only in unpleasure 
for, never learning his childhood lesson, he must experience again the loss of his parents 
by his own hands, his own desire to possess them. 
For Freud, the compulsion to repeat revealed "the regressive character of 
instincts," the remarkable fact that "all instincts tend towards the restoration of an earlier 
state of things" (Beyond 59,37). Ryder's urge to repeat means re-experiencing elements 
of his own childhood, and not just the separation from his parents for, as Freud points 
out, "The repressed instinct never ceases to strive for complete satisfaction, which 
would consist in the repetition of a primary experience of satisfaction" (Beyond 42), so 
that Ryder replays those childhood happinesses which promised utter fulfilment, but 
delivered desolation. Repeatedly, then, Ryder finds himselfback in the world of his 
childhood. His hotel room becomes "the very room that had served as my bedroom 
during the two years my parents and I had lived at my aunt's house," a room in the flat 
where he, Sophie, and Boris once lived resembles "exactly the back part of the parlour 
in the house my parents and I had lived in for several months in Manchester," and, in the 
grounds outside the Karwinsky Gallery, he finds "the remains of the old family car my 
father had driven for many years" (Ishiguro 16,214,261). Ryder's emotional 
attachment to the time represented by that old car is apparent in Sophie's comment that 
he seems "to have fallen in love with that thing," as he holds the car in a "virtual 
embrace" (Ishiguro 262). A Freudian interpretation, however, gives these memories a 
greater resonance, for "whenever a man dreams of a place or a country and says to 
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himself, while he is still dreaming: 'this place is familiar to me, I've been here before', 
we may interpret the place as being his mother's genitals or her body" (Freud, 
"Uncanny" 245). These remembered places become the site of the mother's body, and 
so a replaying expression of the Oedipal desire to be at one with the mother's body, to 
be possessed by it to the exclusion ofthe father. 
Ryder's desire to return to those times when he was closest to his parents may 
also restore him to an even earlier state ofthings, when he was yet in his mother's 
womb. Nor does the text itself contradict such a reading. The concert hall where Ryder 
is supposed to perform has a roof domed like a pregnant woman's swollen belly. Inside, 
Ryder views the performance from within a tall, narrow cupboard set high under the 
ceiling of the auditorium. Before entering, Ryder supposes the "cupboard contained a 
urinal or perhaps a drinking fountain" as he sees a man "bent right forward with his rear 
protruding, to all appearances rummaging busily through the cupboard's contents" 
(Ishiguro 476). Freud tells us that cupboards "have more connection with the uterus 
than with the female genitals" (Introductory 189), so that Ryder may be seen to witness 
his own conception by this rummaging man. When he enters, Ryder finds "a thin cord 
tied at waist height" (Ishiguro 477), like an umbilical cord. Ryder watches much ofthe 
concert from the cupboard, including Stephan's recital, and most of Brodsky's 
performance, but emerges to move to the side of the stage in time to see Brodsky 
collapse. Soon after this he learns of the absence of his parents, but, as we have seen, 
the compulsion to repeat which drives him to reexperience this loss, also never absolves 
him from the belief that he himself is responsible for this loss. The indirect admission 
of a guilty Oedipal desire requires a further punishment from the censoring agent, and 
Ryder, in a form of mitigated self-blinding, meets the news of his parents' loss by 
weeping uncontrollably, so that the "tears filled my eyes very steadily and ran down my 
face" (Ishiguro 516). 
Despite this disappointment, Ryder is nevertheless determined to go ahead with 
his own performance, feeling that to do anything less "would be to open some strange 
door through which I would hurtle into a dark, unknown space" (Ishiguro 518). The 
auditorium, however, is empty, and Ryder is faced with "a vast, dark, empty space" 
(Ishiguro 519). This is perhaps the final repetition, the replaying of the earliest of all 
possible states, the return to what lies before the womb, the return to the inanimate, to 
death, for, of course, "the aim of all life is death" (Freud, Beyond 38). It is only natural 
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that Ryder's compulsion to repeat should end with death, with the negation of 
animation, for Oedipus himself prefers death to an awareness of his parrincestual 
crimes. "Cursed be the benefactor / That loosed my feet and gave me life / For death; a 
poor exchange. / Death would have been a boon / To me and all of mine," says Oedipus 
(Sophocles, Oedipus line 1356-1360). "Would you had never lived to read this riddle," 
says the Chorus, suggesting it would have been better had death greeted Oedipus at the 
entrance to the city, rather than letting him find it at the end (Sophocles, Oedipus line 
1355). 
Uncanny parallels: an experience of the space of literature 
In our final reading of The Unconsoled, informed by the interpretative procedures of 
three other readers, Quinn, Freud, and Oedipus, we seem to have produced a relatively 
satisfactory account of the text as one shaped by the psychoanalytical theories of Freud, 
and particularly the theory of the Oedipus complex. Yet, though we saw in Ryder an 
expression of all that was Oedipal, we failed to place him in that one Oedipal role 
central to both our own and Freud's analysis, the role of reader. At this point, therefore, 
it seems we should return now to an earlier part of this discussion to retrace the same 
path along a different line. 
That this brief repetition is necessary becomes clear when we look to one further 
element in Oedipus's reading of the riddle which we haven't yet mentioned, namely the 
advantage given to him by his own name. The name Oedipus means 'Swellfoot,' or 
'Swollenfoot,' from oidos (swelling) and pous (foot), and was given to him on account 
of his damaged ankles, which were riveted to ensure the child's death on the mountain-
side. Oedipus, then, is already familiar with the feet being used as a synecdochal 
naming of the man, so in answering the riddle of the Sphinx, he need only see that it 
repeats the same pattern. As Chase puts it, "sensitive to feet as part of a name for man, 
Oedipus can provide the identification that destroys the Sphinx" (65). Pietro Pucci, 
however, argues that Oedipus himself prefers to relate his name to the verb oida, 
meaning 'I know,' though also related to the verb 'to see,' so that he may identify himself 
by the name 'Knowfoot' instead (Pucci 66-78, see also Chase 65-66). Oedipus then 
draws attention to his own heroic narrative rather than to the more telling marks on his 
ankles, though Pucci comments that the ambiguities of expression in the text may "point 
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to a conscious refusal to read in his name the scars of his feet or an unconscious 
repression of the name's implications, or finally the possibility that Oedipus really was 
unaware of his scars" (Pucci 71). 
Levi-Strauss points out how not just Oedipus's name but the names also of his 
father Laius, 'left-sided,' and grandfather Labdacus, 'lame,' "refer to difficulties in 
walking straight and standing upright" (1: 215). It's tempting, though perhaps slightly 
unwarranted, to see a similar line of thinking emerge in the name Stephan Hoffman, 
'step-and-hop man,' a further link to Oedipus with his pierced feet, but, accepting this, 
we could also include an interpretation of Hoffman as hoof-man (,hoof coming from the 
Germanic huj), the misrecognised father who rides on horseback. Ryder's obvious 
equivalent, 'rider,' would not be out of place for one whose parents are absent, who is 
un-fathered, and so given the place of privilege on horseback. In fact, we should notice 
that all the characters of The Unconsoled are the un-con-soled, are those without soles, 
are the lame, and are therefore necessarily bound by the Oedipus complex, following, as 
they do, in his line. Even as the marks on Oedipus's ankles forever recall his damaged 
past, so it is that the unconsoled are marked by "wounds that won't heal, something that 
went wrong very early on" (Ishiguro qtd. in Ohno par. 17) 
Where the game of naming most clearly relates to the riddle posed by The 
Unconsoled is where, looking more closely at the name 'Ryder,' we can see that it is 
none other than a pun on both the word 'writer' and 'reader,' phonetically akin to 'writer,' 
visually akin to 'reader,' so that 'Ryder' is a combination ofthe two, is 'wri/der.' Even as 
Freud sees in Oedipus the model self-analyst, so Ryder allows Ishiguro to enact for us 
the reader's role, our own role, in the text. Our own reading of the text may be informed 
by Oedipus's understanding ofthe Sphinx's riddle, but Ryder's success or failure in 
helping the people ofthe city also lies, like Oedipus's, in his ability to read the situation 
and come to a conclusion. Ryder, therefore, goes about his task in much the same way 
that a reader might try to come to an understanding of a text, in a way easily comparable 
with our own approach to The Unconsoled, at times even replicating a reader's 
vacillation between self-doubt and self-confidence. On the one hand he is driven to 
attend to the issues at hand, to find out as much as he can about the local situation, to 
undertake some "background research," or, in other words, to read closely and 
attentively, for, as the city's original musical saviour, Christoff, argues, "even an expert 
of your calibre needs to apply his knowledge to a particular set of local conditions. 
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Each community has its own history, its own special needs" (Ishiguro 187). Ryder takes 
offence at Christoffs "implication that I was more or less ignorant of the local 
conditions, that I was the sort to draw conclusions without bothering with such factors, 
was quite insulting" (Ishiguro 187). At times, however, he is absolutely convinced of 
his own abilities, and believes that he need only bring the lessons of his prior 
experiences to bear on the situation and all will be well: "I surveyed the scene around 
me and saw how needless had been my worries concerning my ability to cope with the 
various demands presented to me in this city. As ever, my experience and my instincts 
had proved more than sufficient to see me through" (Ishiguro 115,524). The text is 
always there, though, to challenge such arrogance, to demand "why do you take it upon 
yourselfto pronounce like this, as though you're blessed with some extra sense the rest 
of us lack?" (Ishiguro 133). 
But as events unfold, Ryder more than adequately fulfils his role as reader, even 
acting out its limitations. At times, he has a keen and insightful eye, inferring from the 
state of those around him what has gone before: "Then as I continued to cast my gaze 
about me, I began to realise just what had taken place before our arrival" (Ishiguro 126). 
When required, he provides a mute witness to conversation, and an excuse for dialogue, 
as Ryder as reader is provided with the information he needs to understand what's going 
on: "But we were just discussing something else together. I really would appreciate 
your advice" (Ishiguro 130). When there is no information to be given, he is generally 
ignored, "no one seemed especially interested in me," and, if necessary, he is as 
invisible as an external reader so that others may talk freely, "the two men continued 
their discussion without looking up at me" (Ishiguro 125, 166). At other times, he 
seems to be invisible against his will, unable to act, even as a reader may sometimes feel 
impotent in the face of what they are reading, caught up in the action of the text but 
unable to intervene: "I made another concerted effort to announce myself, but to my 
dismay all I could manage was another grunt" (Ishiguro 239). The reverse of this is 
when he is invited to take part but instead withdraws, unwilling to initiate action. Boris 
asks him to playa board game with him, but Ryder, the wri/der, "pretended not to hear 
and went on reading" (Ishiguro 285). 
Seeing Ryder as reader, we realise that The Unconsoled contains not one but two 
readers, and we are both encountering the world of the book as a textual construction. 
Reading has become, as Todorov predicted, one ofthe major themes ofthe book. And 
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again this mirrors Oedipus's case also, for, as Chase points out, he is proven guilty of his 
crimes not by empirical evidence but by the accumulation of texts, by "a constricting 
network of texts: the Herdsman's word ... , the Messenger's news ... ,his wife's 
confession ... , and, above all, the words ofthe oracles" (64). Neither is shifting the 
perspective from seeing the world of The Unconsoled as one of dream to seeing it 
simply in its textual reality a radical move when we see that the riddle of dreaming itself 
was solved by Freud by a reading of a play which hinges on the correspondence of texts, 
and specifically in the reading of the text of this play of text. With the riddle of 
dreaming solved, Freud also suggests a particularly textual approach to the riddle of the 
individual dream, describing as the "work of interpretation" (Introductory 204) the 
process of undoing the dreamwork, and everywhere paying attention to the language of 
the dream, to the etymology of the words used, to their connotations, and symbolic 
meanings. Elsewhere, Freud describes psychoanalysis as a whole as "first and foremost 
an art of interpreting" (Beyond 18) and speaks of operating "with the scientific terms, 
that is to say with the figurative language, peculiar to psychology" (Beyond 60). The 
result is, in effect, a science of interpretation, which Trilling has described as "a science 
of tropes, of metaphor and its variants, synecdoche and metonymy" (qtd. in Bloom 176), 
and which Chase describes as having a "definitive and continuous dependency on 
writing" (70). 
Whatever difficulties this might create for practitioners of psychoanalysis, for 
The Unconsoled this approach works extremely well, for all those elements which were 
explained as resulting from the logic of the dream can as easily be explained through 
narratological convention when we understand that the world of the text is purely text. 
Throughout The Unconsoled, Ishiguro confuses the world of the text with the space of 
the text, blurring the formal levels so that what is usually seen as taking place on the 
level of the story, now occurs on the level offabula. For example, the inordinate 
amount oftime which Ryder spends in the elevator, listening to Gustav relate a story for 
far longer than the elevator ride could possibly have lasted, can be explained by the fact 
that the story which Gustav tells is an example of a realised retrospection, or flash-back. 
Instead of pausing fictional time and externally narrating Gustav's story, or creating 
fictional time in which Gustav can tell his story, by having him relate it in Ryder's room 
perhaps, Ishiguro simply uses up fictional time, creates textual time, without regard for 
the worldly reality of the situation. As Barthes points out, "both narrative and language 
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know only a semiotic time, 'true' time being a 'realist', referential illusion" 
("Introduction" 99).75 The way in which Ryder appears to be able to project his spirit 
can also be explained by his unique status. As wri/der he is writer, reader, and character 
too, but it is with a writer's eye that he provides us with information which couldn't 
possibly be available to him as a first-person narrator. At times he seems to approach 
the status of the traditional omniscient narrator, able to access information both by 
focalising through other characters, seeing through their eyes, but also by using external 
focalisation. 
There are times, though, when Ryder fails in the role ascribed to him by the 
people ofthe city, and yet the text still continues, carrying him along with it. It doesn't 
matter that he never gives that speech on the Tuesday night; the next day he is still being 
praised for "a marvellously witty address" (Ishiguro 155). Neither does Ryder's 
inattentiveness to what sometimes takes place around him impact negatively on the 
progress of the text. The townspeople proceed with a momentum of their own which is 
independent of this reluctant participant, but of course, even before his arrival, they had 
his trip planned out for him. The schedule which Ryder so vaguely remembers at the 
beginning ofthe text is a pre-record of the events that will take place over the days to 
come. Ryder's journey is already planned, his itinerary, his route, laid out for him. In 
this way too Ryder is the wri/der, because the reader knows that hislher future path 
through the text is already complete, mapped from beginning to end. The schedule 
which Ryder remembers so tangibly, recalling "the very texture of the thick grey paper 
on which the schedule had been typed" (Ishiguro 15), mirrors the physical volume 
which the reader holds in their hand, and which contains the line of text over which the 
reader will soon be travelling. 
This realisation that what we will read is already there, before us, creates an 
awareness of the fact that the line of the text, and the text's space, is always already a 
whole in itself, a simultaneously existing design. But this is not to say that the world of 
the text can ever be considered as some complete and ethereal world where characters 
wander as we look on. Instead, when Ishiguro allows the textual world and space to 
coincide as he does, he foregrounds the constructed nature of textual space, and the way 
75The textua1ity of Auster's New York produces similar comparable phenomena. For example, "Quinn is 
amazed that his initial interview with Peter Stillman takes fourteen hours. He can't know that taking the 
case means entering text time, where experiential time equals writing time; the detective's interview in 
chapter two takes the amount of time it takes to write that chapter" (Malmgren 196). 
172 
in which, in our encounter with that space, the space itself tries to guide us in our 
reconstruction of its already-existing self. By denying us the usual orienting signposts, 
the techniques employed to create the illusion of a whole textual world, he reveals for us 
a world which is being created only as it is encountered in "the words which unfold it in 
time and inscribe it in space" (Blanchot 362). On that first day, for example, at the 
bequest of Gustav, Ryder goes to the Old Town to find Gustav's daughter and discuss 
his concerns with her. Initially, he cannot see anyone to match their descriptions but 
then "turning, I saw a woman sitting with a young boy waving to me from a nearby 
table. The pair clearly matched the porter's description and I could not understand how I 
had failed to notice them earlier" (Ishiguro 32). The fictional world is being 
manipulated for Ryder as easily as textual space is manipulated for the reader. Things 
are brought into being through the simple act of writing them, as are their relations to 
other objects. Ryder is "a little taken aback, moreover, that they should be expecting 
me" (Ishiguro 32), because he is in the same situation as the reader and doesn't yet know 
that the woman is his wife and the child her son. Ishiguro gives Ryder only the bare 
minimum to start with, and it is only over time that Ryder learns of the internal 
connections and links, the system of references, which form the reality around him. The 
text so also becomes an illustration of how the act of reading is required to substantiate 
the text and its space, to reveal its design. Ishiguro writes the fictional world of the text 
not as a pre-existing world of realism, but instead the world and the character relations 
within it are accounted for as textual time progresses. The further Ryder as wri/der 
travels into this world, the more complex and expansive it becomes, for the text looks to 
the act of reading to reveal its semantic space and uncover the relations between its 
partS.76 
With Ryder experiencing the world as ifhe were a reader also, an understanding 
of Ryder's position illustrates the significance of our own role as readers, for Ishiguro 
shows us how the text is forever oriented towards the reader, requires the reader. Just as 
Ryder becomes increasingly concerned about the part he has to play in the city's future, 
so the reader too tends to experience the burden of presence, becoming increasingly 
76Yet, though the textual space may, in this way, appear to change with the reading, this does not mean 
that we should agree with Sutton when he says, "the form of the work - its manifest structure at any time -
is not absolutely fixed in a spatial revelation or epiphany, but is organically flexible and adaptable, 
accommodating itself to every altered perspective in time" (117). We would say instead that "it is only 
our vision which is being expanded & altered, not the thing itself. Curious, how easy it is for us little 
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aware ofthe demands the text places upon hirn/her, and beginning to question what it is 
that the text requires. Moreover, as readers standing at the threshold of a space of which 
we are the focal point, entering the textual city which will pose us so many questions, 
we know already where it all will end. The already-written conclusion lies before us in 
the volume of text to hand, and it is only a matter of time before the printed lines bring 
us to our inevitable destination. 
Given this, our reading of Ryder as an Oedipal figure becomes more clearly not 
only an account of Ryder as a neurotic, but also of Ryder as reader. Oedipus stands 
with us before this already-written story in that his own future path had been laid out for 
him from a time before his birth. In a divination which mapped out not one life but two, 
Oedipus's father Laius heard from the ministers of Phoebus, also called Apollo, that he 
was to be slain by his own son. Oedipus, in tum, learnt from the oracle at Pytho, 
another representative of Apollo, that he would bear children by his own mother, and 
kill his father. The figure of the god Apollo, then, can be seen to stand over the line of 
Oedipus's life as a sign of its teleological necessity, for, determining Oedipus's ultimate 
end, he ensures also that the events of his life conform to the pattern predicted. The 
word of Apollo is the law which rules the progression of the story, and the fulfilment of 
Oedipus's destiny is a witness to the authority ofthe god. Within the world of the play, 
the god Apollo is the law-giver, and so he is also god the Father, for it is the father who 
presents the law to his child, and initiates his son into the social order. He is also the 
god as Author, for he is the author of Oedipus's destiny, yet, though his word is law, he 
speaks only through his representatives, through the medium of others, so that, though 
his words are known, his voice is never heard. Like a reader, Oedipus stands before an 
unspoken but already recorded future, so that as Pucci writes, "the reader perceives that 
he [Oedipus] is following an already written path unknowingly" (10). This is not to say, 
however, that Oedipus's actions are in themselves predestined, but the final revelation of 
the truth of the prophecy, Oedipus's arrival at that pre-destination, reveals the absolute 
inevitability of his fate.?7 Fate is not that which determines the future, but that written 
past which is re-traced, even unwittingly.?8 
creatures to confuse the opening of our eyes with the coming into being of a new creation: like children 
conceiving the world remade each morning when they wake" (Banville 141). 
77pucci cites a number of sources which show that the idea of fate as a form of predetermination is "false 
and ahistorical" (Pucci 10) when applied to Greek tragedy. Martin Mueller also argues that "Fate ... is in 
the widest sense that which lies beyond human control. The assertion of the power of fate is simply a 
metaphorical transformation of human limitations into a counterforce actively resisting or oppressing 
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For readers entering the world of the text, it will be as if we have placed 
ourselves under the ordinance of our own Father figure, our own Apollo, exhibiting 
similar beliefs in an Author God whose prescribed path we must follow. Where we 
differ from Oedipus is in our intent to keep to this "already written path" (Pucci 10), for, 
while Oedipus tries to avoid the fate which awaits him, we adhere to the line of the text 
to ensure its proper fulfilment. 79 Our movement along the line of the text is often 
propelled by our faith in this certain conclusion, just as this very reading of The 
Unconsoled has been motivated throughout by the belief that the narrative line is 
governed by a coherent logic, and that the aim of our reading is to come upon the key to 
its design. As Hillis Miller argues, "the linearity of the written or printed book is a 
puissant support of logocentrism" where "narrative event follows narrative event in a 
purely metonymic line, but the series tends to organize itself or be organized into a 
causal chain" (Ariadne's Thread 5, 18). The text is seen to spring from some knowing 
origin, and to move purposefully forward towards a revelatory end which will illuminate 
the structuring logos, the teleological primacy of the end determined by our presumption 
that the line of the narrative represents a series of causal relations which arrive at, or 
result in, this inevitable final position. Our belief in the existence of the text's logos 
means that only the end will provide us with all the answers, for, as Hillis Miller says, 
"The end of the story is the retrospective revelation of the law ofthe whole" (Ariadne's 
Thread 18). As such, the end is the locus of the Father, and it is there that he stands to 
oversee our progress and enforce his law. 
Again, we see that Ryder truly occupies the position of reader too, for his own 
passage through the city is motivated by a belief that his Father waits for him at the end, 
ready to praise or condemn his musical interpretations. For us as readers, the possibility 
also remains that we will either have the answer we provide corroborated, or else we 
human aspirations" (129). When Freud writes that some normal people feel that they are "being pursued 
by a malignant fate or possessed by some 'daemonic' power; but psychoanalysis has always taken the 
view that their fate is for the most part arranged by themselves and determined by early infantile 
influences" (Beyond 21), he supports this sense of a compelling and constricting force which, 
nevertheless, has an internal source, and is not something imposed on an individual from outside. 
Though Freud here speaks of a determined fate, he does so in the context of the compulsion to repeat, so 
that what is fated is that which must be repeated, the past which must be retraced. 
78Writing about Jean Giraudoux's La guerre de Troie n'aura pas lieu (translated as Tiger at the Gates) 
Genette says, "Fate, as everyone knows, is what is written," meaning that, though Giraudoux's play "plays 
with its / prescribed end" it cannot avoid what has been foretold, cannot escape having to rewrite what 
has been written before (Palimpsests 380-81). 
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will have to have that answer provided for us. Now the end then assumes a double 
aspect, being both that point when we can gain a complete understanding of what has 
gone before, but being also a place of judgement, a time of reckoning which sees our 
abilities as readers put to the final test by the Author God. The significance of our 
situation is underlined by the corresponding pattern of Oedipus's experiences. When 
Oedipus provides the answer to the Sphinx's riddle, he assumes his father's position as 
King of the city and husband to the Queen, and once we discover the truth to this text's 
cypher, then we too will have gained the place of the Father, and our destined arrival at 
the end will herald only our triumphant entrance onstage. The alternative, as when 
Oedipus is provided with the key to his own identity, is to have our own eyes put out, to 
suffer our intellectual castration at the hands of the Father we challenge, but whose text 
defeats us.80 
As the place of ultimate judgement, the end ofthe text is, ultimately, death in the 
text, for, as Kermode comments, "the real point is surely that reading is, or mimes, a 
matter of life and death - the structuring of a life by a death" ("A Reply" 588). We saw 
too in Kepler an expectation of the end as a moment of revelation, death as "the 
perfecting medium" (134). There are at least two, admittedly rather minor, occasions in 
The Unconsoled where death is clearly portrayed as a certain end. At one point, we 
learn of an important event in Sophie's life, when, as a child, she had placed her pet 
hamster "inside this little gift box she had, all ready to go out, but then something had 
happened," and she forgot that she had ever put him in the box until some weeks later, 
by which time, of course, he had died (Ishiguro 84). Elsewhere, death is more clearly 
associated with the end of narrative, or, rather, those narratives which are destined to 
end in a particular way are seen to lead to death. Strangely, this occurs when Boris is 
playing his games of table-football. Then, the most impassioned tales of" dramatic 
reversals and nail-biting comebacks" centre on the player Number Nine, a player so 
gifted that soon "the inevitability of the outcome once he had received the ball was such 
that the commentator would say: 'It's a goal,' in tones of resigned admiration, not when 
the ball actually went into the net, but at the moment Number Nine first gained 
79In fact, in what follows after he hears the words of the Pythian oracle, Oedipus seems comparable to 
that Ryder who fails as a reader but still keeps to the line of the text, for Oedipus, while trying to avoid 
the future prophesied for him, nevertheless fulfils its every word. 
80This conflation of the sexual and intellectual is not discounted by the various connotations of the name 
Oedipus, for, as Freud himself suggested, "the signifier pous, ... in Greek not only signifies 'foot' but 
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possession" (Ishiguro 41, 42). The outcomes of Boris's miniature narratives are as 
inevitable as Oedipus's fate, and the end result is also a small death, for when Number 
Nine gets damaged, Boris puts "him in the box, it was a special one, so I wouldn't forget 
where he was. But we left him behind" (Ishiguro 42). In each ofthese cases the small, 
special box seems an obvious coffin, but it is important also simply as an example of an 
enclosed space, clearly bounded on all sides, like a narrative governed by teleological 
principles, with its creator, such as young Boris, standing over it to impose the law, and 
defined by its relation to death, which gives it its final meaning. 
Ifwe are looking solely to Ryder as an example of the reader's experience, 
however, we should remember that Ryder's end discovery is the absence of the Father, 
so that whatever faith we might have in a Father figure who is both our origin and goal 
is problematised by the text itself. Within the context of the Oedipal story as it appears 
in The Unconsoled, the role of the Father was given to Hoffman, and, we might recall, 
Stephan's apparently successful slaying of his father was actually seen to sit uneasily 
with the interpretation ofthe text as an anxiety-dream, although Stephan's ready 
admission that his parents were right after all seemed to indicate the intervention of the 
censoring agent. Certainly Hoffman seems to fit the role of the Author God when we 
consider that, throughout the book, he "supervised the larger structure of events" 
(Ishiguro 508), and he is seemingly alone in knowing what exactly the future holds. His 
awareness of what lies ahead is seen in his regular declaration of "An ox! Yes, an ox, an 
ox, an ox!" (Ishiguro 123) and the action of banging his fist on his forehead, both of 
which Ryder witnesses on a number of occasions. These acts form part of his rehearsal 
for that moment which, for him, is the purpose of all that has gone before. It is he who 
has guaranteed the disastrous tum of events by misdirecting his son in his choice of 
music, by sabotaging Brodsky's relationship with Miss Collins, and by plying Brodsky 
with whiskey before the show. Now, finally, he can confront his wife with what he 
believes must be her extreme disappointment in him, a man of such mediocrity, 
"nothing but an ox, an ox, an ox!" (Ishiguro 507). He was "the very ball and chain on 
your ankle" (Ishiguro 507), but she had been as much a prison for him, silently 
pressuring him to perform, demanding success, and his only aim had been to free 
himself. Now we have fresh evidence for the failure of the Oedipal desire in the text, 
metaphorically also the male sex," so that the name of Oedipus "might point to the signification of the 
phallus and libido in their relation to intellectual curiosity" (Pucci 76. See also n28 193-94). 
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for, rather than interpreting Hoffman's failure on the night ofthe concert as a variation 
on the murder of the father by the son, we should now instead see the ruin of the 
evening as something planned and directed by Hoffman from the beginning. It is not so 
much murder, then, as a form ofliberation through self-destruction, the Father absenting 
himself from the sphere of action. 
The absence of the father-figure, the representative ofthe logos which would 
give the narrative line its aim and purpose, means Ryder, the wri/der, our representative, 
never comes to the end, or at the end, never dies, or lays claim to a finality. Ifwe could 
read the signs, however, we would have known from the beginning that there was to be 
no end, for the very first sentence tells us that "there was no one - not even a clerk" 
(Ishiguro 3) to receive Ryder into the text. No one, then, or no One, no singular being, 
or absolute truth, no monological force to propel him through to the end, but also not 
even a clerk, a clergyman or priest, and representative of the Father God, no Teiresias, 
to instruct him. When a clerk finally does appear, he can only apologise for his absence, 
and for Hoffman's, who had wanted to meet with Ryder personally. Here, again, we 
find Kepler mirroring The Unconsoled, for there, too, those first few lines tell us all that 
we will be told, but it is, as Wincklemann says, that "Everything is told us but nothing 
explained" (Banville 191). 
The question then, however, is who is telling us that there is nothing to be told, 
who produces the signs ofthe absence ofthe signifier. Some possible answers might be 
found in what follows this negative beginning, in the nature of the fulfilment of the 
prophecy, in what we have described as the re-tracing of a written past. In particular, 
the uneven, often unintentional nature of the rewriting, casts a fresh light on the original 
lines. For example, we have said that Oedipus's life seems governed by telos, by 
"origin, continuity, and finality," and the word of Apollo, but it is also not without its 
elements of "indeterminancy, chance, and arbitrariness," marked throughout the play by 
the appearance of the word tukhe (Pucci 5). The figure of the Father may be the 
teleological force behind Oedipus's life, but he "has a mother that the text explicitly 
identifies with the notion of chance (tukhe)" (Pucci 5), Oedipus identifying himself as 
the "child of Fortune" (Sophocles, Oedipus line 1080), and sent out into the world by 
antagonistic parents. Oedipus's ties to the chance event are evident even in the origin of 
his name, given to him on account of the misfortune of his riveted ankles, instead of 
being bestowed to him by a father who would "insure his identity and that of his 
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lineage," and so preserve his family line (Pucci 32). In its ambiguous etymology, his 
name presents two contrasting readings, "Swollenfoot, allied to the element of finality, 
and Knowfoot, partaking of the element of chance," so that Teiresias may even claim 
that Oedipus arrived at the answer to the riddle of the Sphinx not by any innate 
intelligence, but by the "vagaries of chance [tukhe]" (Pucci 13,35), by the fortuitous 
combination of an accidental naming and a timely misreading which produced a final 
answer. The intervention by chance into Oedipus's affairs problematises the theological 
assumptions behind the play, questioning both the real presence of Apollo in the words 
of his oracles, and his ability to effect change when necessary. As Pucci argues, within 
the play's "ideological framework there should be no places for either tukhe or the 
absence ofthe father" (29). 
Significantly, however, these chance occurrences don't divert Oedipus from his 
destiny, but rather guarantee it, for the divine word of Apollo which preordains 
Oedipus's destiny is seemingly fulfilled only through events which the language ofthe 
text itself marks as random or accidental. For Pucci, the two ideological stances, telos 
and tukhe are "simultaneously in conflict and in complicity" (5). Perhaps this is partly 
explained by the changes affecting the concept of tukhe around the time of the play's 
writing. Where once TukhS had been thought of as a divinity herself, and the word had 
"theological associations with fate, fortune, and providential (and unexpected) chance," 
it had begun now to diverge from its traditional meaning to suggest the "mere 
accidentality" featured in Sophocles's play (Pucci 30. See also 181n). Pucci points out, 
however, that tukhe "has a wide range of connotations, implying both the providential 
(and unexpected) intervention of a god and the secular notion of randomness, and 
chance" (12).Sl Tukhe embraces both the concept of purposeful intervention by an 
Author God in an ordered plan, and the purposelessness, though not necessarily 
meaninglessness, of chance occurrences, leading Pucci to "use the word chance - and 
more precisely the term scriptural chance - to designate the effects of the difference and 
deferral of the linguistic sign. . .. In fulfilling this function tukhe may be almost 
synonymous with telos, or its direct opposite" (36). This is in accord with Derrida's 
SlThe fIrst of these, unexpected intervention, seems to return to Mueller's description of fate as something 
which lies outside of human control (n7), so that tukhe circles back to telos to illustrate their close 
relation. Remarkably, the historical Kepler also wrote of the part played in his life by what we are here 
calling tukhe: "I believe Divine Providence arranged matters in such a way that what I could not obtain 
with all my efforts was given to me through chance" (qtd. in Imhof, Banville 105). 
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description of the play of difj'erance as announcing "the unity of chance and necessity in 
calculations without end" ("Differance" 7).82 
Perhaps coincidentally, an excellent example of a text which begins by chance is 
City of Glass, the text which fittingly guided us in our initial reading of The 
Unconsoled. There, of course, "It was a wrong number that started it" (Auster, City 3), 
that was "the mistake that sets the whole story in motion" (though the text itself, the 
actual writing of the story, was similarly "inspired by a wrong number" (Auster, Red 
Notebook 377).83 Even on the first page we are being told that, by the end, Quinn's 
feeling was that "nothing was real except chance" (Auster, City 3). Yet the most 
remarkable chance event in the text occurs when Quinn first goes to Grand Central 
Station, to find and to follow Stillman. Quinn spots Stillman on the ramp, but "what 
happened then defied explanation. Directly behind Stillman, heaving into view just 
inches behind his right shoulder, another man stopped, took a lighter out of his pocket, 
and lit a cigarette. His face was the exact twin of Stillman's" (Auster, City 56). As "the 
first turned right, the second turned left," Quinn, as Auster, had to choose to follow one 
or the other, but he knew that that choice "would be arbitrary, a submission to chance. 
Uncertainty would haunt him to the end" (Auster, City 56). Quinn has only a fifty-
percent chance of following the right Stillman because there are two of them now, 
Stillman is a repeated figure. Moreover, this repetition interrupts Quinn's pursuit of 
Stillman, it introduces an element of hesitancy into what follows, and into the telling of 
what follows, for though we continue to follow the line of Quinn's story as he tails 
Stillman, we are now always aware of that second possible storyline, where Quinn 
follows the other Stillman. 
This brief instant in Quinn's tale bears scrutiny because it mirrors exactly the 
structuring elements ofthe space of text identified in the first chapter, where repetitions 
in the textual line mark points of intersection which divert us from our course. The 
closeness of Auster's account to our own is emphasised by a passage in The Invention of 
Solitude, where the vocabulary constantly recalls our own discussions, touches on 
similar points. Auster writes: 
82We can compare this to Agamben's statement that rhythm opens the work of art "in a space in which 
calculation and play appear to blur into each other" ("Original Structure" 99). 
83B1anchot also points out that "Valery often reminded us that his best works were created for a chance 
commission" ("Literature" 362). 
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As in the meanings of words, things take on meaning only in relationship 
to each other. ... The faces rhyme for the eye, just as two words can 
rhyme for the ear. To carry the proposition one step further, A. would 
contend that it is possible for events in one's life to rhyme as welL ... 
Wherever his eye or mind seems to stop, he discovers another 
connection, another bridge to carry him to yet another place, and even in 
the solitude of his room, the world has been rushing in on him at a 
dizzying speed, as if it were all suddenly converging in him and 
happening at once. Coincidence: to fall on with; to occupy the same 
place in time or space. (161-62) 
The image of repetition in the text requires that one line touch upon the other, that, for a 
moment, they coincide, co-occupying a section of the space of the narrative, the two 
lines intersecting at a point which diverts us from the path to an absolute end. Now, 
however, this coincidence means not simply a spatial co-existence, but implies also a 
certain arbitrariness, a connection without causality, a chance occurrence which may, 
nonetheless, happen by design, be the work of the Author God. 
Such coincidences are equally apparent in The Unconsoled, but manifest 
themselves only at very particular points in text. In each case, Ryder will have travelled 
to some place but then, when he wants to return to where he was, will realise that where 
he is is simply another part of where he wants to be: "it suddenly dawned on me that we 
were in the atrium of the hotel;" "I had at that moment remembered that this cafe and 
the one in which I had left Boris were in fact parts of the same building;" "I recalled 
from the previous evening that the house adjoined the hotel;" "only then did it dawn on 
me that I was in fact sitting in the Old Town by the main square, looking over to the 
Hungarian Cafe" (Ishiguro 148,203,277,390). In each case Ryder must move through 
darkness from one section to another: "Somewhere in the darkness on the far side," "I 
could see only darkness," "the long dark corridor," "the square was largely in darkness" 
(Ishiguro 148,203,280,390), as ifthe world ofthe text had been sliced apart, 
rearranged, and darkness fills the joints. Here again we witness the relation between 
repetition and coincidence, for the return to a particular location, the repeated 
appearance of that location, results from the discovery that the desired location shares its 
space, or coincides with, the present location. Of course, this coincidence does not exist 
in the world of the text, or at least it seems irrational to believe that the Karwinsky 
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Gallery, located on a "quiet road rising between meadows" (Ishiguro 259), is also the 
hotel in the city centre. Such a coincidence, however, may easily exist in the space of 
the text which produces this world, and which will regularly transport us from one place 
to the other within the space of a sentence, in a way which would suggest that these 
places really did adjoin each other if, as Ishiguro does, we saw no difference between 
the world and space ofthe text. Ryder must indeed traverse a black passage, then, 
because it is the printed text which returns him to his point of departure, the locational 
repetition being no more than a repetition of text. 
Ifwe try to map the movement ofthe path of the text at these points when Ryder 
can suddenly change the direction he appears to be following, we can see that the 
narrative has here arrived at something of a fork in its own road. The apparent route of 
the text is diverted from its original course by this coincidence of textual parts, by this 
intersection of narrative elements. This image of the diverging narrative line is not 
uncommon for, as Hillis Miller points out, "Another area of narrative terminology 
involves topography: roads, crossroads, paths" and, of course, "narrative motifs like 
Oedipus murdering Laius at the place where three roads cross" (Ariadne's Thread 20) 
(Pucci reminds us also that "the crossroad is the place ... of tukhi" (Pucci 1 06)). The 
fork at which Oedipus meets and slays his father is that "place where three roads meet" 
in the "land called Phocis - where the road divides, I Leading to Delphi and to Daulia" 
(Sophocles, Oedipus line 716, 733-34). Laius would have been travelling the road from 
Thebes, about to head down the road for Delphi up which Oedipus was coming. These 
two lives, then, which had diverged so many years previously, come together at this 
point from which emerges only one life-line, the other ended at the crossroads. In The 
Unconsoled, however, the crossroads are significant not because they are being alluded 
to as part of a recurring narrative motif, but rather because the text itself is obeying the 
law of the crossroad, eliminating one potential narrative line to enable another to 
continue.84 
Ishiguro's mapping of the space of the text onto its world therefore dramatises 
the way in which these repetitions in the narrative line, as points of intersection, act to 
divert us from our path. Ifwe think ofthe narrative as being represented by a straight 
line, we can form the point of intersection by curving that line back upon itself, creating 
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a sort of bow shape, with two loose ends forming a 'V' above the point of intersection, 
and a small loop below. Ifwe think of the line going from one end to the point of 
intersection as the account of Ryder's journey to the Karwinsky gallery, and the line 
going from the point of intersection to the other end as the account of what happens 
after he leaves the hotel, we can see that the point of intersection does away with the 
need to account for the loop, that is, to describe the journey from the gallery to the hotel. 
Ryder's journeys back to the hotel, or cafe, or square, need now never be related because 
the textual intersection enables another narrative route to be taken instead. The 'natural' 
course of the narrative is diverted onto this intersecting line, selecting a new direction 
provided by this textual coincidence. 
Ishiguro's text, in its explicit imbrication of world and space, is making manifest 
what occurs in almost every text, that is, the manipulation of the space of the text so as 
to edit the narrative line. Most interestingly, this manipulation occurs especially at the 
physical level of the space of text. In chapter one, we saw how Hillis Miller 
distinguishes "between effects of discontinuity, spaces or hiatuses between segments of 
a narrative line, and true disturbances of the line that make it curve back on itself, 
recross itself, tie itself in knots" (Ariadne's Thread 6). Such spaces include the break 
between volumes or chapters, and we saw also how Sarah Fielding praised her brother's 
use of divisions, which moved the reader "without hurry or apparent absurdity to and 
from the several places" (qtd. in Watson 67).85 Of course, the word 'absurd' has its root 
in the Latin surdus, meaning 'not to the purpose', or, even, anti-teleological, so that the 
line of the text is being saved from purposelessness by a break in the course of the line 
which mimics a redirection through textual coincidences. In other words, the black text 
through which Ryder passes is here replaced by the white space ofthe textless, so that 
the line of the text, though here severed and broken apart, nevertheless preserves its 
sense of order and is saved from the umeasonableness of "absurdity." 
Ifwe question why chapter breaks should be chosen over textual coincidences, 
we need only look to the way such coincidences explicitly divert the narrative from its 
84The importance of the crossroad in the formation of our narratives is seen also in Kepler's story, for "all 
his life was summed up in this picture of himself, a little man, wet and weary, dithering at a fork in the 
road" (Banville 187). 
85In contrast with those texts where chapters enclose narrative units, or where chapter divisions allow a 
discreet change of scene or setting, chapter breaks in The Unconsoled coincide with Ryder's periods of 
sleep, so that the text is never absent from him. Given our description of Ryder as one who wakes into a 
dream world, we could, if we wished, suggest that this Ryder is the dream-form of a real Ryder whose 
life occurs in these non-textual spaces. 
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natural line, so physical divisions are a preferable option if a sense of realism is 
required, with the narrative seemingly progressing naturally. As Lefebvre argues when 
discussing the illusion of transparency, because the space to be described is assumed to 
be fully comprehensible, then "it is assumed that absurdity and obscurity, which are 
treated as the same thing, may be dissipated without any corresponding disappearance 
of the 'object'" (28). The elision of the spatial repetitions which would act as "true 
disturbances of the line," an elision which is a veiled manipulation of the textual line, 
means the line more fittingly acts as a representation of space (Hillis Miller, Ariadne's 
Thread 6). 
If the text is to preserve the illusion oflogical order, then it would be preferable 
to remove points of repetition from the narrative line, for the striking thing about 
coincidences is their own lack of any causal determination; they are coincidental only in 
that they are not linked by any causal connection, but only, by chance, occupy the same 
place, occurring simultaneously. The Unconsoled, therefore, reveals how the linear 
narrative order implied by the constant line of the text, depends on the intervention of 
chance, the rupture of order, to preserve its apparently constant progression. In this 
way, then, the idea of repetition, or re-occurrence, a textual coincidence working against 
a logic of narrative but still presented in the printed line of text, leading us to the end of 
the book, parallels the interplay of telos and tukhe which preserve the trajectory of 
Oedipus's fate. 86 
What must also be asked is what follows this point, where the line hesitates 
between chance and destiny, between accident and design. We can see that, at the point 
where he encountered two Stillmans in Grand Central Station, Quinn made a decision 
and "went after the first Stillman, slowing his pace to match the old man's, and followed 
him to the subway" (Auster, City 56), but there is no way for Quinn to be sure that the 
Stillman whom he intended to follow from Grand Central Station, is the same as the 
Stillman he is following. By creating a fork in the path and sending the line on a detour 
to another place, the coincidence, whose elision was meant to prevent absurdity, here 
creates in the text an anacoluthon, for that which comes after the point does not follow 
from that which precedes it: the line is lacking sequence (this is even more apparent in 
The Unconsoled, where a door in the Karwinsky Gallery can open onto the hall of a city 
86Strangely, graffiti sprayed on a wall at the intersection of Great Eastern Street, Rivington Street, and 
Old Street in London Ee2 reads "Solid configuration fonned by chance events." 
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hotel).87 This interruption in Quinn's pursuit of Stillman can be seen to reflect on his 
later role as the inheritor of Stillman's mission to recover the prelapsarian tongue, for 
Derrida has argued, in "Peljuries," that an anacoluthon is always implied in the figure of 
the acolyte, the one who follows (,anacoluthon' and 'acolyte' come from the Greek 
'akolouthos' and 'akoloutheein', meaning 'following' and 'to follow'). As a follower of 
Freud and Heidegger, Derrida says of himself that, though he may try to be faithful, 
nevertheless there is always an element of betrayal, a break in his following. When he 
adds something new to what they have written, that is a betrayal, but ifhe were to 
follow mechanically, repeating exactly what they have said, that would be a betrayal 
too. As he follows, therefore, he displaces also. 
And this is exactly what Quinn does as well, as a reader following in Stillman's 
wake. We have seen how QUinn's reading allows him to take what is effectively the 
fabula of Stillman's progress, a chronological record of the events as they happened, and 
reorder the steps according to their spatial organisation so that what once appeared to 
follow one from the other are now seen in a different relation, a spatial relation 
produced by the course that Stillman plots. Yet we have to wonder if this chronology is 
not so much a record of Stillman's movements as of Quinn's experience of them, a 
record not of Stillman's writing, but of Quinn's reading. Quinn, trailing behind Stillman, 
tracing his every movement, is "seeing the thing and writing about it in the same fluid 
gesture" (Auster, City 63), so that reading is already a re-writing, a synchronised 
repetition ofthe deliberate and hesitant progression ofthe writer, a mirrored experience 
of the rhythms and motions of moving through the text's space. Quinn's mapping, or 
interpretation, of Stillman's passage is, then, are-tracing of his own path, and not a 
representation of the equivalent, but not identical, path taken by Stillman.88 It is the 
"thread and labyrinth," as Hillis Miller writes, "thread intricately crinkled to and fro as 
the retracing of the labyrinth that defeats the labyrinth but makes another intricate web 
at the same time; pattern is here superimposed on pattern" (Ariadne's Thread 12). Nor 
can the form of Quinn's interpretation of his writing reproduce his own experience of it, 
87 As Blanchot asks of Lautreamont's prose, "At what moment, in this labyrinth of order, in this maze of 
clarity, did meaning stray from the path? At what turning did reason become aware that it had stopped 
'following,' that something else was continuing, progressing, concluding in its place, something like it in 
every way, something reason thought it recognized as itself, until the moment it woke up and discovered 
this other that had taken its place?" ("Literature" 390-91). 
88Todorov points out that "two accounts dealing with the same text will never be identical" because 
"these accounts describe not the universe of the book itself but that universe transformed, as it is found in 
the psyche of each individual" (42). 
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for the interpretation cannot take place in the space of that initial reading/writing whose 
words are inseparable from the "streets where they had been drawn" (Auster, City 71), 
but must instead be removed from it, displaced and recontextualised. Quinn must 
appeal to an abstracted representation of the city's physical space, re-tracing the letters 
on a map ofthe city, so that he may finally read what it is that he himself has already 
written, betraying the one he has followed. 89 
And, of course, we have been following Quinn ourselves as he follows Stillman, 
analysing his every move, looking over his shoulder to reproduce faithfully his reading. 
In fact, if we wish to text our adherence to his methods, the text seems to provide us 
with the perfect opportunity, an excellent chance to act the part ofthe detective reader, 
for, with Stillman gone, and having visited the character Auster, Quinn spends one "day 
on his feet," walking through the city (Auster, City 106). We know how Quinn reacted 
to such a situation, and we are encouraged to follow his lead. In The Invention of 
Solitude, Auster writes: 
It sometimes seems to A. that his son's mental perambulations while at 
play are an exact image of his own progress through the labyrinth of his 
book. He has even thought that ifhe could somehow make a diagram of 
his son at play ... and then make a similar diagram of his book 
(elaborating what takes place in the gaps between words, the interstices 
of the syntax, the blanks between sections - in other words, unravelling 
the spool of connections), the two diagrams would be the same (165) 
and in City of Glass we will find Quinn himself wondering "what the map would look 
like of all the steps he had taken in his life and what word it would spell" (129). Indeed, 
if we map the path that Quinn takes on that one day in New York city, the result is 
suggestive, but it is hard to read any letters in it, to see it spell any word (see Fig. 1). 
Sometimes it looks like Manhattan Island, but it doesn't correspond too closely, and we 
begin to feel we're straining to make things fit. Yet there is another map that we can 
superimpose on this one, the map of places linked by this walk through the city. There's 
the statue of Columbus (in The Locked Room, the narrator meets the character 
Fanshawe in Columbus Square, Boston); there's Grand Central Station, where the text 
89Barthes writes that Sollers's!:! should be read "not looking directly at the book as though it were an 
object which was kept and contemplated and consumed in the absence of any subject, but over the 
shoulder of the person writing it, as if we were writing it at the same time as the author himself' (Sollers 
92). 
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Figure 1. A map of QUinn's path through New York City 
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divided; the Flatiron Building, New York's first skyscraper, and the first Tower of this 
Babel; Sheridan Square, named after the Civil War general, and scene of one of the 
worst of New York's Draft Riots in 1863; Washington Square, the title of a novel by 
Henry James; the World Trade Centre, whose own story now seems a sad echo of the 
Tower of Babel and its divisive end; Bowling Green, where the Dutch colonists bought 
Manhattan from the Native Americans for approximately $24; the Staten Island Ferry; 
Union Square; the United Nations. This path, marked out by Quinn, might almost tell 
the tale ofthe fall of America, how the New World failed to be the New Eden also (see 
Fig. 2). Yet Quinn's related experience of the same route is very different, for though 
he, too, "concentrated on the things he had seen while walking," he finds different 
(broken) words to describe them, speaking of "the tramps, the down-and-outs, the 
shopping-bag ladies, the drifters and drunks" (Auster, City 108). Though we never lost 
sight of Quinn, and followed closely in his footsteps, our map of his movements betrays 
his vision, and brings us into contact with only our own interpretative stumblings. 
But still we cannot think that we have arrived at this place by ourselves, that our 
unfaithful translation of Quinn's passage means a complete rupture in our relations with 
him. In the previous chapter, we mentioned how, in The New York Trilogy, the 
detective, the one who follows, becomes a writer, but we had not yet recognised that the 
writer also becomes the one to be written about. This is most evident in The Locked 
Room where the narrator, who is to write a biography of Fanshawe that "could be as 
much about you as about him," says that Fanshawe "is the place where everything 
begins for me, and without him I would hardly know who I am. . .. He was ... the one 
I saw whenever I looked up from myself' (246, 199). Therefore, when Fanshawe, in a 
letter, writes that the narrator should "say nothing to Sophie. Make her divorce me, and 
then marry her as soon as you can," then this is exactly what the narrator does, so that, 
as Bernstein writes, "Fanshawe's writings - his manuscripts and letters - become a meta-
writing that scripts the course ofthe narrator's existence" (91).90 The narrator may try to 
write of Fanshawe, but his efforts return him only to himself: "we substitute ourselves 
for the person in the story, pretending that we can understand him because we 
understand ourselves. This is a deception. We exist for ourselves .... No one can 
90 As Perec writes, "Puzzling is not a solitary game: every move the puzzler makes, the puzzle-maker has 
made before ... each hope and each discouragement have all been designed, calculated, and decided by 
the other" (Life Preamble and 191). 
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Figure 2. An annotated map of Quinn's path through New York City 
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cross the boundary into another - for the simple reason that no one can gain access to 
himself' (Auster, The Locked Room 247). 
This theme of the "inability to enter Fanshawe's thoughts" (Bernstein 97) is very 
apparent in a scene set in a cemetery on the day of Fanshawe's father's death. Fanshawe 
has climbed down into a freshly dug grave and is lying at the bottom, staring at the sky 
above. The narrator recalls that, for a period when they were very young, Fanshawe 
took to sitting in a cardboard box, removed from everyone else, leading the narrator to 
admit that "nothing interested me so much as what was happening to Fanshawe inside 
that box" (Auster, The Locked Room 220). Now, with Fanshawe in the grave, as ifin 
an invisible coffin, the narrator again sees that "Fanshawe was alone down there, 
thinking his thoughts, living through those moments by himself, and though I was 
present, the event was sealed off from me, as though I was not really there at all" 
(Auster, The Locked Room 220-221). The box and the coffin mirror exactly the two 
illustrations in The Unconsoled of the death-defined end of logically constructed 
narratives, epitomised by the footballing exploits of Boris's Number Nine. The narrator 
in The Locked Room, too, is concerned "to reason out the relationship between death 
and closure" (Bernstein 98), suggesting that "it would seem impossible to say anything 
about a man until he is dead" (Auster, The Locked Room 253). His attempt to enter into 
Fanshawe's thoughts represents a desire on his part to gain access to the Authorial 
position, to know for certain the way of the world, but we are aware ourselves of the 
difficulties he would face in this. 
Instead, we should notice other similarities between this scene in the graveyard 
and those points of coincidence in The Unconsoled. In the description of the way in 
which "the snow was coming down heavily, and the ground was turning white. 
Somewhere in the middle ofthe cemetery there was a freshly dug grave" (Auster, The 
Locked Room 220) we have again a blank, clean page marked by a black hole, like the 
black passage which brings Ryder from one line of the text to the other. Unlike the 
closed coffin, in the open grave, which was there as "a matter of pure chance," we find 
the expression of a further repetition, and again an anacoluthon, for just as Fanshawe lay 
there and "looked up at the sky, his eyes blinking furiously as the snow fell onto his 
face," so the narrator, standing and waiting, "turned my head up to the darkening winter 
sky - and everything was a chaos of snow, rushing down on top of me" (Auster, The 
Locked Room 221,220,221). In the displaced repetition of Fanshawe's actions, what 
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the narrator encounters is not a sure reality ordered by an Author God, but a random 
constellation of points, formed of the same matter though all different, and all seemingly 
meant for him. 
Bernstein refers to this moment as "one of the novel's first figurations of the 
sublime" (96), and as we begin to understand why this might be so, we begin also to 
comprehend why these points of repetition, these coincidences, the hinges which bring 
the anacoluthon into play, and the manifest structure of a text's spatiality, inform the 
entire reading experience. Looking up into the sky, the narrator is like Kepler (who 
sought patterns in the stars) with his eye to the knot in his world formed by chance 
coincidences, thinking "if only he could find the right way to apply his eye, he might 
glimpse enormities" (Banville 174). At this point, Kepler, as reader, expresses the same 
sense of arrogance and self-doubt we saw in Ryder as well ourselves, thinking that it is 
simply a matter of applying his abilities in the right way, but perhaps wary of being 
overwhelmed by what he might then see, just as, in the European Enlightenment, the 
sublime "was strangely transformed into a vision of the terror that could be perceived 
both in nature and in art, a terror uneasily allied with pleasurable sensations of 
augmented power, and even of narcissistic freedom, freedom in the shape of that 
wildness that Freud dubbed 'the omnipotence of thought,' the greatest of all narcissistic 
illusions" (Bloom 182). 
It is in Freud's essay "The 'Uncanny'" that Bloom reads his theory of the 
sublime. There, Freud, tracing the word through its linguistic usage, first defines 
'uncanny', in German 'unheimlich', as "the opposite of what is familiar" (220), in 
contrast with what is heimlich, homely or familiar. This simple opposition, however, is 
troubled by other meanings attached to 'heimlich', which suggests also a thing 
"concealed, kept from sight, so that others do not get to know of or about it" (Sanders 
qtd. in Freud, "Uncanny" 223). That which is homely is, in tum, that which is not for 
strangers to see, so that, finally, "among its different shades of meaning the word 
'heimlich' exhibits one which is identical with its opposite, 'unheimlich'. What is 
heimlich thus comes to be unheimlich" even as the word itself returns to itself as 
something altered, the same but different (Freud, "Uncanny" 224).91 The uncanny now 
becomes "that class of the frightening which leads back to what is known of old and 
91 Heimlich and unheimlich here reflect the movement of tukhe towards telos, where it comes almost to be 
synonymous with its supposed opposite. 
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long familiar" (Freud, "Uncanny" 220), implying a repeated encounter, or a return to a 
familiar place. Indeed, Freud later links the uncanny to "the repetition ofthe same 
thing," or "an unintended recurrence of the same situation," recounting from his own 
experiences an occasion where three times he found himself on the same street, despite 
all attempts to leave it ("Uncanny" 236,237). 
Now we can begin to see how the uncanny might relate to our experience of 
textual space, where the repetitions in the line bring us again and again to the same 
place, and as Freud furthers his argument we find him describing familiar situations. 
"This factor of involuntary repetition," he argues, "forces upon us the idea of something 
fateful and inescapable when otherwise we should naturally have spoken only of 
'chance'" ("Uncanny" 237), recalling Kepler's growing conviction that the chance 
occurrences in his life are a sign that "it had all been slyly arranged" (Banville 101).92 
Yet as we have seen time and again, this move towards an acceptance of a guiding telos 
cannot erase the sense that tukhe may underlie everything. It is in that experience of 
repetition that we come face to face with the tension between design and chance, and it 
is in the need to decide if any coincidence is in fact the truest intervention on the part of 
the Author (is it coincidence or design that Djuna Barnes's first novel was called Ryder, 
or that Kepler is lent a hat by a Baron Hoffmann?) that we become most keenly self-
aware of our own involvement in the text. More than this, it is not simply our 
involvement which we become aware of, but our very selves, our presence within the 
text, for our repeated entrance into that place in the text includes both our first, 
unquestioning passage through that point, as well as that second time, when we are 
suddenly alert to possibilities. Returning to that place, it is as if we come fact to face 
with our prior selves, experiencing "the phenomenon of the 'double'" where there is "a 
doubling, dividing and interchanging ofthe self' (Freud, "Uncanny" 234), another 
uncanny repetition, and another rupture also, this time in our perception of our self, for 
suddenly we ourselves are that long familiar thing become unfamiliar. The spatiality of 
the text, therefore, enables us, as Culler says, "to read ourselves in the limits of our 
understanding" ("Towards" 262). "We are nothing more that this movement, nocturnal 
and diurnal, of the readable and the unreadable, in us, outside of us" (Sollers qtd. in 
Culler, "Towards" 262). 
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Freud's understanding of the uncanny here expands on what we had said so far of 
the reader's experience ofthemoment of repetition, and he takes us yet further when he 
argues that "whatever reminds us ofthis inner 'compulsion to repeat' is perceived as 
uncanny" ("Uncanny" 238). From this, we can argue that the textual space produces an 
uncanny effect not only because it shares with this compulsion the matter of repetition, 
but because the 'content' of that repetition also relates back to the compulsion. In our 
earlier discussion of the compulsion to repeat, in relation to Ryder in The Unconsoled, 
we saw Freud, asking "how is the predicate of being 'instinctual' related to the 
compulsion to repeat?" argue that "it seems, then, that an instinct is an urge inherent in 
organic life to restore an earlier state of things" (Beyond 36). Ryder, we argued, 
seemed compelled to repeat the loss of his parents, this loss seemingly motivated by 
their recognition of his Oedipal desire, so that at that point where he was to achieve that 
which he most desired, he instead found himself utterly alone. So it is also for the 
reader who, at that point where the long hoped-for meaning of the text should be most 
clearly expressed, instead finds only the echo of their own reading. 
The instinctual urge behind the compulsion to repeat reveals a more fundamental 
drive as well, however, for the first instinct, claims Freud, is "the instinct to return to the 
inanimate state" (Beyond 38), the death instinct. The image of Fanshawe in the grave 
connects that uncanny moment clearly to death, but all coincidental intersections 
involve a death, for they mean the death of a narrative line, as when Laius is killed by 
Oedipus at the crossroads, or Quinn follows the first Stillman so that the story of the 
second is no more. And with every step Stillman himself took in his path across the 
city, there was a near infinity of steps which would never be taken, so many messages 
which would remain unwritten. Yet these deathly points are in no wayan end, for there 
is always that which follows on from there, and, indeed, we can recast the image of one 
line emerging from the meeting of two as the birth of a new narrative path, not the death 
of the one. Indeed, as we have seen, ifthe line is to be saved from absurdity, then it 
must interact with another, so that the two lines become like those animalculae who, if 
"at the moment before they show signs of senescence, are able to coalesce with each 
other, that is to 'conjugate' (soon after which they once more separate), they are saved 
from growing old and become 'rejuvenated'" (Freud, Beyond 48). In fact, at the point 
92Imhof sees in Kepler's successful discoveries "the uncanny intuition of a dreamer" (Banville 106), 
while Pucci says of Oedipus the King that "the chain of events in the play produces an uncanny feeling of 
193 
where the two Stillman's appear, Auster writes that "Quinn craved an amoeba's body, 
wanting to cut himself in half and run off in two directions at once" (City 56). Now, we 
can read the repetition on the line of the text as a function of the life instincts, for 
"conjugation ... has a life-preserving and rejuvenating effect" (50), and again we find 
support in the texts, for we had already seen how, at these points of intersection, Ryder 
often moves from a dark passage into light, like a reenactment of birth, while the 
concert hall where Ryder is scheduled to play seems like a womb in which he is held. 
In the space of the text, then, life and death do not coincide with 'in the 
beginning' and 'the end'. Instead, Fanshawe lives to say "I'm already dead. I took 
poison hours ago" (Auster, The Locked Room 312), and The Locked Room can become 
a tale where "new, botched beginnings fill the latter portion of the text, and even the 
final chapter finds the narrator meditating 'that the story wasn't over'" (Bernstein 92). In 
The Unconsoled, death seems most clearly represented in that passage when Ryder 
moves out onto the empty stage to be faced with the "vast, dark, empty space" (Ishiguro 
519) of the auditorium, and this marks the point of the most fundamental repetition, 
when the various Oedipal narratives begin again. Stephan, as the younger Oedipus, is 
about to leave his parents. Ryder, as Oedipus the King, is about to enter a new city, 
having apparently solved an impossible riddle. And Brodsky, the elder Oedipus, is 
being sent to his own version of Colonus, the St. Nicholas Clinic, "the place that takes 
in down-and-outs" (Ishiguro 522). At this point of intersection, therefore, where the line 
turns right back upon itself, the life instincts come into play and the result is "the influx 
of fresh amounts of stimulus ... [ which] increases those tensions, introducing what 
might be described as fresh 'vital differences' which must be lived off' (Freud, Beyond 
55). In fact Lefebvre, whose criticism of Freud is that his "bio-energetic theories tend to 
collapse into mechanism," argues that "the explosive waste of energy is 
indistinguishable from its productive use: beginning on the place of animal life, play, 
struggle, war and sex are coextensive" (177), so that, though Freud might see "these two 
instincts ... struggling with each other from the very first" (Beyond 61n), Lefebvre see 
the death instinct as no more than "an unproductive use or misuse ... of basic energy," 
"a joyful pessimism" (180). 
This injection of vital differences places the reader in an interesting situation, 
however, especially when we remember that Freud has already set out as one of his 
random finality, of controlled arbitrariness, and undetermined decisions as in an anxiety dream" (41). 
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tenets the beliefthat "the course of those [mental] events is invariably set in motion by 
an unpleasurable tension, and that it takes a direction such that its final outcome 
coincides with a lowering of that tension - that is, with an avoidance of unpleasure or a 
production of pleasure" (Beyond 7). The burden of presence placed on a reader by a 
text such as The Unconsoled, which so clearly demands from the reader an adequate 
performance, seems exactly the kind of experience which might produce such an 
unpleasurable tension in the mind. For some, therefore, this fresh stimulus, which 
coincides with a further reminder of the absence ofthe Father, means only that no 
pleasurable release of tension is possible, either through intellectual victory or defeat. 
The end which was to reveal the law which had governed the whole instead loops us 
back to the beginning of the story, and with no Father to guarantee its meaning or reveal 
its intended sense, the text takes its meaning now only as a re-writing of itself, one in an 
unending series of texts we are compelled to read. This repeating act of reading is also 
now no longer simply Ryder's story but ours also, for what else are we to do now but 
move on to another text, another labyrinthine city, and start again on the path to the 
conclusion. Textual repetition brings only the continuation of a reading life which is a 
routine of constant stress and tension without relief, to the extent that a true conclusion 
is asked for, even if that conclusion were death at the hands of the Father. The desired 
end would be the death of the text, as well as the death of our ambition as readers, but 
would bring a welcome relief from unpleasurable tensions. It is as Freud says, that "it 
may be ... that this belief in the internal necessity of dying is only another of those 
illusions which we have created 'um die Schwere des Daseins zu ertragen' ['To bear the 
burden of existence']" (Schiller qtd. in Freud, Beyond 45). 
The Unconsoled does not provide us with such an ending, for even the material 
end of the book is not allowed to signify the end of the text, but it does suggest a more 
pleasurable motivation for repetition instead. In those last few pages, Ryder is 
breakfasting on a tram which never arrives at the end of the line but instead" goes right 
the way round the entire circuit" (Ishiguro 533). Making his way towards the buffet at 
the rear of the tram, Ryder begins to imagine the conversation he might have with his 
fellow passenger, the electrician, discussing football and the cinema, the usual subjects, 
and then he considers what might happen after that, the second helpings, the comradely 
talk, until, finally, "as the tram came to a halt, I would perhaps give the electrician one 
last wave and disembark, secure in the knowledge that I could look forward to Helsinki 
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with pride and confidence" (Ishiguro 353). The text projects a future which lies beyond 
the end of the book, but which is also the repetition of the story which has just occurred, 
the story of an arrival at a hotel, a planned performance, the non-appearance of the 
parents. The final sentence of the text replays this pattern on a smaller scale, for as 
Ryder "began making my way back to my seat" (Ishiguro 535), it seems that what 
would follow next would be the repetition of the imagined passage just read. 
In this serene account, the text offers such an easy and guiltless pleasure that 
there is hardly much need for explanation if we attempt to repeat the experience. As 
Freud says, "Novelty is always the condition of enjoyment" and "repetition, the re-
experiencing of something identical, is clearly in itself a source of pleasure" (Beyond 
35,36). The Unconsoled seems to illustrate such innocent pleasures when it describes 
Ryder's final, circuitous tram journey, with its routine conversations and second 
helpings of such delicious food. If, however, we relate Ryder's experience here to his 
experience as wri/der, just as we have his other paths through the city, we can see that 
the circular route of the tram, reached via a path which "cut a completely straight line 
through the woods" (Ishiguro 528), suggests a very different textual experience, for the 
tram's passage is uninterrupted, unbroken, enclosed, and the tracks which carry it 
inevitably to its destination allow no deviation from its course. This is the purely linear 
text, unmoved by tukhe, or, at least, with any hesitation in the line superbly disguised. 
This is the text as a representation of an exemplary space, the illusion of transparency 
meaning that all that might be hidden is supposed to have been brought "from the 
shadows into the light" (Lefebvre 28) of "another sunny day" (Ishiguro 529). Suddenly, 
all that Ryder has become aware of during his time in the city, is again repressed, veiled 
from him, and he believes again that he is living "good life" (Shields 40), with no desire 
to change. As Freud says, "If conditions remained the same, it [the living entity] would 
do no more than constantly repeat the same course oflife" (Beyond 38). This circular 
repetition, therefore, is nothing but the "repetitiveness of daily routine" (Shields 33), a 
monotonous and banal motion which dulls the senses and makes us strangers to 
ourselves because we never encounter ourselves. Lacking the uncanny repetitions of 
that textual space which is a space of representation, the linear text can become a space 
of alienation, deadening rather than death-defying. 
The reader's experience of the space of the text, then, can appear as something 
rather negative, meaning either the loss of a desired object, the perpetuation of uneasy 
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tensions, or a lulling into a false haze of pleasure. But the vital differences introduced 
by the life instinct which motivates the compulsion to repeat do not necessarily result in 
disturbing tensions, for, as Freud describes, "our consciousness communicates to us 
feelings from within not only of pleasure and unpleasure but also of a peculiar tension 
which in its tum can be either pleasurable or unpleasurable" (Beyond 63). Lefebvre, 
also, says that "the release of energy ... modifies space or generates a new space" (177), 
but perhaps it is hard to see how the space opened up by the energies of the life instinct 
can produce pleasure. In part, this is because what happens in this space depends on the 
reader and how they react, in that moment of uncanny repetition, to the doubling which 
confronts them with their self made unfamiliar, defamiliarised. In this break in the line, 
which is in such contrast with the soothing homogeneity of the circle of routine, what 
was meant to remain hidden is revealed, "for this uncanny is in reality nothing new or 
alien, but something which is familiar and old-established in the mind and which has 
become alienated from it only through the process of repression" (Freud, Beyond 241). 
In the darkness within the text, everything comes to light, and a true experience of the 
unalienated self becomes a possibility.93 It is these uncanny repetitions, therefore, 
which enable the space of text to be a truly lived space, for, as we have seen, for 
Lefebvre living is "the practice of overcoming alienation to reach a deeper level of 
understanding" (Shields 43). 
In the previous chapter we saw how Quinn, the acolyte who had betrayed his 
master, achieved an authentic experience of his place in his world, a moment of reality. 
Now we see how the reader in textual space, having lost the one they followed in the 
maze, is offered a similar moment of presence. The lived temporality of this moment is, 
for Lefebvre, uncanny, "repetitive and reversible. It is full of anticipations, insights into 
the future and of deja VU, the sensation that one has already been through the moment 
one is now living" (Shields 59). This moment is sublime, linked to Dada which was 
"the prototype ofthe 'modem sublime', that is, a mixture of awe and terror as our 
imagination and concepts fail to grasp an experience" (Shields 57). It is also a moment 
of adventure, of danger, of release, of "waste, play, struggle, art, festival," taking place 
at the point where life and death are in the balance, where "production, destruction and 
93Literature, says Blanchot, "is not the day, it is the side of the day that day has rejected in order to 
become light. And it is not death either, because it manifests existence without being, existence which 
remains below existence, like an inexorable affmnation, without beginning or end - death as the 
impossibility of dying" ("Literature" 384). 
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reproduction overlap and intersect" (Lefebvre 177).94 This has to be so, for, as we have 
seen, the uncanny moment when we find ourselves repeated coincides with our most 
intimate insight into the workings of the text. Ifwe saw in Ryder's movement through 
the text an image of birth, there is also something sexual in this movement slipping 
between two surfaces of the text which are joined but not joined, formed of a line which 
breaks with itself.95 For the reader, it is as ifthe Oedipal drive becomes the instinct 
behind the repetition in the text, for when we come upon ourselves, it is as a reader in 
close contact with the body of the very text which has made readers of us. As Oedipus's 
answer to the riddle of the Sphinx leads ineluctably to incest, so our own desire to arrive 
at an answer means a further penetration of the form of the text. "Like the solved 
riddle," says Levi-Strauss, "incest brings together terms meant to remain separate: The 
son is joined with the mother, the brother with the sister, in the same way as the answer 
succeeds, against all expectations, in rejoining its question" (2: 23). We may not arrive 
at an absolute answer, but in the anacoluthon which keeps us on our path, we join one 
part of the text to a part which would otherwise remain distant. 
Now, death must also become a part of the equation, for we have placed 
ourselves at the intersection oflines, at the crossroad, the place of tukhe, the mother, and 
so "symbolic of the woman" (Pucci 118). Even as the meeting of Oedipus and Laius at 
the crossroad is "a clear scene of competition for the possession ofthe woman" (Pucci 
118), so the moment of repetition asks us to recognise the ruling telos of the father, or 
engage in productive play with the tukhe of the mother, betraying then the father, the 
(blood)line we have followed. This moment here assumes a further uncanny aspect, for 
this betrayal will conjure up a fear ofthe father, of the law, of the punishment for doing 
wrong, of castration.96 Freud says that "anxiety about one's eyes, the fear of going 
blind, is often enough a substitute for the dread of being castrated. The self-blinding of 
the mythical criminal, Oedipus, was simply a mitigated form of the punishment of 
castration," and then, in his analysis ofE. T. A. Hoffmann's "The Sand-Man," he shows 
how "the feeling of something uncanny is directly attached to the figure of the Sand-
94For a discussion of the intertextual intersection as something both war-like and sexual see Coughlan, 
"Her War of Words" (S32). 
95pucci points out that Jacques Lacan has argued that "analysis inscribes phallic pleasure within the realm 
of the contingency, of the encounter, and of nonnecessity" (Pucci 76). 
96Lacan, says Pucci, argues that "at the other pole of the phallic pleasure and its contingency 
psychoanalysis places the determination of a necessity, that is, castration" (76). 
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Man, that is, to the idea of being robbed of one's eyes" ("Uncanny" 231, 230).97 So it is 
that we become aware of ourselves in the moment of the uncanny, and find ourselves in 
the tension between the mother and the father, between the desire to live and the urge to 
die, between knowing and forgetting, between the rule of a controlling power and the 
chance of creative play. 
The aim ofthis chapter was to explore the reader's experience oftextual space by 
observing reader's in their texts, Quinn in Stillman's letters, Ryder in the city of The 
Unconsoled. Trailing them as they followed their father-figures, their authors, through 
the texts, we found that, even as they came only to realise their own place in those texts, 
so our paths circled back on us. Though the lines we retraced were theirs', the 
experience of that repetition was fully our own, a moment of potential authenticity. 
Lefebvre writes in his 1961 lecture on the imagination, "Towards a New Romanticism?" 
that 
When magical operations were repeated exactly - words, gestures, 
dances, mime, certain actions which were repeatable at will in a specific 
form of repetition which could be pushed to the point of delirium - they 
would induce strange states. They had an effectiveness which was both 
illusory and real, and ... they organized the repetition and the 
resurrection of what had already been accomplished. Such practices still 
go on. These operations made time reversible (in a semi-fictitious, semi-
real way). . .. Thus magical actions determined an intense participation 
on the part of those 'present' in a vaster and more total reality, on the level 
of a lived fiction. . .. These 'categories' of magic - repetition, 
resurrection, evocation, participation, projection - are also categories of 
imagination and the image. . .. Receiving their content from emotions 
and representations (knowledge), these categories have developed 
socially. In this way they have become and are becoming categories of 
aesthetics or art. (281-83) 
The repetition of words which the space of the text produces, the repetition of rhythms 
and gestures in a participatory movement, indeed induces a strange, uncanny state. It 
reverses time (induces deja vu), and embraces magic and resurrection (the doubling of 
the self and the coming oflife from death), but we have seen these yet in relation to the 
97Hoffman, of course, was our father-figure in The Unconsoled. 
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individual alone, the sole reader. It is in the next chapter that we bring to this a social 
dimension, as we attempt to place textual space in the real world. 
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IV 
CITING TEXTUAL SPACE 
The last chapter began with the aim of following the reader through the space of the 
text, to analyse the effect of that space upon them so that we might better understand its 
nature. Of course, we have been observing the reader for some time, as well as the 
writer, placing them at their desk, book before them, their eyes moving across the lines, 
their hands turning over the pages. In the second chapter, these actions became the most 
visible manifestation of the rhythms of the body which produces the space of the text. 
We saw also the reader put the book down, leave the room, to eat and sleep, and return 
to it again, saw them reaching to take the book from a shelf, and sit again at a desk in a 
room whose walls are lined with shelves holding books. What we have not asked, 
though, is at what point the reader actually comes in contact with, or enters, the space of 
the text, for we have not adequately disturbed the idea of the space of the text as 
contained within the space of the book as volume, arranged on the shelf ofthe library, or 
shop, or study, and this despite the fact that any easy notion of the space of the text as 
something contained, beginning at the first line on page one of the first chapter of the 
book, and ending at a final fullstop, has already been problematised by our conception 
of that space as a network of intersecting lines, a nexus of repeated points without a 
beginning and without an end. 
This chapter, therefore, centres on the question of where we might site textual 
space, and how far it extends, always assuming, as it attempts to address these 
questions, that the divide between the space of the book and the space of the text is a far 
more porous line than some might expect. As an easy illustration, it might be 
remembered that in the first chapter I mentioned how I didn't yet own a copy of 
Banville's Dr Copernicus. Since writing that, I have moved, inherited new bookshelves 
from my flat's previous occupant, arranged my books in 'proper' order (from left to right 
on the shelf, from the top shelf down, moving clockwise from unit to unit), and have 
added Dr Copernicus to my library. Still, however, I haven't read it, so on the one hand 
I wonder if! can say that I have yet encountered its space, while on the other I recognise 
that when the book was absent from the space of my room, I questioned whether this 
very lack had an effect on my approach to Kepler, the space in this way already exerting 
some small influence on my reading of Kepler. And now, having taken its place among 
the other books on the shelf, the question is whether the fact of it being closed means 
also that it is sealed, for even as we read the titles on the spines of the books on the 
shelves, we must consider whether what we encounter at that point, in those letters 
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isolated from the main body of text, is a part of the book or of the text, or whether we 
can even talk of a division between an external or internal space. 
The edge of somewhere: the paratext 
The title, in fact, is something which Gerard Genette positions within a class of devices 
which includes, amongst others, the cover of the book, signs of authorship, dedications, 
epigraphs, prefaces, intertitles, and notes. These elements can be placed within the one 
set because they all stand in some way at the outer limits of the text. They are liminal 
devices placed at the threshold to the text, introducing us to the text, drawing us in, but 
also framing the text in such a way that we can recognise it as a text. "Although we do 
not always know whether these productions are to be regarded as belonging to the text," 
Genette says, "in any case they surround it and extend it, precisely in order to present it, 
in the usual sense of this verb but also in the strongest sense: to make present, to ensure 
the text's presence in the world, its 'reception' and consumption" (Paratexts 1). As 
briefly mentioned in the first chapter, Genette terms these means of presentation the 
paratext, defined simply as that which "enables a text to become a book" (Paratexts 1), 
but always with an acknowledged awareness of the potential ambiguity of the prefix. 
As Hillis Miller describes it: 
'Para' is a double antithetical prefix signifying at once proximity and 
distance, similarity and difference, interiority and exteriority, ... 
something simultaneously this side of a boundary line, threshold, or 
margin, and also beyond it, equivalent in status and also secondary or 
subsidiary, submissive, as of guest to host, slave to master. A thing in 
'para,' moreover, is not only simultaneously on both sides ofthe boundary 
line between inside and out. It is also the boundary itself, the screen 
which is a permeable membrane connecting inside and outside. It 
confuses them with one another, allowing the outside in, making the 
inside out, dividing them and joining them. ("The Critic as Host" 219) 
For Genette also, the paratext is "more than a boundary or a sealed border, ... is, rather, 
a threshold" (Paratexts 1-2).98 The paratext, therefore, stands for us at the point of entry 
98The original, French edition of Para texts has the title Seuils, meaning 'thresholds'. The title is possibly 
also meant as a reference to Genette's own publisher, Editions du Seuil. 
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to the text but, more than this, it also provides us with this point of entry, for it is that 
point, or line, or area beyond which the text begins, simultaneously a part of and apart 
from the text. Reading the title of the text, then, whether on the spine, or the cover, or 
the dust jacket, on the title page, or the half-title page, or even in the running heads 
along the tops of the pages throughout the work, there is the sense that we are standing 
at the entrance to the text, facing in, seeing in the few words of the title a concentrated 
embodiment of the text which will funnel out from this point. Yet the title itself is 
directed outwards also, towards potential readers and the wider public, for the paratext 
stands "between the inside and the outside, a zone without any hard and fast boundary 
on either the inward side (turned toward the text) or the outward side (turned toward the 
world's discourse about the text)" (Genette, Paratext 2). These marginal additions to the 
body ofthe text possess, then, an enviable potency, for though they exist for the text, 
and, as Genette says, "the paratextual element is always subordinate to 'its' text," it is 
also true to say that we cannot encounter the text without first encountering the paratext, 
for "a text without a paratext does not exist and never has existed" (Genette, Paratexts 
12,3). 
The title, then, which so often stands for us as the leading edge of the expansive 
text which follows, is also a member of an equally extensive set which is formed by the 
proliferation of the title itself as it fulfils another of its functions, to bring the text to the 
attention of others. As Genette says, "ifthe text is an object to be read, the title ... is an 
object to be circulated" (Paratexts 75), and so it cannot be permanently tethered to the 
text it names, but instead is dispersed beyond what is bound with the text, while still 
standing as the boundary to that text. 99 The paratext, then, which may stand in contact 
with its text, or be separate from it, "necessarily has a location that can be situated in 
relation to the location of the text itself' (Genette, Paratexts 4). Genette, therefore, 
distinguishes between the peritext, the "spatial category" which refers to those 
paratextual elements which are to be found, or bound, within the same volume as the 
text, such as the title, preface, and so on, and the epitext, formed by those elements 
which "are located outside the book, generally with the help of the media (interviews, 
conversations) or under cover of private communications (letters, diaries, and others)" 
99This ability of the paratext to float free of its text means that, whereas there can be no text without 
paratext, a paratext can exist without its text for "there are certainly works - lost or aborted - about which 
we know nothing except their titles" (Genette, Paratexts 4). 
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(Genette, Paratexts 5).100 As the difference between the peritext and the epitext "is in 
theory purely spatial," the epitext being simply "any paratextual element not materially 
appended to the text within the same volume" (Genette, Paratexts 344), it means that 
any epitextual element may at some point in the future become a peritextual element if it 
is included within the book, while any peritextual element might become epitextual by 
being excluded. It should be noted, however, that all paratextual elements, whether of 
the epitext or the peritext, must be acknowledged by the author in some way, and that 
"something is not a paratext unless the author or one of his associates accepts 
responsibility for it" (Genette, Paratexts 9). Therefore, the critical essays which are so 
often included within a scholarly edition of a text do not generally qualify as an element 
ofthe paratext, since they can be included without the author's explicit approval, and 
often posthumously (Genette uses the term metatextuality to describe the relationship 
between a text and its commentary; "it is the critical relationship par excellence" 
(Palimpsests 4». We cannot deny, however, that when essays are bound with the text 
they comment upon, they are granted a certain authority in the process. 
The existence of the epitext means that we may be absent from the space of the 
book, removed from its physical presence, and yet already on the threshold of the space 
of the text, moving into its sphere of influence. Far from containing the space ofthe 
text, the physicality of the book is seen now as only one element of a paratextual 
presence which extends way beyond the confines of the covers which hold the printed 
pages. What is perhaps more important, however, is the effect that the paratext has on 
the reader moving through it, towards the text, for the paratext is not a passive force, 
presenting the text to us in neutral fashion. As Genette indicates in his own paratextual 
subtitle, paratexts are the "thresholds of interpretation," guiding us and directing us in 
our approach to the text. Largely an expression ofthe authorial voice, the paratext's 
function is to ensure "a better reception for the text and a more pertinent reading of it" 
(Genette, Paratexts 2), so that it becomes "a fringe ofthe printed text which in reality 
controls one's whole reading ofthe text" (Lejeune, qtd. in Genette, Paratexts 2). 
Moreover, the varied appearance of the paratext is such that we may not even be aware 
when it is that we first encounter it. As Genette points out, "the epitext is a whole 
100Further sub-categories are defmed by their temporal relation to the text. Prior paratexts are those 
elements which appear before the original appearance of the text, original paratexts appear at the same 
time, and the later and delayed paratexts appear after the original text (the latter is used when the length 
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whose paratextual function has no precise limits and in which comment on the work is 
endlessly diffused in a biographical, critical, or other discourse whose relation to the 
work may be at best indirect and at worst indiscernible" (Paratexts 346). The epitext, 
then, formed of material "circulating, as it were, freely, in a virtually limitless physical 
and social space" (Genette, Paratexts 344), offers a rich vein of material to be plumbed 
by critics, commentators, theorists, historians, and readers, so that sometimes it seems 
that everything about the text, the rhythms of its prose, the details of its plot, the 
complexity of its themes, is already known to us, when we have never even read the text 
itself, never encountered it on the page. 
The paratext itself, however, is only one of five forms of what Genette calls 
transtextuality, meaning "textual transcendence - namely, everything that brings it [the 
text] into relation (manifest or hidden) with other texts" (The Architext 81). The others 
in this set include metatextuality, which we've mentioned above; architextuality, by 
which Genette means "the entire set of general or transcendent categories - types of 
discourse, modes of enunciation, literary gemes - from which emerges each singular 
text;" hypertextuality, by which he means "any relationship uniting a text B (which 1 
shall call the hypertext) to an earlier text A (I shall, of course, call it the hypotext), upon 
which it is grafted in a manner that is not that of commentary," as in parody for 
example; and intertextuality, which Genette defines as "a relationship of copresence 
between two texts or among several texts," as in quotations, allusion, or plagiarism 
(Palimpsests 1, 5). The significance of these relations is that they too, like the paratext, 
though not involved in the making the text a book, all contribute to making the text 
present, to further distributing it in the world. Just as the paratextual devices of both 
Kepler and Dr Copernicus, the brief biography of the author placed on the opening page, 
the included list of works by the author, the advertisement for Dr Copernicus placed at 
the back of Kepler, all act to make me aware of the existence of Dr Copernicus, so it is 
that one text, through quotations, allusions, criticisms, and so on, can put us in touch 
with others. Michel Foucault, for example, says ofFlaubert's The Temptation of Saint 
Anthony, that it "exists by virtue of its essential relationship to books," placing itself 
within a space of intertextuality where "it is born and takes shape in the interval between 
books," with the result that "it serves to circulate the fiction of books ... it serves, in 
of time separating the appearance of the text and the paratext is considerable). Posthumous paratexts 
appear after the author's death, while anthumous paratexts appear during the author's lifetime. 
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actuality, to extend the space that existing books can occupy" ("Library" 91). Therefore, 
though George Perec's Life A User's Manual occupies its own place on the shelf, it 
appears also in Genette's Paratexts, where he mentions how "the 'appendix' ofPerec's 
Vie mode d'emploi [Life: A User's Manual] contains a floor plan of the building (sic), 
an index of persons and places, a chronology, a list of authors quoted, and an 
'Alphabetical Checklist of Some of the Stories Narrated in this Manual'" (404). By 
referring to that list of authors quoted, we find that Perec can place us within a number 
of other volumes on the shelves (or bring those texts to us), for the list includes Jorge 
Luis Borges, Michel Butor, and Sigmund Freud, while Freud, in tum, can take us to 
Oedipus the King and, through this, to The Unconsoled, which, we have seen already, 
has its own ties to Freud's work. 
We begin to see that a complex network of connections and relations exists 
between the books on these shelves, but that this woven web of connections extends far 
beyond the limits of this room, producing an unending library, "a literary space wholly 
dependent on the network formed by the books ofthe past" (Foucault, "Library" 91). Of 
particular significance, however, is the way that this networked space, which extends 
the space of texts, is structured, for when we begin to think of how we can visualise that 
situation where a quotation from one text appears in another, and whether quotations 
transport us to another part of the literary space or insert another space into their own, 
we realise that we are reproducing the images we used to describe the formation of 
textual space, for "we can see the spatiality of the work as extending outwards into an 
intertextual space, lines of connection radiating out from the points of the narrative, or 
we may see the line of connection as a point of contact, drawing the lines of narrative 
together so that they intersect" (Coughlan, "Framework" 134). Even as we spoke of 
those points of repetition which divert us from the line of the text, so now we can speak 
of those citations which are always anyway a rewriting, and which, in their "copresence" 
(Genette, Palimpsests 1), mean a repeated reading also, once of them in their original 
context, and once more along the line of intersection. 101 As Agamben points out, "In his 
article "What Is Epic Theater (ii)," Walter Benjamin defines the characteristic procedure 
of quotation as 'interruption': 'To quote a text means to interrupt its context'" 
("Melancholy Angel" 104n). What this homology in design reveals is that the 
101 The same sense of similar structures on different scales is seen in Julia Kristeva's statement that" each 
word (text) is an intersection of word (texts) where at least one other word (text) can be read (sic)" (66). 
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transtextual or, more usually, the intertextual, that "in which every text is held, it itself 
being the text-between of another" (Barthes, "Text" 160), is not a means by which we 
can link one textual space with another, or move from one to another, but is itself a part 
of that space, is, in fact, the whole of that space. Like Lefebvre's /'espace, textual space 
is a space made up of spaces, and though we may often see the covers of the book as the 
borders of our wandering, a wider horizon is always available. The shelves which hold 
my books may represent only a small section of this space, but they open on to it in its 
entirety nonetheless. Since this is so, then to complete our picture of the space of text it 
is necessary now to see how intertextuality, its form and situation, is portrayed. 
Mapping the intertext: Thomas Pynchon 
Certain texts lend themselves to an analysis of intertextuality because they so clearly 
position themselves within the network of relations between texts, drawing attention to 
the links between their space and others'. Examples include Umberto Eco's The Name 
of the Rose and, of course, Auster's City of Glass which presents itself as a textual 
nexus, composed of paraphrases and quotations from Quinn's red notebook, and 
Stillman and Dark's books, all fictitious, but also connecting this space to works by 
Marco Polo, Haydn, Vermeer, Herodotus, Montaigne, Defoe, Poe, Melville, and, of 
course, Milton and Cervantes. It is no wonder then that Auster says of Quinn, "What 
interested him about the stories he wrote was not their relation to the world but their 
relation to other stories" (City 7).102 If, however, the intention here is to investigate the 
ways in which intertextuality and, ultimately, an intertextual space, is conceived of, 
represented, and used in certain fictions, one of the most fruitful places to begin would 
be with the work of Thomas Pynchon who has always displayed an awareness both of 
the intertextual nature of his own work, and of the relation oftextuality to what Pynchon 
might call "nonverbal reality" (Introduction 22). Pynchon is known for his verbal 
acuity, though it's a characteristic of his writing he sometimes dislikes, accusing himself 
of spending "too much time and energy on words alone" (Introduction 15), and, indeed, 
some argue that this energy is spent at the expense of a greater emotional or personal 
102For an analysis of the intertextuality ofEco's text, see Coughlan, "Situated Intertextuality." 
"Framework" discusses the intertextuality of the filmic texts of Canadian artist Nathalie Melikian, whose 
work dissolves the substance of its own body as it "charts the architexture, mapping the in-between" of 
the intertext (Coughlan, "Framework" 136). 
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reality. One ofthe reasons for the peculiar nature ofPynchon's texts is his scrupulous 
research, resulting in factually detailed and highly allusive texts, allusive not only 
through implicit or explicit textual reference, but also through the adoption of differing 
voices, styles or tones. Any section of his text, therefore, may combine the grotesque 
with the comic, the scientific with the tragic, the sexual with the pathetic, or all of the 
above, to produce an original, yet also strangely suggestive piece. 
Pynchon does not, however, simply employ intertextuality, but is concerned to 
explore the nature of the contact between text and text, providing us with a model of the 
intersection and interaction of texts. Probably the best place to start such an exploration 
is with his first novel, V. Essentially a quest novel, the novel structures itself around 
two characters. One, Benny Profane, provides the link between those sections ofthe 
novel set in the years 1955 and 1956, and through the other, Herbert Stencil, we gain 
access to the historical sections, which are set at periods from 1898 to 1943. Though 
Stencil's search for V. is ostensibly a search for a particular woman, it is also at times 
cast as a semiotic quest, "merely a scholarly quest after all, an adventure of the mind" 
(Pynchon, V. 61). Even when the hunt is seen as far more real than a merely intellectual 
investigation, the description given of it is as a "simple-minded, literal pursuit," a 
pursuit of the letter, word for word (Pynchon, V. 61). The inevitable failure of the 
chase, however, is inscribed in the very form of its quarry, which reflects the limited 
field of vision ofthe reader at 'ground zero'. As Pynchon says of history, it "is rippled 
in its fabric such that if we are situated, as Stencil seemed to be, at the bottom of a fold, 
it's impossible to determine warp, woof or pattern anywhere else .... Perhaps if we 
lived on a crest, things would be different. We could at least see" (Y.:. 155-56). 
Similarly, trapped at the point of the V, we cannot see beyond it, cannot see how it 
relates to its surroundings. Instead, the quest is confounded by its floating signifier, as 
the sign ofthe abbreviated V attaches itselfto countless objects, while elsewhere single 
referents attract multiple signs. Even in the early pages ofV. there is a peculiar 
concentration on vocabulary, on variation, so that Benny Profane and his former 
comrades are sailors but also marines, seamen, a crew, deck apes, yeomen, corpsmen, 
boatswain mates. For Alec McHoul and David Wills "the text is about signification in a 
world where the transcendental signified is absent. So the opposition, 'V.' v. V., is 
broken down, levelled to a single plain of signification (sic)" (163). In the deferred 
absence of the signified V., the text becomes an "ensemble of material graphemes + 
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signifiers. For V. is no thing, res, object. ... Character, name, text: they are fused" 
(McHoul and Wills 164), as we have seen already in Quinn and Ryder. Vs proliferate 
throughout the novel, from the shapes of the chapter headings, to the Virginia of the first 
page, to the asymmetric V of lamps on the second, and so on. Victoria Wren is Vera 
Meroving and Veronica Manganese also, but she shares her name too with Queen 
Victoria, the Hotel Victoria, Vittorio sa, and the Piazza Vittorio Emmanuele. The 
abbreviated V is incomplete, deferred, open to endless recontextualisation. "Beyond V. 
there is the [full]stop, the closure, the end (as both finality and goal). But that can never 
be reached" (McHoul and Wills 164). Stencil understands; he tries "not to think:, 
therefore, about any end to the search. Approach and avoid" (Pynchon, V. 55). 
The V., then, is the rhyming repetition which threads a line through the text, 
relating part to part, but if we are to develop an understanding ofintertextuality from 
this, then we need to see how the represented structures in the text which link: the V.s 
can also act as models for the connections between texts. One possible starting point is 
the seventh chapter, "She hangs on the western wall." Set in Florence, Italy, in 1899, 
this chapter twines together a number of different plot strands which constantly connect 
and overlap; a young Evan Godolphin arrives in Florence to find his father, Hugh 
Godolphin, having received a mysterious telegram from him mentioning the fabled 
country ofVheissu; Signor Mantissa and his accomplice Cesare invite the south 
American Gaucho to help them steal Botticelli's Birth of Venus; at the same time, the 
Gaucho continues with his plan to organise a riot of the Venezuelan population of 
Florence outside the Venezuelan Consulate. Coincidences abound. Evan is arrested by 
the Italian police and a clerk misspells his name, calling him instead Gadrulfi, the name 
of the florist, also under surveillance by Italian spies, who is to provide Signor Mantissa 
with a Judas Tree in which he will hide the stolen Venus. Godolphin arranges to meet 
his son at Scheissvogel's Biergarten und Rathskeller, a German beer hall, which is also 
where the Gaucho usually meets his lieutenant, Cuernacabr6n, and where he intends to 
meet Signor Mantissa (as it happens an old friend of Godolphin's). Each coincidence 
means the confluence of plotlines, their paths and final contact inevitably recalling the 
sign which lies at the heart of the confusion, the variously associated V. 
Victoria Wren is here of course, a former lover of Goodfellow in Pynchon's 
"Under the Rose," now serenaded by Evan, but also Godolphin's confessor and Sidney 
Stencil's informant. Perhaps the central V. here, however, is Vheissu which becomes, 
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like Stencil's V., a shifting signifier, interpreted differently by the different communities 
in Florence. Evan knows Vheissu from the stories told to him as a boy by his father, an 
adventurer and explorer, but "he himselfhad stopped believing in the place" (Pynchon, 
V. 157). When the Italian police hand Evan over to the English Foreign Office he is 
quick to tell them about his search for his father and of Vheissu, but already its identity 
is becoming confused, for "someone in the higher echelons had got the idea Vheissu 
was a code name for Venezuela," so that, when the Gaucho is brought in for 
questioning, it is Vheissu he is asked about not Venezuela (Pynchon, V. 192). Yet it is 
Victoria's belief, reported to the Foreign Office, that Godolphin is in danger from 
Vheissu emissaries, together with reports of Godolphin's recent expedition to the 
Antarctic, and Evan's story, related to the Gaucho, of cities in Vheissu built in the 
mouths of volcanoes, that form the elements of the memorandum eventually sent by 
Stencil to London. The story as told in tum by the Italian secret police is that "a 
barbaric and unknown race, employed by God knows whom, are even now blasting the 
Antarctic ice with dynamite, preparing to enter a subterranean network of natural 
tunnels, a network whose existence is known only to the inhabitants ofVheissu, the 
Royal Geographic Society in London, Herr Godolphin, and the spies of Florence" 
(Pynchon, V. 197). One spy can only conclude that Vheissu is a codename for none 
other than Vesuvius while the other, covering, says, "It could stand for Venus, for all I 
know" (Pynchon, V. 198). To complete the circle, we need only see the crucifix comb 
worn by Victoria Wren in her hair as her link to Venus and her associated CUlt. 103 
Vheissu, then, presents a point of contact between each of the other V.s, 
Venezuela, volcanoes, Vesuvius, Venus, Veronica, bringing them into relation with 
each other, but its own ontological nature remains unclear. Its positioning within the 
world of the text, at the heart of a network of subterranean tunnels, seems to distort 
McHoul and Wills textual plane of signification, give it an extra dimension. We would 
not, however, describe it as the transcendental signified, the centre that "is, 
paradoxically, within the structure and outside it" (Derrida, "Structure" 279). Though 
for Godolphin it is real, there are only his reports to confirm its existence, the reports of 
a man perhaps traumatised by what he had witnessed in Khartoum, and perhaps 
hallucinating when he later finds a spider monkey frozen in the ice of the Antarctic, a 
sign from the inhabitants ofVheissu. Certainly, in the world of Florence Vheissu exists 
103See Seed 93. 
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purely in textual terms, it appears in the world only as text. Originally mentioned in a 
Foreign Office memorandum condensed from Godolphin's personal account, the loss of 
that original memo means that when the Foreign Office again becomes aware of 
Vheissu fifteen years later, Godolphin's testimony has to be reconstructed by 
interviewing the remaining members of the Board of Inquiry of the Geographical 
Society, to whom Godolphin reported. It had become for Evan "a bed-time story or 
fairy tale," until he sees the repercussions its apparent reappearance has on the political 
world around him, though even here its appearance is as a series of memoranda, as a 
story, or codeword (Pynchon, V. 193). Held within a narrative web which connects to 
all the plot-lines which riddle this chapter, Vheissu suspends itself within the space of 
textual transcendence. As such, it is no longer constrained by any physical location, it 
"is without volume or place, for it is dependent on the non-physical connection between 
texts," but it can exist at any point in its network, forming a point of intertextual contact 
between the narratives of the various Florentine communities (Coughlan, "Framework" 
135). Imagined as a political state, Vheissu became a centre of intimidating power, 
linked to points over the entire surface of the world by tunnels which "lace the earth's 
interior," which would allow instant invasion by its inhabitants, claiming Venezuela or 
Vesuvius as colonies ofVheissu (Pynchon, V. 197). Within the textual landscape of V., 
however, the subterranean earthen network which would allow the proliferation of the 
cities of Vheissu becomes instead an information network through which Vheissu 
appears in the criss-crossing texts as a variable sign.l04 
The desire of so many to penetrate then and occupy the system of naturally 
existing underground tunnels reveals a desire to take control of the textual network so as 
to be able to both regulate the appearance of the rogue sign and fix its meaning within 
the system when used. Otherwise, Vheissu acts like a rogue nation disrupting the 
authority of those who rule elsewhere. For Evan Godolphin at least, it is a "nexus" 
"where the Establishment held no sway," one of his "private colonies of the imagination 
whose borders were solidly defended against the Establishment's incursions or 
104 A similar model of intertextuality as a network of underground tunnels can be found "under the Street" 
(Pynchon, V. 42), where Benny Profane fmds a job hunting albino alligators down in a sewer system 
which is marked as a textual network, Profane fmding that "scrawled on the walls were occasional quotes 
from the Gospels, Latin tags," so that he walks between "chalkwritten walls oflegend" (Pynchon, V. 120, 
122). The labyrinthine structure of the sewer underground is mirrored by a similar communications 
network aboveground, formed by "roving anchor men, who would walk around a route of certain 
manholes," keeping contact with the office through walkie-talkies, making the office the centre of "a 
great net spreading out all the way to the boondocks of the city" (Pynchon, V. 113, 114). 
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depredations" (Pynchon, V. 158, 159). Even when imagined as a reallocation, Vheissu 
has resisted any attempts at colonisation. Hugh Godolphin sought Vheissu so that there 
would be "Contour lines and fathom-markings, cross-hatchings and colors where before 
there were only blank spaces on the map. All for the Empire" (Pynchon, V. 171). But 
the failure of the mission means that Vheissu, V., remains unmapped and 
unrepresentable. Why Vheissu is so resistant to colonisation might not be immediately 
obvious, but it is surely related to its place in the space of intertext, a space defined "by 
the Library: by the ranging to infinity of fragmentary languages" (Foucault, "Language" 
67), an "impossible space in which fragments of disparate discursive orders ... are 
merely juxtaposed, without any attempt to reduce them to a common order" (McHale, 
Constructing 250). For Vheissu, "the violence of competing forces ... is a feature of its 
composition" (McHoul and Wills 205). Its defining characteristic is the intensity and 
variety of its colours which produce vivid dreams full of random and meaningless 
shapes, dreams which "are not, not closer to the waking world, but somehow ... do 
seem more real" (Pynchon, V. 171). Hugh Godolphin says of it that "There's barbarity, 
insurrection, internecine feud. It's no different from any other godforsakenly remote 
region. The English have been jaunting in and out of places of Vheissu for centuries," 
and yet it remains unattainable (Pynchon, V. 170). The word Jaunting' signals here a 
further connection, that of the link between colonialism and tourism, a form of 
consumption. Godolphin speaks of tourists as "the lovers of skin" because their contact 
with the land is purely superficial (Pynchon, V. 184) and wonders what they would 
make of Vheissu which seems to be skin alone, "Like the skin of a tattooed savage" 
(Pynchon, V. 170) whose "violence also has the positivity of constant change, playing 
upon a signifying surface which is the sole medium of meaning, for here there is surface 
without depth, skin without soul" (McHoul and Wills 205). His desire is to strip that 
skin away, to "leave the veins and ligaments raw and quivering and open at last to your 
eyes and your touch," but when at last he sees beneath it all he finds is "Nothing" 
(Pynchon, V. 171,204). Godolphin's need to map Vheissu, to flay the skin and reveal 
the structure beneath, seems to be the need of" a hero of the Empire" to control and 
colonise (Pynchon, V. 156). Vheissu, "that skin, the gaudy godawful riot of pattern and 
color," that single layer of signification, remains outside ofthe tourist route, ofthe 
colonial sphere, outside of hegemonic influence (Pynchon, V. 171). If Godolphin views 
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it as a "Dream of annihilation," then perhaps it is the annihilation of the empire it 
dreams of (Pynchon, v. 206). 
Yet, though Vheissu remains distant from us, vast and uncharted, we encounter 
it almost everywhere, skirting its edges, always at the margin, for, of course, though the 
intertext has no place of its own, every textual space is a part of it, opens onto it, and 
holds it, for the intertext would be nothing without the materiality ofthe texts which 
produce it. Through the space of the text, then, we are exposed to the skin of the 
intertext, to that "riot ofpattem and color" (Pynchon, V. 171). Some sense of the 
potential for violence in this gaudy riot is apparent in Butor's writings on embedded 
texts and quotations, where he speaks of the "tensions we so often feel today in our 
cities covered with slogans, titles and signs" ("Object" 55), suggesting a forced intrusion 
as the space of the text interferes with the space ofthe city. Elsewhere, in Butor's "The 
Space ofthe Novel," a more positive aspect, as the text opens on to a network (of 
subterranean tunnels) giving access to points across the globe, so that, Butor says, "In 
my own city many other cities are present, by all kinds of mediation: signposts, 
geography manuals, the objects which come from them, the newspapers which discuss 
them, the images and films which show them to me, my memories of them, the novels 
which make me pass through them" (37). The effect is ofthe space of one city being 
quoted within another so that the two spaces commingle, the one containing the traces 
of the other and linked to<it. For Butor, "Space, as we experience it, is not at all the 
Euclidean space whose parts are mutually exclusive. Every site is the focal point of a 
horizon of other sites, the point of origin of a series of possible routes passing through 
other more or less determined regions" ("Space" 37), and Foucault says, "we are in the 
epoch of simultaneity: we are in the epoch of juxtaposition, the epoch of the near and 
far, of the side-by-side, of the dispersed. We are at a moment, I believe, when our 
experience of the world is less that of a long life developing through time than that of a 
network that connects points and intersects with its own skein" ("Spaces" 22). 
Raymond Federman relates this to the text, arguing "If life and fiction are no longer 
distinguishable one from the other, nor complementary to one another, and if we agree 
that life is never linear, that, in fact, life is chaos because it is never experienced in a 
straight, chronological line, then, similarly, linear and orderly narration is no longer 
possible" (Introduction 1 0). The networked text is necessary, it seems, to tell of a 
networked life, but Butor's experience of the city suggests that textuality, as something 
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wired into reality, making its presence and possibilities known, does not simply reflect a 
pre-existing ontological plurality of the world, but contributes to it. This is as we would 
have expected, for it textual space is a lived space, then the space of intertextuality must 
be a social space also. "Language is not truth," says Auster, "It is the way we exist in 
the world. . .. The world is not just the sum of things that are in it. It is the infinitely 
complex network of connections among them" (Invention of Solitude 161). 
Suppression and subversion: intertextual spaces 
We must always remember, however, that, as a social product, textual space can be 
employed in different ways, and we have already seen in chapter two Lefebvre's 
concerns regarding the abstract space of capitalism, wherein conceived spaces dominate 
lived spaces, and the text no longer simply participates in reality, but displaces it 
through its representations of space. A useful illustration of this process appears in 
Pynchon's short story, "Under the Rose," a tale of intrigue and espionage set in Egypt in 
1898, later to appear in a greatly altered form as the third chapter of V., "In which 
Stencil, a quick-change artist, does eight impersonations." The story is remarkably 
allusive, plugged into the intertextual network at a number of points, with Pynchon 
himself providing us with some of the sources for the story, pointing out how the name 
ofthe central character, an English spy named Porpentine (meaning 'porcupine'), comes 
from Shakespeare's Hamlet, while his German adversary's title, Moldweorp, is both an 
Old Teutonic name for a mole and an allusion to the character Wormold, "a reluctant 
spy," in Graham Greene's Our Man in Havana (Introduction 19-20). Pynchon also 
speaks of the influence of John Buchan, author of The Thirty-nine Steps, while Puccini's 
opera Manon Lescaut also makes an appearance, and there are references to Antony and 
Cleopatra, Sidney J. Webb's Industrial Democracy, and Arthur Conan Doyle (119, 123, 
124). David Seed also shows where Pynchon has incorporated the views of the British 
Consul-General of the time, Lord Cromer, as published in an article, "The German 
Historians" (57). It is Pynchon's use of one text in particular, however, which demands 
closer attention, namely Karl Baedeker's Egypt: Handbook for Travellers. 
Pynchon's own description of his relation to Baedeker is that he did "loot the 
Baedeker," taking from it "all the details of a time and place I had never been to, right 
down to the names of the diplomatic corps" (Introduction 17), but his use ofthe 
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Baedeker is in a sense more complicated because of the extent to which it pervades the 
world ofthe story. Porpentine for instance, a spy by profession, plays at being a tourist, 
"living in the most frequented hotels, sitting at the tourist cafes, traveling always by the 
respectable, public routes" ("Rose" 102). He signals that he is a tourist by looking the 
part and by acting in the correct manner, by adhering to the accepted conventions, often 
reinforced by Baedeker in his guides. The ubiquity of Baedeker for the tourist is evident 
in the fact that when Porpentine is faced with Hugh Bongo-Shaftsbury, an archaeologist 
whom he suspects of being a German spy, he has to question the sources of Bongo-
Shaftsbury's information, for he "could have got the data, of course, from any Baedeker" 
("Rose" 115). When Porpentine is led into unfamiliar territory, discussing his partner 
Goodfellow's love life, he wishes for "any Baedeker of the heart" to guide him in this 
matter, to show him how to behave ("Rose" 130). Even the co-ordinates of the 
landscape the characters move through are taken from the Baedeker, so that they 
orientate themselves in relation to the known tourist sights and calculate their position 
in terms informed by map-reading, speaking of "staying at the Hotel Khedival, seven 
blocks away" and of the "Hotel Victoria, four blocks south and west" ("Rose" 104, 124). 
Therefore, though superficially Pynchon draws on the Baedeker to provide factual 
details about the period and country he is writing about, he constantly goes beyond this, 
at times quoting verbatim from the Baedeker, describing the world around his characters 
in the very words used by the tourist guidebook. His references to that text are not mere 
factual details about the country Baedeker refers to, but rather the integration of a world 
which is specifically Baedeker'S, the world of Baedeker's text rather than that 'nonverbal 
reality' it writes about. In fact, we cannot say either that the Baedeker's first reference is 
to a nonverbal reality, for, in the Preface to the eighth edition, we will find that "the 
Handbook to Egypt ... is founded on the combined works of several Egyptologists and 
other Oriental scholars. The first edition, which appeared in 1878, was founded on the 
manuscript of Professor Georg Ebers (1837-98)." 
The importance of Baedeker's text becomes even more evident in the 
corresponding section of V., where the itinerant lifestyle which follows Maxwell 
Rowley-Bugge's flight from Yorkshire is said to take place in "Baedeker land" (Y: 70), 
not only in the sense that the reader is reading of a place whose topography has been 
informed by Baedeker, but also in the sense that certain of the characters of V., as in 
"Under the Rose," have an experience of the land which is inseparable from their 
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experience of the Baedeker text. Their behaviour in the land is affected, Pynchon might 
even say conditioned, by their reading of Baedeker, so that they expect and respond to 
perceived conventions of their situation, much as one seeks and responds to certain 
features in a text of a particular genre. When Pynchon speaks of, "A common game 
among tourists. . .. it was in the unwritten laws of Baedeker land" (Y: 71) he blurs the 
line between the social conventions of the world within the text and the generic 
conventions ofthe text which informs the writing of his own work but also the 
behaviour ofthose existing in it. Ultimately, Pynchon is able to speak of "a world ifnot 
created then at least described to its fullest by Karl Baedeker of Leipzig" (Y: 408), with 
the intertextual intervention of the Baedeker in his own story simply mirroring the 
displacement of the reality of Egypt by the text of the Baedeker. 
The world as filtered through the Baedeker is one meant for the eyes of tourists 
alone, and the Baedeker goes so far as to direct the tourist's gaze to selected sights, 
manoeuvring the traveller physically along paths it has chosen. Travelling from 
Alexandria to Cairo, for example, the Baedeker describes how "we cross the 
Mahmudlya Canal by a drawbridge, and the triangular sails of the boats which appear 
above its banks enable its course to be traced for quite a distance. . .. Cotton-fields now 
appear to the left," while "beyond Taufiqlya the train crosses the Sahil Marqas Canal ... 
and an iron bridge over the Rosetta arm of the Nile (fine view to the left)" (Egypt and 
the Sudan 33,35).105 The Baedeker's representation ofthe space of Egypt reduces it to 
the level of a work, "usually the object of a consumption," instead of opening it to the 
text which "participates in its own way in a social utopia" (Barthes, "Text" 161, 164), 
with interesting results. For example, on arrival in Cairo, Porpentine, "in a holiday 
mood" (Pynchon, "Rose" 124), takes chase after his partner Goodfellow who has gone 
off in a carriage with Sir Alastair's daughter, Victoria Wren. A similar chase occurring 
towards the end of the story, but this time involving Porpentine's arch-rival Moldweorp, 
is a far more serious matter for Porpentine, but for Victoria is a chance to do some sight-
seeing, as their route follows the traditional tourist trail to the Sphinx. Veronica can 
react to the situation only as it relates to the confines of the Baedeker text. Her only 
105The path of the tourist is even reflected in the Baedeker's typography, where "an attempt has been 
made to indicate clearly the most important among the bewildering multiplicity of the monuments of 
antiquity, and the descriptions of these have been so arranged that he [the traveller] will fInd adequate 
guidance on the spot in that portion of our description that is printed in larger type, while those who have 
time and inclination for a more thorough examination will fInd additional particulars in small type" 
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other alternative is to exhibit "the honest concern and bewildennent of any English 
tourist confronted with a happening outside the ken of his Baedeker or the power of 
Cook's to deal with it" (Pynchon, V. 190).106 
If the Baedeker in "Under the Rose" enacts the way in which the space of the 
text, as a representation of space, replaces a lived space with conceived space, then in 
chapter eleven of V., "Confessions of Fausto Maijstral," set in Malta between the years 
1937 and 1943 but concentrating on the period during the second World War and 
especially the Siege from 1940 to 1943, Pynchon uses another intertext to illustrate how 
textuality works within society as a representational space also. This chapter has as its 
intertext the work of W. B. Yeats, but especially those works which link Yeats as poet 
to Yeats the occultist and spiritualist, activities he himself described as "next to my 
poetry, the most important pursuit in my life" (qtd. in Jeffares xi).107 Yeats's Sligo 
upbringing meant exposure from an early age to the myths and folk-tales ofIrish 
culture, enriched by an oral tradition of story-telling. Many of these stories told of a 
fairy-land existing side-by-side with our own, accessible through the raths and stone 
rings which dotted the landscape, a land of excess and great achievements, like the 
mysterious Vheissu. Yeats found confinnation for his belief in an other world, co-
existent with this one, through his involvement with theosophical and occult societies, 
leading him to believe in "the existence of an anti-world, an invisible complement to the 
earth, keener and greater than ours, where the dead could think with superhuman speed 
and sureness" (Albright, Introduction xxxvi). 
As with Pynchon's Fausto Maijstral, however, knowledge of this world is not 
independent of the poetic impulse. If for Yeats the anti-world was a superior one, the 
aim of art should not be to mirror reality but to provide insight onto this greater reality: 
"Yeats hoped to subvert a language created for the description of the everyday world, in 
(Baedeker, Egypt and the Sfrdfm Preface). From his knowledge ofMr. Flinders Petrie, we can tell that 
Bongo-Shaftsbury reads the small print. 
106The part played by texts in Porpentine's world creates difficulties for him also. The new generation of 
spies "read books" to learn their trade, and are "full of theory," producing a text with which he is 
unfamiliar, giving him no "time to learn the new role" (Pynchon, "Rose" 123, 137). 
1 07Yeats was interested in magic all his life. Some significant dates include his founding of the Dublin 
Hermetic Society with Charles Johnson in 1885, his first visit to the spiritualist Madame Blavatsky in 
1887, and his membership of the Esoteric Section of the Theosophical Society in London from 1888 to 
1890, of the Society for Psychical Research from 1913 until1928, and of the Hermetic Order of the 
Golden Dawn from 1890 on. Yeats attended his first seance in 1888 in Dublin with Katharine Tynan but 
the disturbing nature of the experience meant he didn't attend another for many years afterwards. Yeats 
also intended to found a Celtic Order of Mysteries, but this was abandoned before 1900. The Order of 
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order to embody visions ofthe extra-terrestrial" (Albright, Introduction xxxiii). Part of 
Yeats's project was to discover images which would transcend description of the 
everyday and provide access to the spiritual realm. If the Irish countryside was a land 
strewn with sacred places, gateways to fairyland, in the same way the language available 
to the poet contained points of symbolic power, images which would reveal the spiritual 
kingdom. Eventually, Yeats was convinced that these images with which poets 
unveiled the other kingdom were drawn from a store of images called the Anima Mundi, 
the Soul of the World, a site of shared memory which Yeats sometimes describes 
through the image ofa "great pool or garden" (Per Arnica 54). At death we return to the 
Anima Mundi and our memories eventually blend with those already there, but we 
"carry to Anima Mundi our memory, and that memory is for a time our external world" 
(Per Arnica 55). 
The form of the interaction of the two worlds, the physical and spiritual, the 
prosaic and poetic, is given in Yeats's philosophical work A Vision. lOS It is here that 
Yeats develops fully his concept of the gyre, formed by two interlocking cones, the tip 
of each cone touching the centre ofthe base of the other. It's visualised most clearly in 
V. in a discussion ofthe Maltese children's view ofthe evil of the Germans in conflict 
with the pure good of the Allies: "if their idea of the struggle could be described 
graphically it would not be as two equal-sized vectors head-to-head - their heads making 
an X of unknown quantity; rather as a point, dimensionless - good - surrounded by any 
number of radial arrows - vectors of evil- pointing inward" (Pynchon, V. 338). Here 
the two cones, the antithetical and primary, are placed tip to tip and then interlocked, so 
that the final image is ofthe point of one surrounded by the base ofthe other. As a 
result of the organisation of the cones, any series of cross-sections taken which begins at 
the base of one cone and works towards the tip will see a decrease in size of that cone 
while the area of the other cone will increase. Yeats saw a corresponding relationship 
between other oppositional forces, including the spiritual and physical. An increasing 
presence of one would result in an increasing absence of the other, or, as Yeats quotes 
from Heraclitus, "Dying each other's life, living each other's death" (A Vision 120). 
the Golden Dawn is mentioned in Gravity's Rainbow in connection with a discussion of the tarot card The 
Tower, the title, of course, of Yeats's 1928 collection (746-48). 
IOSIt may not be a coincidence that Maijstral and his friends Maratt and Dnubietna refer to themselves as 
the "Generation of'37" (Pynchon, V. 305), the year of the revised edition of A Vision (Grant notes that 
"Chambers identifies Pound, Eliot, and Yeats as models" for the Generation of'37 (149)). It is also 
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The fonn of the gyre is used by Pynchon especially in an account of one day in 
the lives of Fausto and his wife Elena. This section draws closely on two poems, 
"Sailing to Byzantium" and "Among School Children," from the collection The Tower, 
which shares its structure with A Vision. Also important are the third and fourth 
sections of "Anima Mundi" from Yeats's Per Amica Silentia Lunae, where he says, 
"From tradition and perception, one thought of one's own life as symbolised by earth, 
the place of heterogeneous things, the images as mirrored in water, and the images 
themselves one could divine but as air; and beyond it all there were ... the fire that 
makes all simple" (50). Pynchon traces a movement from earth to water to air and fire 
through the course of the passage. The couple emerge in the morning from the sewers, 
washing themselves in a stream of rainwater which has "caused a merry water-fall to 
enter our quarters" (Pynchon, V. 332). They spend the morning walking by the sea and 
then head inland ("Forenoon for sea, afternoon for the city") where the wind begins to 
blow off the harbour and clouds to surround the sun, as if "winds were blowing today 
from all thirty-two points of the rose" (Pynchon, V. 334, 335). Finally gulls fill half the 
sky, "drifting slow, up and down and inexorably landward, a thousand drops of fire" cy:. 
337).109 
By the same train of imagery, Pynchon transfonns Valletta into Byzantium, so 
often for Yeats the epitome of the anti-world where life is abstracted into art. One of the 
characteristics of Byzantium is its ethereal nature, as if it were "manufactured out of air 
and shadowed on water" (Albright, Notes 629), and in an early draft of "Sailing to 
Byzantium," Yeats spoke of"St. Sophia's sacred dome .... Mirrored in water" 
(Stallworthy 95).110 In keeping with the construct ofthe gyre, the abstract nature of 
Byzantium can only be at the expense of the physical Valletta, and Pynchon signals 
through simile the spiritual seeping into the spaces left by the destroyed buildings and 
broken streets: "Sunlight came to us broken by walls, window frames, roofbeams: 
skeletal. Our street was pocked by thousands oflittle holes like the Harbour in noon's 
notable that Pynchon gave the title of "Under the Rose" to a story set in 1898, one year after the 
publication of Yeats's short-story collection The Secret Rose. 
109Note also the images Pynchon includes from Coleridge's "Phantom," which Yeats quotes in "Anima 
Mundi." Elena (her name means 'bright') seems young again to Fausto, she speaks "adolescent girl talk" 
(Pynchon, V. 332). Her appearance is similarly youthful, "Her face, fresh from sleep, was so pure in that 
sun. Malta's old sun, Elena's fresh face," and she laughs at "an English club building whose side wall had 
been blown away" (Pynchon, V. 332, 333). The Coleridge poem speaks of how "All accident of kin and 
birth, / Had passed away" and "There was no trace / Of aught on that illumined face, / Upraised beneath 
the rifted stone" (qtd. in Yeats, Per Arnica 51). 
llOSee also T. Sturge Moore's original cover design for The Tower. 
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unbroken sun" (y 334). Fausto becomes a Yeatsian figure, the old scarecrow of 
"Sailing to Byzantium" and "Among School Children," for as Fausto and Elena enter 
the park the birds have abandoned their nests, "all but one whose head was visible, 
looking out at God knew what, unfrightened at our approach. It looked stuffed," as 
artificial of course as Yeats's golden bird. Elena becomes Fausto's Maud Gonne, linked 
by her name to Gonne's mythical precursor, Helen of Troy. Pynchon's portrayal of 
Byzantium, however, is not a positive one. Gonne's ageing face in "Among School 
Children," "Hollow of cheek as though it drank the wind / And took a mess of shadows 
for its meat" (4.3-4), is reflected in the faces of Fausto and Elena who "had been using, 
it seemed, nothing but Valletta to fill up the hollows of ourselves. Stone and metal 
cannot nourish" (Pynchon, V. 335). Pynchon equates the artifice of Byzantium with the 
inanimate which is so often the villain in V. The later Fausto, reading back on his 
account ofthat day, criticises the "human attributes applied to the inanimate ... a 
resurgence of humanity in the automaton" (Pynchon, V. 337). The form which offers 
eternity offers no sustenance, and the abstract unity of "Among School Children," "our 
two natures blent / Into a sphere" (2.5-6), contrasts with the fleshly vulnerability of 
Fausto and Elena's embrace: "Her nails, broken from burying the dead, had been digging 
into the bare part of my arm .... My own nails fastened in reply and we became 
twinned, symmetric, sharing pain" (Pynchon, V. 336). 
Yet Pynchon's rejection of the dead Byzantium does not necessarily entail a 
rejection also of poetry. One ofthe "apparent contradictions" (Pynchon, V. 337-38) in 
the account ofthis day is the strange relation between "the street and under the street," 
where Fausto, Elena, and their young daughter Paola shelter from the air-raids in the old 
sewer (Pynchon, V. 337-38, 325). We might expect the underworld to be here 
associated with death, but Fausto himself seems to imply that the opposite is the case 
when he says, "But in dream there are two worlds: the street and under the street. One 
is the kingdom of death and one oflife. And how can a poet live without exploring the 
other kingdom, even if only as a kind of tourist? A poet feeds on dream" (Pynchon, V. 
325). The same division appears in the chapter, "In which Stencil nearly goes West 
with an alligator," where Father Fairing had originally moved underground because he 
foresaw nothing but death aboveground, "foresaw nothing but a city of starved corpses, 
covering the sidewalks and the grass of the parks, lying belly up in the fountains, 
hanging wrynecked from the streetlamps" (Pynchon, V. 118). Now war, which was a 
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constant threat in "Under the Rose" also, has laid waste to the streets of Valletta, ended 
life there. Below the street seems no better, with Fausto the poet describing his 
underworld in terms of dead history, writing of how, in the sewers, "in this wretched 
tunnel we are the Knights and the Giaours; we are L'Isle-Adam and his ermine arm, and 
his maniple on a field of blue sea and gold sun" (Pynchon, V. 310). 
But, like the Animus Mundi, this is an underworld enriched by death, for the 
children, poets also, draw their inspiration from the deathly world they know, spread 
their "arms like aeroplanes and run screaming and buzzing in and out ofthe ruined 
walls, rubble heaps and holes of the city," the R.A.F. game being "only one metaphor 
they devised to veil the world that was" (Pynchon, V. 331). Textuality follows on the 
heels of the children, for it was their presence in the park with Fausto and Elena which 
marked also the increasing penetration of the Yeatsian hypotext into Pynchon's own 
text. Through the figure ofthe children, Yeats's Soul ofthe World, a storehouse of 
images, is now recast as an (inter)textual realm that is not simply "a literary space 
wholly dependent on the network formed by the books of the past" (Foucault, "Library" 
91), but is a space of the present also, ever changing. The spiritual realm becomes 
comparable to Eliot's sense of "'tradition' as a timeless order of works" (Mitchell 549n), 
for they "form an ideal order among themselves, which is modified by the introduction 
of the new (the really new) work of art among them" (Eliot, "Tradition" 15). The 
textuality ofthe space, however, is not incompatible with its spirituality. Though they 
"have had only one father, the war," who brings death, these children of the island bring 
a poetic life to the streets which is not the eternal form of dead art, but a force of the 
spirit. "Raids," writes Fausto, "the death of a parent, the daily handling of corpses had 
not been able to do it. It took a park, a siege of children, trees astir, night coming in. 
'Elena'," he says, "Her eyes returned to me. 'I love you'" (Pynchon, V. 337). If Valletta 
is Byzantium, the cold though perfect city, the children are the threads of true poetry 
through it, like the pulp which is "soft and laced with little blood vessels and nerves" in 
contrast with the enamel which, "mostly calcium, is inanimate" (Pynchon, V. 153). The 
space of the text here links back to one of the earlier forms of space, absolute space, 
which is "'lived' rather than conceived, and it is a representational space rather than a 
representation of space" (Lefebvre 236). Absolute space disappeared from Western 
Europe at the end of the Middle Ages, existing only in an altered form in 
representational spaces, themselves, now, dominated by representations of space, but it 
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was originally perceived "as sacred ... as magical and cosmic," becoming "above all 
the space of death," of the underworld (Lefebvre 234, 235). That the space of text might 
assume its place in society is less surprising when we find that "considered in itself -
'absolutely' - absolute space is located nowhere. It has no place because it embodies all 
places, and has a strictly symbolic existence. This is what makes it similar to the 
fictitious/real space oflanguage" (Lefebvre 236). 
These children, however, who" got about Valletta by their private routes, mostly 
underground" (Pynchon, V. 332), also show how the intersecting network of the 
intertext, though always seen as subterranean, is not identical to the underworld. Just as 
Vheissu does not exist in its theoretical network oftunnels, but in the multiplicity of 
contexts it inhabits, so here the significance of these underground routes is not, as we 
might initially think, that they seem to occupy the same space as the underworld, but 
that they enable the recontextualisation of the aboveground as underground, and of the 
underground as aboveground, bringing the two worlds, bringing life and death, into 
contact. Just as the space of the text had to be distinguished from the world of the text, 
so the space ofthe intertext must be distinguished from the reservoir of worlds it holds. 
The imagined networks of underground tunnels do not form the body of the intertext but 
act to illustrate the relations between the repetitions and displacements which structure 
the intertext and which make it that place where life comes again from death, where 
society is restored. In Fausto's declaration oflove, we see again how the space oftext 
creates the opening for authentic experience, except, in Valletta, death is too strong, and 
even after a "thousand drops of fire ... there are no epiphanies ... no moments of truth" 
(Pynchon, V. 337). 
This exploration of the intertextual underworld continues in Pynchon's Gravity's 
Rainbow but in an even more sophisticated form. It begins most obviously in London, 
in December 1944, where Pynchon's Tyrone Slothrop is interrogated by agents of 
PISCES (Psychological Intelligence Schemes for Expediting Surrender) using Sodium 
Amytal. In his drug-induced trance, Slothrop sees his beloved mouth organ, his harp, 
fall into the toilet in the men's room of the Roseland Ballroom in Boston, and pursues it 
down the shit-encrusted tunnels to an underground world of "waste regions" (Pynchon, 
Gravity's Rainbow 66). This unsalutary episode marks the first intersection of 
Slothrop's story with the myth of Orpheus, the poet whose music won him entry to the 
underworld so that he might save his wife Eurydice. He loses her, however, when he 
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looks back too soon to see if she is following him. Later, he is dismembered by 
Thracian maenads, his mother among them, who throw his head and lyre into the river 
Hebrus, from where they float out to sea, landing on the island ofLesbos, where 
Orpheus's head becomes an oracle. The links between Slothrop and Orpheus have been 
detailed elsewhere (see Bass, Hume 168-174, and Hume and Knight), but what is 
important to note is that the Orphic Slothrop immediately reconnects us with the 
experience oftextual space, not only because of Orpheus's journey through the 
underworld, but because Orpheus, like Oedipus, loses that which he most desires at the 
point where he seems most certain to attain it. Blanchot describes Eurydice as "the limit 
of what art can attain ... the profoundly dark point towards which art, desire, death, and 
the night all seem to lead," like the dark passages which mark The Unconsoled 
("Orpheus" 437). Orpheus loses Eurydice because he cannot resist turning to see her, 
because "his error is that he wants to exhaust the infinite, that he puts an end to what is 
unending," just as the reader can desire an end to the text, a true finality (Blanchot, 
"Orpheus" 439). As we have seen, however, to face the dark in the text is to break with 
the line of the text, to rupture that line, just as "by turning around to look at Eurydice, 
Orpheus ruins the work, the work immediately falls apart, and Eurydice returns to the 
shadows ... he thus betrays the work and Eurydice and the night" (Blancot, "Orpheus" 
437). Yet it is only by turning around that Orpheus is true to himself, for otherwise he 
would "be betraying, being disloyal to, the boundless and imprudent force of his 
impulse" (Blanchot, "Orpheus" 437-38). Nor is what he does wrong, for "the ultimate 
requirement of his impulse is not that there should be a work, but that someone should 
stand and face this 'point' and grasp its essence where this essence appears" (Blanchot, 
"Orpheus" 437). 
Equally significant is that Slothrop is an Orpheus who "never really emerges" 
from his underworld (Hume and Knight 302). Instead, "the entirety of Gravity's 
Rainbow itself can be said to take place 'underground,' in an above-ground underground 
where dreaming and waking exist as inverted images of each other. The boundary 
between the two is permeable" (Bass 29). Where the division in v. between the above-
street and under-street placed the textual worlds in an elsewhere which was accessible 
only through the mouth of the tunnel (the book as a portal onto another world), Gravity's 
Rainbow more accurately places the real and textual worlds on the same plane, 
intertwined. This does not disqualify the representation of the interaction of the two 
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worlds seen in Fausto and Elena's Byzantine day in Valletta, which finds a parallel in 
Gravity's Rainbow in the Zone, the newly occupied Germany of post-war Europe. In 
Berlin, for example, in "an inverse mapping ofthe white and geometric capital before 
the destruction ... the straight-ruled boulevards built to be marched along are now 
winding pathways through the waste-piles, their shapes organic now" (Pynchon, 
Gravity's Rainbow 372-73). Berlin is as desolate as Valletta, "Ceilingless rooms open 
to the sky, wall-less rooms pitched out over the sea of ruins in prows, in crow's-nests," 
while, even as the destroyed city of Valletta had yielded to poetry and the non-physical, 
so in Berlin the advertisements which had once been kept within the pages of the 
newspaper are now "out in the wind, when the wind comes, stuck to trees, door-frames, 
planking, pieces of wall- white and fading scraps, writing spidery, trembling, smudged, 
thousands unseen, thousands unread or blown away," the needs and wishes ofthe 
citizens, some unspoken, some unheard, distributed throughout the city, uncontained 
(Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 373). The waste-piles recall the shit and excrement of 
underground sewers, brought now to the surface, linking back not only to Slothrop, and 
to Fausto and Elena, but also to the textual networks of Profane's sewer system. The 
newspaper pages, therefore, are not the only textual element spreading across Berlin, for 
Gravity's Rainbow continues the association of sewers and text, or, more precisely, shit 
and information, when Slothrop studies rocket manuals translated from originals 
"salvaged by the Polish underground from the latrines at the training site at Blizna, 
stained with genuine SS shit and piss" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 211. See Tololyan 
47-49). 
With the Zone revealed as an area laced with the space oftextuality, Slothrop's 
passage through that space, as a creature of the underworld, assumes a significant 
aspect. Making his way from England to France, through Switzerland to Germany, 
Slothrop adopts a number of different disguises, including Ian Scuffling, war 
correspondent; Raketemensch, the Rocketman; the Russian officer Max Schlepzig; and 
Plechazunga, the Pig-Hero. As Hume points out, however, his "adventures themselves 
follow no very obvious logical sequence," so that Pynchon "estranges us from the 
known hero pattern by making his traditional figures part of an open system, a series of 
possibilities without absolutes. It is as if each hero represents a square on a chess board, 
and Slothrop, by his moves, comes into the territory of each, one at a time" (175). A 
chess board is formed, of course, of a series of intersecting horizontal and vertical lines, 
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so that Slothrop's story can be read as one which uses the intertextual intersection of 
plots to move from one heroic text to another, but rarely to any purpose or to serve any 
logic. Nevertheless, the apparent randomness of Slothrop's progression, and his failure 
to carry storylines through to their expected conclusion, is exactly that which enables 
him to survive, as when, at Putzi's, he avoids becoming the sacrificial pig. Major Duane 
Marvy assumes the velvet pig suit instead and meets an Oedipal end when mistaken for 
Slothrop and castrated. 
The only time Slothrop is conventionally heroic is when he saves Katje from the 
octopus, and this is an event engineered by Them, controlled, and not an act of free will: 
"after all, we were meant to meet . ... " (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 189). Slothrop's 
textual freedom from such pre-determined plots is explicitly spatialised in Gravity's 
Rainbow, his wanderings through the Zone made possible only because those "straight-
ruled boulevards built to be marched along are now winding pathways through the 
waste-piles" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 372-73), the liberating randomness of 
intertextuality contrasting with the ordered routes which normally confine movement. 
Their construction is motivated by a desire to control which we saw also in the attempts 
to map Vheissu, exemplifying the aggressive rise of representations of space in social 
space, forever "winning away from the realm of the Sacred, its Borderlands one by one, 
and assuming them unto the bare mortal World that is our home, and our Despair" 
(Pynchon, Mason and Dixon 345).1ll As Brian Jarvis describes it, "As colonial 
dependencies and supermarkets are built up, so too are all spaces of myth and magic 
razed to the ground," and driven underground (58). In Zurich, however, Slothrop hears 
the Argentine revolutionary Francisco Squalidozzi speak ofthe possibilities offered by a 
Germany free of the state borders and demarcations which had been mapped out over 
the centuries. This virgin Germany reminds him of the early days of the Americas, 
when it "was a blank piece of paper," as yet untouched by the obsession with property 
which would see the country fenced, divided and subdivided, the new boundaries 
tracing "complex patterns on the blank sheet" in a way reflected now around him in the 
"engineered scars of Swiss avenues" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 264).112 The 
111 As Rosello argues, "No map is neutral. When the wanderer roams around the tight network of city 
streets, his or her map makes sense - a different, more local sense - and this body reminds us that the 
supposedly anonymous and abstract map is not only a conduit for human information but also a political 
text" (137). 
112In Pynchon's Mason and Dixon, which has space as one of its major themes, the regulated surface of 
the world is again contrasted with the underworld, so that "A Knowledge of Tunneling became more and 
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parallels drawn between land and paper, colonisation and the act of writing, invite us to 
see Germany too as a clean sheet ready to receive a new inscription, and indeed 
Slothrop imagines that Squalidozzi can only be hoping to seize this land for himself, 
writing his name across it as if signing the deed to the land. Squalidozzi, however, 
insists that the war has not simply erased the previously existing lines but has "wiped it 
clean. Opened it," and "in the openness ofthe German Zone, our hope is limitless" 
(Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 265). The openness of the Zone suggests that the image 
of the page alone is insufficient, limited as it is by its own physical dimensions, and 
limiting once used, since the purpose of the page is to be written upon, to have its own 
area divided and marked. Once we perceive this page as a part of the wider textuality of 
the Zone, however, the material manifestation ofthe intertextual network, the landscape 
becomes not a new sheet, virgin and untouched, but a newly erased palimpsest, the 
surface unmarked but bearing everywhere the traces of previous texts. Hope now is not 
limited by the surface area of the page but open to the infinite intricacy of the relations 
within it. 
Slothrop's fate in this textual space is to become "a crossroads, a living 
intersection," the embodiment of intertextuality, which means his disembodiment, as he 
is "scattered all over the Zone," echoing Orpheus's dismemberment (Pynchon, Gravity'S 
Rainbow 625, 712). Now, "he is no less dead than she [Eurydice] was, not dead with 
the tranquil death of the world, the kind of death which is repose, silence, and ending, 
but with that other death which is endless death, proof of the absence of ending" 
(Blanchot, "Orpheus" 438). His path to this point is remarkably similar to that taken by 
Quinn in his final few months. After his time outside the Stillmans' building, Quinn's 
"clothes were discoloured, disheveled, debauched by filth. His face was covered by a 
thick black beard" (Auster, City 120). In the apartment, he takes off all his clothes, and 
eats the food which appears without explanation in the room for him, until the dark and 
the closing notebook bring an end to him. In a text itself presented as one woven of 
other texts, this figure, of whom it was said "whatever he knew about these things, he 
had learned from books, films, and newspapers" (Auster, City 7), dissolves into the 
weave of the intertext, existing now only at the intersection of his text with others, 
more negotiable, as more of the Surface succumb'd to Enclosure, Sub-Division, and the simple 
Exhaustion of Space, - Down Below, where no property Lines existed, lay a World as yet untravers'd, 
that would clearly belong to those Pioneers who possess'd the Will, and had master'd the Arts of Pluto" 
(233) 
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appearing, perhaps, as the "man named Quinn" in The Locked Room (202). Slothrop 
had been leading an equally solitary existence, "letting hair and beard grow," spending 
"whole days naked, ants crawling up his legs, butterflies lighting on his shoulders," 
noticing that "offerings offood were being left near the lean-to he'd put up," though "he 
never saw who was leaving them" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 623, 622). Now, he 
finds himself everywhere in text, sitting in "Saure Bummer's kitchen, the air streaming 
with kifmoires, reading soup recipes and finding in every bone and cabbage leaf 
paraphrases of himself' (a moire "involves the superimposition of one repetitive design 
on the same or a different pattern" (Weisenburger 270)) (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 
625). Later, he will become "the story about Tyrone Slothrop, who was sent into the 
Zone to be present at his own assembly - perhaps, heavily paranoid voices have 
whispered, his time's assembly - and there ought to be a punch line to it, but there isn't. 
The plan went wrong. He is being broken down instead and scattered" (Pynchon, 
Gravity's Rainbow 738), and later still he can be found even further afield, appearing out 
"in the zone" of Melvin Jules Bukiet's After as Rocketmann, who, as they say, "was 
legendary in a place where legends were hard put to contend with actualities" (97,255). 
Even here, his time on the ship Anubis is prefigured by "harmonica music that seemed 
to vibrate underneath him [Fishl], the clear pool rippling with tidal affect, bubbles 
ascending from the toilet's sole orifice to break like notes at the surface" (Bukiet, 160). 
Slothrop as living crossroad encompasses all that we've dealt with in our 
exploration of textual space, even to the extent that his transformation includes an 
uncanny experience, as he discovers the message "ROCKETMAN WAS HERE" and "his first 
thought was that he'd written it himself and forgot" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 624). 
Most importantly, Slothrop comes to illustrate the significance of textual space's role as 
a representational space in social space. As we saw in the previous chapter, the 
crossroad, as a place of repetition, of absurdity and chance, undermines the authority of 
the figure who would rule the line of the logical text. It is "Outside and Inside 
interpiercing one another too fast, too finely labyrinthine, for either category to have 
much hegemony any more" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 681). Here, the crossroad is 
where Slothrop finally frees himself from his pre-ordained role and the place assigned to 
him in others' plans. David Cowart reads this moment through E. M. Forster's story 
"The Other Side of the Hedge:" 
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[The] main character also pauses by the roadside and ends up discovering 
a completely different and richer order of experience. . .. The story 
presents modem life as an endless, meaningless trek along a dusty road 
bordered by a hedge. The point is to press on, to cover distance, though 
no one has any idea where the road actually leads. The main character 
cuts through the hedge beside the road and finds himself in a beautiful 
and timeless landscape - one that does not 'go anywhere'. (116) 
This dusty road, like the straight-ruled Boulevards of Berlin, the Swiss avenues, even 
the grid-like arrangement of New York streets, designed as if to convey a purposeful 
intent, are representative only of the routines which regulate our lives, and make us 
strangers to ourselves. Slothrop's crossroad, as a representational textual space, puts 
him in touch with himself again, existing, "just feeling natural" (Pynchon, Gravity's 
Rainbow 626). 
For Pynchon, textual space becomes most meaningful at these intersections 
which undermine its linear progression to nothing. It is not only the act of interpiercing, 
however, which is significant, but the site's orientation also, the form of its crossing and 
intercrossing, resulting in "crosses, swastikas, Zone-mandalas," or a drawing of "the A4 
rocket, seen from below" (Pynchon, Gravity's Rainbow 625,624). These forms, "a 
square (the mandala), a circle or sphere, a triangle, a rational volume occupied by a 
divine principle, a cross, and so on" are the forms of absolute space also (Lefebvre 237). 
Pynchon appreciates the significance of such spaces, admires the spaces of Herero 
villages, which "were circular, set up like the ancient yang/yin diagram, women living 
on the north half, men on the south, the whole thing oriented like a mandala on the 
points of the compass, each direction having a special meaning. Their god embodied 
male and female, creation and destruction, life and death" (qtd. in Seed 241). He 
contrasts such living social spaces with "the Cartesian grid system layout in Windh6k or 
Swakopmund," with "the whole Western / analytic / 'linear' / alienated shtick," made all 
the more lamentable by the fact that "the physical shape of a city is an infallible due to 
where the people who built it are at. It has to do with our deepest responses to change, 
death, being human" (qtd. in Seed 241,242). Pynchon makes his own text a meaningful 
space in that it is, as Weisenburger shows, "plotted like a mandala, its quadrants 
carefully marked by Christian feast days that happened to coincide, in 1944-45, with 
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key historical dates and ancient pagan festivals," the design "fonned as much by 
traditional, orderly patterning as by contemporary, purely coincidental event" (9-10, 10). 
The final meaning of this specific orientation is undecidable, however, for the 
"liturgical structure seems to focus the novel around a theme of salvation, a redeeming 
earthly savior. Equally as well, the pagan coincidences suggest that the whole 
enterprise is a poisson d'avril, a red herring, a fool's quest. And one can find nothing in 
the novel to resolve this antimony" (Weisenburger 10). The circular mandala is "a 
symbol of opposites held in delicate equipoise" (Weisenburger 10-11), seen most 
obviously in the planned circle at the heart of the text, where the arc ofSlothrop's quest 
underground, bringing life from Hell, is one side of a circle which would be completed 
by the projected arc ofthe Rocket 00000, fired during Easter of 1945, bringing death 
from Heaven. Blicero, whose name means 'death', is ofthe text too, but would occupy 
its absolute space to serve his own ends, joining the "priestly castes and the political 
power they exercise" (Lefebvre 237), "seeing the world now in mythical regions . ... It 
was not Gennany he moved through. It was his own space" (Pynchon, Gravity's 
Rainbow 486). The open circularity of the fonn of the text, however, its line broken by 
an Orpheus who never finds his love, a Rocket which never strikes, revolts against any 
would-be hegemony, but keeps these opposites in balance, the space ofthe text keeping 
"the work in suspense in such a way that it can choose whether to take on a positive or 
negative value and, as though it were pivoting invisibly around an invisible axis, enter 
the daylight of affinnations or the back-light of negations" (Blanchot, "Literature" 397). 
Now the space of the text seems to move away from absolute space, the space of 
the past, towards the space of the future, differential space, a space which "accentuates 
differences," "a theatricalized or dramatized space," a space "eroticized and restored to 
ambiguity (Lefebvre 52,391). Ifthe textual space is as we have described it, then it is 
perfectly placed to become this differential space, for it has at its heart the body which 
produces "differences 'unconsciously' out of repetitions - out of gestures (linear) or out 
of rhythms (cyclical)" (Lefebvre 395). In the fonn of its repetition, producing always 
vital forces, "a concentration of energy," as it intersects with its own body, it holds 
differences in dialectic tension with each other, "condensation-radiation ... 
concentration-eruption, implosion-explosion," life and death, each text opening "in play 
which leaves room for both repetition and difference, for both time and juxtaposition" 
(Lefebvre 399). Pynchon's textual space is a liberating place, playful, fun, diverting, 
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sexual, subversive, magical, sacred, but it is difficult to know what the future holds for 
the text as differential space, if this is what it is to become. As Lefebvre says, "The 
revolutionary road of the human and the heroic road ofthe superhuman meet at the 
crossroads of space. Whether they then converge is another story" (400). 
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CONCLUSION 
If, in the last chapter, we wondered at what point the reader comes in contact with the 
space of the text, in our reply we seemed always eager to extend the range of the space 
of the text, to see it explode outwards through all manner of transtextual relations, so 
removing the reader further and further from the space of the text in its most convenient 
form, the book. Though we would hope that our argument has shown the significance 
and importance oftextual space's facility for recontextualisation and connectivity, 
nevertheless it can, with justification, be asked if there is not another side to textual 
space, a sense in which it is not dispersed and open, but concentrated and closed, a 
space of the work more than text. The concern here might be said to parallel Genette's 
warning that "inasmuch as the paratext is a transitional zone between text and beyond-
text, one must resist the temptation to enlarge this zone by whittling away in both 
directions" (Paratexts 407). Just as the description ofthe paratext might grow to the 
exclusion of all that is purely textual, so the space of the text, as a place of diversion 
from the body of the text, might be criticised as hollow and without substance. 
In response to such criticisms, we need to clarify the relation between the work 
and its space. A useful illustration is provided by Thomas Moore's description of a 
design detail in Pynchon's Gravity's Rainbow: 
The 1973 Viking edition of the novel features an odd design element: 
between each two adj acent blocks of narrative is a row of seven precise 
little squares, these suggesting movie frames, and the rows in tum 
suggesting sprocketed separations between successive frames of the 
novel film. Although the little squares are rumoured to have been a 
Viking editor's inspiration, not Pynchon's, the fact of their thematic 
pertinence remains. (30) 
These small squares are not textual but paratextual, a part ofthe publisher's peritext. 
Though placed within the body of the text, they are extraneous to it, but as the markers 
of the divide between one textual block and the next, their place is significant. They 
are, in fact, what Kant would call a parergon, which "is only an adjunct, and not an 
intrinsic constituent in the complete representation ofthe object," for examples of 
parerga include "the frames ... of pictures or the drapery on statues, or the colonnades 
of palaces," ornamental additions to the body just like these small squares, suggesting 
movie frames (Kant qtd. in Derrida, Truth 53). 
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The parergon, sharing the same ambiguous prefix as the paratext, raises similar 
questions, Derrida asking "Where does a parergon begin and end," and then, "Where 
does the frame take place. Does it take place. Where does it begin. Where does it end. 
What is its internal limit. Its external limit. And its surface between the two limits" 
(Truth 57,63). The movie frames of Gravity's Rainbow ask the same questions, for 
they are both the square-framed holes which accept the sprockets which drive the film 
through the projector, put it into action, and also the frames on the film itself, the edges 
marked by the limits of the visible image and the celluloid which is to remain unseen. 
As such, these frames run alongside the film, the work, the text, but also surround it, 
support it, project it. But the frame here seems, above all, to act as a description of the 
space of text, that which physically bears the text, but is bound in with it, that which is 
produced by the text, but without which the text itself could not be. 
That the parergon might illuminate the space of text is not surprising when we 
consider how the space is the product of "an indeterminable wealth of contingencies, 
accidents, appearances, and - I was about to say - ornaments" (Lefebvre, "A Vision" 
130). For Derrida, the parergon becomes something "extraordinary," it is "neither work 
(ergon) nor outside the work (hors d'oeuvre), neither inside nor outside, neither above 
nor below, it disconcerts any opposition but does not remain indeterminate and it gives 
rise to the work. It is no longer merely around the work" (Truth 58, 9). Indeed, we 
have seen again and again how the space of text disturbs simple oppositions, for in that 
place there are always "three. The third term. On every side. Inside the limits, in the 
relation between what is limiting and what is limited. Beyond the limits, in the limitless 
depths of harmonics and in the amplitude of space" (Lefebvre, "A Vision" 130). 
The space of text is not so much a frame as a framework, the work that forms the 
frame. It is to be understood in terms ofthe passe-partout ("a square of cardboard ... 
open in its 'middle' to let the work appear") which "occurs everywhere" (Derrida, Truth 
12, 7). The passe-partout exhibits the strange nature of the frame, of the parergon, for 
it occupies a space" between the outside and the inside, between the external and the 
internal edge-line, the framer and the framed, the figure and the ground, form and 
content, signifier and signified, and so on for any two-faced opposition" (Derrida, Truth 
12). This "topos," this place, between the outside and the inside, "between the visible 
edging and the phantom in the center" (Derrida, Truth 12), is where we situate a space 
of text that is truly Lefebvrean, bridging centre and periphery, being both/and also. 
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Held in tension between the elements which it simultaneously unites and 
divides, holding them together while always threatening to disperse them, the space of 
the text, as frame, neither belonging to the work, nor not belonging, is everywhere in the 
work, with no 'between' the framer and the framed, no space ofthe text and, then, now, 
suddenly, the space ofthe work. This is why we can be at the very limits ofthe space's 
reach and feel close to the text, and this is why we can be at the very heart of the textual 
space and still wonder where we are. This is why the most expansive, glorious space 
can arise from the most humble and innocent place, a book. 
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